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Abstract
Hacking Away with an Ax: Henry Miller and Modernity
Henry Miller offers an "oppositional" critique of the West, rather than the 
Modernist "alternative" critique of an Eliot or a Joyce, openly attacking industrial 
capitalism for its inhumanity. French poets Charles Baudelaire and Arthur Rimbaud, 
precursors of Miller, voiced complaints similar to those Miller raised some sixty to 
eighty years later, and evinced much the same anti-bourgeois attitude.
Miller condemns cities, especially New York City. American cities were often 
established quickly, to bring immediate profits to real estate investors, but little 
thought was devoted to their future inhabitants. These cities have little architectural 
history: older buildings have regularly been demolished to make room for new 
buildings. European cities, in contrast, present a historic text mixing old and new 
buildings, a space where businesses, cafes, parks, and dwellings mingle.
Consumer capitalism, epitomized by the department store and sustained by 
factory labor, dominates. Thousands of new products and technological improvements 
mask discontent. People toil at jobs, receiving, in exchange, products which inspire 
only momentary satisfaction. Miller's critique of work and his refusal to support the 
Second World War are linked by his belief that the rich are the main beneficiaries of 
the system. The average American or European enjoys few of the alleged benefits of 
the industrial age.
These critiques coalesce in Miller's denunciation of "Progress." People, though 
possessing a variety of commodities, are no happier. Rationality, furthermore, 
dominates lives, but in a dehumanizing fashion, most clearly evident in grid-cities and 
assembly-line work where laborers perform mind-numbing mechanical motions. 
Technology, rather than freeing, only further enslaves people. Miller, like Baudelaire 
and Rimbaud, denies progress in human affairs has occurred.
Miller attacks his world as fundamentally flawed. The world he critiques, 
however, still exists. The shape it was taking in the early part of the century has only 
become clearer with an urban crisis and mass lay-offs of industrial workers due to 
technological developments and the shifting of factories to third-world countries.
Miller remains one of the great oppositional voices of "the American century."
VII
Introduction / Neither Crank nor Littérateur. Heniy Miller in a Worn Pair of Shoes
One has to hack his way out with the ax. The real wilderness is not out 
there somewdiere, but in the towns and cities, in that complicated web 
which we have made o f life and which serves no purpose but to thwart, 
cramp and inhibit free spirits. (Henry Miller, Stand Still like the 
Hummingbird, 117)
In 1984, Salman Rushdie asserted that, in "Inside the Whale," George Orwell 
had overrated Henry Miller. Rushdie, entitling his own essay "Outside the Whale," 
reports, "Miller’s reputation has more or less completely evaporated, and he now looks 
to be very little more than the happy pomographer beneath whose scatological surface 
Orwell saw such improbable depths" (95-96). Rushdie's denunciation represents a 
fairly common—if limited and distorted—view of Miller, especially in America and 
Great Britain. Reading Henry Miller as a "happy pomographer" surely necessitates 
jettisoning much in Miller's works that is not sexual in nature. In the 1991 
introduction to the collection of essays. Imaginary Homelands, which includes 
"Outside the Whale," Rushdie claims, "seven years on, I find "Outside the Whale" a 
little unfair to George Orwell and to Henry Miller, too" (3). Regrettably, he fails to 
clarify what in the essay he finds "unfair," and thus his portrait of Miller has yet to be 
rectified.
To dismiss Henry Miller as a crank, a "happy pomographer," is to assert that 
nothing he wrote has any lasting consequence. However, his critique of American 
culture, which ranges so widely that there is little that does not wilt under his caustic 
glance, calls for nothing less than a radical transformation of American culture and the 
American landscape. He challenges many of the most basic principles Americans 
affirm—among them the notion of individual freedom, the necessity for work, and the 
belief that new technologies and new products bring in their wake security and
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happiness (this in an era before the "downsizing" so prevalent in many industries in 
late twentieth-century America, often resulting from corporate mergers made feasible 
by improved computer technologies). Were he labelled a crank, Henry Miller would 
appear to be only an unrepentant rebel—as well as a vocal sexist and anti-Semite—who 
waged a failed, futile, and essentially wrong-headed war against the West in the first 
three-quarters of the twentieth century. At most, he might figure in as a colorful 
footnote to discussions of American culture between 1930 and 1980.
On the other hand, one could argue that Tropic o f  Cancer and many of Miller’s 
later books constitute great works of literature deserving their fair share of the 
attention academe has thus far directed elsewhere. From this perspective. Tropic o f  
Cancer should be set alongside T. S. Eliot's "The Wasteland" or F. Scott Fitzgerald's 
The Great Gatsby, as the work of a wordsmith, a genius, a consummate example of a 
modernist work critical of the post-World War I world, while offering an alternative—a 
sometimes explosive, sometimes muted optimism—to the despair evinced in these other 
works. At the very least it could be set alongside another recently revived classic, 
also set largely in Paris, Djuna Barnes' Nightwood.
Such a restricted reading of Henry Miller, focussing on those elements that 
make his works "classic," would then strip Tropic o f Cancer and his other works of 
any value as cultural artifacts and arguments in their own right, reducing them to 
museum pieces to be admired from afar. Miller's introduction to a book collecting 
three essays by Henry David Thoreau combats such debilitative readings. "As always 
happens with bold, original utterances," he writes, "these essays have now become 
classic. Which means that, though they still have the power to mold character, they
no longer influence the men who govern our destiny" {Stand Still 112); They may 
inspire admiration, even quotation, but t h ^  do not affect behavior.
Additionally, we have only to look at the way in which Eliot's "The 
Wasteland" and Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby have been gutted by academic criticism 
in order to foresee the fate of Miller's works were they, like Thoreau’s, to be fully 
accepted and admitted into the classroom. Any relevance to the culture in which 
Miller's works were produced, and to that in which they are being read, would be 
safely overlooked in a strict adherence to the text. We have all seen Gatsby 
alternately set on a pedestal as a modernist artifact, such that any critique of capitalist 
culture in the story is examined in a vacuum and thus neutralized, or tumed-in upon 
itself through its language, made the sport of Deconstructionists and Post-Structuralists 
alike, such that it is once again elevated and nullified.
Both approaches to the works of Henry Miller, as crank and as literary genius, 
offer dismissive readings of a writer who saw his role as artist to liberate himself, first, 
and, later, others. A third approach to Miller and his works, one common among 
readers who conceive of Miller as primarily a wisdom writer, is as dismissive as the 
first two readings: Henry Miller as saint. Lives of the saints are not open to us for 
emulation; their visions and their destinies remain singularly theirs. Henry Miller must 
instead be understood as a flawed human being, with a talent for writing, who 
observed his world and commented upon it passionately, pointing out the cracks in the 
fabric of society and the crackpots who inhabited it. Sometimes accurate, sometimes 
mistaken. Miller is a writer who calls on the reader to question what is taken for 
granted in the every-day-world, who challenges expectations, and, in doing so, brings 
the world vividly back to life.
The Focus of this Study
Why read Henry Miller in the nineteen-nineties? Erica Jong asks in her 1993 
study. The Devil at Large: Erica Jong on Henry Miller, a work that demands 
hyphenated descriptors. Having posed the question, she attempts to answer the 
question herself:
All the questions his life and oeuvre raise about the role of the writer in 
society, the impact of books on sexual politics, the impact of sexual 
politics on books, the threat of censorship to free speech and written 
expression are, unfortunately, as fresh today as they ever were. (3)
Jong's answer spotlights one of the most vexatious problems confronting a writer
attempting a study of Henry Miller, one that Jong herself fails to overcome: moving
beyond "the sex question." Apart from first amendment questions and discussions of
sex in literature, which remain the typical concern of writers (journalists as well as
scholars and essayists) who either praise or condemn Miller, there is for Jong an
additional reason for reading a writer whose overarching theme was liberation:
"Because we are no freer today than we were in 1934, when he published Tropic o f
Cancer, in many ways we are more enslaved" (3). Though Jong seems to be referring
once more to sex, I believe her answer confronts a broader spectrum of modem
experience. Perhaps we are more enslaved now because we even more firmly believe,
a priori, that we are free.
For Miller, the issue of freedom is of paramount importance. Compared with 
many other nations, Americans and many in the West certainly enjoy great freedom. 
But while such a statement may have a basis in fact, it is also an important tenet of 
American ideology: Americans generally believe themselves the freest, their country 
the most democratic on the face of the earth. What is overlooked or discounted, in an
uncritical acceptance and even valorization of "American freedom," is evidence that, 
rather than greater freedom, Americans currently enjoy less freedom than ever. They 
often quite willingly submit to questionable prohibitions—against drugs (recreational as 
well as medical) and prostitution for instance—and even seek to limit the freedom of 
others—with anti-abortion, seat-belt, and smoking laws. Perhaps more importantly, 
fewer and fewer people own more and more o f America and can dictate what products 
materialize on store shelves, what movies receive financial backing in order to make it 
to the screen or to receive wide distribution, what books get published. Furthermore, 
sheer volume of goods in various shapes and forms often masks the fact that many 
products are not clearly distinct from each other. Finally, freedoms as enunciated in a 
constitution or some other charter, often differ substantially from those enjoyed in day 
to day life, often due to cultural conventions, as well as to limiting interpretations of 
such statutes—freedom of speech does not mean an activist can launch a protest march 
without a permit. The capitalist system in America today, while it often acknowledges 
dissenting voices, tends to defuse rebellion in a number of ways, ignoring it, 
repressing it, or transforming it into fashion, into marketable products—Nehru jackets, 
tom jeans, sagging jeans—and thus undermining it, while appearing to respond to it. It 
is this doubtful conception, that we in the democratic West are free, that Americans 
live in the land of plenty which proves they are among the blessed people of the 
planet, which Miller continually disputes. Moreover, as the author of a number of 
barmed books—the most famous of which include Tropic o f  Cancer (1934), Black 
Spring (1936), Tropic o f Capricorn (1939), Sexus (1949), Plexus (1953) and Nexus 
(1959)—Miller knew first-hand the realistic limits to that most cherished of freedoms, 
the Freedom of Speech.
Miller's notoriety as a sex writer grew, between initial publication in France of 
Tropic o f  Cancer in 1934 and American publication in 1961, despite the fact that his 
books were very difGcult to obtain. Few, in those years, had first-hand knowledge of 
the works listed above. To read Henry Miller as a sex writer, rather than a writer who 
assimilated sexual motifs into his works, however, greatly reduces the scope of his 
texts to a concern with sexual freedom, a danger Miller himself recognized. He 
argues, in The World o f Sex, "the problem o f the author [of Tropic o f  Cancer] was 
never one of sex, nor even of religion, but o f self-liberation" {On Writing 117). Miller 
perhaps makes his point a little too emphatically; surely freeing himself from deeply 
ingrained American puritanical attitudes toward (or, more properly, against) sex played 
a role in his self-liberation. Still, focussing solely on the sexual and, in turn, 
disregarding the many other elements of his critique of the West, which constitutes a 
major component of his project of self-liberation, is effectively to mis-read his works.
For this study, a more pointed response to the issue of Miller's relevance in the 
nineteen-nineties would be that Miller should be read because his broad critique of 
American and Western culture, even apart from the "sex" issue, remains relevant, if it 
is not more relevant in our time than it was in his. In the last years of the twentieth 
century, the trends Miller critiqued are still recognizably a part of the cultural 
landscape in America and much of the West. As we will see in Chapter Two, for 
instance. Miller deplores intrusive, all-pervasive advertising because it manipulates 
consumers through creating desire for products previously unnecessary, projecting an 
image of the world as better for possessing this product. The hype used to sell a 
variety of products—the mid-nineteen-nineties Nike slogan "Just do it" being only an
especially blatant example—encourages consumers to adopt an uncritical attitude, to 
buy products because they have "No Fear."
In addition, a number of works published in the last decade, among them James 
Kunstler’s The Geography o f  Nowhere and Witold Rybczynski's City Life, scrutinize 
the American city and critique it in terms very similar to Miller's, comparing U.S. 
cities unfavorably with many European cities, especially Paris. Rybczynski’s focus on 
Paris as a model city, in particular parallels Miller’s repeated assertions of his love for 
Paris. Paris as a city designed to serve the needs of the inhabitants as well as the 
needs of business interests provides a strong contrast to most American cities, which 
were I aid-out with an eye solely to profit.
William Leach's Land o f Desire critically explores the genesis of the consumer 
culture that came of age with Miller and which he rejected. Leach's work concludes 
with the proposition that the deficiencies and extravagances of the capitalist 
consumption system are today only multiplied, its effects even more widespread, even 
more deleterious. Rather than attacking a world that has disappeared. Miller attacked 
a world taking shape, one that contained most of the characteristics we still recognize 
today, a world that has ripened and whose features, often, have only intensified.
A secondary argument that I will not directly address until the conclusion is 
that the censorship Miller encountered as an alleged sex writer, as well as the general 
hostility of some readers, resulted in large part from his anarchic' condemnation of 
Western Culture in general, and American culture in particular. Whether consciously 
or not, censors and readers rejecting his works rightly linked the sexually graphic
‘ Anarchic (as an adjective) in the sense o f wide-ranging and sometimes pell-mell, 
rather than (as a noun) in the political sense.
aspects of Miller's works with his harsh criticism of American and Western culture, 
understanding that one was not necessarily separate from the other, that Miller was a 
writer exposing something they found unpalatable. The rejection of puritanical sexual 
mores forms one part of a more general repudiation of much that is taken for granted 
in "Western" and capitalist society which forms the subject of this study." Some 
readers were repulsed equally by the descriptions of sex and the rampant anti-Western 
attitude informing Miller's works, and their experiences can be likened to shell-shock. 
That these issues in Miller's works have not been explored in any depth, that his 
critiques of Western culture have thus far received little beyond half-hearted, under­
analyzed rejections’ while the questions he raises remain unresolved, demonstrates his 
ill-repute in academic circles—as well, perhaps, as a failure of nerve: Miller's 
descriptions of sexual relations and his attacks on Western culture can make reading 
his works a disturbing experience.
While Miller no longer faces legal censorship, Miller-biographer Mary 
Dearborn notes that, though American sales of his books are not high, "they sell 
steadily. They are more successful abroad, most notably in France, Germany, and 
Japan" (308-09). While this lack of a large reading public in his native land might be
■ For a link between sex and consumer capitalism see Herbert Marcuse's One- 
Dimensional Man, Eros and Civilization, as well as the discussion of "Work" in 
Chapter Three.
’ See for instance Alan Trachtenberg's 1970 essay '"History on the Side': Henry 
Miller's American Dream," where Miller as cultural icon is of interest, but as cultural 
critic is dismissed—without "the closer attention" the author claims Miller's criticisms 
deserve. Trachtenberg, an otherwise highly-reputable and insightful critic of American 
culture, fails to recognize the value of Miller's critiques, many of which will appear in 
his 1982 The Incorporation o f America, which exclusively employs canonical writers— 
William Dean Howells, Walt Whitman, Henry James, Stephen Crane, and Theodore 
Dreiser, among others.
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understood as a trend toward actively-producing authors. Miller is still largely ignored 
in academic circles as well (308), a locale vdiere many writers past and present (Henry 
James and Thomas Pynchon, to provide only two examples) find, if not their only 
audience, the largest percentage of their readers. Roger Jackson, who compiled an 
exhaustive bibliography of Miller’s published works, opted to direct his bibliography 
toward collectors rather than scholars ("Bibliographer's Tale" 31). In what Jackson 
terms "a curious phenomenon," in the three years after the 1993 publication more 
Japanese collectors had purchased his 1000+ page bibliography of Henry Miller's 
primary works than had American libraries (25). While Miller's reputation abroad 
appears to remain relatively high, in his homeland it is, as Rushdie claimed, almost 
nil.
In this study, I propose to examine Henry Miller's works for their commentary 
on American and Western civilization, almost to the exclusion of sex. While the 
sexual issue has still seemingly not been exhausted, I view the "sexual" in the works 
of Miller as integral, but also as the on-ramp to the broader exploration of "Life," of 
which it is. naturally, one of the lanes. To switch metaphors, the "sexual" in his 
works is one strand of many woven into the fabnc that forms his subject matter. In 
fact, the sexual and the social maintain a reciprocal relationship. In his biography of 
Sigmund Freud, Peter Gay argues that Freud’s interest in things sexual "brought 
unexpected dividends for his social theory," that Freud's awareness of "sexual misery" 
directed him to "the study of religion and civilization" thus enlarging the scope of his 
work (548). Similarly, Miller's perception of sexual problems, more specifically the 
secrecy, guilt, and repression that surrounds sex, the inwardness and the variety of
distinct masks with i ^ c h  we face the world, leads him to explore the individual's 
relationship with the larger society as he. Miller, experiences it himself.
Though possibly any one of his longer works (for instance, one of the "Paris 
books"—Tropic o f Cancer, Black Spring, Max and the White Phagocytes, and Tropic 
o f  Capricorn) might suffice to illustrate Miller's rejection (at least in a précis) of much 
that is modem, I will incorporate a wide variety of published works by Miller to 
provide greater depth and breadth to my account of his criticism.
The Role of the Artist
Throughout his oeuvre. Miller expounds upon the life of the writer as an 
instance of the artist's role in American and Western society. This theme of the artist’s 
role assumes such a prominent place in Miller’s oeuvre that Thomas H. Moore 
compiled a selection of such passages, from a variety of published and unpublished 
works by Miller, into Henry Miller on Writing. Miller, then, consciously created a 
body of works that he believed illustrated and addressed the issue of the role of the 
artist in society.
The role of the artist, however, has been the subject of much theorizing, dating 
back at least to the Romantics and, even much further, to Plato. More recently, Colin 
Partridge has examined the function of literature in cultures recently established, 
focussing mainly on countries colonized by Western powers since the seventeenth 
century—especially Australia, New Zealand, North and South America, Africa, and the 
Caribbean. For Partridge, a culture is an "original system o f values," and it is through 
culture that "social structure, individual relations, art and religion take substance.
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meaning, and form" (30). Partridge's definition agrees with Raymond Williams' rather
more expansive definition of culture:
a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: 
our sense and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of 
ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values— 
constitutive and constituting—which as they are experienced as practices 
appear as reciprocally confirming. (R. Williams, Marxism, 110)
As the newly-formed culture begins to develop, individual relations and their patterns,
in the form of values within a fixed yet evolving constellation, begin "to become
congealed in narratives" (30). The values "congealed" in these narratives—the
literature of the early New England writers (Cotton Mather, Anne Bradstreet, Jonathan
Edwards, and others), for example—diverge from those of the mother countries, often
intentionally so. Furthermore, the world the settlers faced in New England, on the
Virginia coast, or in the convict camps of Australia, necessitated that they "modify
European cultures" (31) in order to survive. When writers from within this new
culture begin to produce texts, one element implicit in their subject matter is "their
innovative responses to life and growth in the new land" (3 1-2). In this way, a
distinctive literature arises, one with a different sense of what is important or at least a
different perspective on that importance.
The artist in these new cultures plays a primary role "in surveying the culture's 
needs, shaping new attitudes and restructuring the imported European language" (32).
In America, a writer such as Washington Irving continues the process of delineating a 
uniquely American literature, through his short stories and tall tales, though he spends 
many years in Europe. James Fenimore Cooper's The Last o f the Mohicans bears the 
influence of Sir Walter Scott; at the same time his work considers a distinctively 
American subject—the occasionally friendly, often tense and destructive relations
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between the settlers and the native inhabitants of the land. Fenimore Cooper’s work 
offers a mixture of the old and new cultures, an instance of a literature, as well as a 
culture, in conspicuous transition.
One characteristic of new cultures, writes Partridge, "is a concern with 
analyzing both the origins of the culture and the processes that formed the value 
system" (34). Such analysis involves both compiling history as well as evaluating and 
re-evaluating the history, and not only in straight-forward histories (if such can be said 
to exist) but also in fiction. The classic example of such fictions in American culture 
are Nathaniel Hawthorne's short stories and novels which evaluate certain events of the 
New England past.
Another characteristic of new cultures is that after a period of development, the 
writers become aware of the choice either to "explore the possibilities of their own 
culture's colloquial usage; or they could fashion an amalgam from old-world orthodoxy 
and new regional inventiveness" (38)—such as we see in The Last o f  the Mohicans. 
Many authors producing first-person texts (Partridge cites as one example Mark 
Twain's The Adventures o f  Huckleberry Finn and the "negro dialect" in the work of 
Richard Wright offers another) devote themselves entirely to native dialects (40-2), a 
medium which functions to transmit as well as to affirm the new dialect as a 
particularly native construction, an implicit or explicit challenge to the imported idiom. 
In Henry Miller's case, we find an attempt to directly record or reproduce street-talk, 
hence the four-letter words strewn throughout his texts and which signal, among other 
things, a different relation between the public and private persona. This new idiom 
"congeals" the new values, at once as their transmitter and as their illustration.
1 2
But Partridge notes one other feature of these new cultures—a certain
"restlessness" (44);
Process, not fixity, is the unavoidable inheritance and the great writers 
o f new societies have analyzed this restlessness in their work; by doing 
so they have gained personal articulation but they have also contributed 
to the radical criticism of their cultural formation. (44)
This "criticism" o f the "cultural formation" of a nation is one element of Miller's
attack on America, as will be discussed in the opening sections of the first chapter.
Miller hopes to move forward, to a new vision o f America, but to do so he must
expose the unpleasant underside to American history. Among many other examples.
Miller cites the particularly harsh treatment of the indigenous peoples.
In an older culture, in France for instance, which has literature dating back a 
millennia, there exists a certain rigidity in the literary forms. ThQ Académie française, 
founded in 1635 and charged with overseeing literary production, moderates the 
evolution of the language.'* Thus the literary establishment attempts "to diminish 
invention by appealing to tradition" (44); even in a new culture, as the process of 
formulating and solidifying new values in a new literature is taking place, many 
writers feel the compulsion to conform with what appear to be the unique 
characteristics of the new literature. Writers often learn these characteristics through 
study of the literatures that contributed to the development of their literature but must 
reject them, if not wholesale then in part, as models (32).
Once the new culture finally informs the perceptions of those within it, it is 
dominant, in Raymond Williams’ use of that term in Marxism and Literature. The
* In France, the protectors of language have battled so-called "franglais," the 
incorporation o f English terms into the French language.
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dominant, though, always retains a dymamic relationship widi what Williams calls the 
residual, that wdiich was "effectively formed in the past, b u t . . .  is still active in the 
cultural process" {M&L 122), and the emergent, "new meanings and values, new 
practices, new relationships and kind of relationship [which] are continually being 
created" (123). A culture is rarely if ever monolithic, even in its formative years, but 
composed of elements that were once determining but are presently less so, elements 
that are more or less defining now, and those that mc^ one day replace the dominant. 
"Resolute dissidents may protest," writes Partridge, "but they can never fully evade the 
cultural processes which are locked into their very beings and into their human 
language" (30), a mechanism Williams labels "incorporation."
Partridge's interest ends at the point at which the literature reflects the 
establishment of a particular culture. However, it seems that the next step, beyond the 
establishment of a native literature, requires a reaction against that newly-established 
literature. Some writers continually seek new methods to communicate the experience 
of living in a certain region, in a certain era, while others wish to lodge a protest 
against this or that aspect of the culture. Few writers wish merely to reflect some 
monolithic vision of their society, though many may support it largely as it is.
Protesters can be divided into those who are alternative and those who are 
oppositional, as Williams identifies them. Alternative writers do not object to the 
goals of their culture, though they may in part, so much as to the means of attaining 
these goals or the measure of importance ascribed to them. Oppositional wnters, 
however, disagree with these goals, and the values inscribed in them, in a fundamental 
way, aspiring additionally to effect great change. While the difference between 
alternative and oppositional writers might at first glance seem only a matter of degree,
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it actually indicates a difference in kind, involving a combination of such factors as 
medium (fiction, poetry), "message" (admittedly a problematic term), and accessibility 
(language—slang, syntax, for instance; publication, distribution). Oppositional writers 
constitute a challenge to the existing order and its extension and continuation in a way 
that alternative writers do not.
Miller, as a "resolute dissident," in fact as an oppositional writer, lodges his 
protest many times over. He believed what he wrote mattered, that art really could 
change people, and that he was not just howling into the abyss, an attitude shared by 
the Surrealists in France and writers in England, such as W. H. Auden, Stephen 
Spender, and Louis MacNeice (as George Orwell pointed out in "Inside the Whale"). 
In his first published book. Tropic o f Cancer, Miller announces his abandonment of 
literature, reacting against current literary fashion as well as his own earlier 
unpublished books in order to do so Erica Jong characterizes his first two 
manuscripts, Moloch, or This Gentile World and Crcay Cock, as die work of a man 
"at war with his surroundings, trying [through literature] to make the uncompromising 
asphalt bloom" {Devil 83). In both works, only recently published, the third-person 
narrator recounts the story, attempting to give literary expression to the rage of the 
"heroes," Dion Moloch and Tony Bring. Finally in Cancer Miller declares,
"Everything that was literature has fallen from me" (1). Such a rejection is not 
perfunctory and involves rejecting old idols as well as old forms. "I'm not reading 
Thomas Mann any more, any more," he reports soon after finishing Cancer. "No Sir!
* Apart from these two works. The Smite at the Foot o f the Ladder, and his play 
Just Wild A bout Harry, only a tiny fraction o f Miller's published works are in anything 
but first-person voice.
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Through with him! Reject him! He’s a polished, finished craftsman—and that's why I 
drop him. He's 30 years behind the day" {Emil 156-57). For Miller, the term 
"finished craftsman" has both literal and figurative meaning, that the work of art is 
seamless, technically flawless, and that it is dead, for life itself is anything but 
"polished" and seamless.
"What is not in the open street," Miller writes in the opening pages of his 
second book. Black Spring, "is false, derived, that is to say, litenaure” (3). Instead of 
a work of literature. Cancer "is a gob of spit in the face of Art, a kick in the pants to 
God, Man, Destiny, Time, Love, Beauty . . . what you will" (ellipses in original, 2). 
Notice the words in capital letters. In Miller's view, "literature" equals transcendent 
values enshrined, untouchable, worshipped unquestioningly, and that is what he wishes 
to confront.® Like Charles Baudelaire, he wishes, above all, "to restore life to 
literature" {Time 5). It is a "literature" that lies, as we shall see in a moment, that is 
not true to life, that Miller targets; it is a death-dealing Western culture he hopes to 
destroy. Miller had once esteemed Sherwood Anderson, had read popular realists like 
Theodore Dreiser, but he rejects them for their distanced view, for their linear 
narratives, for their essential untruth. Marshall Berman, writing of 'sixties radicals, 
unwittingly invokes Miller's literary project; They found, writes Berman,
a source of life and energy and affirmation that was just as modem as
the expressway world, but radically opposed to the forms and motions
® Miller does not, as Trachtenberg would have it, merely "dishonor all pieties in 
order to honor the piety of free expression" ("History" 248). His first goal was to 
express himself as boldly and baldly as possible, in order to be true to his perception 
of his experience, to leave nothing out. First Amendment concerns became of major 
interest to Miller only after he had received positive responses to Tropic o f Cancer 
from Eliot, Orwell, Ezra Pound, Blaise Cendrars,and others. Once confident in himself 
as a writer, he resented the fact he could not publish his books in his native land.
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of that world. They would find it in a place where very few of the 
modernists of the 1950s would have dreamt of looking for it; in the 
everyday life of the street. (314)
Though Berman cites James Joyce's Stephen Dedal us as a precursor to the sixties
radicals, Henry Miller would certainly be a more unambiguous figure.’ The sixties
radicals realized, as did Miller, they had to clearly and demonstratively reject certain
values that were even then being passed on to them. Many of these radicals also
adopted an alternative canon of writers—the Beat writers of the previous decade.
among others.
The difficulty implicit in rejecting previous literary gods is evident in Miller,
who succumbs to the urge to produce "literature," in a letter, even as he quite overtly
struggles against it:
This afternoon I went up to Sacré Coeur and looked over the city. It is 
just such a vision as I have often dreamed. It is all that you wish—and 
maybe a little more. And I thought (this is literature, because I didn't 
think any such thing) of how it looked to the Romans when they 
christened it Lutetia—and how it looked to Napoleon when drunk with 
the wine of victory he came back from Italy through what is now the 
Metro Station Place d'Italie. {Emil 17)
Instead of exploring what he felt and saw at Sacré Coeur directly, he tumbles into
historical allusion—or illusion. At worst, the literary writer turns away from the
experience, unable to communicate anything more than surface facts in sure, poetical
language, which masks a deadly vacuity, even falsity. Such writing is, for Miller, an
evasion, a sign of failure, and must be exposed as such. The letter quoted above,
however, is dated March 6, 1930 and is the first Miller wrote upon his arrival in
’ "Henry Miller" as protagonist in Henry Miller's works. Ronald Gottesman 
wntes, in the introduction to his collection of essays on Miller, "If it is usually 
difficult to separate a writer from his work, in the case of Henry Miller it is virtually 
impossible to do so" (xvii). I will attempt no such separation in the present study.
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France. The change he daims to have experienced there finally results in Cancer, 
begun over a year later and published four years later, where one finds a new Henry 
Miller: "Paris plus first person bravado equals the voice we have come to know as 
Henry Miller," declares Erica Jong ("Foreword," ix). Moloch and Crazy Cock provide, 
for her, interesting examples of what Miller "had to overcome to find his own voice as 
a writer" (vii). It is in Cancer that Miller begins crafting a vision of the world in 
which he attempts to hold nothing back.
Miller's Mission
In order to understand Miller's mission as a writer, one he believes he shares 
with all true artists, it is important to recognize Oswald Spengler’s influence on Miller 
and, with that in mind, to understand Miller's notion of the individual. Spengler's most 
important work. The Decline o f the West, influenced many artists and intellectuals in 
the post-World War I era, since it seemed to describe as well as explain the decay 
many of them sensed. The Great Crash of 1929 even appeared to confirm Spengler's 
vision. In the aftermath of the Second World War, however, the influence of 
Spengler's contribution to ”kulturkritik" (Farrenkopf 165) began to wane as the post­
war economies in America and western Europe boomed. Erich Heller, defending 
Decline from a multitude of attacks, argues the book is ultimately "untrue" because it 
looks down on history from such a high perspective that finally Spengler's "historical 
vision is lacking in depth as well as in love, pity and pathos" (193). He likewise 
faults the author for repudiating "the idea of progress" (195), though without 
confronting Spengler's argument. Heller critiques precisely those points that Spengler 
holds dearest, the first his method, which attempts to be all-inclusive and asserts
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"depth" as one of the goals (Spengler 6); the second implicit in his vision of the 
recurrent rise and fall of civilizations. Heller’s argument can today be seen as a 
blindly ideological response to an unorthodox work, a response that lacks grounds as 
well as argumentation.
Literary scholars have explored Spengler’s influence on such authors as F. Scott 
Fitzgerald and Jack Kerouac,* but they tend to view Spengler simply as a period figure 
rather than a philosopher of long-standing importance, whose work may still have 
relevance. Philosopher Tomislav Sunic, on the other hand, traces Spengler's current 
influence to a number of recent cultural critics, among them Jean Baudrillard, in 
America, and Christopher Lasch, in The Culture o f  Narcissism (5 In), specifically in 
the despair they evince toward Western culture. Sunic, further, accuses those who 
share Spengler's vision of decline of endorsing passivity (61) or of implicitly assuming 
proto-totalitarian positions since Spengler himself assumed such a position. Sunie s 
response, which may or may not accurately reflect the position of those he lists, rests 
basically on unfounded assumptions about readers of Spengler. What would seem to 
be one of the more expected criticisms of Spengler, in the so-called postmodern era, 
would be his reliance on a totalizing system: Spengler attempts to read a variety of 
cultures through one specific lens. But even given present skepticism about such 
systems, certain elements of Spengler's criticisms retain validity. His discussion of 
cities laid out on the grid format, for instance, in which he argues that such a form 
augurs the end of the creative era of a civilization, is echoed (though perhaps not in
* John S. Whitley's "'A Touch of Disaster Fitzgerald, Spengler and the Decline 
of the West" in Scott Fitzgerald: The Promise o f Life, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1989; Michael D'Orso's "Man Out Of Time: Kerouac, Spengler, and the 'Faustian 
Soul'" in Studies in American Fiction, Spring 1983, 11:1, 19-30.
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precisely the same terms) in Richard Sennett,® Marshall Berman, James Kunstler, and 
Witold Rybc^mski, critics of the city in the last thirty years.
Though the concept of progress will be explored in a later chapter, at this point 
we can see that insisting the modem world has not been substantially improved fosters 
an oppositional stance, in an era otherwise absolutely sure of its ascendancy. Thinking 
the negative, thinking dialectically—as did Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter 
Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse—is to challenge current assumptions, current 
ideologies. The chief beneficiaries of capitalism, the bourgeois class, claim they have 
improved the world; to view the world as in decline is to declare the failure of the 
capitalist system and the bourgeoisie, and to imply that some other system is required.
Miller quite certainly believes his world, "Western Civilization," is on the 
decline. Looking back over fifteen years. Miller claims in the 1947 Remember to 
Remember, "I could never have written the sort of books I did [Tropic o f  Cancer, 
Black Spring, Tropic o f  Capricom] had I not been imbued with the absolute conviction 
of the imminence of the end" (129). His certainty was such that, borrowing a 
descriptive term from Spengler, he describes himself as "a late-city artist" {Semblance 
8, emphasis added), prefiguring the current notion of "late capitalism." Though Miller 
agrees with Spengler's analysis of Western culture, he has one caveat; "I do not 
accept it applying to the individual artist" {Hamlet 72). Spengler views civilizations as 
organic forms that age like other biological creatures. Just as people, whether from 
Madagascar or Samoa or Germany, go through phases of development between birth 
and death, so too do civilizations. Based on certain stages previously encountered by
® See Sennett's The Uses o f Disorder, as well as The Conscience o f the Eye.
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other cultures throughout various historical periods, which Spengler enumerates in the 
work, he concludes that Western civilization is on its last leg; it has stopped 
developing, its contours are frozen, it will generate nothing further o f any substantive 
value. Accordingly he announces "the great crisis of the present" (Spengler 26), to 
which Miller believes the artist can still effectively respond
In a world in decline, where systems have failed. Miller decides the individual 
must be his focus. His almost total reliance on autobiography, for instance, 
emphasizes the significance the individual holds for him. Not all individuals are 
capable o f responding to his call, but Miller has faith that some will manage to evolve 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche also venerates individuals, specifically those 
he calls "the free spirits," to whom he dedicates Human, AII Too Human. Later works 
such as Beyond Good and Evil and Genealogy o f  Morals also attempt to extricate 
these "free spirits" from the limiting, even crushing bonds of Western, Christian 
culture through a sustained illumination of die repressive, life-negating forces 
underpinning the culture, and Miller's works function similarly, as we will see
The concept of the individual, even during the nineteen-twenties and -thirties, 
was problematic, and it has only become more so today Freud's notion of the 
unconscious, as a force operating in our lives and of which we are largely unaware, 
and Marx's concept of the socially-constructed individual, both call into question the 
uniqueness of the individual, the amount of freedom a person has for self-creation. 
Freud and Marx have both been updated by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adomo, 
Herbert Marcuse, Raymond Williams, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Catherine 
Belsey and many, many others, so that the question of individuality, the possibility of 
the truly individual individual, is much more questionable than it once seemed to be.
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Along the same lines as Walt Whitman, Miller holds an exalted—though not 
altogether—Romantic notion of the individual as differentiated, as self-created and self­
determining. Such a notion of the individual, as an autonomous and self-willed entity 
who stands up against an "objectified (unconscious and unwilled)" society, Raymond 
Williams rejects as "a bourgeois version of society" {M&L, 86-7). The individual 
should, instead, be understood as created within a social process—which may partially 
explain Arthur Rimbaud's notion that Je est un autre [I is an other]—as part and parcel 
of that process, even as it struggles against the process, hence a force to act as well as 
to be acted upon. But, since a culture is composed of competing claims, of struggling 
"movements and tendencies" (121), the individual is no more a monolith than is the 
society within which he or she emerges.
Catherine Belsey problematizes the individual in somewhat different terms.
She writes that it "is not a unity, not autonomous, but a process, perpetually in 
construction, perpetually contradictory, perpetually open to change" (132). The concept 
of the individual as a stable being, completely self-aware, knowledgeable of all its 
desires and the source of these desires is untenable once the import of the unconscious 
is accepted. To be constructed in such an apparently random fashion seems 
disempowering: How can 1 act when, ultimately, there is no consistent /? To 
recognize, however, that one is constructed by a culture in a myriad of ways seems to 
offer some clue to understanding the ground for certain assumed values and hence the 
key to rejecting them. Miller, for instance, never fully recognized the way in which 
he was constructed by his culture, in regard to his often problematic (though typical 
for his time) views of women, Jews and black people, for instance, but he does seem 
to realize that people are multidimensional, perceiving himself as a fragmented being.
22
In Black Spring, he writes, "For me the book is the man and my book is the man I 
am, the confused man, the negligent man, the reckless man, the lusty, obscene, 
boisterous, thoughtful, scrupulous, lying, diabolically truthful man that I am" (23). 
Miller seems aware of the complexity of individuals but cannot respond to it. Hence, 
Miller's individual is an abstraction as well as something of a fiction.
Moreover, his faith in the individual is, I believe, restricted; he would not 
extend to the masses or to most "accepted" artists the status of true individuals.
Miller, in what might be described as "reverse elitism," usually reveres only the little 
guy, one of Nietzsche’s "free spirits." who creates solely for the pleasure of creating 
and who will probably never receive recognition, nor be corrupted by such 
recognition—for recognition seems to lead to "incorporation" by the establishment.
Such figures as the black shoeshine man who has written unpublishable novels for 
twenty years or Dr. Souchon the New Orleans surgeon who paints for pleasure and 
release are two of the many people Miller venerates in The A ir-Conditioned Nightmare 
and Remember to Remember. Such are the individuals, the artists that Miller honors.
While this faith in the individual, however limited, may seem naïve to modem 
readers, I believe it reflects our experience of the world: we regard ourselves and 
those close to us as individuals, people who have real options and make real choices. 
Those beyond our circle of friends and acquaintances we are not so sure about. 
Intellectually we understand that we are all more or less "incorporated," but we do not 
necessarily act upon that knowledge on a daily basis. Miller's un theoretical conception 
of the individual does not really pose a high hurdle for modem readers and may 
reflect, as well. Miller's sense that truth is in the streets. In addition, such 
contemporary writers as Marshall Berman still demonstrate a belief in the strength of
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the individual. In opposition to his criticism of the Frankfurt School theorists, and 
other twentieth-century philosophers, for what he calls their "monolithic cultural 
despair " (28n), Berman seems to broach bourgeois individualism. He endorses a 
number of nineteenth-century philosophers who "understood the ways in which modem 
technology and social organization determined man's fate. But they all believed that 
modem individuals had the capacity both to understand this fate and, once they 
understood it, to fight it'" (27). The individual struggling, not against but outside 
society, is Miller’s answer to the problem of the decline of civilization, which helps to 
explain the rich wells of inspiration he found in Paris, where he felt himself an 
outsider—though today we can see that he really was not so far outside as he believed. 
Berman may be suggesting, rather than a naïve or outmoded belief in the individual, a 
course of action exemplified by Antonio Gramsci's "pessimism of the intellect, 
optimism of the will" (qtd. in Berman 120), which also constitutes Spengler's response 
to his own cultural pessimism, as we shall see.
It is Miller's perception of decline, and the role open to the individual, that is
responsible for much of the urgency of his works. "For a hundred years or more,"
Miller writes, once again echoing Spengler (30), "the world, our world, has been
dying" {Cancer 26).
And not one man, in these last hundred years or so, has been crazy 
enough to put a bomb up the asshole of creation and set it off. The 
world is rotting away, dying piecemeal. But it needs the coup de grace, 
it needs to be blown to smithereens. (26)
For Miller the time of the cloistered genius is past. "We have need for strong hands,
for spirits who are willing to give up the ghost and put on flesh . . ."—to become real,
living human beings acting outside the roles society thrusts upon them (27, ellipses in
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original). In the age of decline, the role of the artist has nothing to do with remaining 
aloof It is a time for involvement, for looking to the street for motivation. The 
artist's role is to recover value, to take back the c^italized ideals listed above, now 
devoid of significance, and to create new purpose. "Life," writes Miller, "has to be 
given meaning because of the obvious fact that it has no meaning " {Wisdom 5). 
Though Miller has been critiqued for being apolitical, ever since George Orwell's 1940 
essay "Inside the Whale," it will become clear that he is quite political, simply not in 
terms of political parties or sauntering off to battle with a gun on his shoulder.
For Miller, the artist must be committed. Miller's critique of the European
founders of America parallels his critique of most artists who receive acclaim:
Men have come here hoping to "find, " not to "build." Not all men, of 
course, for if that were true this would indeed be a hell unbearable. But 
there has been the persistent feeling all throughout the history of this 
land that America had inexhaustible riches to yield up. It has brought 
out the plunderer and the exploiter of human beings. ("Fragment from 
Letter of Thanksgiving" 81)
The writing task involves more than simply describing what is on the surface, what is
"out there." This task demands constructing a vision of the world as the artist truly
perceives it, on the street, beneath all the surface smoke generally mistaken for
"reality"—but even that is not enough. Spengler describes his own project in terms
that very nearly parallel Miller's: "What concerns us is not what the historical facts
which appear at this or that time are, per se, but what they signify, what they point to,
by appearing" (6). Miller aspires to get at "the works" as well, to understand the
functioning of the apparatus.
Miller critiques James Joyce and Marcel Proust because, in his reading of these 
two writers, they merely "reflect the times. We see in them no revolt: it is surrender.
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suicide, and the more poignant since it springs from creative sources" {Cosmological 
109). Miller critiques Joyce and Proust,'® not for lack of talent, but for failure of 
nerve. Rather than oppositional, in Williams’ sense, they are at best alternative.
Miller detects "no struggle" (108), in the sense of rebellion, in the sense o f creating a 
forward-looking vision of the world.
The only way to be an artist in a disintegrating world is to work against the 
grain, to rebuild with new stones. "Joyce is the lost soul of this soulless world,"
Miller declares; "his interest is not in life, in men and deeds, not in history, not in 
God, but in the dead dust of books" (115). Joyce, in short, is a long way from the 
streets, even if his protagonist Leopold Bloom spends much of his day in June 1904 
walking the Dublin streets.
In his introduction to Finnegan’s Wake, Seamus Deane defines Joyce’s works 
(the Wake as well as Ulysses) as "alternative" (x)" as well as subversive (xiii), but 
ultimately acknowledges they are self-defeating since works that require scholarly 
exegesis "are politically neutralized" (xviii). These inaccessible texts demand every bit 
of the reader’s energy just to be understood; none remains for revolt. Joyce creates 
ingenious works, exhibiting his erudition but offering little recognition of the impasse 
in which modem readers find themselves; if he recognizes the world situation, he only 
acknowledges it through the medium of myth, hence "literature," which Miller 
considers a distancing technique. For Miller, as for Spengler, "the point [is] to
'® My interest, here, lies not in whether Miller’s critique of Joyce and Proust is 
valid, though such a case could be made; rather, his critique offers a useful foil for 
expounding his goals as a writer.
" Deane does not mention whether or not he uses "alternative" after Raymond 
Williams, but it fits in any case.
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distinguish the 'superficial' from the 'profound'" (Hughes xvii). Joyce's "literature” 
limits him to the superficial, despite the pretension of great depth.
In contrast. Miller claims, "Everything I write is loaded with the dynamite 
which will one day destroy the barriers erected about me" {Cosmological 159). He 
means to rearrange the pieces, to make the world once more strange and the site of 
exploration, rather than the source of settled values. To be oppositional, however, 
usually means to go uncompensated. "The only artists at present who are being 
handsomely rewarded for their toil are the mountebanks . . . skilled in raising a cloud 
of dust when real issues are at stake" {Air-Conditioned 133). The non-threatening, 
non-challenging artist is generally the only one to receive substantial recompense for 
his or her work, though these artists do not produce works of real and lasting value, 
works that articulate some problematic—instead they "raise clouds of dust." But Miller 
takes the mission of the writer seriously, working against the grain quite in earnest.
He writes, "Every creative act is a declaration of war" {Hamlet 101), against the way 
things are and the way they appear to be. "A creative act is in the nature of a 
trespass. It is a violation of the static order of things" (101). This declaration of war 
signifies an attempt to breach the protective film that has congealed around culture, 
especially as it manifests itself in narratives, and to open that culture to questioning, to 
evaluation and evolution, hence to new values. "It is [the poet's] mission to seduce 
us," Miller proposes in his book on French poet Arthur Rimbaud, The Time o f  the 
Assassins, "to render intolerable this limited world which bounds us" (55), to make the 
reader uncomfortable and thus to effect an awakening and inspire action, to begin 
seeking for what Miller repeatedly calls the life more abundant.
27
This mission o f the artist is not simply destructive—though Miller, like 
Rimbaud, affirms ”[p]art of every artist's time and energy is devoted to destruction— 
willful, deliberate, purposive destruction" {Semblance 35); or it is not destructive 
solely in a negative sense. "Man is a creator," Miller asserts. "And to create means to 
destroy at the same time. To destroy usually gives us pleasure, but to create produces 
a sense of guilt. And why? Because to create entails responsibility" {Hamlet 101). 
There is, thus, a fecundatory side to the artist's mission. Walter Benjamin asserts, 
"destroying rejuvenates in clearing away the traces of our own age" {One-Wc^ Street 
157), like burning dead vegetation in order to sow new seeds in fertile soil, a view 
which links this "destructive character" to Berman's "developer," that "consummate 
wrecker and creator, the dark and deeply ambiguous figure" (63), who arises in the 
capitalist era and who Berman sees prefigured in Goethe's Faust. While Benjamin's 
"destructive character," as he terms it, "avoids . . . being creative" (158) (and he or she 
IS so incidentally, provoking misunderstandings in order to ensure nothing becomes 
settled), Berman's developer unleashes an "impersonal drive . . .  to create a totally 
modernized space, in which the look and feel of the old world have disappeared 
without a trace" (68). The developer, a dialectical counterpart to the artist, transforms 
the world simply because he or she can, for the sheer pleasure of exertion, of creating 
a modem world. "Whatever I do is done out of sheer joy," Miller proclaims. "I drop 
my fruits like a ripe tree. What the general reader or the critic makes of it," he 
asserts, contradicting his earlier declaration of responsibility, "is not my concern. I am 
establishing values: I defecate and nourish. There is nothing more to it" {Wisdom
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2 2 ) . Miller digests, to maintain the metaphor, the material of his life, transforming it 
into a fertilizer that he hopes will allow others to flourish. Through detailing his 
struggle to free himself from the many constraints o f Western culture, he believes he 
will benefit his public.
Directly addressing his readers. Miller writes that one of his goals is "to give 
you the courage to live your own life, and live it abundantly" ("Fragment" 82). Such 
an assertion is somewhat disingenuous; it is Miller posturing as a wisdom writer, 
hoping to make his works more acceptable to the censor. As he had previously 
asserted, in The World o f  Sex, it was his own freedom he was battling for in the 
Tropics. Readers, he might reasonably assume, could benefit from his experience, as 
recounted in his works, but it was certainly not a conscious goal. If his hope, later, 
that readers could learn from his example appears naïve, the validity of the criticisms 
Miller leveled at America and Western culture in general still stands.
But if civilization is on the decline, it might be asked, what role is there for an 
artist? what is left to be done, short of surrendering to circumstances beyond the 
artist's control? One aspect of Miller's ethos is a joyful embracing of even the most 
awful, even hopeless situations, rather than the despairing sigh of an Eliot.'^ Like 
Nietzsche, Miller often takes a position that seems absurd at first glance, but then, 
with explanation, validates it. "Not only have I never felt the least desire to conserve
'■ The artist's "responsibility" for readings o f his or her text remains an open 
question. The fa tw a  against Salman Rushdie provides persuasive evidence that many 
hold the artist responsible for opinions expressed in works of art.
"Up to that time," he writes in Cancer, "nothing very terrible had befallen me, 
though I had already lost all my worldly possessions and had known what it was to 
walk the streets in hunger and in fear of the police" (180).
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or bolster up or buttress anything," Miller asserts, "but I might say that I have always 
looked upon decay as being just as wonderful and rich an expression o f life as growth" 
{Wisdom 29). Just as Miller attempts to write about "the street" —everything that is 
left out of novels—so he venerates that which is often despaired of, decay and 
destruction, for instance, which remain for him signs of life, providing him hope for 
the future.
In Spengler’s conception of the world, the only option open to Westerners is "to 
embrace the present and its narrowly defined, historically determined possibilities" 
(Farrenkopf 173). Thus Miller claims another role for the artist, perhaps clarifying 
what he means when labelling himself a "late-city artist": "you can plc^ the role o f  
the undertaker^' {Cosmological 345). The late-city artist helps to bury the old world, 
which suggests that he or she will then be present at the dawn of a new one.
It is important to be aware, however, that Miller is often deliberately provoking 
his audience, that he is contradictory, that while he sees Western civilization in a 
period of decline, from which there is no hope of escape until the decline has run its 
course, he also views art and the role of the artist, and thus culture too, in positive 
terms: "Art is only a means to life, to the life more abundant. It is not in itself the 
life more abundant. It merely points the way, something which is overlooked not only 
by the public, but very often by the artist himself {Wisdom 24). Miller, then, points 
out the irreversible course of the present but holds out hope for the future.
The role of the artist, for Miller, can be summarized as follows: The artist 
must be, in Jean-Paul Sartre's term, engaged. He or she must expose the values of a 
culture to examination, must expose as well the manifold imperfections and trends in a 
culture, making the reader conscious of what was once accepted uncritically, without
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question or quibble, and which must now be altered or rejected. "Literature" either 
purposefully reinforces the status quo or does so incidentally because it "throws up a 
lot of smoke" and obscures the need for change, so Miller abandons it in favor of the 
prose we find in Tropic o f  Cancer and later works. His incitory descriptions of the 
role of the artist, finally, serve to underscore the importance he assigns to that role.
Henry Millen Throwing the Gauntlet
Already it should be clear that Henry Miller's prose is provocative, meaning he 
makes bold emphatic statements, striking analogies, and employs strong language— 
hyperbole, slang, profanity. Miller writes above about defecating, about the writer as 
undertaker, about spitting (spit appears on page two of Tropic o f Cancer and page one 
of Tropic o f  Capricorn— first time aimed at the face of Art, the second time at the 
face of God). He describes sex graphically, and just as graphically supports letting the 
world fall to pieces, perhaps even giving it a shove on its way. All of this unusual 
content strikes even the avid readers of Miller, for few other writers employ such 
language, while attributing the thoughts to a narrator the reader is expected to identify 
with, to admire.
Not every sentence, of course, is provocative. M. M. Bakhtin defines the novel 
"as a diversity of social speech types (sometimes even a diversity of languages) and a 
diversity of individual voices, artistically organized" (262). Not only are there the 
various voices of characters in Miller's novels,’'* but the narrator has a variety of 
voices. Trachtenberg notes that in contrast to French writer Louis-Ferdinand Céline,
Characters in The Rosy Crucifixion tend to sound like the Miller-figure; this is 
less true of the earlier works.
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with whom Miller is often (and I think uncomprehendingly) compared. Miller "has 
striking moments of softness" ("History" 249), moments when he is sentimental, 
broken, or joyful.
Just Wiy, then, does Miller write so provocatively'’ First, we can argue, 
negatively, that it surely did not help sell books, for there was twenty to thirty years 
lag-time between French publication and American publication of the "Paris books" in 
die early nineteen-sixties. Miller was by then seventy and had survived many lean 
years Most of his works, published between 1940 and 1961, came out on small 
presses with limited distribution. New Directions, in 1939 a small and independent 
publishing house, brought out Miller's first American book. The Cosmological Eye, 
and many thereafter, though these books were often compilations o f essays published 
in various journals rather than conceptually unified works. Other presses published 
The World o f Sex (clandestinely). Semblance o f a Devoted Past, and The Colossus of 
Maroussi, one of Miller's most celebrated books. The books Miller considered his 
major works, apart from Colossus and New Directions-published works like The A ir- 
Conditioned Nightmare, were unpublishable except in France, where The Obelisk Press 
(later renamed The Olympia Press), which dealt almost exclusively in pornography, 
published them. These books could not be legally imported into English-speaking 
countries, though many were smuggled in. Certainly Miller could have benefited from 
a reputation as a barmed author. On the other hand, the books available to an English- 
speaking audience, those mentioned above, differed substantially, in form and content, 
from the earlier, more radical works, and would serve only to mystify readers aware of 
his reputation rather than to help develop a significant body of readers.
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If not to publish books and make a fortune, what other reasons might Miller 
have had to write so provocatively? To begin with. Miller claimed his "motives" for 
including sex and obscenity in his works went "far beyond sex" {Remember 287). 
George Bataille defines obscenity as "our name for the uneasiness which upsets the 
physical state associated with self-possession, with the possession of a recognized and 
stable individuality" (17-8). The uneasiness Bataille describes, which results in 
"disequilibrium" and calls into question one's "own existence" (31), or awakens one to 
the physical nature of existence, results from transgression. In Nietzschean terms, the 
individual transgresses, or is made to transgress, the boundary between the stable 
world of forms (the Apollonian) and enters into the unstable world of becoming (the 
Dionysian). Transgression leads to transformation of the self and the world as viewed 
by the individual self. Sex and death, specifically the disintegration which follows 
immediately upon death, are two of the primary sources of obscenity, and alluded to in 
Miller's declared focus on "what happens in the streets."
"It's purpose is to awaken," Miller writes of his use of obscenity, "to usher in a 
sense of reality" {Remember 287). Obscenity removes the lid from the metaphysical 
stew, as it were, to let us see and smell what is cooking, to provide glimpses of 
unadorned living. Through obscenity. Miller lifts the reader up out of the flow of 
common daily occurrences which pass by almost unnoticed, demanding the reader's 
attention, his or her awareness of so much of life that is hidden, repressed by the 
unconscious, by culture, by routine. Like a snow-dome shaken, the view of the world 
changes—perhaps only briefly, as a momentary insight, or possibly permanently.
The obscenity of Miller's works then, incorporated strategically rather than 
accidentally, constitutes yet another element of his oppositional stance, for without the
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obscenity he would be at best alternative. But the obscenity is also another instance 
where Miller's failure, equally, shows itself. Though he perceives society's attitude 
toward sex as seriously flawed, he fails to observe that his own attitudes toward sex, 
but especially toward women and the sex roles o f men and women, is culturally 
constructed. Luce Irigiray's Speculum o f  the Other, Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, 
Michel Foucault's History o f Sexuality, and many other works, explore ways in which 
sexuality is gendered, desire is construe:ed, taboos created. While I do not necessarily 
fault Miller for not going to these lengths, to the degree that he does not recognize his 
own attitudes toward women are as problematic as the general attitude toward sex, we 
can see some limits to his own oppositional stance.
Apart from the sexual and the obscene, however. Miller's prose remains notably 
unsettling. The provocation can be related to Benjamin's conception of the storyteller. 
Benjamin writes.
The most extraordinary things, marvelous things, are related with the 
greatest accuracy, but the psychological connection of the events is not 
forced on the reader. It is left up to him to interpret things the way he 
understands them, and thus the narrative achieves an amplitude that 
information lacks. {Illuminations 89)
Miller too seeks "amplitude," though in a somewhat different fashion than Benjamin's
storyteller, by including in books what is usually left out—work and complaints against
work, a very personal experience of sex as well as a generalized rage against the
modem world. In this instance. Miller, as does Benjamin, follows the High Modernist
notion of "making it new," which reaches back to the Romantics' desire to "lift the veil
of familiarity," though for an Eliot the notion reaches even farther back to John Donne
and George Herbert, and the so-called Metaphysical Poets, alternately praised and
condemned for the uniting of two disparate images—the "metaphysical conceit."
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dian am ple reportage or 2  cxtUecQoa o f Miller s y^otks usualK 
procssd impressiamsacaily. wnfaoux the connecting links oAen supplied bv narrators^ 
Evaythmg m a seennngiy self-contained narrative is held together bv expianatotv 
links. The story told by Benjamin's storyteller, however, offers no such cotmecnng 
links, no such Snai interpretation, which may be one reason such a story bears 
rqjeaimg Informapon. tor Benjamin, lay s  daim to prompt venfiawiity ‘ iS'^) and 
thus secures no gnp on the imaginanon, engenders little or no contemplation on the 
part of the reads- or listeier for moovanonal purposes, and does not encourage the 
reader to make cormecnons with other snippets of information. It encourages passive 
reading and passive expaience.
Graeme Giiloch descnbes Benjamin s project in a way that parallels Benjamin s 
descnpnon of the storyteller, but further bears upon Nliiier's narranve structure as well 
Boyamm's apparent metfaodolo^ m the PlJssagi^naràeu, uniting quotes and fragments 
without the mterpreting mediation of a narrator, presupposes "the disruption of 
established contexts and the juxtapositions of diverse elements in order to startle the 
reader" (116). The methodology is meant to "engender shock" ( I I 6) and to actively 
engage the reader in the construction of the meaning of the text and thus its relevance
Like the storyteller who presents events without providing definitive motives, 
thus forcing the listener to attempt to do so. and like Benjamin's collection of quotes 
and fragments without the guiding analysis of a narrative voice, requiring the reader to 
hypothesize the cormection. Miller similarly engages his readers. Through his 
provocative prose, obscene, defiant, and hyperbolic, as well as his plotless scene- 
shifting, he forces readers to react: sometimes they reject aspects of the world they 
have thus far tolerated; sometimes they reject Miller. They can no longer passively
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consume the text. Once awakened in this rarified atmosphere, in this world of decline 
and despair and joy and "cunts," the reader becomes an outsider, able to observe his or 
her daily world from a different perceptual angle. Miller does not expect that his 
works will simply make manifest a new vision, however. "The worst sin that can be 
committed against the artist," he writes, "is to take him at his word, to see in his work 
a fulfillment instead of an horizon" {Cosmological 168). His work is a call "To-Arms" 
rather than an "All-Clear," a challenge with only a suggestion of a solution.
Miller's inspiration for such provocative language derives at least in part from
some of his most admired writers. François Rabelais, Nietzsche, and Spengler are all
given to hyperbole, to blasphemous or nonconformist declarations, to the use of
unorthodox images. M. M. Bakhtin, writing of the "Carnivalesque" in Rabelais, says:
It is necessary to destroy and rebuild the entire false picture of the 
world, to sunder the false hierarchical links between objects and ideas, 
to abolish the divisive ideational strata. It is necessary to liberate all 
these objects and permit them to enter into the free unions that are 
organic to them, no matter how monstrous these unions might seem 
from the point of view of ordinary, traditional associations. (169)
This description of the writer’s task is also descriptive of the task of Nietzsche, of
Spengler, and of Miller. The destruction Bakhtin writes of necessitates a voice prone
to overstatement as well as sometimes grotesque imagery, which suggests the reader
need not always take the writer strictly at his or her word. Bakhtin notes that in this
destruction "the foremost device is Rabelaisian laughter—directly linked to the
medieval genres of the clown, the rogue and fool" (170). Miller's works employ
"Rabelaisian laughter" as well: exaggeration often functions satirically in his works,
and he plays the role of the clown, the rogue and the fool in many of his major works.
This laughter that Bakhtin foregrounds appears in "the crude, unmediated connections
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between things that people otherwise seek to keep separate, in pharisaicai error" (170); 
otherwise known as the obscene, as well as the Spenglerian desire to get beneath the 
facts to their signification.
This destructive Rabelaisian laughter is at the same time constructive. It is, to
employ a Nietzschean image, once again tossing the dice, in hopes of happening on a
better world. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra likewise venerates destruction, seeing in it the
seeds of rebirth: "I love the great despisers because they are the great reverers and
arrows of longing for the other shore" {Portable 127). The flip-side of destruction
(decay, defecation), as Miller suggests above, fosters creation (nourishment). Berman
describes the provocative "voice" peculiar to both Marx and Nietzsche as a voice
distinctive and remarkable . . . not only [for] its breathless pace, its 
vibrant energy, its imaginative richness, but also its fast and drastic 
shifts in tone and inflection, its readiness to turn on itself, to question 
and negate all it has said, to transform itself into a great range of 
harmonic or dissonant voices, and to stretch itself beyond its capacities 
into an endlessly wider range, to express and grasp a world where 
everything is pregnant with its contrary . . . .  This voice resonates at 
once with self-discovery and self-mockery, with self-delight and self­
doubt. It is a voice that knows pain and dread, but believes in its power 
to come through. (23)
Berman’s description o f the multi-faceted voices of Marx and Nietzsche, voices which
take their inspiration from a complex and contradictory world, describes Miller’s as
well. Like the dominating figure of nineteenth-century American poetry, Walt
Whitman, Miller is not afraid of contradicting himself, nor of exposing himself,
literally or figuratively, but only of being untrue to himself, to his experience.
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adomo view provocative language as a 
necessity. "When language becomes apologetic, ” they argue, "it is already corrupted, 
and it can neither be neutral nor practical in its essence . . . .  There is only one
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expression for the truth: that diought \^ ic h  denies injustice" (219). Certainly 
Horkheimer and Adomo refer to Hitler’s Germany, to the complicity of silence that 
surrounded the Nazi rise, in Germany and elsewhere, and to the necessity of 
combatting Nazi "injustice." But they are also more generally addressing commitment, 
the requirement that people take clear, principled positions on issues, especially those 
that dramatically affect the future. The change the world has undergone due to 
industrialism comprises one such issue. New technologies as well as a capitalist 
system more than ever dominating countries greatly changed the way people lived, 
often for the worse despite pronouncements to the contrary. To return to Miller’s 
earlier criticism of James Joyce, it becomes clear that a provocative prose, a 
challenging, oppositional prose—but a prose that is at the same time not mired in 
intellectual mystification—becomes a necessity for those who maintain there is 
something very wrong in the world, that it is somehow out of kilter and on the 
decline.
Raoul R. Ibargüen declares that Miller and Céline were the losers in the battle 
for whose version of modernism would prevail (489). Joyce, Eliot and the New 
Critics were the victors, advancing "the "mythical method' that Eliot endorsed" (492), 
alluding to Greek, Roman and other mythologies in their works to provide, especially, 
depth, a sense of historic continuity to modem literature, and a certain amount of 
distance between the work and the society that produced it. Benjamin notes a 
conservative, superstitious element to mythology, asserting that it is a "nightmare" 
humanity has already once overcome {Illuminations 102). Miller, Céline, and others 
put forth "their own versions of literary modernity," but they were narrative rather than 
mythical—"burlesque, anecdotal, and digressive narratives of hyperbolic rage, elation
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and boredom" (490).'* These narratives employed provocative language as a tool for 
engaging the readers' attention, for exposing the reader to a viewpoint quite other to 
that which he or she might normally be inclined, for more accurately mirroring the 
world. The New Critics spring from Eliot and Joyce and proffer "symbolic, ironic and 
mythic" textual exegesis (492) which purposefully restricts, even denies, any grounded 
political reading one might make, hence largely neutralizing these texts. As we have 
seen. Miller claims in the begirming of Cancer that his book "is a gob of spit in the 
face of Art [...] what have you" (2); because he and those like him lost the battle that 
was modernism, he still pays dearly for the insult and readers approach his texts 
unprepared at best, antagonistic at worst."*
Critics of Culture and Miller's Cultural Criticism
Despite the fact that Miller remains a very American writer, occasionally naïve 
and often hopeful, he is influenced almost as much by Europeans—Marcel Proust, 
Thomas Mann, and others—as by Americans. Though it is not certain he ever read 
works by the Surrealists, their manifestoes contain some of the ideas, focussing on the
'* I do not believe Miller and Céline have a great deal in common beyond similar 
styles and general attitudes toward modernity. Miller answers despair with laughter, 
Céline with a wail of helplessness; Miller refuses to support either side in World War 
II, faulting all sides for an anti-life attitude, while Céline succumbs to nihilism, 
collaborating with the Nazis.
'^Modernity/Modernism will be considered to range from the beginnings of 
industrialism, roughly the early years of the 1800s, reaching its peak between 1880- 
1930 in America. It is the time of "high capitalism," and results in artists, deeply 
divided, often vocally anti-modem while concerned with many of the same things the 
capitalists are; "novelty, innovation, the transformation of older forms . . . "  (Jameson, 
Postmodernism, 304).
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"marvelous" and scouring the psychic depths, for instance, that seem to guide Miller’s 
writing.
Miller’s first published works, perhaps because he was older, are a mixture of 
characteristics of writers of the end of the nineteenth century and the first thirty years 
of the twentieth century. His earliest American influences are writers Theodore 
Dreiser, Sherwood Anderson, Sinclair Lewis, active especially in the first twenty years 
of the twentieth century, as well as later ones like John Dos Passos, writers whose 
influence is manifest in Miller’s earliest, only recently published works.
In the years immediately following the stock market crash of 1929, it was 
popularly believed that the literature most characteristic o f the previous decade was 
unpolitical, even decadent, more concerned with painting a portrait of the changing 
fashions of life than with commenting on those changes—and it was writers like 
Fitzgerald, Hemingway, Anderson, and others who were at the head of this movement, 
though not all truly correspond to such a description with consistency. The writers of 
the thirties, however, were much more overtly concerned with politics, many of them 
Marxists, some even joining the Communist Party. There is a certain amount of 
overlap, however, between writers from both decades. There were writers in the 
nineteen-twenties whose works exhibited "aesthetic dissent from the materialism and 
Puritanism of contemporary American life" (Bradbury 80), among them Dos Passos, 
Fitzgerald, and Anderson. The novelists of the thirties, however, while flaunting their 
political engagement, were also engaged in a search for a new form, one that could 
"deal with the deplacement, alienation, and deep unease generated by urban, 
technological, capitalist American life" (127). Dos Passos is probably nearest to 
Miller in that he bridges the twenties and thirties, demonstrates great concern for the
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world around him, while embarking on a search for a more modem form. Dos Passos, 
however, still relies on the distancing technique of a narrator, and incorporates 
documentary-style techniques in U.SA., his mtyor work o f tihe thirties: He writes 
"Literature." Miller’s search for form involves, instead, an eschewal of any obvious 
form, simply recording impressions seemingly as they happen, and an abandonment of 
chronology as well, simply describing one adventure after another and, in between, 
recounting memories or offering opinions, observations, and venting his rage Miller 
attempts to remove all inhibitions, to include all experiences, however banal or 
"shocking, " in order to get at the "truth." The apparent formlessness of it all, 
however, is part of the story—an existence demonstratively outside the expected bi­
polar structure of work-home, a life without a rigidly-defined plot.
Berman proposes that "to be fully modem is to be anti-modem" (13) because 
modem life has become so multi-faceted due to the impact of numerous novel forces, 
technological developments as well as the reverberations of a new economy, modem 
consumer capitalism. He writes, further, "Modem mankind found itself in the midst of 
a great absence [the death of God] and emptiness of values and yet, at the same time, 
a remarkable abundance of possibilities'" (21). This new world was greatly lamented 
by conservative figures (Eliot) as well liberal figures (Fitzgerald). Miller, whose ideas 
are sometimes, perhaps unwittingly, Marxist on the one hand (redistribute the wealth) 
and then staunchly conservative on the other (the masses are just robots), offers 
something neither Eliot nor Fitzgerald, or even most of those associated with 
modemism, profess: Hope. Miller quite clearly believes the world could have become 
something other than it did and finds in that very belief a reason to be optimistic. He
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tends to blame systems for the failure and thus rejects party politics in general, in 
favor of the individual, who can help bring the world back to life.
Miller often cites Emma Goldman as an influence, "the most important 
encounter of my life" he calls her in The Cosmological Eye, implicitly aligning 
himself with Anarchism. Miller then credits her with ”open[ing] up the whole world 
of European culture" (368), more specifically, "European drama" (370), rather than 
"opening up" to him the philosophy of Anarchism. Like most or all Anarchists, 
however. Miller rejects systems, party politics, and any formal grouping which might 
enforce some sort of regulating behavior or which might inspire people to act in ways 
they might not normally act. He rarely projects a future, however, which would offer 
some specific, positive side to his rejection. Anarchists generally foresee "a self­
regulated society of individuals and freely-formed groups" (Bottomore 18), and, in 
"Artist and Public," from Remember to Remember, Miller writes.
No man is a failure who lives up to the best that is in him. That the 
world does not follow suit means nothing. [....] No Utopia is realizable 
which demands that every one think and act alike. A Utopia is in 
essence always a dream of harmony, if not perfection. (414)
He looks toward a time when people do not control others, where people "live up to
the best that is in them," as if that is a natural impulse. Miller’s works, filled with
criticism of the modem world and everything that he perceives as sustaining the
system, encourage people to live outside these systems, outside their world.
To provide a framework for Miller's cultural criticism as well as to aid in 
clarifying his arguments, I will employ a number of current historians—many of whom 
have already been cited—as well as a group of philosophers whose stated goal was 
criticism of contemporary culture. Around the same time as Miller was putting the
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final touches on Tropic o f  Cancer and seeing it published. Max Horkheimer in 
Frankfurt, Germany, was gathering together a group of scholars at the Institut fü r  
Sozialforschung (the Institute for Social Research), known popularly as the Frankfurt 
School. Similar to Miller, though he would not join a "school," these scholars 
operated outside the accepted paths, united in "the belief that formulating the negative 
in the epoch of transition was more meaningful than academic careers" (Horkheimer, 
"Foreword," xxv). They were, in short, committed to a radical questioning of society. 
According to Benjamin, who was associated but never a full-fledged member, the 
members of the Frankfurt School, though from various backgrounds, "converge[d] in a 
critique of bourgeois consciousness" (qtd. in Jay 292). The Frankfurt School 
philosophers took as one of the primary goals of their collective project a thorough 
critique of German and Western society.
The members of the Frankfurt School were critical of much of the western 
world, especially decrying its blind attachment to "reason,"the effects of which go 
well beyond science. The critiques put forth, almost simultaneously, by Miller and 
members of the Frankfurt School (especially Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, and 
Herbert Marcuse) often overlap. For instance. Miller's critique of Hollywood in "The 
Golden Age" (from The Cosmological Eye) echoes that of Horkheimer and Adorno in 
"The Culture Industry" from Dialectic o f Enlightenment and Marcuse in "The 
Affirmative Character of Culture" collected in Negations. All understand Hollywood 
as most often providing sheer escapism to the audience, hence implicitly supporting 
the current system, rather than using the new medium to challenge viewers and to
” See for example Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic o f Enlightenment or 
Horkheimer's Eclipse o f  Reason.
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effect social change. As I will demonstrate, the critiques of bodi Miller and the 
Frankfurt School serve to illuminate each other and, moreover, are still pertinent as we 
near the year two thousand.
To provide some literary points of comparison, I have examined the literary 
works o f two French poets of the nineteenth century, Charles Baudelaire and Arthur 
Rimbaud, in order to look at their cultural criticism. Both examine a world 
undergoing great change due to capitalism, a force that, similarly, made itself felt 
strongly on Miller's America. It is not clear how familiar Miller was with the work of 
Charles Baudelaire. In Crazy Cock, written between 1927 and 1930, the Miller- 
character mentions "talking about the poet Baudelaire" (106), though reductively and 
somewhat inaccurately as an example of decadence Throughout the nineteen-thirties, 
Benjamin examined the affects of capitalism, and the concomitant rise of French 
department stores (forty years ahead of the American version), employing Baudelaire's 
poetry. Les fleurs du mal and Le Spleen de Paris, and Baudelaire's translation of Edgar 
Allen Poe's short story "The man o f the crowd," as well as his art criticism, as a key 
to the culture. Many of Benjamin's conclusions agree with those reached by Miller 
about his own time period.
Miller seems to have been more familiar with the work of Rimbaud, to whom 
he devoted a book. Time o f the Assassins. Still, even with Rimbaud it is not certain 
that Miller, who in 1949 contributed an introduction to a new edition of Illuminations, 
went beyond the biographies and actually read and grasped the works. In his book on 
Rimbaud, Miller uses Rimbaud primarily to understand himself. Their attitudes 
against the bourgeoisie, their wish to shock, and their lack of concern for strict
44
consistency unites them. Choices they made, for or against fighting, often were made 
on the same basis and, hence, provide rich points of comparison.
Works by Baudelaire, Rimbaud, the Frankfurt School theorists, Spengler, 
Nietzsche, as well as theorists o f modernity will help to contextualize as well as to 
elaborate Miller's cultural criticism. Miller claimed his works were autobiography. If 
they constituted a mere recounting of events, however, they would be of little enough 
interest within American culture, let alone other cultures. Miller, though, connects his 
life with that of the culture he was raised in as well as the world he experienced.
What I propose to examine in this study is his response to his world, meaning the 
West, America, New York City, Paris, consumer capitalism and advertising, war and 
industrialization, work, and other facets of a culture with which Miller stood in deep 
disagreement. Henry Miller was not a crank, nor was he a littérateur or a saint. Like 
most Modernists, Miller expresses distaste for the modem world; unlike them, 
however, he holds out hope for the future. Just as Charles Baudelaire did in Paris in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Miller walked the streets o f his world, observing 
it first-hand, and assessing it, in very personal and uninhibited terms, both loving and 
hating the world.
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Chapter One / Gfies of Disgust and Delight: New Yoik City and Paris
"At this very moment, in every part of the world, people were dreaming 
or talking about New York. New York! What was it made people so 
damned silly about New York?" Tony Bring. Crazy Cock 44-5.
New York City and Paris: two cities that, as embodiments of western culture, 
the sites where everything of lasting importance happens, have attracted people from 
all over the world, sometimes as emigrants but more often as tourists. Even their 
names—Paris, New York City—inspire awe, a sense of the overwhelming, boasting the 
best as well as the worst modem civilization has to offer. Canadian writer Witold 
Rybczynski, in City Life, his study of North American cities, devotes much of the 
introductory chapter to a discussion of Paris as a metropolis that for many Americans 
exemplifies the ideal city, a city designed for people: with large and verdant parks, 
streets alive with history, stores located inside the communities they serve, buildings 
displaying sculpted facades that reward even casual glances from passersby, as well as 
magnificent, inspiring monuments. New York City, on the other hand, with its 
skyscrapers and Broadway and Wall Street, is the city where people amass their 
fortunes; for many, however, it constitutes an aesthetic horror with a hostile 
environment, where endurance rather than enjoyment of life is the order of the day.
Henry Miller lived in New York City, "grew up with [the] changing skyline" 
(Miller, Cosmological, 338), during the last years of the nineteenth century and the 
first three decades of the twentieth, when the city experienced great changes— 
construction of more and more skyscrapers and the influx of new waves of 
immigration only the most obvious—before moving to Paris in 1930, where he was to 
live, on and off, for nearly ten years. French poet, essayist and art critic Charles 
Baudelaire, on the other hand, lived in Paris in the middle decades of the nineteenth
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century, a witness to many of the great changes that city experienced, the destruction 
of old yet vital communities, the leveling of buildings that had stood for centuries, in 
order to make way for the new, wide boulevards. Paris underwent fundamental 
change at the hands of Baron von Haussmarm and his army of laborers, such that Paris 
today still bears the stamp "which Haussmarm gave it" (Benjamin, Charies Baudelaire 
[CB], 85).
What Walter Benjamin said of Charles Baudelaire, living in a city undergoing 
profound transformation, characterizes Henry Miller in New York City some eighty 
years later: "He was not pleased by his times nor could he deceive himself about 
them" ("Central Park" 35). Forced to return to America at the very end of 1939 by the 
onset in Europe of the Second World War, Miller embarked on a tour of America, late 
the following year, which resulted in The Air-Conditioned Nightmare, a book critical 
of all things American but especially cities, where the mercantile spirit reigns supreme 
and people retain importance only for the role they play within the economy.
The brutality and ugliness Miller observes in America, in the way it treats so- 
called outsiders and in the cities it has built, has been a feature of American culture 
since Columbus. "Was not their precious new world reared on the destruction of the 
innocent, on rape and plunder and torture and devastation?" he questions in Tropic o f 
Capricorn (287). The men who accompanied Christopher Columbus on his voyages 
east Miller describes as "a bunch of desperate, hopeless men," {Cosmological 181); 
rather than some Romantic notion of these men as adventurers or people of high moral 
integrity seeking asylum, they "were ignorant, superstitious and filled with greed"
(181). These men and later generations of emigrants, for Miller, sewed violence in the 
soil of America. In his 1925 study of American history. In the American Grain,
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Miller's contemporary William Carlos Williams declares, of "the orgy of blood which 
followed [the Columbian 'discovery' of the Americas], no man has written. We are the 
slaughterers. It is the tortured soul of our world" (41). The violence with which the 
Spanish began their conquest o f this new land, Williams and Miller assert separately, 
remains a feature of the American psyche. The first permanent settlement foimded in 
the "New World" began a process of colonization which entailed clearing the land of 
its native inhabitants, building cities and developing industries, and watching the two 
expand, gradually at first but with increasing rapidity over the years.
Williams, in a spirit similar to that which Miller would later adopt, depicts the 
Puritans as "the bane, not the staff" (66) of life. "In those little pips, " Williams 
maintains, "a nadir, sure as the sun, was reached in which lay the character of the 
beginnings in North America" (63). The settlement of America was an act of 
imperialism and brutality, such as one finds historically—in empires assembled by the 
Romans, in the Far East (Hong Kong, India, and others) of the British, the African 
colonies of various European countries in the second half of the ninteeneth century— 
where a land and a people were colonized. The free land the predominantly British 
and Dutch colonists settled had prior inhabitants and thus was not free at all. This fact 
later necessitated the creation o f rationalizing myths like manifest destiny and the 
frontier in order to explain away the brutal and inhuman treatment of the indigenous 
populations at the hands of supposedly Christian beings (Jennings 321). ”[N]o race 
was ever more ruthlessly wiped out than the American Indian, " Miller writes. "I blush 
to think of our origins—our hands are steeped in blood and crime" {Capricorn 287). 
Such brutality flows, for Miller as for Williams, in the very veins o f Americans, and 
continues to shape their behavior.
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The Developing Gty
"John Winthrop," writes Leo Marx, "envisaged the colony the Puritans were 
about to establish as 'a city upon a hill'" (210). This city, though conceived as a 
paradise, evolved through human rather dian, as the Puritans had anticipated, divine 
agency, and thus developed a history quite different from that foreseen by John 
Winthrop. Indeed, the city, as an exemplar of human creation, has been the site of 
remarkable social and technological changes, both for better and for worse
Like everything else, cities have a history. They were usually not founded as 
"cities," did not simply spring into being fully-formed. In America, writes James 
Kunstler, "[ujntil after the Revolution, few towns were worthy of the term city" (39). 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, in the "Old World," the situation was not much different. 
Though founded well before 52 B C E ,  the year it was attacked by the Romans 
(Favier 22), only in the sixteenth century was the population and territory of Paris 
finally large enough to necessitate a guidebook (P. Ferguson 38-9). With the 
escalation of capitalist industrialization in the early 1800s, however, cities in America 
and elsewhere grew much more quickly and quite differently than imagined in 
Winthrop's "city upon a hill." Small communities such as Chicago, fortuitously 
located on Lake Michigan and the convergence of several smaller rivers, received an 
influx of industry and people looking for work, and were transformed "overnight" from 
virtual back-water encampments to major centers of business (L. Marx 210).
It was not long before these early American cities suffered "the horror of 
industrialism" (Kunstler 39); among the attendant horrors were overpopulation, 
pollution of every kind (trash, human and animal feces, rotting animal carcasses), and 
street after street of face-less, unadorned buildings. While the first two problems were
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largely resolved, though certainly not completely, the third still plagues most, perhaps 
all, American cities. Initially, there was little time for ornamentation, considered a 
luxury on the frontier, where protection from the elements as well as the need to 
produce profits constituted more pressing needs. Whereas a European city such as 
Paris might have buildings 800 years old, buildings designed to glorify God and the 
human spirit, and streets that since the sixteenth century had been ornamented just for 
the sake of decoration (Favier 184), in the New York City of 1831, the most active 
city in America was "a dismal place," a "hurriedly built place, which, combined with 
the lack of an architectural heritage, gave it a makeshift, insubstantial air" (Rybczynski 
99). It suffered notably from haphazard growth, shoddy construction, and inadequate 
housing.
American writers have often written about the city but have seldom produced 
encomiums to its beauty. Miller notes the surprise exhibited by the French when they 
read American writers who "have worse things to say about their own country than 
any foreigner" {Remember -xvvi). Vincent McHugh's largely-forgotten classic I  Am 
Thinking o f My Darling provides, however, a conspicuous exception. In this 1943 
novel. New York City is described appreciatively, the cosmopolitan aura 
sympathetically evoked. But even this work includes intimations that the city 
manifests marked faults: it takes a virus which intoxicates nearly the entire population 
of the city, rendering them uncharacteristically out-going and generous, for the 
narrator, Jim Rowan (who also happens to be an architect), to truly appreciate the city 
and to feel himself a true New Yorker. More often than not American cities are 
subject to censure, often as "a space of neutrality, . . achieved by denying to the 
environment any value of its own" (Sennett, Conscience, 55). Few American writers
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are attached to American cities the way certain French writers, André Breton and 
Louis Aragon for instance, are attached to Paris (White and White 1-2).
Early American writers, such as Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and 
Edgar Allen Poe, demonstrated a certain patriotism; though they condemned American 
cities, they believed European cities to be even worse (53). Melville, for instance, 
regards Liverpool with horror, describing the "indifference" with which Liverpudlians 
look on starving people in the streets (3S). Liverpool and London are nightmarish
(38); the American city, however, is only less so. Walt Whitman describes himself in 
"Starting from Paumonauk" as a "lover o f  populous pavements, /  Dweller in 
Mannahatta my city" (Leaves 12). Where in his poetry Whitman attempted to unite a 
divided nation, through highlighting commonality as well as emphasizing the best 
features of America and Americans, in prose pieces such as "Democratic Vistas" he 
reveals a strong ambivalence toward the success of the American experiment. His 
journalism, similarly, often presents a bleak vision of the city that has little counterpart 
in his poetry. "Mobs and murderers appear to rule the hour," he declares. "The 
revolver rules, the revolver is triumphant" (qtd. in Reynolds 106). While Whitman's 
poetry, accentuating the good, may be read as wish-fulfrllment, the journalism, more 
critical of New York City, reflects the day-to-day world he encountered. Later 
American writers such as Frank Norris, Upton Sinclair, and Theodore Dreiser present 
an even more equivocal réponse to the city, especially New York City and Chicago, 
then the second most populous city in America. Though they condemn the city, 
recognizing it as a divisive force (Bradbury 33), they often do not leave it and finally, 
like Winston Smith swooning over Big Brother, come to love it—only to later once 
again maintain their dislike (White and White 137).
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Henry Miller’s commonality with earlier American writers critical o f the city 
consists in an analysis that revolves around the industrialization of the city and its 
effect upon the inhabitants. In opposition to these earlier writers. Miller registers a 
very personal vision of the nightmarish city, for he is not looking over a character's 
shoulder, describing and commenting on the scene; rather, he vehemently depicts the 
anger, disgust, fear and delight he personally experiences, recording the ways in which 
he perceives his life has been shaped by the city and the lines of thought inspired by 
what he sees. The reader is provided the opportunity to experience Miller's various 
sensations at first hand, as if unsynthesized.
Beginning with some of his earliest attempts at writing and continuing 
throughout most of his career as a writer. Miller consistently concerns himself with 
America, particularly the American city, of which New York City is unquestionably 
the epitome. Often his enjoyment of locales such as Paris, or an island off the coast 
of Greece, is set in opposition to his experience of New York City, which he depicts 
almost uniformly negatively even as he includes the joy he experiences there. In 
works written before his first published book. Tropic o f Cancer, but only published 
within the last ten years. Miller has already targeted the American city. In Crazy 
Cock, written in the year prior to his 1930 relocation to Paris, he offers an 
encapsulated history and summary of the Greenwich Village section of New York 
City: "In the beginning were cow paths and the cow paths were all there was of the 
village. Today she sprawls out like a sick bitch debilitated by an attack of delirium 
tremens. Dreary. Greasy. Depressing" (14). Greenwich Village begins natural 
enough, as farm land, but ends a wreck, inhabited by a people corrupted by society, 
shaking with the "delirium tremens" of civilization: the corruption of the land and the
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people occurring simultaneously. The city and its inhabitants make a whole—or a hole, 
negative space from which no one can escape, space upon which few leave positive 
marks.
The people who inhabit this rotting world, though, rouse Miller’s interest and
sympathy. A poignant description of the city dwellers who do the work of industry
appears in an even earlier work, from 1925, one of Miller's mezzotints, a broadside of
sorts printed on six-by-nine inch colored cardboard. In a piece entitled "...Dawn
Travellers..." he argues.
No righteous God fashioned this bleak subway world in which the 
"Great Unwashed" scud before dawn. They look so weary, so utterly 
dejected, so futile. [....] No these monsters of despair, fashioned out of 
our industrial civilization, have yet to be portrayed. We need another 
Gustave Dore for this modem Inferno. {Mezzotints 21)
Miller evokes here the grey morning of the world of the modem factory worker living
in a hell, displaying a concern for working men and women which reappears often in
later works, most especially in Tropic o f Capricorn and The Air-Conditioned
Nightmare.
A poem depicting the weariness of the waking worker, similar to that presented 
in Miller's mezzotint, appeared some sixty-five years earlier in a poem entitled "Le 
Crépuscule du matin" by Charles Baudelaire. There, too, the writer attempts to elicit a 
sense of "human distress and heart-break" by identifying Paris with workers in the 
modem city (Leakey 40). Baudelaire, though living in a different country and in a 
different era than Henry Miller, had a remarkably similar experience of the city, in his 
case Paris, and of the results of capitalism and urban expansion. Claude Pichois, in 
his biography of the poet, characterizes Baudelaire's Paris as "a society based on law-
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of-the'jungle capitalism” (152), an accurate and pediaps even more justified 
description of New York City of die early 1900s.
As in America, in Europe there was an established history of writing about the 
city. Many French poets took Paris as their topic (Leakey 42), but Baudelaire differs 
from his contemporaries in that he does not attempt to distance himself from the city. 
While many poets of the mid-century, such as Théophile Gautier et al, subscribed to 
"I'art pour I'art," Baudelaire goes to the streets and writes about his experiences 
(Chambers, "Street," 254). Paris represents not just a setting for Baudelaire’s poetry 
but a "complex background" against which he studies "the extraordinary range of often 
mysterious behavior" the city provokes (Leakey 42). Though other poets took Paris as 
their subject, Baudelaire is considered "its laureate," for he perceives in the city a 
network of "social forces" with both "a moral and a symbolic dimension" at the root 
of "mundane urban existence" (Sharpe, Unreal Cities, 39). William Chapman Sharpe 
compares Baudelaire to another poet of the city, this time London, arguing Baudelaire 
displays "a Blakean willingness to listen and hear, however unsettling the experience," 
the noise of the crowd and to study the variety of individuals, the "types"—the 
ragpicker and the prostitute, the flâneur and the dandy—who inhabit the street and 
become the topic of much discussion (56).
Both Miller and Baudelaire, then, take the city as one of the central subjects of 
their work. Miller, whose great topic was his life lived in New York City, and 
secondarily in Paris, continuously describes his reaction to this city and the 
surrounding country. Baudelaire, meanwhile, argues throughout "Le peintre de la vie 
moderne" [The Painter of Modem Life] that the true topic for the modem artist is not 
(as sometimes supposed by many of his contemporaries) the ancient but the modem
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world, in wdiich there is great beauty; "La modernité, c'est le transitoire, le fugitif, le 
contingent, la moitié de l'art, dont l'autre moitié est l'étemal et l'immuable" [Modernity, 
it is the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent, the one half of art, of which the other 
half is the eternal and the immutable](£’cnte esthétiques 372-73). He compares the 
modem artist's response to the city to that of the Romantic's response to nature, noting 
the similarity of "the vertige' experienced in a big city to that had in nature"
(Hannoosh 176). The poems in Les Fleurs du mal, while they rarely address the city 
or its crowds directly, convey Baudelaire's experience of living in the city; the prose 
poems of Le Spleen de Paris, alternatively, contain explicit depictions of the city and 
city life.
Miller in New York and Paris in the period 1900-1945, and Baudelaire in the 
Paris of 1840-1864 share a number of sentiments, among which are a general dislike 
for the expanding city and for the consumer culture that developed in and around the 
city. These two men experience an alienation from the city, as well as from the 
culture of their respective eras. Baudelaire, allying himself with American writer 
Edgar Allen Poe (or Edgar Poe, as the French seem to prefer), best summarizes how 
his alienation, and later that of Miller's, will appear to readers of his works: "The time 
is not distant when it will be understood that a literature which refuses to make its 
way in brotherly concord with science and philosophy is a murderous and suicidal 
literature" (qtd. in Benjamin, CB, 43). Artists critical of their own era, of prominent 
features such as glitzy lighting on buildings, face not an indifferent audience but 
potentially a hostile audience, for their works will make readers and/or viewers 
uncomfortable and rouse antagonisms.
55
Acknowledging Differences
Certain differences between these two writers must be noted at the outset, 
firstly, the different genres through which tfiey approach die writing task. As we will 
see. Miller, in his novels, short stories, and essays,' makes what may amount to 
sociological asides when describing die city; Baudelaire is much more fragmentary in 
his descriptions, and allegorical in his responses to the ever-changing Parisian 
landscape, since much of his work is poetry, often sonnets. That the world of the 
modem is fragmented, however, is a theme and an aesthetic principle o f much 
literature of the late nineteenth century and of the twentieth century, perhaps 
culminating in such works as T.S. Eliot's The Wastelcmd or, much later, William S. 
Burroughs' Naked Lunch and the cut-up novels. In Baudelaire's poetry, especially in 
what Ross Chambers has called his "street poetry," the poet reveals "a 
disconnectedness of experience wiiich, since Marx, we have learned to call alienation" 
(Chambers 244). Miller's plodess novels demonstrate that, as do many o f his 
generation, he shares that alienation.
Next, though Miller also at times deplores the ugliness of certain features of 
Paris, especially the most recent additions, he venerates a city Baudelaire felt "bound" 
to by his hate, a trait often said to be typical of Parisians (Pichois 258), much as 
hatred of New York City may be a feature frequendy ascribed to New Yorkers. 
Miller's approval of Paris, however, is not one-hundred percent, nor is it based solely 
on the physical city. Rather, Miller's commendation is heightened by the Parisian 
attitude toward life, a sense that pleasure in the present has importance and need not
' Miller's works tend to resist easy categorization For instance, they mix 
autobiography, fiction, philosophy, and mysticism.
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be continually deferred, a quite different attitude from that found in a puritanical, 
work- and success-oriented America.
These two writers are obviously also active at different times; however, the city 
of Paris in 1930, though it may have been modernized technologically, still resembles 
its counterpart from eighty years earlier enough for a philosopher such as Walter 
Benjamin to explain the present through a constellation of enduring connections with 
the past. Moreover, each era is characterized by great change in relatively short 
periods of time. The two writers approach the problem of describing the experience of 
modem life and realize current language is inadequate. Even in the piece cited above, 
"...Dawn Travellers...", Miller calls for a new vision and a new approach to depicting 
the modem world. In order to represent modem experience. Miller tums from self­
consciously literary novels to novels without plot and without apparent restraint, 
producing texts often difficult to classify, in order to incorporate the numerous asides 
that could sometimes stand alone, employing a language characterized by obscenity 
and verbal pyrotechnics.
Baudelaire, too, realized he had to develop "a new, comprehensive urban 
aesthetic" in order to "take in tous les hôpitaux e t . . .  tous les palais'" [all the 
hospitals and . . .  all the palaces] (Sharpe 39). The city of Paris had undergone such 
great change that it "brought traditional models of interpretation into question" so that 
Baudelaire was forced to fashion what Patricia Ferguson calls a "new literature of 
articulation" (117). Baudelaire moves away from objective, factual realism to "cruel 
realism . . . where the most brutally physical details encompass the most subtle 
metaphysical reflections" (Lombardo 152). Patrizia Lombardo provides as example the 
French verb "hurlait" (to scream), which is attributed to the street in "À une passante"
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[To a (female) Passerby], which transforms the street into a troubling site of violence, 
"dehumanizing the human voice, disfiguring architectural structures" (153). 
Furthermore, that the verb is in the imparfait, the imperfect tense, indicates that the 
"screaming" began at some indefinite point in the past and suggests the deforming 
action is prolonged rather than of a relatively brief duration. Baudelaire's poem 
"Correspondances" offers a sort of aesthetic manifesto, similar to those later produced 
in great numbers by the French Surrealists and other avant-garde groups (the Italian 
Futurists, for instance) in the first four decades of the twentieth century, explaining 
that the verbs and adjectives descriptive of the various senses must be exchanged (an 
technique termed "synesthesia") in order to provide a more full and accurate depiction 
of modem life.
These two writers, Henry Miller and Charles Baudelaire, despite important 
differences, are more alike than not in their responses to their respective worlds. 
Though not contemporaries, the worlds they live in, the problems they face and the 
way they choose to face them, contain enough similarities that the differences between 
them are, generally, instructive.
Defining the Oty
Though it is a task seldom attempted by writers-on-the-city (there is for 
instance no definition of "city" in James Kunstler’s book on the American city- and 
town-scape), it is essential to attempt the difficult job of defining, or at least sketching 
an outline of, what is meant when one uses the word "city." Christopher Prendergast 
typifies the difficulties inherent in defining "city-ness" when he examines the 
assumption underlying the works of Honoré de Balzac and his contemporaries; the
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city "is what goes without saying, either too obvious or too complex for anything other 
than the knowledge or weary self-evidence of tautological statement" (179). Similar to 
the cliche "If you have to ask how much it costs, you can’t afford it," either you know 
what a city is or you've never been in one, the implication being that words alone 
cannot adequately define a city, that it must be experienced.
However, certain characteristics can be compiled that add up to "city-ness." 
Cities, for instance, are generally associated with "concentrations of people" 
(Rybczynski 36). Still, as Rybczynski himself acknowledges, this is vague.
Throughout history, various population densities have been considered sufficient for 
the designation city, anywhere between three hundred and three thousand people or 
more has been considered adequate (36-7). Walled French cities of the middle ages, 
with populations between two to three thousand people, "functioned like modem 
neighborhoods" (37) rather than cities, intimating the inhabitants knew each other and 
were typically familiar with all comers of the city, which were easily if not always 
safely accessible. Modem, industrialized cities, however, are generally considered 
places where it is impossible for one person to know everybody. Friedrich Engels, in 
an early, proto-sociological work entitled The Condition o f  the Working Class in 
England, describes people in London passing "by one another as though they had 
nothing in common, nothing to do with one another, and their only agreement is the 
tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the pavement"; people tend to become 
alienated from one another due to the sheer size of the population of a modem, 
capitalist city (69).
The notion of "city-ness," then, has changed under capitalism, or, more 
accurately, it has expanded, both in population and territory. Though Engels, writing
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in 1844, refers to London—inaccurately—as a "town,"* he describes the capitalist city as 
a place "where a man may wander for hours together without reaching the beginning 
of the end, without meeting the slightest hint which could lead to the inference that 
there is open country within reach . . (68). The city has grown to such proportions
that it has forced nature to retreat, walling itself in with factories and tenements rather 
than the bricks that characterized so many medieval European cities.
Another characteristic of cities is that they are usually deemed "self-sufficient"
(39); people bring their wares to the city rather than representatives of the city going 
to the countryside to fetch what the city requires. Villagers generally travelled to the 
city on a regular basis to sell their hand-made wares or home-grown products and to 
purchase at least some household necessities. The city, then, functions as a magnet, 
attracting what it needs—raw materials, products, and workers—while producing 
finished goods that will induce repeated visits from those in the surrounding 
countryside and beyond.
By the nineteenth century, cities were generally recognized to be distinguished 
by "industrial employment, access to power sources (steam, gas, and, eventually, 
electricity), pollution, literacy, technological innovation, unemployment, social reform" 
(Rybczynski 49). The city of the twentieth century, though still an economic center, is 
less easily defined, for now people often live outside these centers but commute in on 
a daily basis, to work and/or shop, thus making the split between city and town or city 
and village much more fluid. In fact, expanding cities like Paris and New York City
* Engels describes London, within the same paragraph, as "the commercial capital 
of the world" (68), which should confirm the label of "city."
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have simply incorporated some villages, w^at we might today call "suburbs," that once 
lay outside the city perimeter.
Importantly, cities have often been the seat of power. For centuries, Paris was 
home to the French monarchy and, when Louis XTV decided Paris was becoming too 
unruly and unpredictable, he transferred his throne to Versailles, a village not too 
distant ftom Paris. In Germany, which was at best a coalition of sovereigns rather 
than a united country until 1871, princes and dukes built their castles in the principal 
cities, die hauptstadten, of their domains. With capitalist industrialization, large 
populations in cities signified more than large armies for the military. Again 
describing London, Engels writes, "this heaping together of two and a half millions of 
human beings at one point, has multiplied the power of this two and a half millions a 
hundredfold" (68). Power, now economic as well as military, concentrated and 
organized, is reflected in the opulent homes of the rulers as well as in the sheer 
volume of products a city produces and, especially, exports.
The reason few writers attempt to define "city-ness" is clear: the city has 
become a semanricisfs nightmare. What constitutes "city-ness" constantly changes, as 
populations grow, technologies evolve, and events occur that offer populations 
different possibilities for social organization hence different power structures.
However, the description of the nineteenth century city (with the exception of some 
features—access to electricity and literacy—which are widely available in the West) as a 
capitalist-industrial, thus political, center will suffice, without attaching a specific, and 
arbitrary, number for population concentration, while still recognizing that the city 
requires a population sufficient to operate its political and economic machinery.
6 1
Benefîcial Aspects to Cities
It is appropriate to note, before exploring critiques of the city put forth by 
Miller and Baudelaire, that cities clearly do not simply represent social evils that 
should be wiped off the face of the earth—and that neither writer assumes such a one­
dimensional position. Leo Marx notes another characteristic of "city-ness" is that in 
cities we generally find culture and the institutions that both support and inspire it, 
"universities, libraries, theaters, museums, galleries, publishers, printers—almost 
invariably have been located in cities" (211). Cities also offer individuals a chance to 
recreate themselves, since anonymity, found in the crowds of cities, allows them the 
requisite space. Cities, then, represent a site of creation.
Furthermore, though today we sometimes consider cities to be almost faceless 
(Kunstler tellingly entitled his critique of the American landscape The Geognphy o f  
Nowhere), cities at least at one time manifested a semblance of identity "that indicated 
that at least some personality flourished" (Coldfield and Brownell 193), though even in 
the nineteenth century American cities and culture "demonstrated a startling tendency 
toward a far-flung homogeneity" (Rybczynski 112), or what Richard Sennett has 
called, in The Conscience o f  the Eye, "neutrality." Coldfield and Brownell, in a book 
often highly critical of cities, agree with Leo Marx "that only a city could support such 
a variety of architecture, peoples, shops, gardens . . . that lent a special character to 
that particular city" (193). The authors provide the example of a "well-travelled 
gentleman" of the mid-1800s who could tell the difference between New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington D C , although adding that "each [city] 
borrowed each other’s innovations with impunity" (193). "A visitor," they assert,
"could indeed tell whether he or she was in Chicago or Mobile, though both had
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gridiron streets, new urban parks, and a dozen other characteristics in common" (193). 
These characteristics included a variety of improvements so that by the end of the 
century the city was more aesthetically pleasing, as well as a healthier place to live, 
than it had been at the beginning of the century (189). These improvements were 
often shared characteristics—"Some streets were paved, gas-lighting adorned the 
thoroughfares, sewer systems flushed many city streets" (189), and thus cities for a 
brief period in the late nineteenth century offered inhabitants health benefits not found 
in smaller towns or in the countryside. Such benefits were, however, 
disproportionately located in regions where the middle and upper classes lived.
Henry Miller's writings on the city reveal his experience of the city as anything 
but one-dimensional. Like many of his modernist contemporaries, as well as those 
who came before him, Dreiser and Sherwood Anderson, for example. Miller’s reaction 
to the modem city can best be described as ambivalent. He roundly condemns the 
city, as we will soon see, and yet takes great inspiration and joy from the city. It is a 
text he returns to repeatedly, finding it endlessly stimulating, endlessly frustrating.
Mid-Century Paris, America, and City Planning
Baudelaire's Paris was the hub of French capitalism. The Paris of Les Fleurs 
du Mal, writes Susan Buck-Morss in her study of Benjamin's Paris Arcades project. 
The Dialectic o f Seeing, stood "at the bursting point of unprecedented material 
abundance" (178). A depression between the years 1846 and 1851 forced many 
peasants to leave their villages for the city, especially Paris, in search of work (Wright 
179). The Paris they entered provided a home to "Europe's most highly centralised 
government," and was, as well, a frequent site of "experimental revolution " (Collier
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25), revolutions having occurred there at least three times (1789, 1830, 1848) in the 
previous sixty years. It was the era of the Paris Arcades, precursors to modem 
department stores, and of Haussmannization, that traumatic transformation of the 
familiar historic Paris into modem Paris with "uniform facades" and long, wide 
boulevards (P. Ferguson 118). This transformation of Paris left many Parisians, bom 
and raised in the old Paris, bewildered, an experience Baudelaire relates in his poem 
"Le Cygne." A similar occurrence befell citizens of American cities after the Civil 
War, due to increasing industrialization (Trachtenberg 115), an exodus of people from 
the country to the city analogous to that experienced in France, and further waves of 
immigrants from various comers of the world.
Many old European cities, such as Paris, can be described as organic, meaning 
they were founded and grew as people arrived and built their own communities to fit 
their needs. Over time, various sections were "gradually knitted together" and a city 
took shape (Rybczynski 46). Little city planning, beyond that dictated by geographical 
circumstances (the Seine for instance), was initially involved. The Romans usually 
imposed a grid layout in the center, but often left the peripheries to develop for 
themselves (Favier 163-64), such that by the Middle Ages Paris was characterized by 
the lack of a simple passage across the city, due to the narrow width of the streets, 
usually only one or two meters wide (167). "Saint-Denis, called in 1310 the largest 
street in Paris,' was only six meters wide" (167). Later, management of growth and 
expansion became a practical necessity. Paris has a history of city planning, dating 
back to the period when French kings first consolidated power, planning that has 
consistently involved "an aesthetic vision" (Rybc^nski 24), though certainly not all 
"visions" have been considered equally pleasing.
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As opposed to the organic design of most European cities, many cities in 
America were designed solely on the grid pattern, which involved dividing land into 
square-shaped, identically-sized parcels for easy sale. Their grids, imposed upon 
terrains "as a weapon to be used against environmental character" (Seimett, 
Conscience, 52), ignored natural features, occasionally to the detriment of the city.
For example, the grid that Manhattan was laid out in had deleterious effects upon the 
water table (53). A further liability of the grid pattern as a foundation for city design, 
however, is that it fosters a certain attitude toward the land constituting the city, one 
foreign to many Europeans^; "the city as 'real estate' [property] rather than as 
communal space" (Trachtenberg 116). Laying out a city in a grid pattern often had 
the effect of producing cities designed not for people but for profit, to provide quick 
financial returns to investors with a minimum of risk and initial outlay. The use of 
each plot of land was left to the owner’s discretion, even if at odds with what 
surrounded it. A factory, for instance, producing a great deal of smoke, noise, and 
waste might be built near houses. Moreover, no one ensured that the inhabitants of 
the grid-city had some place to meet or to enjoy leisure time. Grid cities, again, did 
not arise with America; they had precedents in ancient Egypt and Rome. But where 
this design once had spread out from a center and fostered complexity, in America the 
grid served "to deny that complexity and difference existed in the environment" 
(Sennett 48), and, furthermore, provided little or no basis for the organization of 
communal life, assured in earlier versions.
 ^ I would argue, however, that one result of the "Americanisation" of Europe and, 
indeed, the world is just such a change in attitude toward the land. In Europe, we are 
beginning to see full-blown suburbs executed in the American style.
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Citing examples of what he terms "the chessboard form" in many previous
cultures on the verge of decline, Babylon and Tenochtitlàn for example, Oswald
Spengler, in an argument Miller will appropriate, rates these grid-based cities
"soulless," perceiving in them signs of the decay of civilization itself (248). While
some might perceive the sinister specter of socialism or communism in the concept of
overseers for city planning, such planning "also reflects human ambitions and desires":
the desires of French kings, for instance, to transform Paris from a small, dingy
medieval city into an appropriately ornate seat for the monarchy (Rybczynski 127).
Architect Louis Sullivan argued repeatedly that architects should seek to evoke the
spirit of the citizens of a region or country in their buildings, rather than adopt styles
wholesale from other countries. Sullivan encourages his readers to read everything, to
go beyond the printed page and to read landscapes. When he studies the American
cityscape, what he reads there, writes Sullivan, is that
[t]his Architecture shows no love of Nature—you despise Nature. In it 
is no joy of living—you know not what the fullness of life signifies—you 
are unhappy, fevered and perturbed. In these buildings the Dollar is 
vulgarly exalted—and the Dollar you place above Man. You adore it 
twenty-four hours each day: it is your God! (IB?)"*
America, precisely because it has skewed values, as exemplified in its cities, has
ceased for Sullivan to be a truly creative place, the people half-dead.
Lacking public space and buildings o f anything more than use-value, a city 
designed on the grid pattern represents "surveying rather than town planning," the 
basic benefit being "simplicity and speed of execution" (Rybczynski 69). Since large 
parts of American cities are in the hands of private individuals and no one is charged
* I have preserved Sullivan's idiosyncratic capitalization and punctuation wherever 
I have quoted him.
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with providing an aesthetic plan for the city, some features of cities simply reflect the 
outcome of "idiosyncratic decisions ": what results is not so much a city as a jumble 
(30)/ In the United States, the absolute freedom of the individual appears to be more 
important than imbuing a city with a sense of community. Laissez-faire attitudes 
toward property ownership, the belief that owners can do whatever they please with 
their property, encourages them to attempt to make as much profit as possible off land, 
whether to the benefit or detriment of the community at large. In such an atmosphere, 
notes Lewis Mumford in his study The City in History, owners endeavored "to utilize 
every square foot of rentable space"" even when the land was designated for "private 
use and not . . . sheer pecuniary exploitation"" (428). Trying to crowd as much as 
possible onto a parcel of land, however, is not as fiscally promising as it may at first 
appear, because it does not necessarily follow that immediate profits will be 
maximized, "nor is [the property] likely to remain sound and attractive enough to 
ensure profitable exploitation"" over a stretch of many years (428). It has long been 
assumed by Americans that free enterprise automatically looks to all needs, provides 
for all wants, without requiring the guiding hand of any person or persons: American 
cities often provide evidence to the contrary.
While Haussmann was roundly criticized by many of his contemporaries for his 
renovation of Paris during his reign as Napoleon Ill s prefect for Paris, Howard 
Saalman argues that both Haussmann and Napoleon HI had great plans for Paris,
* Zoning and Planning are two different issues. Zoning is more passive, merely 
defining (often arbitrarily) what may or may not be done with a certain piece of land 
(residential, business), loosely based on features of the land, without providing a 
detailed vision of the city. Planning determines the needs of the inhabitants and seeks 
to satisfy them when completing a design of the city.
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intending "to improve the city, not destroy it" (114), though one does not preclude the 
other.® Much was tom down—"most of the area between Les Halles and le Marais 
which during the July Monarchy had been the cite of large insurrections and the 
erection of barracades," along with a number of streets on the Left Bank that had 
served as a center for "student agitation" (Favier 210)—to roll out the new, wide 
boulevards that now seem so identifiably Parisian. Still, adjacent to these boulevards 
remained "the tightly knit, highly organic, and lively fabric of the old town" (Saalman 
114). Paris, though permanently altered—industries and workers had largely been 
forced to the outskirts of the city (Marchand 128)—was still Paris.
James Kunstler is a much less forgiving observer than Saalman. In his view. 
Modernity, under the influence of capitalism, "dedicated itself to the worship of 
machines, to sweeping away all architectural history, all romantic impulses and to 
jamming all human aspiration into a plain box" (Kunstler 57). Though speaking 
specifically of America, Kunstler’s statement is true, in part, of Paris during the period 
of Haussmannization, for Haussmann, after demolishing blocks of old Paris, proudly 
labelled himself an "artiste démolisseur'' (Benjamin, CB, 174). Certainly not everyone 
was pleased with the new Paris, as we will see. But never "in their wildest dreams of 
demolition," Saalman asserts, did either Napoleon HI or Haussmann consider tearing 
"down all of old Paris in order to rebuild it anew" (114), a project Le Corbusier would 
later suggest. In those charged with expanding the city of Paris, or renovating sections 
so that needs of certain of its citizens could be met, there was the desire to enhance
® Implicit in most accounts of Haussmannization is that the city is "improved" for 
the bourgeois class but "ruined" for the working class, whose communities most often 
fell foul of Haussmann's boulevards.
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Paris, to make it a better city to live in, to facilitate circulation of traffic, but not at the 
cost of divorcing it from its past/ Benjamin has pointed out a French propensity, 
regarding construction in cities, one that critics of American cities usually find lacking 
in their own cities: "the tendency . . .  to ennoble technical exigencies with artistic 
aims" {CB 173). American cities, and those people charged with designing or 
expanding them, have generally been "bottom-line" fixated, with profits rather than 
aesthetics the most important if not the sole measure of success.
In a behavior pattern that continues to characterize America, but has been 
particularly prominent since the end of the Civil War, when old buildings were 
demolished in America, more often than not what went up in their place were usually 
"new buildings of a different kind" (Trachtenberg 118), thus tending to make of the 
old city a completely new entity with very little or no cormection to its past. In Paris, 
overseers almost uniformly ensured that no such transformations occurred. Even 
during the height of Haussmannization, a committee "exercised a harmonizing 
influence on individual buildings" to ensure a certain cohesiveness in the city 
landscape (Rybczynski 152n). Plus, Haussmaim's architects, attentive to the history of 
the city, "favored the classical style" (152n) so that, as Anthony Sutcliffe notes in 
Paris: An Architectural History, "the result was a classical architecture for the 
industrial era rather than an industrial architecture" (qtd. in Rybczynski 152n).
’ Benjamin and many others have noted the political dimension to Haussmann's 
renovations, arguing the wide boulevards were intended to prevent barricades, and the 
destruction of bohemian neighborhoods, such as the old Carrousel, represented another 
attack on disruptive elements. If there were such a political dimension to the 
renovations, the rise of Paris Commune in 1871 demonstrates its failure.
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Haussmannization notwithstanding, expansion of Paris has often occurred with
as little demolition as possible. Henry IV's projects for Paris, in the early seventeenth
century, "involved no extensive demolition whatever" (Saalman 35); the same is true
of Louis XTV's schemes at the end of the same century (41). When renovation of
Paris occurred under the Restoration, in the early nineteenth century, of the 687 houses
demolished, 404 came down because they were dilapidated and 283 because they
stood in the way of the plaimed reorganization o f the city (Favier 197). But when the
first railroads were built in central France in the eighteen-thirties and -forties, they did
not penetrate Paris proper; "No one dreamed," writes Saalman, "of cutting a passage
for these iron roads into the heart of the city," not merely for the demolition it would
involve but also for the resulting pollution and congestion (44-5). Napoleon HI and
Baron von Haussmann, of course, reversed that predilection against destruction,
levelling entire sections of old Paris, here and there, and bringing the railroad into the
heart of the city. However, even with such large scale change, Paris and other
European cities, still "retained a residue of earlier stages" (Trachtenberg 115). "In
America," writes Henry Miller,
though there are vestiges [of the past], they are effaced, wiped out of 
the consciousness, trampled upon, obliterated, nullified by the new. The 
new is, from day to day, a moth which eats into the fabric of life, 
leaving nothing finally but a great hole. {Ccpricom 217)
Worship of the new has consistently guided city-building in America, but that same
worship of the new, rather than a search for consistent and distinctively American
style, results in transparent or "neutral" cities. Robert Twambly reports that of the
more than 190 buildings Louis Sullivan designed and built, between 1879 and 1922,
only 50 remained in 1987 (xi). What is sometimes called character, distinguishing
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features o f a city, retreats as the past is effaced. Most American cities lack "old 
towns" which serve "as a visible memory" or reminder of the city's history 
(Trachtenberg 115). Rybczynski acknowledges that the markers of the past are often 
"impatiently discarded," but optimistically argues that all this tearing down and 
building up is "evidence of a constant striving to correct and improve, o f an attempt to 
finally get it right" (34), suggesting that "striving" alone, however blind or 
schizophrenic, is enough. In 1908, Sullivan condemns American architecture arguing, 
"we neither do things right, inquire how to do things right, see things right, nor attend, 
nor reflect" (197), asserting his contention that Americans lack the patience that could 
result in wisdom, hence in cities that could rival the best Europe has to offer.
When expansion of American cities occurred, construction often took place on 
the outskirts of cities, where cheaper acreage was often available, rather than in the 
center where land remained a limited commodity and was thus more expensive.
Rather than utilizing available buildings in the city center, many businesses opted to 
locate themselves on the outskirts where rents were lower. Thus the American city, by 
the early twentieth century, "was vital and dynamic on its fringe, and often decaying 
in its core" (Coldfield and Brownell 304). Responsibility for social services as well as 
city planning were "divided among a number of autonomous municipalities" (304) 
whose attempts to improve the city were not coordinated. Similar to what some 
Parisians experienced during Haussmannization, the American city, in a rush of 
change, was no longer recognizable "to those who had resided there for only a 
generation" (308). Miller understands America as a place "where things grow so fast 
and so large over night" (A Her Retour 18), buildings popping up like pimples, change 
more or less unthinkingly signifying "progress."
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Neighborhoods, too, change swiftly; the population of Miller's beloved 
Williamsburg, a region of Brooklyn, was completely transformed between 1890-1914 
due to an influx of Jewish immigrants (R_ Ferguson 13); Miller cites, several decades 
later, the slums on the south side of Chicago, where former mansions of the rich were 
divided into apartments and inhabited by working class black people {Nightmare 52). 
The modem American city was gradually "becoming more spatially divided by 
economic status," the wealthy living in ever-greater opulence while for the poor "the 
burdens of poverty" yielded greater misery (Coldfield and Brownell 149). At the same 
time, the wealthy and near-wealthy began to move to the outskirts of town (210), 
finding there more space and greater safety. No city planners attempted to channel the 
growth involved in this outpouring from the city center, until the nineteen-sixties when 
the city centers were at last considered sites for "urban renewal."
Where Paris grew along with the environment, only much later experiencing 
the imposition of grand designs that affected some or all comers of Paris, American 
cities laid out in grids grew haphazardly, away from city centers where these existed. 
Where Paris remained Paris, American cities often lost whatever character they had 
once possessed and became "neutralized." Marshall Berman discusses the influence of 
a self-proclaimed son of Haussmann, Robert Moses, who transformed New York City 
between the nineteen-twenties and the nineteen-sixties. At first his projects, according 
to Berman, improved the city, for the most part, removing refuse piles, improving 
traffic circulation, providing beaches. But later, his projects grew in size and 
destructiveness, such that a highway through the Bronx in the nineteen-fifties, which 
could have been run around the neighborhood, effectively destroyed the communities
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and businesses there, creating a wasteland (367-68). Not even Haussmann's 
destruction left such lingering devastation.
Flânerie, Lmsfwradon, and EilEe: Gty Streets and Crowds^
Both writers acquired knowledge of their respective cities directly on the 
streets. For Miller and Baudelaire, this consciousness was arrived at through flânerie: 
through walking the streets of a city and observing, moving as it were instinctualiy, in 
order to gain knowledge and understanding of the city (Blanchard 73-4). Flâneurs thus 
can be divided into two groups, those "who merely experience it" and those "who 
understand the city"; experience followed by understanding is the goal for the 
"highest" (P. Ferguson 90).
Miller, while trying to make sense of his world, complains Americans in 
general "refuse to look facts in the face, or rather, to look behind the facts for the 
reality which animates them" {Remember 323). Facts do not in and of themselves 
produce knowledge; it is the ordering of facts and gaining insight into the reality, or 
perhaps structure of forces, behind them that constitutes knowledge. Sullivan, in a 
1906 essay, draws a correlation Miller will later take up, between the American 
acceptance of dismal cities and their unwillingness to "draw aside a word-mask to see 
. . . the countenance of reality which it may both reveal and conceal" (191). Much in 
late capitalist western culture must be interrogated because so often words attached to
* An assumption in this section is flâneurs were male. For an essay on the female 
flâneurie see Janet Wolffs "The Invisible Flâneuse: Women and the Literature of 
Modernity" in The Problems o f  Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, Andrew Benjamin, 
ed.. New York: Routledge, 1989.
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facts, to movements, to actions and objects function as labels which short-circuit
thought. Horkheimer and Adorno write.
Terms themselves become impenetrable; they obtain a striking force, a 
power of adhesion and repulsion which makes them like their extreme 
opposite, incantations. They come to be a kind of trick. [....] The layer 
of experience which created the words for their speakers has been 
removed; in this swift appropriation language acquires the coldness 
which until now it had only on billboards and in the advertisement 
columns of newspapers. (164-66)
Language often contains currents of propoganda, functioning to obscure issues through
implicit assertions and simplifications. Americans in Miller's view remain, for the
most part, uncritical, blind to what they see on the streets, accepting what should not
be accepted. The vrâXQX-flâneur attempts to reunite his world with experience as he
lives it, to elude as much as possible the meanings daily projected upon him and his
world.
Roaming the city on foot, hence, should not necessarily be mistaken for aimless 
wandering, though Benjamin contends wnxer-flâneurs "have traversed the city absently, 
as it were, lost in thought or worry" {CB 69). He further asserts an important 
characteristic in Baudelaire was his "absent-mindedness" {CB 69). For "absent- 
minded,"® however, I would substitute "preoccupied": Baudelaire, on many of his 
walks, was absorbed in his poetry, his essays, his financial worries, his mistress(es), or 
his troubled relationship with his mother—Miller, as we will see, shared similar 
obsessions—but he was not oblivious to his surroundings. The importance of this 
distinction, between preoccupied and césent-minded, lays in the fact that both enjoyed 
a heightened, rather than diminished, awareness of their surroundings due to their
’ The German word "abwesend" is used by Benjamin and accurately translated by 
Harry Zohn.
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overwrought states. They would imprint their moods on the passing architecture, 
window displays, and faces, and derive associations, arrest impressions and freeze 
them in the moment. Hence, Benjamin's assertion that flâneurs have not drawn the 
"revealing presentations of the city" constitutes a half-truth. The traditional flâneur 
may not have been a writer, but writers, like Miller and Baudelaire, who have layed 
the city bare, were also flâneurs: people who knew their city, who had internalized 
the city through direct and thorough contact with it.
In such a way, the 'mixer-flâneur also differs from many analysts of conditions 
in the city, who tend to remain aloof from the object of study. While reporting he 
knew Manchester "as intimately as my own native town" (83), Engels, in his study of 
working class conditions in Manchester and elsewhere in England, repeatedly decries 
the seemingly willed blindness of those entrusted with examining working class 
conditions. They have not seen working class neighborhoods, nor the dwellings these 
people inhabit, nor the factories they work in—and yet they file their reports, 
documents that will do little or nothing to improve the conditions of the working class. 
Moreover, those who do penetrate these regions often cannot divest themselves of 
even the most blatant of class prejudices and, thus, tend to blame the working class 
itself for the misery rather than the system. The ymixer-flâneur, in contrast, studies his 
subject personally and opens himself to that subject, struggling to imaginatively cross 
class boundaries, attempting to function as medium before interpreter, wimess before 
judge. Further, he believes he stands outside the system that so many must bolster for 
fear of losing all; his detachment, pretended or otherwise, allows him insights that 
might escape others.
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For the flâneur, familiar with the reality behind the facts o f the streets, the 
street is "an interior" where he is "at home" (Benjamin, CB, 37). Signs, shop 
windows, advertisements, architecture and architectural anomalies "are at least as good 
a wall ornament as an oil painting is to a bourgeois in his salon" (37). Benjamin notes 
that the flâneur was at times an "unwilling detective," but that such ventures were a 
benefit for "it accredits his idleness" (40-1). Flânerie requires an active intelligence 
searching out inspiration in the city, a point of entry from which to explore the 
experience of living in a specific moment and to begin the process of translating the 
moment into words; Baudelaire depicts the vmtei-flâneur traversing the city, 
"Trébuchant sur les mots comme sur les pavés" [Tripping over words as over the 
cobblestones] ("Le Soleil, FM, 92).
The flâneur, as a type, was "a distinctive feature of modem Paris" (P. Ferguson 
90) during the first half of the nineteenth century, then fading out as a discernable 
figure sometime after the middle of the century, with the rise of the modem 
department store, which replaced the passages that had served as a popular attraction 
for flâneurs}° In an article on Realism and Walter Benjamin, John Rignall regards the 
flâneur as an "overdetermined figure," the result of too many studies and of too many 
depictions in nineteenth century literature (113). However, a general portrait should 
include that the flâneur was usually a man of private means, though not always of 
great wealth, such that working for a living was not an absolute requirement. Thus 
there is in the flâneur a "lack o f identification" with the cityscape surrounding him
Benjamin suggests as much when he writes of the department store as a sign of 
the "interior’s decay," CB, 54. For more on the passages and department stores, see 
Chapter Two.
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(Blanchard 91). He stands on the "margin," neither a member of the bourgeois class, 
from which he often originated, nor a worker, drawing inspiration from the streets 
(Benjamin, CB, 170). By virtue of his marginality, he is, or conceives himself to be, 
an objective observer. It is not one or another part of the city he desires, but "the city 
as a whole" (P. Ferguson 84). For the flâneur, however, the actual, physical layout of 
the city comprises one "text" (38) and the people who populate it yet another.
A defining feature of any city is the character of its inhabitants. The flâneur 
does not wish to become personally acquainted with people of all classes, even 
hypothesizing that such meetings would sway objectivity, but he joins the crowd to 
"gain personal experience of its alienation" (Blanchard 73-4). He prefers to survey 
people with a certain aloofness, so that those who fall under his gaze do not step out 
of character. Benjamin argues the decisive influence of the crowd on Baudelaire, for 
"through it he saw Paris" (Illuminations 168). Baudelaire's observations of the crowd 
focus on the poor and destitute, the underdogs—and those who "accommodate his 
mood"—in order to expose differences among members of the city crowd (Blanchard 
93). These differences serve to distinguish the variety of peoples produced by a city, 
by Paris.
In "Le Vieux Saltimbanque," Baudelaire describes a circus where he observes 
an old, downcast clown, "voûté, caduc, décrépit, une ruine d'homme, adossé contre un 
des poteaux de sa cahute" [bent, old-fashioned, decrepit, a ruin of a man, leaning 
against one of the props of his hut] (Le Spleen de Paris 100), but finds himself carried 
away from the scene by the crowd, unable to return, led on to other sights. This loss 
of control is among the most satisfying experiences for the flâneur, "willingly 
surrendering himself to the stimulating but demanding shocks, penetrations, and gazes
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of this 'ineffable orgy'" (Sharpe 52). The experience might be comparable to a voyeur 
wiio, stumbling upon a couple making love in a park, discretely stands behind a tree to 
observe—the lovers unaware diey are performing.
Where some might find the city crowds, among which the flâneur must
circulate, frightening even alienating, Baudelaire writes that one must "épouser la
foule" [join/marry the crowd]:
Pour le parfait flâneur, pour l'observateur passionné, c'est une immense 
jouissance que d'élire domicile dans le nombre, dans l'ondoyant, dans le 
mouvement, dans le fugitif et l'infini. Être hors de chez soi, et pourtant 
se sentir partout chez soi; voir le monde, être au centre du monde et 
rester caché au monde . . . .
[For the perfect flâneur, for the impassioned observer, it is an immense 
pleasure to choose residence in number, in the undulation, in motion, in 
the ephemeral and the infinite. To be away from home and yet to feel 
everywhere at home; to see the world, to be at the center of the world 
and remain hidden to the world . . . .] {Ecrits 369)
These pleasures, writes Baudelaire, are among the greatest a sensitive soul can
experience (369), for there is depth to the experience, a result of its dialectical nature:
one is part of something and not, grounded in the world and outside it. Like an
intravenous drug-user who injects a speedball, a concoction that is half heroin (a
depressant) and half cocaine (a stimulant), the flâneur experiences a rupture, if only
momentarily, that leads to (a possibly dangerous) rapture. He must be able to
maintain control and make sense of this experience of the crowd and the various sights
it affords him; thus it is no wonder a new language is required.
Few flâneurs articulate their experiences in poems or written works. Rather, 
the flâneur represents both an image of the poet, as a discerning observer, as well as 
another figure for the poet to observe. Flânerie, for the poet, involves a certain 
projection, distantiation. The vmxct-flâneur must first seek to stand outside the city.
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outside any particular class, outside the crowd, must actually tear himself away from 
all structures that seek to restrain him in order, as Marc Blanchard asserts, to create 
new meanings, new interpretations of all he encounters (82). Once free, the flâneur 
can observe the city as it is at that very moment and attempt to assimilate the 
multiplicity of perspectives it contains, funneling these perceptions into paintings, 
novels, poetry, essays, or, more typically, simple café conversation.
The writer-flâneur, ambulatory and curious, comes closest to depicting the city 
in the fleeting moment, for he is a "moving observer in the midst of a moving city" 
(82). Such a comprehensive depiction is quite possibly doomed to failure; however, 
the quantity of input available provides the writer-flâneur a source from which to pick 
and choose (P. Ferguson 93). A poet such as Baudelaire examines an encounter, 
attempts to reexperience it, and thus to become "attuned to the secrets of the city" and 
to lose himself in it (Blanchard 80).
Baudelaire "wishes to embrace the city in its strangeness," to observe features 
of Paris recognized by few Parisians, yet he is not interested in making it other, does 
not seek "to reduce the strangeness of the world at hand" through an exhaustive listing 
of landmarks and facts that might help locate the reader on familiar terrain (Blanchard 
76). Instead, he warns "le spectre en plein jour raccroche le passant" [the specter in 
broad daylight sidetracks the passerby] and "les mystères partout coulent" [mysteries 
circulate everywhere] ("Les Sept Vieillards," FM, 97). But where Blanchard sees this 
indeterminacy as an attempt to make Paris "one city, any city" (76), it can also be 
interpreted as a stripping away of the familiar city in order to remake it as the poet 
perceives and experiences it, a setting for Baudelaire's experiences of his city: the 
ever-changing, personal city of Paris, rather than the monumental, eternal city of Paris.
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While, for Benjamin, Blanchard, and others, Baudelaire is an archetype for the 
flâneur, the flaneur need not be considered a purely nineteenth-century phenomenon. 
Surrealists such as André Breton and Louis Aragon write texts, Nadja and Le Paysan 
de Paris, respectively, employingyZônenc as a sort of modus operandus. Adrian 
Rifkin, in his book on Parisian popular culture of the early twentieth century, traces 
the flâneur into the twentieth century citing writers Francis Carco and Pierre Mac 
Orlan, among others, as prominent examples (17). Henry Miller, too, is a twentieth 
century flâneur. In the "Paris books" and The Rosy Crucifixion, one reads of his life 
on the streets and what he experiences there, both in New York City and Paris, among 
the varieties of architecture and the crowds.
In Tropic o f Capricorn, Miller recounts his life on the streets of New York City 
in the nineteen-twenties, where he retreats to avoid the unhappy apartment he shares 
with his wife and infant daughter. Elsewhere he relates that this troubled domestic 
scene, his aversion for America, die misery he felt himself mired in at work drove him 
to the streets: "I had to take what was happening to me and walk the streets with it" 
{Black Spring 118), he writes. But it is not only misery and the need to endure that 
takes Miller, or any flâneur, to the streets. Declaring his affection for the city, ugly 
and depressing as it often is, he writes, "To be lost in a great city is the greatest joy I 
know; to become oriented is to lose everything" {Cosmological Eye 346), especially 
the ability to be surprised. Orientation, however, is not merely spatial, found in the 
knowledge of which streets intersect where and the best route from point A to point B, 
but also involves recognizing distinctive features and facets o f each street, from an 
architectural perspective to the people one is likely to meet or particular smells 
resulting from the variety of ethnic cuisines prepared in the area. Dion Moloch, the
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protagonist of Moloch set in early nineteen-twenties New York City, exemplifies the 
knowingness the flâneur brings to the street: "What was it about Bedford Avenue that 
tickled him so? Not the upper reaches, mind you . . . .  [But] Down near the fountain, 
where the avenue first broadens out and begins to take on dignity—ikteX. was the 
section" (emphasis added, 101). The flâneur has an educated eye, one that has learned 
to read and characterize the streets, that notes features it does not like—the regions of 
Bedford Avenue "where the dour bourgeoisie dwelt in smug, stiff apartment houses"— 
and can mark developments: in the section of Bedford Avenue that was good, "[ejach 
time he went back to it, it got worse" (101).
Miller’s experience of the streets of Paris is analogous to that of New York
City, minus (usually) the horror New York City inspired in him, for he still feels
drawn to these streets. In a letter to his friend Emil Schnellock, written in April 1930,
soon after his arrival in Paris, Miller says of the streets:
You want to go down all of them at once—but each of them requires a 
day in itself. This is one of the reasons why I seldom get back to the 
same place twice. I am always going off on a tangent. Each street 
promises the end of the rainbow. {Emil 40)
His depiction of Parisian streets was not uniformly glowing, as it might be for tourists
who rarely get beyond initial impressions to knowledge of the streets: "for friends I
had the streets, and the streets spoke to me in that sad, bitter language compounded of
human misery, yearning, regret, failure, wasted effort" {Cancer 184). In evidence here
is another similarity between Baudelaire and Miller, as flâneurs, for both men
"exploration of the city is a pretext for exploration of the s e lf  (P. Ferguson 94). The
failure Miller sees in the streets of New York City or, later, in Paris is the failure he
acknowledges after ten years of attempting to write, if not a publishable novel, at least
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one he felt proud of. Like Baudelaire, however. Miller’s Paris is a personal Paris, one
that he cannot even communicate to his wife;
. . .  I suddenly realized the impossibility of ever revealing to her that 
Paris which I had gotten to know, the Paris whose arrondissements are 
undefined, a Paris that has never existed accept by virtue of my 
loneliness, my hunger for her. Such a huge Paris! [....] This Paris, to 
which I alone had the key, hardly lends itself to a tour, even with the 
best of intentions; it is a Paris that has to be lived, that has to be 
experienced . . . .  {Cancer 179).
Miller describes, here, a Paris on which he has put his imprint: the Place de
l’Estrapade or some "little square, a few trees and a bench" where he and Mona have
argued (179). His Paris contains echoes of French history as well as of his own
personal history.
Many years after his return to America, Miller reports, "There are scarcely any 
streets in Paris I did not get to know" {Remember 309). He wished to see and know 
Paris, all parts of it—not just the isolated sections that catered to tourists or the sections 
the "Lost Generation" writers kept to. Miller did not simply wander the streets; he 
observed, he learned, he let his interest and his instincts and the crowd lead him, in 
true flàneur-^\Q, around Paris. One of his proudest experiences involved helping a 
Frenchman around Paris; Miller relished the surprise the man evinced at his knowledge 
of the city since at the time. Miller asserts, he could "barely talk the language" (344). 
He thus considered himself a person with an aptitude for the streets of Paris, 
potentially an expert on them. "Through me," he writes, "Paris will live again, a little 
more, a little brighter" {Wisdom 179).
Neither Miller’s knowledge of New York City nor his knowledge of Paris can 
finally make him feel a part of that culture. "I am not an American any more," he 
asserts in Cancer,
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nor a New Yorker, and even less a European, or a Parisian. I haven't 
any allegiance, any responsibilities, any hatreds, any worries, any 
prejudices, any passion. I'm neither for nor against. I'm a neutral." 
(153)
Miller is a Western writer, certainly, perhaps even quite clearly an American writer,” 
despite his denials, but his assertion of neutrality signifies the flàneur‘s attempt to 
distance himself from the object of his study, in Miller's case Western culture.
While Miller found something like a home there, Paris—like Miller's New York 
City—accorded Baudelaire "no sense of belonging" (Buck-Morss 186). Buck-Morss 
quotes Benjamin, "No one felt less at home in Paris than Baudelaire" (186). Chased 
through the streets by creditors, unable to fully join in the Parisian life, watching the 
city he had grown up within transformed by Baron von Haussmann, Baudelaire 
suffered an alienation from his city. Though both men were bom in cities in which 
neither felt a "sense of belonging," Baudelaire, as did Miller, turned to the crowds for 
"refuge," even escape (186). Akin to Baudelaire's experience, then, the crowd on 
Broadway and other streets of New York City, "thick as molasses" (Capricorn 97), 
was a notable experience for Miller: "Just fling yourself into it like an ant and let 
yourself get pushed along" (97), he exhorts his readers. Let the crowd take you on its 
tour of New York, he suggests. During his years in Paris, Miller, too, entered the 
streets to mingle with the crowd, "to study the passing throngs and to absorb the 
complex changing spectacle of urban life" (Kennedy 148). Miller enjoyed observing 
vendors on the streets, seeing people sitting outside at the cafés, watching the 
prostitutes on the beat and their maquereaux [pimps] relaxing in bars.
” Miller's individualism and his rejection of literary movements seems very 
American.
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The flâneur, then, is a counterpart to the exile, to the expatriate, for he is
someone who stands apart from most or all that he sees. Miller's experience of Paris
mirrors that of many exiles, for despite his obsessive traversing o f Paris he faces the
impossibility of ever truly coming to know the inhabitants or o f ever fully entering
into the life of the city of exile. "I know all the places," he asserts in a letter, "—from
the outside" {Emil 62). Winter, however, exacerbated Miller’s sense of isolation:
Where the lights are there are people on the sidewalks, jostling one 
another, giving off a little animal heat through their dirty underwear and 
their foul cursing breaths. Maybe for a stretch o f eight or ten blocks 
there is a semblance of gaiety, and then it tumbles back into night, 
dismal, foul, black night like frozen fat in a soup tureen. (Cancer 241)
Walking along the wintry Parisian streets. Miller notes "every window closed tight,
every shopfront barred and bolted" (Cancer 241); Parisians are in hibernation, more
distant than ever
In relocating to Paris, Miller had sought distance: "from dominating women, 
past failures, and the American cult of wealth and success" (Ketmedy 144). Another 
side to the expatriate experience, J. Gerald Kennedy notes in his book on American 
writers in Paris, is "the assumption of an ambiguous position between 'outsideness' and 
'insideness'" (26), a position often fostered by language differences and difficulties. 
Himgarian photographer Brassai notes that in his first meeting with Miller in 1931 
they said very little to each other: "His French was rough, and I spoke almost no 
English" (29). Miller's French vocabulary improved quickly, though he always spoke 
it with a Brooklyn accent, so the language barrier was not insurmountable. Still, in a 
letter written shortly before his departure from Paris in 1939, Miller states that he had 
"never been able to make any worth while contact with the French" ("Farewell" n.p ), 
suggesting he had never been invited into or had never fully entered into the
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intellectual circles of Paris, but he was "grateful to them for having tolerated [him]" 
(n-p).
American writer Samuel Pumam in his wistful, chatty, catty, and childish 
memoir of his years in Paris in the late twenties and early thirties, Paris Was Our 
Mistress, affirms that Miller was not typical of the American expatriates, who largely 
kept to themselves and to Montparnasse. The expatriate community of the twenties 
had largely melted away, in any case, with the stock market crash. Miller, more than 
those who came before him, sought to immerse himself in Paris and Parisian culture. 
"He associated more with the natives of the country than many Americans did," 
Pumam claims, adding derisively, "even though his interest appeared to be confined 
largely to prostitutes and other representatives of the demimonde" (113). Here, 
however, Pumam demonstrates either a forgetfulness of his own experience in Paris or 
a lingering naivete. Anyone who has lived in a foreign country must acknowledge the 
difficulty in penetrating native communities without the mediating influence of mutual 
friends or employment. Miller, working for a time at the Paris branch of the Chicago 
Tribune, was surrounded mostly by British, German, Austrian, Russian, Hungarian, 
and American expatriates. Generally, only the cash nexus, money exchanges in cafés, 
restaurants, or on the streets, allowed him access, however limited, to the French. But 
Miller also attempted to immerse himself in French culture, reading the works of 
French writers—Honoré de Balzac, Marcel Proust, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Blaise 
Cendrars, André Gide, and Jean Giono, among others. "I scarcely read any English 
books any more," he confides in a 1932 letter {Emil 94).
Once Miller believed he was no longer an American he felt himself completely 
free: "I have no country, no frontiers, no taxes to pay, no army to fight for" {Emii
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94). Miller asserts elsewhere that he bears no hatred for America; he is, rather, 
indifferent to their fate. "I lived out my American problem; it is for the other 
120,000,000 Americans to live out theirs" {Hamlet 82). Miller, the flâneur, the 
expatriate, feels himself on the margins and thus believes he is able to see the world 
clearly, to see what good there is elsewhere in this decaying world and to use a new 
yardstick to measure societies, whether they promote the "life more abundant" or 
whether they tend to squelch the life out of their citizens.
Though in the last years of the twentieth century, we often think of exile as 
politically-motivated—people fleeing murderous regimes in Africa and Asia and South 
America, until recently fleeing the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe, of 
artists such as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in America and Salman Rushdie in hiding in 
England—in America there exists a history of literary exile, a phenomenon spurred, in 
part, by the notion discussed earlier that American artists experience few ties to 
America, particularly an America undergoing radical change and ruptures.
Annette Kar Baxter notes that from Washington Irving to Henry Miller and 
beyond, the American artist as expatriate "has been a type, persistent and familiar" (I). 
Only in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, however, did an awareness grow of 
expatriation "as a literary-artistic phenomenon" (Putnam 9). After the initial insecurity 
the first so-called American writers felt for a "colonial dependence on British literary 
models," with increasing confidence that they could marry the inherited literary 
tradition to a foundation that "could be regarded as indigenous" American writers more 
and more began to view exile as "an assertion of cultural independence" (Baxter I).
The literary exile, according to Kermedy, "regarded displacement as an elective 
strategy of replenishment, a way of shifting one's angle of vision" (26). Literary exile,
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then, often reflects "a quest for a more productive milieu" (26), with the implication, 
especially for American exiles, that the soil at home is not fertile or provides 
insufficient stimulus for creative endeavors, something usually unthinkable for the 
flâneur.
Literary exile can be differentiated into permanent exile, short-term exile, and 
internal exile. Permanent exiles, like Henry James, T. S. Eliot, Gertrude Stein, and 
James Joyce, never return to their native lands or do so infrequently and only for brief 
visits. Short term exiles are those whose periods of exile are of finite duration and 
who return to America and there take up once again their work; the "Lost Generation" 
writers of the twenties (Hemingway, Fitzgerald and many others) fit in this category. 
Finally, internal exiles like Emily Dickinson, Henry David Thoreau and Edgar Allen 
Poe never leave but are secluded, or seclude themselves, from contact with the larger 
world.
The figure of the flâneur, as an outsider, implies exile, and, as noted earlier, 
Baudelaire certainly did not feel "at home" in Paris. An internal exile in Paris, toward 
the end of his life he travelled to Brussels where he spent his last active years sick and 
bemoaning a largely self-imposed exile, as Claude Pichois describes it. Miller, too, 
experienced both a short-term exile and an internal exile, in New York City before— 
and in Big Sur, California after—his years in Paris. Though there was clearly another 
facet to Miller's expatriation, a political dimension that should be emerging by now but 
will be developed further in this and later chapters. Miller shared with the writers of 
the twenties what Armette Kar Baxter calls a "literary despair" (4), a sense of 
estrangement from America, expressed in his disgust for the American landscape as
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well as his rejection of such literary figures prominent in America as Fitzgerald and 
Hemingway, James Joyce and Thomas Mann.
Putnam makes it clear that for many o f his generation all that was necessary to 
precipitate a journey abroad was some event, or series of events, upon which to attach 
their reasons for exile. The story of Putnam's own belated escape from Chicago, 
inspired by the theft of a box of his books in the midst of a move from one apartment 
to another, along with the predictably poor reception of articles he had written critical 
of the current literary establishment (Putnam 44-7), indicates that often the grounds for 
leaving were excuses and that, in short, many self-proclaimed expatriates literally and 
figuratively jumped on the boat, with or without the requisite "literary despair." Quite 
candidly. Miller acknowledges that the idea of going to Paris did not come from him 
but his friend Emil Schnellock, who had spent a couple years in Paris around 1920 
and depicted the life he had led there as one o f relative freedom (Ccpricom 47-8). 
Alternatively, Mary Dearborn, in her biography o f Miller, argues that the move to 
Paris was his wife June’s idea: "She presented it to Miller [in February 1930] as a 
terrific gamble. If he wanted to become a great writer, she said, then he needed to 
return to Europe alone" (119). Whichever version is true, and both seem to have a 
core of truth, it was not a self-conscious literary despair that drove Miller to Paris, for 
his was for the most part unwitting. Miller's life before his move to Paris was, as 
narrated in Crazy Cock and The Rosy Crucifixion, quite out of control and fraught 
with failure.
The immediate affinity Miller felt to Paris drew him to the streets where he 
struggled to know the city and to master the language. Whether or not he was more 
successful than other expatriates in making his way into French society, he was bound
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as an outsider to make the cultural comparisons spread throughout his oeuvre, to 
compare New York City and America to Paris and the life of the French. Without his 
years in Paris, Miller’s criticisms of New York City would likely have remained 
limited to the visual, rather than expanding to connect those criticisms to life as lived 
in the city, as lived in America. Once in Paris, experiencing the new surroundings, he 
blossomed, he found his voice, and began describing his world, the world of the 
present and the past, a world that began to look more and more like a wilderness.
The Oty as Wilderness
Miller and Baudelaire ventured out into a kind of wilderness, one that inspired 
Baudelaire to wonder, "What are the dangers of the forest and the prairie compared 
with the daily shocks and conflicts of civilization?" (qtd. in Benjamin, CB, 39).
Among the most conspicuous shocks for many Parisians was, naturally, the 
transformation of Paris under the direction of Baron von Haussmann. Baudelaire's 
wilderness consists quite literally in the tom-up streets and neighborhoods of Paris, the 
rubble of demolished buildings, the piles of dirt from excavations for the new sewage 
system, the clamor and commotion of workers. The resulting impression is one of 
dislocation, for wilderness, here, signifies terra incognita—zs well as the disturbing, the 
deadly, the unusual phenomena encountered on the streets of Paris. In Miller's case, 
the wilderness corresponds to the modem city rising up like a goliath, forests of 
skyscrapers frozen and austere, virtually anonymous, inspiring fear and repulsion, 
leaving in its wake broken-down people. In reading Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal or 
Spleen de Paris, one senses that though the poet is appalled by the city and thus 
miserable, he enjoys his misery, experiencing a certain fascination in studying his own
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responses, from which he appears to take much inspiration. With Miller, one senses 
an assertion in his works, an I  am, amidst such numbing hostility. In Baudelaire's 
time, people were more likely to lament the changes pervading their lives; by Miller's 
time change had become a constant and the response had turned to fear, for progress 
no longer signified a simple, unalloyed "good."
Despite Miller's avowed affinity for cities and indulgence in flânerie, he 
demonstrates a marked ambivalence toward cities, and quite often depicts them 
negatively. His disillusionment with New York City and even Paris suggests defeated 
hopes. Rather than an oasis, as it promised to become, America on a purely physical 
or visual level is for Miller an A ir~Conditioned Nightmare. He employs "nightmare" 
literally as well as figuratively: the country has become a terrible and unhealthy place 
to live, physically and mentally, save that it has been made comfortable, usually with 
technology (thus the "air-conditioning" of the title), so that people do not recognize the 
nightmare as nightmare and thus attempt to change it. Rather, they remain altogether 
oblivious, as one dreamer is to another's dreams, to what for Miller appears quite 
obvious, that life in America is not the idyll it once seemed to promise, it is not a new 
Eden, but its opposite: a kind of Babylon-meets-Sodom, as epitomized by New York 
City.
Similar to Miller's description of America, a nineteenth-century commonplace 
in French literature equates Paris with hell. Patricia Ferguson asserts that the notion of 
Paris as hell had become "a cliché by the time Balzac got to it in the 1830s in his 
celebrated opening of La Fille aux yeux d'oF (39). Behind this clichéd perception of 
Paris lurks the sensation that the city is "beset by evils" (39), an idea lucratively
90
exploited by Guide de Paris mystérieux. Guide Noir de Paris, and other guidebooks 
conjuring up a Paris o f superstitions, macabre happenings, and horrific crimes.
As did Miller in his descriptions of America, Baudelaire depicted Paris as a 
nightmare, as pure spectacle in much the same way Dante's Hell constitutes a 
spectacle, with its great variety of personal histories, dangers, and tortures. The 
phantasmagoric aspect of Baudelaire's nightmare, however, is seldom ascribed to the 
cityscape, which receives much attention from Miller, and more often to the people 
who populate it—the ragpicker, the emaciated (or, more literally, the skeletal) laborer 
("Le squellette laboreur"), the prostitute, the old men and women. These beings 
appear in Baudelaire's poems, indelibly marking the city, for the city comprises the 
wilderness where the fantastic is on display.
The setting for these human phenomena, Paris, inspires in a more general way 
as much curiosity as does its inhabitants; "O cité! / Pendant qu'autour de nous tu 
chantes, ris and beugles, / Éprise du plaisir jusqu'à l'atrocité" [O city! / While all 
around us you sing, laugh and bawl / Taking your pleasure unto (the point of) 
atrocityJC'Les Aveugles," FM, 103). Paris is personified in these lines as a high-living 
gourmand, a demented Gargantua, who devours life to the point where not even the 
bones remain on the plate. In two poems that might be considered companion pieces, 
to describe Paris Baudelaire employs the word "fourmillant(e)"—swarming—a term used 
to describe the movement of ants or bees and which conjures an image of the city as 
so thickly populated that individuals lose their distinctness. Paris becomes "le 
fourmillant tableau" [the swarming tableau] of "Les Petites Vieilles" [The Little Old 
Women] {FM 100), and the "fourmillante cité" [swarming city] of "Les Sept 
Vieillards" [The Seven Old Men](fM 97). A city of exertion, it teems with beings
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perpetually engaged in a variety of activities, mysteriously coordinated, as if in a 
factory, sustaining the city even as they make it "other." They are at the same time 
people and fypg.r—laborers, ragpickers, the elderly, ghost-like apparitions. In "Le 
Crépuscule Du Soir," Baudelaire associates prostitution with Paris by a subtle 
connection in its depiction: "comme une fourmilière elle ouvre ses issues" [like an 
ant-hill, she opens her passageways] {FM, 105). As the day ends, prostitutes flood 
into the streets to earn their money, inspiring a fascinated repulsion in Baudelaire 
similar to that experienced with the seven old men.
The city as an ant-hill then serves as a suitable location for such marvels as the 
blind whose eyes "restent levés / Au ciel" [remain raised / to the sky] ("Les 
Aveugles," FM, 103), for old women, "Ces monstres disloqués furent jadis des 
femmes" [these dislocated monsters who were once women/wives] ("Les Petites 
Vieilles," FM, 100), and for bent old men, each apparently an identical copy of the 
previous, mysteriously appearing, "Dégoûtant Phénix, fils et père de lui-même" 
[disgusting phoenix, son and father of himself] ("Les Sept Vieillards," FM, 97), for 
gamblers and criminals, and for prostitutes. Thus, while Baudelaire's poetry may 
contain allegorical elements, Benjamin notes that his "works are not esoteric" (qtd. in 
Buck-Morss 222). Antoine Adam, interpreting the emergence of "les sept vieillards," 
explains the appearance of other similarly phantasmagoric beings in Baudelaire's 
poetry, for instance the prostitutes mentioned above: "Baudelaire depicts for us one of 
the hallucinations that does not ignore the lost ones in the desert of the great cities" 
(382). Baudelaire's interest extends to the lowly as well as the rich, but especially to 
those most thoroughly themselves, for they offer him "experiences of otherness"
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(Sennett, Conscience, 123), one way of "transcending the cultural forces" that turn 
people inward and trap them in themselves (123).
Miller, equally fascinated by the varieties of people visible in the city, depicts 
those who appear as freaks or as outsiders: his Tante Melia who, as she comes to the 
end of a block, "leap[s] forward like a reindeer and bite[s] a piece out of the moon" 
{Black Spring 107), and is later admitted to a mental hospital, because ”[w]hen people 
are too good for this world they have to be put under lock and key" (108); his "cunt- 
struck" friend Van Norden, from Cancer, who only wants to lose himself in sex; and a 
man he meets on the streets in New Orleans, "The Alcoholic Veteran with the 
Washboard Cranium," who survived the First World War but remains in such a state 
that he cannot hold a normal job. This veteran exists outside society and declares 
himself free: "I don't need all the paraphernalia you fellows require. All 1 carry with 
me is a toothbrush" {Wisdom 112). Miller includes portraits of American expatriates 
and Asians debauching themselves, "young Gandhi" as Miller calls one Indian {Cancer 
91), of bums ("Max" in Cos/wo/og/ca/)struggling to survive, and of prostitutes. 
Mesdemoiselles Claude and Germaine ("Mademoiselle Claude" in Cosmological and 
Germaine in Cancer) with whom he finds pleasure as well as a momentary respite 
from hunger and walking the streets. Of these figures, only Tante Melia, who is out 
of touch with reality, hence the modem world, is presented as a truly admirable figure.
Miller’s personages are not quite so fantastic as Baudelaire's, since Miller 
retains much that he had learned from the realist writers like Dreiser and Sherwood 
Anderson, but both Miller and Baudelaire populate their works with the unusual and 
the outcast offspring of the city. Neither was blind to the suffering of those they 
depicted, and beyond wimessing their existence. Miller repeatedly argues they deserve
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a better fate, while Baudelaire suggests as much, as we shall see in the next few 
chapters. We find, then, in Miller and Baudelaire, a dialectical vision of the city's 
offspring, whose existence fascinates even as the unmistakable misery of it inspires 
denunciation. Toward the end of Negative Dialectics, Theodor Adorno defends 
"nihilism" which can help shed a positive light on their denunciation; "As long as the 
world is as it is all pictures of reconciliation, peace, and quiet resemble the picture of 
death. [....] The true nihilists are the ones who oppose nihilism with their more and 
more faded positivities . . ." (381). Including these portraits of the more perplexing 
offspring of capitalism argues that these people are disserved by the economy and that 
until they are at last included among the beneficiaries the system is fatally flawed.
Much of the imagery Miller uses to describe the United States, and especially 
New York City, derives from surreal visions replete with nightmarish images, 
occasionally offering parallels to Baudelaire's Paris: "The white prisons, the sidewalks 
swarming with maggots, the breadlines, the opium joints that are built like palaces, . .
. a whole city erected over a hollow pit of nothingness" (Cancer 68, emphasis added). 
In this passage, skyscrapers are recast as "white prisons" where businessmen are 
confined; crowds populating the sidewalks experience a Kafkaesque metamorphosis 
and become "maggots"—paradoxically, legless parasites; the "opium joints" ornamented 
like "palaces" may very well be the cinemas where people ingest visions of the good 
life and turn homeward contented, despite the fact the lives they lead bear no 
resemblance to those depicted on the screen; and the "hollow pit of nothingness," over 
which the city balances, intimates a precipitous disaster. The ever-expanding city, 
growing ever more populous, threatens to one day disappear into an abyss, crashing 
down of its own dead weight. Miller, additionally, laments the "appalling" monotony
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of American cities {Cosmological 337), where both buildings and cities appear as 
exact reproductions of each other, like Baudelaire's seven old men. Most American 
cities, as human constructions, lack what Benjamin has termed, referring to 
mechanically reproduced visual art, an "aura": wdtile cities may be more democratic, 
visually comprehensible to more people, at the same time they forfeit "the essence of 
all that is transmissable from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its 
testimony to the history which it has experienced" {Illuminations 221). Since few of 
the buildings that comprise the American city have ornamentation or have even stood 
for very long, they do not accrue history, do not evoke or exemplify a bygone era. 
Baudelaire and Miller therefore share a similar disgust, and fascination, for the city 
and its byproducts.
Other American cities receive similar if briefer treatment (to that of New York
City) from Miller. A cruise downriver, just off the coast of Boston, Miller describes
as "following in the wake o f a demented giant who had sown the earth with crazy
dreams" {Nightmare 11). The landscape between western Pennsylvania and eastern
Ohio, between Pittsburgh and Youngstown, he compares to "an Inferno which exceeds
anything that Dante imagined" (28). St. Louis he classifies "a foul stinking corpse . . .
like an advertisement of Albrecht Durer’s 'Melancholia'" (69). These intuitive or gut
responses to the countryside omit the detailed argumentation that often accompany
Miller's prognoses. A walk down the streets of Chicago, narrated in The A ir-
Conditioned Nightmare, does incorporate such support, however. Stepping out of the
car in the South Side of Chicago, he observes,
A dingy hotel sticking up like a Mayan ruin in the midst of yellow 
fangs and chalk teeth. Once respectable dwelling places given up now 
to the dark-skinned people we "liberated." No heat, no gas, no
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plumbing, no water, no nothing—sometimes not even a window-pane. 
(52)
Chicago, a skyscraper city like New York, contains ruins, where it consigns the 
workers and the urban poor wdio do not benefit from modem technology or the much- 
vaunted American "progress." Just as New York City constituted a nightmare for 
Miller, so did much of the rest of the country. The virtue of New York City was that 
Miller had lived there nearly forty years and thus knew it, and hated it, intimately.
Though Miller frequently identifies Paris as the city where he found his 
freedom, and for him it becomes the center of the world, the "very navel of the world 
to which, like a blind and faltering idiot, one crawls back on hands and knees" 
{Wisdom 182), Paris is not exempt from the nightmare that Miller often equates with 
modernizing cities. "Paris is a whore," he writes, voicing evident disappointment. 
"From a distance she seems ravishing, you can't wait until you have her in your arms. 
And five minutes later you feel empty, disgusted with yourself. You feel tricked" 
{Cancer 207). You give yourself up to Paris only to realize for a moment that, at 
bottom, it Is just like any other city. The city, moreover, is diseased, for in regions— 
one must wander away from the seductive monumental Paris to other arrondissements 
to really appreciate Paris—it looks "like a big, ugly chancre" {Wisdom 148). This city 
seems inviting, but only once in its grip do you realize it cannot fulfill the promises it 
has made and that, furthermore, it is poisoned.
Miller's perspective on the city as wilderness remains ultimately negative, 
though his disillusionment intimates a frustrated optimism: "the cradles of civilization 
are the putrid sinks of the world," he writes, "the charnel house to which the stinking 
wombs confide their bloody packages of flesh and bone" {Cancer 182). Cities, the
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"birthplace" of civilization and culture, of all that is best in the modem world, contain 
as well all that is worst. Those Wio emigrate to the city, as well as those bom into 
the city, signify little more than fodder for factories, sacriAcial lambs to industry. 
Occasionally Miller's bitter disillusion contrasts with Baudelaire's combined fascination 
and repulsion. Miller fights what he sees as the depersonalizing forces of the city, 
while Baudelaire remarks these same forces though they likely appear less powerful 
given the phantasmagoric creatures who populate his poetry.
Where Hawthome, Melville and Poe considered American cities less 
nightmarish than their European counterparts. Miller reverses the order, most clearly 
with respect to Paris, ranking American cities well below European cities. Paris, for 
Miller, is certainly less nightmarish than what he experiences in America, for in the 
midst of his American tour in the early nineteen-forties he recalls "flinging [himself] 
on the bed and deliberately willing to remember something beautiful, something 
promising out of the past" (^Remember 300). Despite its failures, in his imagination 
Miller retums to Paris, to the streets and cafés and monuments of Paris, not to New 
York City and its skyscrapers, not to America.
Not the City of Dreams
Though Baudelaire once proclaimed Paris a city o f dreams, like Miller's New 
York City it also knew a banal existence that many of its citizens found disheartening. 
Already in the early eighteen-thirties, facades were removed from some buildings in 
order to widen many of the very narrow, medieval streets. "From that moment," 
writes Jean Favier, "Balzac launched his cry, 'the Old Paris is disappearing’" (201). In 
the middle of the nineteenth century, the city was at times denounced as faceless and
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unreadable, and Haussmann’s new architecture "the cause or effect of a general loss of
meaning" (Hamon 126). Baudelaire's poem "Le Cygne" describes the experience of
living in a Paris undergoing renovation, a time when those charged with expanding the
city "had not yet demolished the memory of the city" it replaced (Terdiman 176).
Baudelaire could still picture the Paris he had enjoyed in the eighteen-forties, before
the 1848 revolution and the 1851 rise of Napoleon HI;
Je ne vois qu'en esprit tout ce camp de baraques.
Ces tas de chapiteaux ébauchés et de fûts.
Les herbes, les gros blocs verdis par l'eau des 
flaques.
Et, brillant aux carreaux, le bric-à-brac confus.
[I see only a shadow of the camp of huts, / This heap of the remnants 
of column capitals and bases, / The grass, the large blocks greened by 
the water of puddles, / and, sparkling squares, the confused bric-a-brac.] 
("Le Cygne," FM, 95)
For many Parisians, the experience of adjusting to the new city going up all around, in
the midst of the rubble of the old city, was fraught with difficulty: they could only
remember the old city and could not yet appreciate the new city, for it seemed to have
grown and changed so much that it was now "beyond any conceivable emotional
investment"; and it was profoundly new, "a language which had mutated so rapidly
that even its native locutors discovered they could no longer speak it" (Terdiman 178).
Benjamin notes that while Haussmann might have prided himself on his role in the
metamorphosis of the city, for many Parisians "he had alienated their city from them"
(CB 174). Baudelaire's "Paysage" constitutes a response to Haussmanisation,
describing "a landscape of desire, bom of the need to escape or remake the disorder of
the actual city" (Sharpe 41). The poem that immediately follows, "Le Soleil," counters
"the tranquility of 'Paysage'," offering another view of the same experience, that of
"the city as a combat zone" (42). The vrnter-fldneur traverses the city, forced to
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supply from his memory what is now missing, thus unwillingly transformed into a 
symbol of the struggle to understand the ever-changing cityscape. And yet, while a 
large part o f the citizenry might suffer in the incomprehensible new city, Patricia 
Ferguson argues—dialectically—that the "unknowability" of the city provided "a 
condition of creativity" (93), as the city is now open to new interpretations, can now 
be written anew. As in the poor people standing outside the new café in Baudelaire's 
"Les Yeux des pauvres," old elements of Paris stand out in new configurations, giving 
rise to new sources of poetic inspiration, and thus destruction and construction show 
themselves to be kindred forces—a somewhat surface example of Benjamin's famous 
assertion that each work of art is founded upon, or made possible by, some act of 
barbarism.
Haussmaimization took place not in one isolated section at a time but 
"everywhere and over almost the entire city," such that for those like Baudelaire living 
in Paris, "[djestruction and construction dominated the experience of the city as never 
before" (122). The new city rising up all around became unreadable for many people 
because, in most European cities, the oldest parts stood in the center with more recent 
sections rippling out in "concentric circles" toward the outskirts where the newest 
districts were located (Hamon 128). That order is now inverted, maintains Phillipe 
Hamon, citing "the criss-cross of adjectives" in Baudelaire's poem "Le Cygne," where 
the poet describes the city center first and then the outskirts: "Palais neuf. . . Vieux 
faubourgs'" (155). The intermixing of the new with the old destabilized previous 
readings of regions, such that the character of a region was effectively diluted, reduced 
to a composite.
99
Despite Rybczynski's argument, presented in an earlier section, that the new 
Paris incorporated classical architecture, for many residents these new buildings failed 
to replace the "meaning, substance, and dimension" that had been lost through 
systematic destruction of large swaths of Paris (Hamon 142). Most of medieval Paris 
was destroyed. Instead, there was now, in the Paris of the mid-eighteen-sixties and 
after, a certain uniformity of construction since landmarks—buildings, cafés, stores—that 
once denoted certain areas—and eras—were gone, replaced by new ones to be learned. 
Furthermore, where once buildings had been constructed of stone, they were now 
smeared with a "cosmetic layer" of plaster meant to conceal "the mediocre edifice 
underneath" (140). More than ever before, there were areas where, row after row, 
houses appeared the same, adding to the apparent anonymity of the buildings.
Just as Baudelaire could evoke a lost or fast disappearing Paris, Miller could 
remember New York City at the turn of the century, before it became the monstrosity 
he later viewed it as: "Once again he saw the sturdy brewery wagons clattering 
through the open gates, and a teeming pedestrian life marching in through the 
swinging doors of the cafés that gilded the comers" {Moloch 114). Regions of New 
York had once enjoyed a certain communal flavor, around the tum of the twentieth 
century, neighborhoods of Germans speaking German, that had since been lost.
Miller, too, perceived some beauty in a few buildings, though they are oumumbered 
by those without appeal. In the mid-nineteen twenties. Miller wrote "[a] paean to the 
architecture of the Bowery Savings Bank in Brooklyn" (Jackson 13), publishing it 
himself as one of his mezzotints in 1925, entitled "A Bowery Phoenix." He does not 
describe the building so much as praise "this edifice which rivals the great Florentine 
palaces of the Renaissance" {Mezzotints 22). He continues,
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Its austere elegance and mtyestic sweep is inspiring. Imagine a 
luminous basilica lined on either side by noble marble pillars. [....] And 
in the center of this great oval as pretty a cage for man or beast as one 
could ask of any architect. (22)
One can already note, however, the beginnings of a sense of the city as
phantasmagoria, for the building, compared to a fifteenth century basilica, is figured as
a cage, as a phoenix rising "[o]ut of the squalor and poverty of the Bowery,” as well
as "a luminous Dantesque vision in a crowded thoroughfare" (22). One can detect
here another dimension to his appraisal, an underlying repulsion that will become
much more prominent.
After five years in Paris, Miller visits a New York City which he now 
describes much more thoroughly as a hostile place. Miller walks and walks, seeing 
"no place to sit down—no place, I mean, that looks inviting" {Cosmological 344). The 
city no longer has a space for him or for anybody not immediately employed. No 
cafés like Paris, few parks to just loiter in. Everything appears dirty and characterless 
to Miller; no place invites people to relax and enjoy leisure time.
Moving away from the surreal descriptions of city-as-wildemess. Miller laments 
"the hideous buildings of New York . . . .  [Where] No stone was laid upon another 
with love or reverence; no street was laid for dance or joy" {Ccqjricom 68). He sees 
no evidence of city planning, nothing that suggests love for the city, and argues that 
the city was not constructed to communicate to the inhabitants anything more than 
what, at bottom, it was supposed to be—an economic powerhouse. "Nowhere," writes 
Miller, "do we find a city that was planned for beauty and reverence, unless it be 
Washington [D.C.]" {Remember 395) "But," he asks, "how does Washington look
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today?" (395), implying that despite the designers' intentions, Washington D C has 
failed to embody and glorify the goals of the republic.
Most American cities were layed out by surveyors rather than city planners, 
and Trachtenberg argues that same lack of professional expertise was bought to 
architecture in American cities; many buildings were designed, not by architects but 
by "construction engineers" (119). Of the buildings actually designed by architects, 
many "quoted" a great variety of classical architectures—Greek, Gothic, Baroque—and 
often the design bore little relation to the actual function of the building or to an 
expression of American-ness. The effect of such dissimilar designs only "furthered the 
sense of discontinuity in everyday life," demonstrating that in designing these 
buildings architects had only succeeded in "confusing their identity with spectacle" 
(Trachtenberg 119). Sullivan, the architect, devoted many years to decrying the 
flagrant borrowing of European architectures. "Architecture," he argued, "is an 
expression rather than a style and is the outcome of certain conditions in a certain 
civilization" (153). Borrowing wholesale French architecture of the seventeenth 
century is worse than anachronistic, he claims; it is false, pretentious. "[Y]ou don't 
recover the spirit of the past," Sennett argues in a similar vein, "by quoting its forms" 
(164). In the modem city, then, where people are dwarfed by the buildings they work 
in, where "architecture itself has gone mad" (Miller, Capricorn, 69), reproducing itself 
ad infinitum, the individual is lost, wandering through terra incognita, useful only as a 
worker on an assembly line and a consumer of finished products.
For Benjamin, as for Miller, modernity can be characterized as "hell" (Buck- 
Morss 96). One reason for this "hell," the hell of New York City or any commercial 
center, is that cities in America do not grow as a body does; instead, they accumulate—
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wealth, buildings, people—like a closet the detritus of a disordered life. Periodically, 
and indiscriminately, Americans clean that closet, throwing out old items. Doing so, 
they lose touch with their past.’^  Miller is refreshed by an encounter with a 
Frenchman who "talked about the past not as a scholar or student of history but as a 
man remembering something he had lived through" (Nightmcav 72). The French, 
Miller infers, tend to express a respect, a kinship even, for their history, exemplified in 
their desire to preserve historical sections of their cities, while Americans often remain 
oblivious to their history if it is not first altogether "scrapped" {Cosmological 340). 
Street names can also offer some evidence of the French concern with history. In 
New York City, especially in Manhattan, most streets are numbered—Fifth Ave., West 
48th, and so on. Parisian street-names often came from hotels (rue de Nesle) or the 
names of families (rue Vivienne) who lived on the streets, from the names of 
monarchs (Boulevard Henry IV) and cultural figures (avenue and place Victor Hugo, 
rue Charles Baudelaire), even dates in French history (rue 8 May 1945). True, street 
names were occasionally changed, and the old name forgotten, but even today walking 
around Paris you can observe signs that provide the former name of the street, 
ancienne rue de . .  . (Favier 128-29). Paris remains an historical text in a way most 
American cities are not.
Where the French, even after Haussmannization, live side by side with 
monuments of their history, the American, writes Miller, "awakes in the morning to 
look out on a virgin continent which has known no history. A clean jump, without 
transition, from barbarism to the dementia of civilization" {Aller Retour 69). The
The a-historicity of Americans is a theme that will be returned in Chapter Two, 
in a discussion of fashion.
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transformation of some regions of America, from largely agrarian regions to industrial 
regions, sometimes occurred widiin the span of a generation or two, with buildings 
quickly and haphazardly constructed. According to James Kunstler, "Modernism did 
its immense damage . . .  by divorcing the practice of building from the history and 
traditional meanings of building" (59). One might argue that the intensely practical 
nature of city-building Americans indulge in is in the tradition of the historical 
exigencies faced by the first colonists and the later colonists of the American west. If 
so, then perhaps once the demands o f frontier-life were no longer at die forefront, the 
continued focus on simplicity and utility, without overt city planning, could be 
characterized as obsessive-compulsive behavior, if not a byproduct of pure greed. 
Sullivan writes, "as a people thinks concerning Architecture, so it thinks concerning 
everything else" (178). Among other criticisms of Americans Sullivan detects in their 
modem architecture, in the unadorned uncomplicated boxes people construct, he 
perceives a single-minded focus on "die Dollar . . . .  You adore it twenty-four hours 
each day: it is your God!" (187).
Without history, without a sense of the city as a whole—as opposed to 
marketable parcels of land—there is no sense of place, no spot of land that citizens can 
call their own, and nothing to attach an artist to his or her birthplace. Miller argues, 
"there is no America! . . . just millions of things unrelated to one another” {Aller 
Retour 73). David Kolb, iraplicidy agreeing with Sullivan, writes, "[b]uildings 
embody and help form the distinctive practices and values of a community, and so 
they are one way of transmitting the lifeworld" (147).‘^  Kolb extends this analysis.
"  Kolb borrows the term "lifeworld" from Habermas.
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however, arguing "[l]ifeworld meanings are being thinned out, and so places become 
thinner as well" (147). When cities no longer function as "transmitters," moreover, 
they are, in a sense, no longer populated by citizens, rather inhabitants with little or no 
connection to the locality.
In the first American cities, even if they were jumbles, the stores were usually 
family-owned, and the owners, who often lived above or behind the stores, "took pride 
in their buildings, and they took care of them" (Kunstler 177). As American cities 
evolved, usually without planning or vision, what had once been the city became a 
financial unit unto itself, the downtown, "intensive commercial and administrative 
clusters in a diverse urban setting" (GoldAeld and Brownell 299). These regions 
possessed the "greatest population density" and constituted the centers of "economic 
activity" (299).
Simultaneous with the rush of urbanization due to rapid industrialization, city 
populations increased exponentially throughout the nineteenth century, and the lives of 
the workers were transformed. Where once the artisan had been either self-employed 
or employed in an enterprise operating with fewer than five workers, and producing 
finished products, with industrialization came factories and mass production, hence 
"blue collar" workers, and a widening of "the gap between employer and employee" 
(Coldfield and Brownell 151). The inner-city, accordingly, came to be, as a result of 
industrialism and the creation of a new underclass, largely "a city of working class 
men and women" (151).
In the already overcrowded American city of the late nineteenth century, where 
space was at a premium and continued growth an economic necessity, "a new physical 
force was making its presence felt: the skyscraper" (Coldfield and Brownell 211).
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For both the rich and the poor in the late 1800s, there was nowhere to go but up. The 
horizontal grids used to lay out cities in the nineteenth century become vertical grids 
in the twentieth century (Sermett, Conscience, 57). Since city leaders and business 
magnates generally lived outside the city-center, they had little incentive to create 
attractive city-scapes, and thus skyscr^ers were usually erected with little or no visual 
finesse.
Though the first one went up in Chicago, so many skyscrapers were raised in
New York City that it "became the exemplary skyscraper city" (Rybczynski 153).
That symbol of progress and modernity which Miller labelled a "white prison," the
skyscraper was also supposed to be, in its unadorned state, inoffensive and democratic,
accessible to all. Compared to such architectural monuments as Notre Dame de Paris
or Versailles, for instance, structural displays of spirituality in the first case and
opulence in the second, symbols of the power of the church and the monarchy, the
skyscraper was supposedly intended for everybody;
No longer a needle-capped tower sporting gargoyles, it became a box on 
the purest Bauhaus terms: flat roof, no ornament, glass skin', . . . 
guaranteed to prevent contamination from the ruinous pretensions of the 
ruling class. Except that these boxes were the ultimate status symbol of 
the newest ruling class: the corporate elite. (Kunstler 80)
While it might appear democratic and the architects may even intend such a generous
simplicity or a purely functional appearance devoid of overt meaning,'"* the skyscraper
is in reality as much a monument to capitalism as Versailles is to the wealth and
power of the king, only with fewer robes, as it were. As such, the skyscraper
"* One branch of Modernism, as exemplified by Viennese architect Adolph Loos, 
rejected all ornamentation: Loos "wanted to construct buildings and to design objects 
that were solely functional," since in his view "the evolution of culture corresponded 
with the elimination of the omamenation of practical objects" (Marchand 218).
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epitomized, ironically, the minimalist element of much o f American architecture. But 
)^ere monumental structures in Europe had ostensible uses—Notre Dame was quite 
clearly intended for prayer and religious services—"one cannot point to activities that 
ought particularly to happen on the sixth [or sixtiedi] floor of buildings" (Sennett, 
Conscience, 58). Such blanks, however, were not problematic in America, according 
to Miller, because people did not look for significance: "[hjow or why a skyscr^er 
was erected [is] thoroughly unimportant. It's tfiere—that's all that matters!" {Aller 
Retour 69). The plainness of die facade of a skyscraper, writes Trachtenberg, 
extending Sennetfs argument, obscures the activities performed in the building, such 
that they "receded from view, from intelligibility, and from criticism" (119); "we 
cannot imagine what goes on inside," say Miller’s Americans, "and we do not care." 
Whether aesthetically pleasing or not, whether the simplicity of design is democratic 
or reductive and renunciative, for Miller the skyscrjqjer is, like the flag, ultimately a 
symbol that for the rich "things are under control" {Nightmare 37). The democratic 
aura, in the Benjaminian sense, is revealed to be thin, bland, counterfeit.
Amid the raising of numerous skyscrapers, many only slight variations on a 
formula, occasionally a building such as the fifty-two floor Woolworth Building in 
New York City would stand out. In the Woolworth Building, "ornamentation and 
lavishness replaced utility with classical gothic facades eclipsing the simplicity" that 
characterized earlier skyscrapers (Coldfield and Brownell 213). After a number of 
years in Paris, however. Miller notes that even this building is banal and resembles 
nothing so much as "a Nuremberg cheese cake" {Aller Retour 37), a caricature of the 
beauty and impressiveness architecture aims for. Americans, Miller argues, echoing 
Sullivan's repeated assertion, "have an architectural taste which is about as near the
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vanishing point as it is possible to achieve" {Nightmare 35). "Nowhere in America," 
continues Miller, "was there anything comparable to the cathedrals of Europe, the 
temples of Asia and Egypt—enduring monuments created out of faith and love and 
passion" (228). Monuments in America are nearly always built with "utilitarian" 
purposes in mind (228), which reduces their monumentality, limits them to finite uses, 
fettering the imagination, the spirit.
The designs for buildings intended for commercial use, according to Lewis 
Mumford, "were based on abstract units of space" (438). That is, the designs 
privileged by businessmen tended to be those that provided the most space and offered 
the greatest variety of uses, so that "with no essential structural rearrangement the 
hotel, the apartment house, the department store, and the office building were 
convertible, one into the other" (438). Ornamentation limited space, increased 
construction costs, and restricted the variety of possible uses to which buildings could 
be put. But when Americans began to specialize in high rise office buildings—and 
"nobody knew how to make them better than Americans" (Kunstler 78)—rather than 
opening up the downtowns to the inhabitants, they produced "a mass of gloomy houses 
and business premises in grimy, spiritless cities" (Horkheimer and Adorno 120). 
Parisian city plaimers, in contrast, banished skyscrapers to a region approximately two 
kilometers outside Paris proper. La Défense. Relatively few buildings in Paris itself 
stand taller than six floors, hence the Eiffel Tower is visible from many of the 
arrondissements o f Paris. People are not separate from the cities they inhabit, argues 
Miller. Echoing Sullivan's assertion about architecture. Miller declares, "The 
landscape in which a person lives does not merely frame the picture; it enters into his 
very being and becomes a part of him" {Remember 332). The city expresses the
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resident, and the resident expresses the city. If p/ace is thinned-out, then so is 
humanity, or that portion of it inhabiting the city.
The problem, then, is no longer simply that the city is ugly or unreadable, or 
that land-owners wish to make as great a profit as possible on their investments, but, 
finally, that a people divorced from their surroundings are divorced from themselves: 
"We need to sit down somewhere, to rest, to contemplate, to know we have a body— 
and a soul" (Miller, Cosmological, 344). As opposed to Paris and many European 
cities, such places are rare in America, and few of those that do exist are enticing.
Inhabitants of the City: Parks and Leisure Space
Though bom into the bourgeoisie and then raised within the military aristocracy 
(Pichois 3), Charles Baudelaire, in his writing, showed a sympathy for "the underdogs 
of society—for its victims, its dispossessed, its outcasts, even its pariahs," though he 
often expressed it "indirectly" in his works (Leakey 28). "Le Désespoir de la vieille" 
[The Despair of the Old Woman], "Les Veuves" [The Widows], and "Le Vieux 
Saltimbanque" [The Old Clown], from Le Spleen de Paris, depict various broken-down 
people, human wrecks, who at the same time represent the figure of the poet, who 
feels himself as much an outcast as they.
Miller asserts a similar affinity to the downtrodden, especially after the years of
daily contact: as a manager of the Cosmodemonic Telegraph Corporation (Western
Union), described in Tropic o f  Ccpricom, he was charged with hiring and firing them.
The messengers he employed came from all over the world. They were among
the lowest of the low, walking around [in their uniforms] like auks, like 
penguins, like oxen, like trained seals, . . and many a one was fit to 
govern the world, to write the greatest book ever written. When I think
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of some o f the Persians, the Hindus, the Arabs I knew, when I think of 
the character they revealed, their grace, their tenderness, their 
intelligence, their holiness, I spit on the white conquerors of the world .
. . , {(Zapricom 33)
Miller not only knew people who were, at least when measured on an economic scale, 
"the lowest of the low," but he recognized their virtures, realizing that the problem 
was not the people but the scale; they contained much o f worth but little or none of it 
had clear value for a market economy.
Where Baudelaire's conception of the city as ant-hill intimates the great number
of individuals one finds there. Miller experiences the city as ant-hill rather differently,
as dehumanizing. Worse, the sacrifice of the people described above is pointless. New
York City he describes as
cold, glittering, malign. The buildings dominate. There is a sort of 
atomic frenzy to the activity going on; the more furious the pace, the 
more diminished the spirit. A constant ferment, but it might just as well 
be going on in a test tube. {Cancer 68)
All the activity—the hustling and the scrambling—in the city, according to Miller, is for
naught. Like a car trapped in a snowbank spinning its wheels, the city fruitlessly
expends its energy. Fredric Jameson writes of "the ultimate form of the "nightmare of
history,""" which he terms "the fact of labor . . .  of the backbreaking millenial toil of
millions of people from the earliest moments of human history," a nightmare which
finds its exemplar in Miller's New York City, "in horror at the endless succession of
"dying generations," at the ceaseless wheel of life, . . for this ultimately scandalous fact
of mindless alienated work and of the irremediable loss and waste of human energies"
("Marxism" 162). Employers demand more work and greater sacrifices on the part of
workers to increase profits. Outside the factory, the city these workers inhabit is a
gloomy cluster of skyscrapers, here and there illuminated in a neon glare, run by
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business magnates whose products, manufactured at break-neck pace, contain no real, 
lasting value.'*
Without any reverence for history, and with profit the primary concern in the 
city, the individual—the citizen, the worker—possesses no real value, when not engaged 
in production or consumption, an attitude reflected in the city itself. Mumford notes 
that while Americans tried to use all available space, leaving nothing vacant for public 
use, "spacious designs like those of the Place Vendôme [in Paris] or Russell Square [in 
London], still flourishing after centuries of use, turned out to be far more economical 
than those that sought only to cover the maximum amount o f rentable space" (428). 
American cities expanded quickly, but focussed on construction of commercial 
buildings rather than housing for the influx of workers or creating spaces where these 
workers could spend leisure time. As a result, even with the retreat of the wealthy to 
the city suburbs and various exclusive communities, cities became still more 
congested, with even less open space for people, and, consequently, more debilitated. 
And though in 1840 there was pressure for the construction of public parks, which 
"underscored the insufficiency of public space in cities," the attempt to rectify the 
problem was for the most part doomed to failure because "the countryside could not be 
injected [into the city] in bits and pieces here and there" (Coldfield and Brownell 185). 
Moreover, parks wedged in a disused comer remain disused, for they lay out of the 
normal current of human traffic.
Paris has always contained parks, interspersed throughout the city, though 
imder Hausmannisation, despite the addition of Parc Montsouris, the Bois de Bologne,
'* For more on Miller's attitude toward "work," see Chapter Three.
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the Bois de Vincennes, and the Buttes-Chaumont, more parks were destroyed than 
created—even a sizable portion of Luxembourg Gardens was abandoned to land 
speculators (Marchand 79). These new parks, modelled on English parks (Napoléon 
m  was an Anglophile), demonstrate that in addition to a certain disdain for Parisians, 
Napoléon m  and Haussmann were also aware of their needs. These four new parks, 
located roughly along the four comers of the compass, contain walking paths and, in 
Montsouris and Buttes-Chaumont, an unnatural (i.e. manufactured) Romantic grandeur. 
Buttes-Chaumont, for instance, contains artificial mountains and an artificial waterfall, 
constructed with some o f the debris from the demolitions. These parks are used, and 
even if Haussmann raised the mountains, with rocky ledges, they no longer seem 
artificial or coldly synthetic.
Those who wanted to construct parks in America faced the problem that though 
the country had been ostensibly founded as a democracy, meaning it was intended to 
be responsive to the voice of the people as a whole, America has tended to venerate 
the individual rather than the collective. This tendency is partially due to the fear of 
collective action, a powerful force which brought the country into existence and might, 
by implication, take it right back out. While Americans in general valorized the 
"rugged individual," only a very small fraction of the American population measured 
up to the ideal. The rest operated in factories, timing their motions to machines, or 
worked in some other similarly restrictive fashion. The "rugged individualist," 
however, was exemplified by those who made the journey from "rags to riches," those 
who lived on the frontier, and entrepreneurs who saw possibilities for making money 
where others did not. In fact, most virtues in American society relate to obedience (to
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Go(L the law, the bosses) and to productivity (the work ethic). Community relations 
take a secondary or tertiary position.
Kunstler argues, "to appreciate grand public spaces, a culture had to first 
esteem the idea of the public realm, and this had not been the case in America" (67), 
where all available land had instead been quickly divided into parcels and sold 
without, it is worth reiterating, consideration for the future inhabitants. America, as 
Miller noted, was a land where people came to take rather than to give, and in such 
conditions "community" does not naturally arise. In Europe, not only was the interior 
and exterior design of a building important, but "the space between buildings was as 
important as the buildings themselves" (39). In this space, people make their way 
through the city, meet one another, relax, or celebrate any number of holidays 
throughout the year. Sidewalks, for instance, are not simply routes from one place to 
the next, one store to the next, but places where people may stop and hold 
conversations, which often impedes travel and may annoy people unused to such 
occurrences even as it demonstrates sidewalks possess a public value beyond their 
utilitarian role.
Since many American cities were quite congested by the early- to mid­
nineteenth century and offered little or no place for people to gather, in desperation 
many escaped to one of the few remaining relatively open spaces: the lush, green 
cemeteries on the outskirts of the city (Goldfield and Brownell 185). People would 
play games, enjoy picnics, and/or simply relax in these cemeteries, away from the 
noise and grime of the city. For a brief time, cemeteries were even "planned as 
recreational space" though the destruction and desecration of cemeteries soon ended 
that (185). In an attempt to rectify the congestion problem, a few cities managed to
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create parks for the people. Some, Central Park in New York City is perhaps the best 
model, were relatively successful and much used. In general, writes Miller in the 
midst of his tour of America, the American park is little more than a "circumscribed 
vacuum" {Nightmare, 59): a patch of green, a bench, a swingset for children.
”[T]here is never an ounce of personality in the park," he reports (59), perhaps because 
they are often set off in some forlorn comer rather than in some central, convenient 
location. Such a lacking suggests the parks were added out of a sense of obligation, 
rather than as a contribution to the life of the city and its citizens, and that city 
officials devoted as little expenditure as possible of time, money and imagination to 
their location, design and construction. These parks, then, often constituted a half­
hearted gesture towards public space rather than a full-fledged effort to bring peace 
and a little bit of nature into the lives of harried city-dwellers.
Similar to Miller's reading of skyscr^ers as symbols of control by the rich, 
Trachtenberg sees in American parks not the attempt to bring the country into the city, 
but instead "the ordering hand of corporate organization, the values o f  system and 
hierarchy" (112): parks designed for limited uses, as playgrounds for instance where 
children sat on swings and parents pushed, were also a subtle attempt to destroy 
working-class consciousness with an infusion of "middle class norms of hearth and tea 
table," an attempt to ensure workers did not perceive themselves as a distinct and 
oppressed class and thus unite and gain a voice, hence power (111-12). The type of 
people who inhabit these parks, says Miller, are ”[t]he American type par excellence, 
ever ready to believe what is written in the newspapers, ever on the look out for a 
Messiah. Not a speck of human dignity left. The white worm squirming in the vise 
of respectability" {Nightmare 51)! Parks in the U.S., then, seem to generally fall into
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one of two categories, either afterthoughts or levelling attempts by those in power, 
such that everyone should become, in the most banal sense, an "American." 
Revolutionary instincts, should these exist, must be undermined.
Cities, without the space and the quiet afforded people who live in the country, 
presented a "sometimes painful contrast to the more attractive countryside" (Goldfield 
and Brownell 184). Their sole purpose, "as centers for business," presented no clear 
demand for "ceremonial spaces and public structures" (Kunstler 33). We pay a price. 
Miller notes, for cities designed exclusively for exploitation; "nowhere else in the 
world is the divorce between man and nature so complete. Nowhere have I 
encountered such a dull, monotonous fabric of life as here in America. Here boredom 
reaches its peak" {Nightmare, 20). Once more, the blandness of the architecture, the 
one-dimensional landscape of most cities, unbroken by parks or squares, mirrors the 
existence to be found there, a reduced realm of human experience, conducive to the 
single-minded devotion to work and consumption so typically American.
European cities, says Kunstler, evolved over a longer period of time and thus 
support a wider variety of uses, a wider variety of architectures, and an "overarching 
civic consciousness" (Kunstler 33). There, cities, more than mere seats for business, 
are multi-dimensional, composed of a variety of buildings and public spaces "tied 
together in an organic whole, reflecting the idea of civilization as a spiritual 
enterprise" (33), rather than a mere pecuniary venture. While on a visit to New York 
City in 1935, Miller recalls a conversation among artists at a bar where one blurts out, 
"all great art is local\" Such a statement is naïve, in Miller's eyes. "To be local there 
must be a sense of place, and there must be a whole to which the parts refer" (Miller, 
Aller Retour 72). Not only is there no sense of place, something that arises from
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community, but there is no history, or respect for history, as such; this takes visible 
form in city expansion and the consistent destruction of old buildings rather than 
renovating or enlarging them.
The initial exigencies encountered by those who settled North America, as well 
as those that cities confronted in the face of industrialism, can only explain the 
peculiar construction of American cities, not excuse it. For Miller, even a city as old 
as Boston "was a vast jumbled waste created by pre-human or sub-human monsters in 
a delirium of greed" {Nightmare 11-12). When Miller compares Paris and New York, 
despite some of the unfortunate parallels he sees between the two cities—both are 
experiencing the decline described by Spengler, both have been affected by 
industrialization, though to different degrees—what Miller celebrates the most about 
Paris is "the notion of the city as historical text" (Kennedy 146). There is an organic 
unity to Paris he finds lacking in American cities. Where European cities expanded 
while preserving large portions of the historic parts of the city, American cities, prey 
to local industries, usually allowed them to do as they pleased. Miller predicts that 
sooner or later Americans will learn "whether the ability to make money," which is 
what their cities are contrived for, "and the ability to survive are one and the same" 
{Nightmare 50). And not merely to survive but to //ve—"[tjhen we shall see the 
meaning of true wealth" (50).
Much of Miller's criticism, inspired by Spengler and Nietzsche, reflects more 
than a simple critique of America and Americans but also a vision of the decline of 
Western civilization. What is happening in America represents only a sign of things 
to come. Miller accepts Spengler’s vision of "the metaphysically exhausted soil of the
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West" (Spengler 5) \xiuch produces a culture''* in wdiich "die fire in die soul dies 
down" (75). Nietzsche similarly perceives a decrepitude in modem human beings, 
timid followers of slave morality For modem people, Nietzsche argues, "The stone is 
more stone than before" {Human 130), suggesting that even if buildings are 
constructed to communicate something, and "[o]riginally everything about a Greek or 
Christian building meant something,” now all the modem person sees or looks for is a 
superficial beauty which is only ever a mask (131). It is body without soul Often the 
only reason for ornamentation, in American terms, on a structure such as the 
Wool worth Building in New York City, was to make it stand out and thus advertise 
itself.
America, says Miller, could be "a Paradise”; "We have only to make ourselves 
fit to inhabit it" {Nightmare 23). Americans seek only to make money and to spend it, 
and the fact that American cities are largely unlivable reflects, in part, the very limited 
goals of those Wio inhabit them. It is now a variant of the chicken-and-egg question: 
Are those living in cities too mean, too unwilling to rebuild their cities? or are the 
cities so repressive, so obdurate that they caimot be transformed?
Miller's Paris and the American South
Paris and regions of the American south constitute sites where Miller believes 
one can discem a sense of place. Paris remains distinctive because of its long history
"Culture" is not used here in the Spenglerian sense but in the sense of "a whole 
body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our sense and 
assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a 
lived system of meanings and values—constitutive and constituting—which as they are 
experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming" (R. Williams, Marxism,
110).
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and the relatively successful attempt to preserve much o f the historical city. The 
American South is another place where, sporadically, remnants of the culture that 
flourished there'^ before the Civil War can still be seen—especially in New Orleans 
and Charleston. It is here, in the South, where history lives, where Sherman's march 
through the South is remembered by some as if it happened yesterday. In this last 
section of Chapter One, I wish to focus upon those features of cities and city-life that 
Miller venerates.
Miller’s Paris was the Paris of an exile. He went there for ”[t]he protective 
silence . . , the congenial tolerance of eccentrics and experimentalists" (Baxter 10). As 
it did for many expatriate Americans, Paris provided Miller the latitude he needed to 
develop as a writer. While many expatriates ultimately travel in order to develop an 
appreciation of their homeland. Miller, a sort of unwitting exile as we described him 
earlier, has no such intentions and indeed experiences no such reconciliation. "This is 
my world," Miller said of Paris {Emil 93), two years into his exile. "I can accomplish 
things now—the way is marked out . . .  I have a direction" (94, ellipses in original). 
Shari Benstock writes in Women o f the Left Bank that men and homosexual women 
were the greatest beneficiaries of Parisian freedom (451). For even if their sexuality 
marginalized them, in Paris lesbians were left to their own devices and "created their 
own private places . . . redefining the nineteenth-century salon for their own emotional 
and intellectual purposes" (451). Though Miller expressed the fear that he might be 
thrown out of the country for the book he was writing. Tropic o f Cancer {Emil 94),
At least in popular culture mythology. W. J. Cash argues, in The Mind o f the 
South, that plantations of the American south that measured up to that depicted in 
Gone with the Wind were a rarity.
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and anti-pom ogr^hy leagues existed in Paris as well as other regions of France,
Adrian Rifkin notes that those charged with deciding what did and did not constitute 
pornography were more likely "to see the complexity of the context of a délit rather 
than its content in the letter of the law" (109). French officials, in short, were more 
likely to employ common sense or critical judgement than to blindly follow some 
state-produced guideline. That French leniency, for Miller, was a healthy antidote to 
American Puritanism. Kennedy writes of the "orienting function of place" (4), and it 
is in Paris that Miller frees himself from the obligation to produce "Literature" and 
settles down to producing instead his "gob of spit in the face of Art."
The American Puritanical attitude—as exemplified in the actions and attitudes of
an Anthony Comstock suppressing not only what he perceived as simple pornography
but also publications on health-related issues such as contraception, menstruation, and
venereal disease—articulates a life-denying force whose influence pervades other
aspects of American life, leisure time for instance (see Chapter Three). Paris offers a
distinct alternative. In a 1933 letter to his friend Emil Schnellock, Miller relates a
street scene in which a drunkard makes a spectacle of himself, dancing and singing in
front of a café, while
the crowd on the terrasse watches in amusement, an amusement finely 
differentiated from derision or scorn or disgust. And then, Emil, by 
Jesus, the curious thing happens that on the other side of the street, a 
whore who had been standing against the shutters waiting for her prey, 
suddenly grows inspired, grows intoxicated by the music and by the 
crazy drunkard's antics too, no doubt, and she lifts her dresses with a 
grand whoop-la and commenced to do a jig. And there, by God, you 
have the real spirit of Paris. The man of the streets, the woman of the 
streets, the open café, the tolerance, the amusement, the wasting o f time, 
the indifference, the common humanity . . . .  A soft gentle moment 
which in America would produce a jagged note. (139-40, ellipses in 
original)
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This scene encapsulates for Miller, not only the humanity of Paris and the French, but 
also the Joie de vivre that permeates the culture. In America such displays. Miller 
contends, would be frowned upon, the joy considered excessive and unmannerly, the 
drunkard and the whore likely arrested as public nuisances. The reaction of the 
French is telling, for Miller, reorienting him toward life as experienced by the French, 
helping to refocus him toward what is real, human, vital, toward what is "in the open 
street."
That the French not only understand life as something to be lived and enjoyed 
is underscored, for Miller, by the fact that they admit to the basic needs of life. The 
outdoor urinals, seen all over Paris in the thirties, symbolize the grounded nature of 
Parisians. From the perspective of an American in Paris, Miller declares the urinal 
impressive because it assures him "he is in the midst of a people who admit to the 
necessity of peeing now and then and who know also that to piss one has to use a 
pisser" {Black Spring 42-3). Miller, ever the flâneur, even provides a listing of some 
of his favorite urinals (44), a testimony to the pleasure he takes in Paris.
Upon his arrival in Paris in March 1930, Miller experiences immediate 
intoxication. He writes of
wandering along the Seine at night, wandering and wandering, going 
mad with the beauty of it, the trees leaning to, the broken images in the 
water, the rush of the current under the bloody lights of the bridges, the 
women sleeping in doorways, . . .; everywhere the musty porches of the 
cathedrals and beggars and lice and old hags full of St. Vitus' dance. 
{Cancer 16)
The importance of place, writes Kennedy, is "that we find or know ourselves 
principally through the attachments we form to a place" (8). The beauty and squalor 
of Paris jell, for Miller. As opposed to his experience of New York City, the physical
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Paris attracts; it is permeated with meaning; "The streets sing, the stones talk. The 
houses drip history, glory, romance" (Emil 18). Pumam, who arrived in Paris in 1926, 
communicates a similar enchantment with Paris: "This was not a dead past; it was 
one that lived and breathed" (98). Kennedy maintains Miller's interest in the Parisian 
past focused either on "antiquarianism" or as it "recorded past instances of injustice" 
(149). His examples—Charles the Silly (Charles VI), the Knights Templar, Rabelais— 
point to another aspect of Miller's fascination with Parisian and French history: he 
liked the fantastic, larger than life stories, reflected in American frontier stories as 
well, which he would mirror in his fiction with characters, events and descriptions 
replete with embellishment and hyperbole.
Not only is Paris a city with a long and elaborate history, a history it attempts—
for the most part—to preserve, but for Miller it is beautiful. His early letters from
Paris, a selection of which are collected in Letters to Emil, contain numerous listings
of streets he has walked down, sites he has seen, and cafés he has patronized. "At
night," he writes in Quiet Days in Clichy, "from Montmartre, Paris is truly magical; it
lies in the hollow of a bowl like an enormous splintered gem" (66). Paris also has
"dreary streets, wide, colorless, insipid streets that might have been transplanted from
Brooklyn or Hoboken. Not many, thank God" (Emil 39). And Miller criticizes Paris
and France just as he condemns much that he sees, especially when looking through
his Spenglerian lens and detecting the downfall o f  the West:
Paris is simply an artificial stage, a revolving stage that permits the 
spectator to glimpse all phases of the conflict. Of itself Paris initiates 
no dramas. They are begun elsewhere. Paris is simply an obstetrical 
instrument that tears the living embryo from the womb and puts it in the 
incubator. (Cancer 29)
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In Spenglerian terms, the Paris Miller describes is a civilization', it has stopped 
developing and no longer produces anything new. It is merely a site, like an oven, 
where something can be brought to final form. Kennedy writes, "[T]he potential 
function of place . . . inheres in the relation vdiich the self assumes to its surroundings 
(material and human)" (4). Rather than an inconsistency, then, these contradictory 
depictions of the city are emblematic of both Miller's ongoing internal struggle with 
his perceived failure as a writer and a man, and his struggle with Western civilization 
which he believes to be in decline. "The world is a cancer eating itself away," Miller 
writes in Tropic o f Cancer (2), but even that decay, perhaps not as strong in Paris as 
in America, retains a "nurturing power" (Kennedy 171). Kennedy offers the possibility 
that "every textual construction of place implies just such a mapping or symbolic re­
presentation of an interior terrain" (6). Miller thus exposes both his joy and despair 
for the world in his treatment of Paris.
Despite this image of Paris as an "artificial stage," seemingly dead, perhaps
contributing nothing more than space; and despite the fact that Paris like other centers
of civilization is a "charnel house," Miller still waxes poetic when describing the city
in "Walking Up and Down in China":
I see the city o f Paris ring upon ring of streets; village within village; 
fortress within fortress. Like the gnarled stump of an old redwood, 
solitary and majestic she stands there in the broad plain of the Seine.
[....] From whatever height, from whatever distance of time or place, 
there she stands, the fair city of Paris, soft, gemlike, a holy citadel 
whose mysterious paths thread beneath the clustering sea of roofs to 
break upon the open plain. {Black Spring 192)
Pumam notes the difficulty in resisting the temptation to become sentimental about
Paris, in response to "the physical beauty and ultimately unanalyzable psychic charm
of a city which for centuries has been the refuge o f and the home of exiles" (50).
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Though also charmed by Paris, Miller's ambivalent relation to Paris, and to the modem 
world in general, usually prevents him from succumbing to an uncomplicated 
sentimentality, the notion that everything Parisian has value simply because it is 
Parisian. Furthermore, Miller recognizes his status as outsider; "I will never become 
a European," he writes, "but thank God, I am no longer an American" {Emil 94).
Paris has served to free him, he believes, from his cultural identity and to spur him on 
to his work, but it has not tranformed him into a Parisian.
France in the twenties and thirties was a cultural mecca, home to painters and 
writers alike. The Parisian avant-garde, especially the Surrealists, stirred up 
excitement, even in Miller (Kennedy 151) who would later largely repudiate them in 
"An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere," because they operated as a movement'* 
and "[were] trying to establish an absolute," because they were idealists and he 
believed their works lacked "guts and significance” {Cosmological 181). Still, for 
Miller they remain the only truly "stimulating" happening on the horizon in the 
nineteen-thirties (188).
Most of these artistic movements, in Paris, staked out territory: they frequented 
certain cafés and avoided others. In order to understand the ferment within which the 
American expatriates of the twenties and thirties existed—"Paris!" Miller exults, 
"Meaning the Café Select, the Dôme" {Cancer 17)—it is important to understand the 
function of the café in France. Cafés remain a central meeting place, "the most 
democratic of meeting places," as Herbert Lottman describes them (35). Whereas 
Americans generally seclude themselves in their homes, after work, and only
'* Movements within artistic circles seems to be something typical of most 
countries. Miller's rejection of movements seems typically American—individualist.
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occasionally go out to dinner with colleagues, friends, or neighbors, for many French
the café is a daily stop. The French, and the expatriates as well, spend a good deal of
time outside the home in cafés;
One could not only meet friends in a café but conduct business there, 
spend half a day writing letters, or even a book. One needed no 
invitation to strike up a conversation with a stranger at a neighboring 
table, and an appointment in a café often replaced an invitation home. 
(35)
The café is, for Miller as for others, another symbol of the difference between the 
French and Americans. It demonstrates the more communal nature of the French, as 
well as the relaxed joie de vivre Miller deems missing in America. The people Miller 
observes sitting at the café, who appear "[s]o intelligent, so indolent, so carefree" 
{Cancer 223), provide a stark contrast to so many Americans who could never relax 
without a prick of conscience. Many of the Paris letters that comprise the Letters to 
Emil were written on café letterhead, for many cafes had their own paper and handed 
it out free to customers, an advertisement—certainly—but also an encouragement to 
customers to remain, acknowledging that work and pleasure can both be public.
In the introduction to The Air-Conditioned Nightmare, Miller writes that when 
he returned to America in 1940 he "wanted to have a last look at [his] country and 
leave it with a good taste in [his] mouth" (10). What a difference, for Miller, between 
the French and the Americans. Where in the French citizen he sees a basic humanity, 
in the American the most noticeable feature is that "his expression is mild, bland, 
pseudo-serious, and definitely fatuous. [....] He looks as though he were turned out by 
a university with the aid of a chain store cloak and suit house" (44-5). Miller notes 
that while Europe may be older than America and its cities may suffer from
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deterioration, "the soul expands. Steadily, like a diermometer rising, die soul expands" 
{Aller Retour 68). It is not crushed by a rigid, puritanical conformity.
In America, and especially in the industrial north, he perceives mental and 
spiritual decline vdiich flies in the face of the proclaimed energy of Americans; "The 
fat, puffy, watde-faced man of forty-five wdio has turned asexual is the greatest 
monument to futility that America has produced" {Nightmare 46). Rather than a 
description of a type dominant in American culture, though numerous specimens could 
be gathered that fit such a description,*'* Miller describes a type expressive of 
American culture and, in so doing, reiterates "his refusal to accept much of American 
life" (Baxter 15). The one bright spot Miller finds during his trip around the country, 
he concedes, is the South—die southwest and, especially, the Old South, which he 
declares "is fiill of eccentric characters; it still fosters individuality" {Nightmare 45).
Miller finds New Orleans "the most congenial city in America that I know," for 
just as he experienced in France, in New Orleans "die sensual pleasures assume die 
importance which they deserve" (126). "It is," he continues, "the only city in America 
where, after a lingering meal accompanied by good wine and good talk, one can stroll 
at random through the French Quarter and feel like a civilized human being" (126). 
Certainly walking in a section of New Orleans christened "the French Quarter" 
heightened Miller's enjoyment, for the after-dirmer walk with people who love their 
city functions as a yet another echo, a reminder, o f his experience of Paris, suggesting 
hope remains, however limited, even for America.
”  Arthur Miller's Willy Loman, from Death o f  a Salesman, might expose such a 
figure.
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More problematic, however, is Miller's notion, after his visit to New Orleans, 
of the South; "At the rate we are going, in another hundred years or so there will be 
scarcely a trace or evidence on this continent of the only culture we have been able to 
produce—the rich slave culture of the South" (131). On the one hand Miller argues 
there is no American culture, so the fact that he embraces whatever America has 
produced in the way of a culture should not surprise. In this instance. Miller provides 
an example of what a culture looks like to those who have never seen one. On the 
other hand, he seems blind to the very real problems and suffering that split Southern 
culture. Perhaps Miller’s notion of this culture can be ascribed to romantic naivete, a 
vision of the Old South still wrapped in its pre-Civil War history and love of land, still 
producing rugged individuals such as Thomas Sutpen—in William Faulkner's Absalom! 
Absalom!—viho stand up to the world and simply do as they please, though, as W J. 
Cash writes, these rugged individuals operated in the South within a near "strait-jacket 
conformity" (88). Little of the Old South was still in existence in 1941 when Miller 
visited, and Cash argues, in The Mind o f  the South published in 1941, that the general 
vision of the Old South, with the mansions and the indolent Southern belles sipping 
mint juleps, only lived up to that picture in a very few instances. But Miller’s 
veneration of the Old South is also partly a result o f his notion of "south" and "north" 
as states of mind, though it is impossible to separate these two notions from American 
history: "In the South life for its own sake, hedonism, action and contemplation, ideas 
related to living" opposed to "the northern world [of] idealism, striving, Ided' {Emil 
149-50, capitalization Miller's): the openness of southern peoples contrasts with the 
reserve of northerners, southern laziness with northern industry.
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Miller's approval o f the Old South is actually much less all-embracing than The 
A ir-Conditioned Nightmare makes it appear. In The Nightmare Notebook, a  facsimile 
of a notebook he took with him on his 1940-42 trip, he writes much less admiringly of 
Southerners, describing them as "[p]hantasmal, menacing," and the South as "[p]eopled 
with assassins and perverts" (n.p.). Charleston is "the first American city which 
impresses [him] as having charm & character" (n.p.), while Cherokee, North Carolina, 
home to Native Americans, offers ”[g]reat silence. Peace" (n.p ). In fact, most of the 
positive comments Miller records about the South, in The Nightmare Notebook, relate 
directly to a history that goes back further than most American cities can lay claim to; 
cities founded in regions first settled by Native Americans, by the Spaniards, the 
French, or, like Charleston, founded early in colonial times. Still, he describes even 
an old city like Savannah, Georgia, as "fat and murderous" though "the dream element 
is still there—but now hideous, distorted, whitewashed by the cruel bleak Baptist spirit" 
(n.p).
In choosing to venerate the Old South, Miller demonstrates a decided 
iconoclasm, for Cash depicts a brutal, racist South—individualist to a point, perhaps, 
but united as well as divided by bittemess and hatred. Like Fredric Jameson who, 
dialectically, perceives virtue in collective action of any kind {Political Unconscious 
290-91), for which he has been uncomprehendingly criticized by Cornel West and 
others. Miller apparently sees virtue in most any culture with a distinctive character. 
While Jameson’s acceptance of collective action is not undifferentiated. Miller's 
veneration of what he sees as a unified Southern culture at times appears to be, and it 
is well to remember Max Horkheimer’s instructive remark about such unity as he
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looked to Nazi Germany; "Error has no less often united men than truth" {Critical 
Theory 283).
Miller expresses his problem with American culture succinctly in his e ss^  
"Staff of Life," from Remember to Remember. "What do I find wrong with America? 
Everything. I begin at the beginning, with the staff of life: bread. If the bread is bad 
the whole life is bad" (36). Beginning at the beginning means for Miller going back 
to basics, to what has been a staple of life for humans since time immemorial and to 
what Americans value. "Americans," he writes, "don't care about good bread" (35). 
Like their vast cities lacking character and crushing their inhabitants with gloom, the 
bread Americans eat is "unwholesome, unpalatable and unappetizing"(52); it is, in 
short, "bread without life" (35). That the breads Americans eat are, above all, filling 
but flavorless signifies for Miller that "the very core of life is contaminated" (35). 
Furthermore, American contentment with their bread demonstrates they "have also lost 
their taste for life. For enjoyment. For good conversation. For everything 
worthwhile" (36)—for that which he found and praised in Paris. Americans, in Miller's 
view, prefer the most up-to-date commodities, whether they need them or not, over 
simpler, more basic necessities. "A plate of false teeth means more to an American 
than a loaf of good bread," he asserts, suggesting the newest gadgets are more highly 
valued than those objects with which people come in daily contact (35).
The nearly ten-year period Miller lived in Paris served to focus his attention on 
America and western civilization, forced him (as it does many expatriates) to come to 
terms with himself and what he valued. While most expatriates make their peace with 
America, Miller does not. Though he may not have appreciated bread before he
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relocated to France, by the time of his return to America he recognized its value and it 
became a symbol for him of America's culture infirmity, as evidenced in their cities 
and, as we shall see, in their obsessive love affair with commodities.
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Chapter Two / Cities of Delight and Disgust: the Gty Spectacle and Consumption
"Yes," I said, "I'm crazy enough to believe that the happiest man on 
earth is the man with the fewest needs." (Miller, The Colossus o f  
Maroussi, 133)
There are times when faith in the future of mankind can be kept alive 
only through absolute resistance to the prevailing responses of mankind. 
(Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory, 280)
In The Air-Conditioned Nightmare and Remember to Remember. The Air- 
Conditioned Nightmare Volume 2, Henry Miller continues an attack on America, 
begun in Tropic o f Cancer, as a country that once promised the life more abundant but 
failed to deliver. American bread, tasteless and filling, composed of flour bleached of 
its nutrients, "the staff of our unsavory and monotonous life" {Remember, 50), 
symbolizes for Miller everything wrong in America. "Yet," he insists, "millions are 
wasted advertising it" (36). More specifically, he might have added, millions of 
dollars are wasted marketing it, making it seem palatable with brightly-colored 
wrapping, through identification with an image, or set of images—relating it to 
something quintessentially American, the Statue of Liberty or "youth," for instance, 
cheapening and distorting that with which it is associated—in that way creating desire 
for the product. With mass production, the availability of a great number of products 
intensifies competition. Marketing a product solely on any material virtues it may 
possess is not enough to ensure substantial sales. A product must somehow be 
associated with something else—through the packaging it comes in, the other goods it 
is placed among, the spokesperson who lends a name or face to it—so that it makes an 
appeal to the potential purchaser's imagination. Such an appeal, additionally, tends to
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promote repeat purchases among those who identify with the image(s) surrounding the 
product.
Both Miller and Baudelaire, as noted above, felt alienated from their respective 
historical periods. The obscenity found in Baudelaire's poetry, writes Susan Buck- 
Morss, is "a radically new aesthetic sensibility that drew its breath from the decadent' 
sense experience of the modem city" (177), expressing this sense of alienation. The 
new Paris—forming in the wake of industrialism, as well as Haussmaimisation, which 
made of Paris a "ville bourgeoise" (Marchand 93)—becomes the site of greater 
indulgences, and greater lamentation by people who saw the Parisian enjoyment as 
extreme, vulgar (88). The decadent,' in this instance, includes the sexual and the 
sensual, commercial appeals to all senses, displays of great wealth amidst raging 
poverty—the decadent inspiring both profound enjoyment and keen repulsion. Miller, 
meanwhile, accepting neither the limits nor the excesses of modem culture, indulges in 
his own provocative unveiling of modem life, returning repeatedly to people engaged 
in acts privatized by society or expounding upon the carelessness of a system which, 
as we shall see, maintains its grasp on power with further excesses. In the 
modemizing city virtually anything can and will be purchased, and in great abundance, 
due to technological improvements in manufacturing, to new forms of marketing, as 
well as the large increase in population and, thus, workers.
The industrial revolution, and the simultaneous rise of commodity capitalism, 
generally affected large cities first, with the effects quickly spreading to the smaller 
cities and then to the countryside, until finally few or none escaped its impact. 
Surveying the West in 1919, Oswald Spengler declared, "In the form of democracy, 
money has won" (379), suggesting that democracy is merely a "cover" for business
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and for free enterprise. Though it boasted a peculiar meaning in the years of the 
Second Empire' and serves as a founding myth in America, "democracy " for Spengler, 
as for Nietzsche, operates as a leveling metaphor with few o f the positive connotations 
its adherents proclaim. Money flows more freely in a capitalist-democratic economy, 
and governments allow people to vote their leaders into office, thus providing the 
appearance of freedom and equality, but whether people actually enjoy greater freedom 
remains an open question. Who ultimately holds power, elected political leaders or 
private economic leaders?
"The enemy of man," Henry Miller declares, is not germs, but man himself, his 
pride, his prejudices, his stupidity, his arrogance. No class is immune, no system 
holds a panacea Each one individually must revolt against a way of life which is not 
his own {Colossus 82). Much that comprises modem life-work and the cult of the 
commodity, especially—turns out to be, for Miller, a way of life that is neither his nor 
ours, but something imposed upon the western world under the rubric of "progress." 
Guy Debord has called this new society, in the book of the same title, "the Society of 
Spectacle." He describes a populace directed by capitalist consumption and all that 
goes with it—commodities and marketing, production and consumption. "The 
spectacle," he writes, "is not a collection of images but a social rapport between 
people mediated by images" (16); It has become our culture, the lens through which 
we see and experience the world.
' The French people were periodically called on to re-elect Napoleon m  as 
emperor, though in an 1851 coup d'état he had toppled his own fledgling democracy 
and founded the authoritarian Second Empire. Voting served a symbolic function, that 
of reaffirming the emperor, and gave a false sense of power to the people.
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What Becomes a Commodity
In Chapter One, I argued that the American city, mapped out on the grid 
pattern, was in reality less a space for people to live and grow than property to be 
sold. Phillipe Hamon writes that during the era o f Baron von Haussmann's dramatic 
transformation of Parisian topography, Paris itself was reduced to "an object of land 
speculation," in this way converted into "a plot o f land to be developed" (129)—and 
then turned over to bourgeois businessmen, the sector of the populace that benefited 
most from Haussmannisation. Commodification tends to both reduce objects to their 
essences and to magnify them into dreams. The marketing of commodities, 
consequently, results in a productive tension that leans toward the dreamworld, as 
evinced in fashion—where a coat is not simply a coat but an Ï  ves St. Laurent or a 
Christian Dior, a status symbol at the very least, for the nouveau riche a sign of 
arrival. Paris itself is an example of a commodity, for it is, on the one hand, merely 
land upon wdiich people live; but it exists also as diat enthralling place, where some of 
the most important monuments in French history stand, where the cultural leaders 
preside and perform, wdiere the brightest, most colorful lights shine, and the newest 
and best commodities can be purchased, at ever-rising prices. Most tourists know the 
city as "Paris"—the place where they can visit Notre Dame, the Eiffel Tower, The 
Galeries Lafayette, the Louvre, or sit in ccfés drinking tiny cups of strong coffee and 
watching the world walk by—though the other Paris tugs at them constantly, today in 
the hooded shapes of women sprawled on sidewalks, hands out, shaking in mute 
appeals for money.
Though Baudelaire wimessed the Parisian poor and depicted them 
sympathetically, in a poem like "Le Vin des Chiffoniers" [The Ragpickers' Wine] or in
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some of the Tableaux Parisiens, Baudelaire's Paris was at the same time a Paris of 
wealth and splendor. The Parisian streets, often narrow and crowded with horses, 
carriages, and offal, presented quite a danger for pedestrians, so to protect pedestrians 
and to encourage shopping and brousing, streets filled with shops were, here and there, 
enclosed under glass roofs and vehicular traffic prohibited. For Walter Benjamin, 
these passage,' symbols of Parisian abundance and the rising consumer culture, were 
both "the original temple of commodity capitalism" and "the precursors of the modem 
department stores" (qtd. in Buck-Morss 83). They represent precursors, as well, then, 
of the shopping mall, so prevalent in America after World War II and currently 
making inroads in Europe and the industrialized East. Though the first passage, the 
Palais-Royal, dates from 1786, most date from the first half of the nineteenth century, 
some fourteen constructed during the eighteen-twenties (Favier 221). The passages as 
well as the first department stores came into their prime while Baudelaire was still a 
young man in the city (Buck-Morss 178).
A number of the Parisian passages still exist: two of them. Panorama and 
Jouffroy (which connects to a third, Verdeau), lie on Boulevard Montparnasse in a 
direct line with each other. The visitor today can walk down the tiled floors, under 
the high glass ceilings, finding cafés, book, toy and furniture stores, as well as the 
Musée Grevin. Another, on St. Germain, is only covered at either end and boasts an 
uneven cobblestone walkway linking restaurants, bars, and art galleries. In these 
passages visitors can still escape the noise of the street and often the thick human
■ Passages has generally been translated as arcades, but for consistency with the 
French and German I will call them passages from now on. Most but not all of the 
passages, it should be noted, were glass-enclosed; some were open to the elements, if 
not to traffic.
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traffic as well. One o f the more famous instances of the passage in literature appears 
in Louis Aragon’s Le Persan de Paris [The Parisian Peasant], where the paysan 
explores the soon-to-be demolished Passage de l'Opéra, a dark crumbling edifice, 
containing a variety of stores and restaurants, residue o f  the past in the form of 
mouldings and old price lists, as well as a bordello.
The passages, housing a number of stores each selling a limited number of 
products, encouraged crowds to wander from one display window to the next. The 
department store, since it stocked a wide variety of products that had once been sold 
by separate stores, reduced the need for shoppers to wander from store to store: in the 
department store customers simply moved from one section to the next, from one floor 
to the next,^ finding everything they needed and more. Enticing people into one large 
space, the department store thinned the crowd on the sidewalks and in the passages, 
altering the routine of many in the city, including the flâneur. Baudelaire, for instance, 
"loved solitude, but . . . wanted it in a crowd" (Benjamin, CB, 50). Haussmann's 
renovations, as well as the rise of the department stores, "converted the flâneur into a 
figure of exile" (P. Ferguson 81), a person who no longer knew the city and whose 
milieu, the crowd, had to a large extent evaporated. The flâneur’s response to the 
"urban spectacle," moreover, was to be "dazed" rather than "dazzled" by "a revolution 
that seemed never to end" (81). Hamon, taking a cue from Benjamin, asserts that 
"tourists and shoppers" replace the flâneur {\A5), in part transforming Paris from a 
place where people live and move to a place people might experience but never know.
 ^The escalator is a nineteenth-century invention.
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The passages "were the first modem architecture for the public" (Buck-Morss 
144). Not even purchasing-power was required for wandering among the stores and 
crowds in the passages, whereas in the early department store it was sometimes a 
requirement for entrance. The passages most clearly foreshadow department stores as 
"the first consumer 'dream houses,' placed at the service of commodity worship" (144). 
Owners and their employees filled the windows of stores in the passages with goods to 
tempt shoppers, as well as those just wandering by in the crowd, into the stores. For 
someone like Baudelaire who could not always afford to purchase products, the shop 
windows still presented a reason to escape to the streets. One regret Baudelaire 
expressed during his three years in Brussels, beginning in 1864, was that he could find 
"[n]o shop windows. Strolling, something that nations with imagination love, is not 
possible in Brussels. There is nothing to see and the streets are unusable" (qtd. in 
Benjamin, CB, 50). Baudelaire clearly recognizes the imaginative possibilities inspired 
by commodities.
The first department store. Ville de France, opened its doors for business in 
1844, "in Paris with a hundred and fifty employees on its staff' (Mumford 438). 
William Leach, whose Land o f  Desire chronicles the birth of consumer culture in 
America, writes that only well after the American Civil War, in the eighteen-eighties, 
did department stores begin to open in America, eventually replacing the dry goods 
stores that had previously provided much the same service (7-8)—only without the 
modem approach to sales. America, in this instance, followed the lead of Paris. John 
Wanamaker, one of the first to open a Parisian-style department store in America, 
travelled to Paris himself several times in the years before the turn of the twentieth 
century, and later sent representatives there, in order to learn the newest ideas about
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marketing and window display design, along widi the latest fashions (Leach 99-100). 
It did not take long, however, to create a consumer public in America.
Commodity Culture and Learning Yonr Place
Department stores quickly made their niche in the downtown, soon known as 
"the retail district," such that when "urban residents talked about going downtown,' 
this is the area to which they were usually referring" (Coldfield and Brownell 210). 
While department stores carved out their own local space within the city, their 
influence extended well beyond the confines of their stores and the "downtown" they 
occupied. Wanamaker and others, like J. C. Fields, "translated the new economy into 
a new culture for many Americans" (Leach 34). Not only did they help change the 
way commodities were produced and sold, but they "legitimated fashion, fostered the 
cult of the new, democratized desire and consumption" (34). One might even contend 
that Wanamaker and others o f his ilk helped to distance one generation from the next, 
visible most explosively in the "generation gap" of the nineteen-sixties; for, if Leach is 
correct, the preoccupation of Americans after the development of consumer culture is 
quite different from those who lived before it. Additionally, commodity culture 
depends upon ruptures, technological breakthroughs and innovative designs in clothes, 
automobiles and other products, to provide new products, new looks and a sense of 
difference from what has come before. Each generation, then, can look back to what 
came before and measure its difference.
Just as Henry Miller laments the near-extermination of the rich and variegated 
Native American culture, in order that this bland new American culture could take
137
root, he also laments what was by the middle nineteen-diirties an entrenched consumer 
culture:
In the windows of the religious shops are inexpensive crosses to 
commemorate the event[: the crucifixion]. A poor Jew nailed to the 
cross so that we might have life everlasting. And haven't we got it 
though . . . cement and balloon tires [inflatable radier than solid] and 
radios and loudspeakers and whores widi wooden legs and commodities 
in such abundance that there's no work for the starving. {Cosmological 
44, ellipses in original)
Everything is marketable, from technological developments to religion, and people are
inundated with products. One senses here again that Miller perceives unrequited
potential, that something good could have come as a result o f  the new technologies
and the new possibilities they released, and laments the failure.
Marshall Berman puts a fine point on Miller's argument when he asserts that 
capitalism "destroys the possibilities it creates," inspiring "self-development for 
everybody," hence the democratic aura, while encouraging only those traits that the 
market can benefit from (96). "[E]verything else within us," he writes, "everything 
nonmarketable, gets draconically repressed . . . "  (Berman 96). The department store 
and its methods of operation, above all its focus on creating desire for its products, 
must take at least partial responsibility for the failure of this new consciousness to 
transform Americans into something approximating the embodiment of their ideals.
"We have enslaved ourselves," Miller asserts, "by our own petty, circumscribed view 
of life. [....] Life demands we give something more [than our lives]—spirit, soul, 
intelligence, good-will" {Colossus 82), little of which is encouraged by the new 
economy We are not merely soldiers for the economy, created to consume and 
produce. Miller reminds his readers.
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The French department store, or grand mc^asin, ”revoIutioniz[ed] both the 
practice and the psychology of selling," beginning in the eighteen-fifties (Christiansen
III).  With the rise of mass production, which made department stores feasible, came 
the need for prompt turnover of goods. Marketing, the contextualizing of products 
within the store as well as advertising on billboards and, later, newspapers, intended to 
ensure such turnover. Benjamin writes that department stores, moreover, "made use of 
flânerie . . .  in order to sell goods" {CB 170): owners expected customers to wander 
their stores, gazing at the products ranged on shelves or hanging from racks. Rupert 
Christiansen writes that A u Bon Marché was "the first to plan its layout so that a 
customer would be lured from one purchase to another" (113). The task of owners 
and employees of department stores, then, became to provide a proper context for 
goods and to incite desire through proximity, scarves near perfume, shirts near jackets 
and ties and cuff-links.
In America, the department store supplanted the more prevalent dry goods store 
through employment of "a new powerful universe of consumer enticements" (Leach 
20-1), among which fashion would be perhaps the most persuasive. Leach cites a 
flagrant example of the new "consumer enticements": a great variety of spoons began 
to appear on the market, designed for a variety of purposes, deemed essential for the 
"modem" home, though previously one or two types of spoons had served. Through 
marketing, "[a] multitude of goods were produced to satisfy needs that no one knew 
they had," writes Leach (16). Debord understands such a practice as "the second 
industrial revolution" and the flip side of alienated labor: "alienated consumption"
(40). Potential purchasers were made to feel the lack, the absence of a product they 
had never known, through shiny surfaces and advertisements assuring them of the
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necessity of the new products (especially hygiene products as Miller repeatedly notes), 
through associations between these products and some ideal homemaker or business 
leader or other object o f admiration, as well as promises that the new product would 
simplify or in some way improve life. "The industrial revolution," for Utopian 
theorists like Fourier and others in France in the mid-nineteenth century, "seemed to 
make possible the practical realization of paradise" (Buck-Morss 81). These theorists 
envisioned in the near future an abundance of goods accessible to all, as well as a 
decline in the need to work to survive. Miller, however, rejects the desire for new 
products while agreeing on the goal: "We don't want better surgical appliances, we 
want a better life" {Colossus 82).
There were those who criticized the new manipulative features of department
stores, not least of whom were the owners of dry goods stores put out of business.
One criticism put forth by Walter Weyl, a theorist who otherwise welcomed the new
economy, was that amidst all this plenitude, all this democratizing of desire,
languished people who did not and could not benefit. Writing in 1912, he warns:
We are developing new types of destitutes—the automobileless, the 
yachtless, the Newport Cottageless. The subtlest luxuries become 
necessities, and their loss is bitterly resented. The discontent of today 
reaches very high in the social scale . . . .  The end of it all is vexation 
of spirit, (qtd. in Leach 243)
Those who cannot purchase the new necessities are thwarted, while those who can
often indulge in "alienated consumption," constantly seeking to acquire the latest
emblems of modernity. Capitalist culture should not be characterized by a sense of
plenty and of satisfaction, but by a sensitivity to what one did not yet own and might
never possess. An imfortunate side-effect to the democratization of desire, then, was
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frustration and even bitter disappointment, when people without means shared some of 
the same desires as those with means.
Leach further explores an argument, first put forth by sociologist Thorsten 
Veblen, that "business focussed desire toward consumption of goods [essentially 
passive] and away from productive labor and the ownership of land [active]" thus 
"shrinking the possibilities of the universe, not expanding them" (232). Encouraged to 
be passive rather than creative, people generally succumbed to the circumscribing of 
their realm of experience. They become an audience who must be dazzled—by stores 
and lighting, newspaper headlines and politicians; they are no longer artisans who 
bring finished products into existence or a public who must be convinced solely by 
material benefits.
Finally, writes Alan Trachtenberg, the apparently "magical appearance of 
goods" on the shelves of a store as well as the focus on the "private use" of goods, 
"disguised links between goods and factories" and the fact that certain goods were the 
product of "a particular mode of production" (133). "The factory," Trachtenberg 
asserts, "lay as a hidden presence within the store" (134), a sort of pit in the plum that 
was and is the commodity dreamworld. A suit, displayed on a mannequin, in a 
display window strewn with other such items, caressingly lit by strategically positioned 
lights, invites viewers to imagine how good they could look and how this suit might 
change their lives rather than to muse upon who produced it and under what 
circumstances. Workers when not on the job become consumers, consumption of 
commodities helping them to forget the way they spend their days or nights.
America and Americans underwent great changes due to the advent of 
consumer consciousness, Leach contends, a consciousness directly attributable to the
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new department stores and to mass production. To demonstrate just how profound the 
change was, he reports on a Frenchman, writer André Siegfned, who made a series of 
visits to America in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Siegfried had felt 
comfortable in America in the early years of the new century, sensing that it "still 
seemed linked to Europe and 'the West'"—its department stores, after all, were 
modelled on the French ones; but in the years following the First World War, writes 
Leach, to this Frenchman "the country seemed strange and foreign, a change he 
attributed to the rise of mass production and mass civilization and to a remarkable 
shift in what Americans considered 'morally valuable'"—their "standard of living" and 
appearing to live up to it (266). What was new was not, however, the "rise" of either 
mass production or mass civilization, for both had been in evidence at the turn of the 
century; rather, both phenomena were finally clearly visible as important, even 
determining forces in American life after the First World War. As a consequence, 
Americans now seemed to be encouraged to behave in conflicting ways: on the one 
hand, at work they were to be responsible, consistent, employing self-discipline; in the 
marketplace, however, they were to let themselves go, buy on impulse, live for the 
moment—which "opened the door to waste, indulgence, impulse, irresponsibility, 
dreaming, or qualities thought of as non western" (Leach 107)—qualities (as we shall 
see in Chapter Four) generally disdained as unproductive.
Department stores became "a prime urban artifact of the age, a  place of 
learning as well as buying: a pedagogy of modernity," writes Trachtenberg (131). In 
the passages, first, but certainly most successfully in the department stores, people 
began to grasp their roles in the new economy. For the first time, they "apprehended 
themselves as consumers” rather than "mere users of goods" (130), consumption
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intimating both that a product will be used up, necessitating replacement, and that the 
consumers are passive, uncreative, with nothing to offer in exchange for a product but 
money. The great variety of products flooding the market "taught families what they 
needed," and "the symbolic as well as practical function of things" they discovered as 
they browsed (132). From fashion they apprehend the "modem measure of time'" 
(Buck-Morss 97), how long something remains "new," how long a season lasts, and 
when it is time to move on to a new fashion. Advertisers, furthermore, aimed their 
products at discrete groups, divided by age, sex and color, and it was important for 
consumers to know which group they fell into in order to measure up to modem 
societal expectations, to not lag behind the times.'* Oebord introduces merchandise in 
his discussion of Spectacular Society as "our old enemy who knows so well how to 
appear at first glance something trivial and self-contained, while it is, on the contrary, 
so complex and so filled with metaphysical subtleties" (35). The worth of a 
commodity, often, is difficult to assign due to the variety of values inscribed in it.
The new economy also taught people not only about their role within the 
economy but about their relationships with others: "People knew one another as 
debtors and creditors, salesman and customers, employers and employees, and above 
all as competitors" (Benjamin, CB, 39). Though neither Leach nor Trachtenberg make 
this argument overtly, one can look at this development in the new culture and see in 
its rise the parallel demise of the family and of community, so lamented by 
conservatives. Not only are people competitors for products, but they are also
“* The 1950s sitcom "The Honeymooners" depicts Ralph Kramden’s miserliness, as 
well as his relative failure within the American economy, by focussing on the fact he 
still has an ice-box, though refrigerators had been available for two decades.
143
separated into a variety of categories for advertisers to appeal to—and, it must be 
added, their enjoyment of these commodities most often takes place within the house 
radier than in a public place.
That "Keeping up with die Joneses" remains a cliché descriptive of American
culture demonstrates not only that alienated consumption still occurs but also that the
competitive nature of consumer culture prevails as an ingrained and divisive, rather
than unifying, force within American culture. For Henry Miller, the focus on "having
things," this "monomania," as he calls it, provides a false comfort. As the American
people "embellishes its meagre, stultified life by the adoption of telephone, radio,
automobile, tractor, et cetera, the meaning of the word communal becomes so
fantastically distorted that one begins to wonder what is meant by the phrase "human
community " (Colossus 123). Bill Bryson writes that the "intention" of the Viennese
designer of the first American shopping mall, Victor Gruen,
was not to create a new and more efficient way o f shopping but to re­
create in America something of the unrushed café-society atmosphere of 
European city centers. Shopping centers—or shopping towns, as he 
preferred to call them—were to be gathering places for the neighorhood, 
focal points of the community where people could stroll and meet 
friends, dally over a coffee and only incidentally shop. (255)
Except for some elderly who gather at malls in the morning for exercises, or the
occasional groups of youths on a Friday or Saturday night, Gruen's vision has failed.
Most of the people who go to a mall do so solely with the intention of purchasing
something. People may have greater access to their neighbors and peoples from other
lands, but only as disembodied voices or pictures, so their relationships with others
diminish and experience is flattened.
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Manipulation and Grcuiation
Western economies had at one time been one focussed on producing 
commodities rather than profits. Spengler argues that the shift, from "quality" to 
"quantity," presents another sign of the decline of Western culture (404). Individual 
craft had been devalued in favor of greater production. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, the American economy, simultaneous with many other Western economies, 
"had evolved" into a highly competitive "system preoccupied with 'making profits'" 
(Leach 18). Workers become invisible as brand-names assume greater importance, and 
people become shoppers, consumers.
Leach's contention, corroborated by his use of letters, speeches, and trade 
publications spaiming the years in question (1880-1930), is that this change in 
consciousness as well as in business operations was neither accidental nor fated. 
Owners of department stores and their managers devised dream worlds of elegance and 
fashion to move goods, to keep the factories of mass production running, and to insure 
greater profits in the next year. He quotes a speaker in the early nineteen-twenties 
exhorting her audience of sales representatives, "Sell them their dreams" (298). She 
continues, "[PJeople don't buy things to have things. [....] They buy hope—hope of 
what your merchandise will do for them" (298). Store layout, shop-windows, the 
persuasive voice of the sales representative, all function as facets of the "mass 
seduction . . .  to guarantee turnover" (298) through creation of desire. Christiansen 
similarly and summarily relates, "As Au Bon Marché^ served, so it also seduced"
(113).
 ^A u  Bon Marché was the leading Parisian department store in the eighteen-fifties 
and -sixties.
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For Miller, though, department stores signal decline rather than prosperity:
"All department stores are symbols of sickness and emptiness, but Bloomingdale's is 
my special sickness" {Ccqjricom 205). These stores signify "sickness and emptiness" 
to the extent that they satisfy largely illusory desires, unrelated to physical or a deeper- 
level of psychological well-being. That people now feel the need to buy "hope" only 
illustrates for Miller the dissatisfaction they otherwise suffer in their daily lives. 
Furthermore, these psychological needs, assuaged by "alienated consumption," often 
remain superficial, created by advertisers who feed off the insecurities and vanity of 
people to market a variety of deodorants, teeth-whiteners, mouthwashes, and perfumes; 
the more pressing needs, for communion with other people, for personal growth, for a 
better life free of worry and exhausting work, for instance, seldom receive full 
attention. Bloomingdale's symbolizes the worst of consumer culture, for like much in 
New York City it is an extreme form of what can be found elsewhere.
Manipulation underlies most aspects of department stores, from the design of 
display windows to the glaze spread on goods with interior lighting. Window 
displays, in the passages and the dry goods stores, were little more than windows 
jammed full helter-skelter with goods. Shoppers were expected to enter the store to 
purchase goods they needed and could not, themselves, produce. Christiansen 
maintains that A u Bon Marché was the "first shop to understand the attractive power 
of a window display" (113). Since displaying products in window arrangements 
required an artistic eye, in order to present the products in a seductive context, it is in 
shop-windows and various other forms of marketing that "art is brought into the 
service of commerce" (Benjamin, "Paris," 146). Attracting people to window displays 
could be of great importance because sheer numbers of customers crowded around a
146
commodity "enhances [the commodity's] attractiveness to the average buyer" {CB 56). 
Desirability breeds desirability.
Writing of American department stores, generally modelled on the French 
prototype as we have seen, Trachtenberg argues that these stores, with respect to their 
goods, were intent upon "cultivating both their desirability and their consumability" 
such that there was constant turnover in the stores and constant need on the part of 
consumers (130). Shop windows were henceforth designed to do "more than visually 
focus goods" (Leach 66); they were organized to contextualize goods, to relate an 
article of clothing, for example, to an image of luxury and thus to draw customers into 
the store. "Associate the goods with people and events,' one retailer said, and not [as 
had dry goods stores] with 'the idea of buying and selling; in this manner you 
command attention'" (66). William Ch^man Sharpe describes the aura surrounding a 
commodity as its strongest selling point (64), though at times it might be eclipsed by 
mass production. This need to sell at a high rate "brought about a nzenchantment of 
the social world'"* (Buck-Morss 253) meant, as Christiansen noted earlier, to "seduce." 
L. Frank Baum, best known as the author of classic fantasy tale The Wizard o f Oz, 
worked as a merchandiser before earning fame as an author. Leach remarks of him: 
"No one was more sure . . . that people could be persuaded or tricked by [display] 
windows into buying goods" (59, italics added). Dreams, then, were just one more 
instrument, like mass production, in the hands of consumer capitalists.
Used wisely and suggestively, dreams led to purchases. Advertising, in 
general, becomes "symptomatic of the transformation of information into propaganda"
* The Enlightenment should be understood as an attempt at a ^//^enchantment of 
the world, an awakening from myth and superstition to rationality and reason.
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(Buck-Morss 144), anotiier example of the change in consciousness wrought by 
consumer culture. In such a society, only information that leads to some sort of 
approved action is privileged, clearly an illustration o f the "bottom-line" mentality that 
prescribes immediate direction—in this case, a purchase.
For Charles Baudelaire, twenty-three Wien die first grand magasin opened it's 
doors, the commodity is not a repository for dreams. According to Buck-Morss, he 
represented "private dreams as hollowed-out as the commodities" (182). In "Le 
Mauvais Vitrier" [The Poor Glassmaker] for instance, the crazed narrator, furious that 
the glass the workman offers is clear rather than colored, that it will not alter "la 
lourde et sale atmosphère parisiame" [the stifling and dirty Parisian atmosphere], 
brutalizes the man and yells after him, "La vie en beau! la vie en beau!" (Paris Spleen 
88)—exhorting him to, through his product, make life beautiful. Few products, of 
course, can perform that function; a well-made coat, however—no matter what it looks 
like—can, in winter, make life a little more bearable.
"Radio, telephone, cinema, newspaper, pulp magazine, fountain pen, wrist 
watch, vacuum cleaner or other gadgets ad infinitum? Are these," Henry Miller asks, 
"the baubles that make life worthwhile?" (Nightmare 29). In Tropic o f Cancer, he 
criticizes an Indian, Hari Das, who answers that question with a resounding "yes": "he 
has been contaminated by the cheap idealism of the Americans, contaminated by the 
ubiquitous bathtub, the five-and-ten-cent store bric-a-brac, the bustle, the efficiency, 
the machinery," mistaking all these things for the good life (93). While these gadgets 
may in some cases reduce the workload of the purchasers, they cannot, on their own, 
make life better. They are "hollowed-out" promises. These items are not an end in 
themselves, as many believe, but a means to an end, to the good life.
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Those who ran department stores, in the early years of twentieth-century 
America, took it as one o f their projects to educate consumers, as we have seen, but 
educate them such that they begin to share the same dreams of the good life. Edward 
L. Bemays, who, beginning in the nineteen-twenties, helped department stores promote 
their products, argued that one of the duties of promoters involved "regimenting the 
public mind" (qtd. in Leach 320). Writes Leach, "Trained 'intermediaries' like 
[Bemays, believed they] had to intervene to interpret reality for the public. They had 
to provide 'truthful' information and to connect the various publics' back together 
again into a 'cohesive' whole" (320). It is creative truth, truth designed to stimulate 
desire as well as to make customers feel good about a purchase, that people such as 
Bemays have in mind when they say "'truthful' information." Though information, as 
Benjamin notes, is open to "prompt verifiability," information must also "sound 
plausible" {Illuminations 89), short-circuiting any investigation, any employment of 
imagination, on the part o f the listener, reader, or viewer.
What Hari Das and other foreigners (as well as most Americans) fail to see, 
according to Miller, is how the American Dream has been vulgarized. Toward the end 
of the nineteenth century the American govemment began working hand in hand with 
business, and "corporate business now orchestrated the myths of America" (Leach 
378), propagating a wide variety of myths—the land of opportunity (while at the same 
time bankrupting small businesses), the land of plenty (though people starve on the 
streets and artificial shortages drive up prices as well as desire for goods), and the 
classless American society (at the same time employing "class" to create desire and 
sell goods). In his 1941 anti-war tract, "Murder the Murderer," Miller attacks one of 
the most sacred of sacred cows:
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The dream o f golden opportunity still clings to the name America no 
matter what part of the world you may go to. It is regrettable that we, 
the American people, have fostered a false interpretation of that dream 
and thereby helped to further poison the world. (Miller Remember,
166)
America, Miller argues, has not been made better through commodity capitalism, 
though outsiders often perceive it to be better simply because its stores are filled with 
commodities. Commodities alone do not improve life. Just as factory owners do not 
acknowledge labor as "alienated," so outsiders do not see consumption as "alienated."
The American and Western capitalist revolution, for it is ultimately a 
revolution, is exported and infiltrating and changing other cultures, though at the very 
source, in America, there is widespread dissatisfaction occasioning but little action in 
response, save repression of labor unions, the white-washing of history, exhortations 
for further purchases. The misconception of America as a land of opportunity and a 
land of plenty is, for Miller, lamentable. In Moloch, he writes that the American 
religion is capitalism and without it the country would disappear. Not so for India, he 
argues, if India lost its religion {Moloch 156). Miller's point seems to be that more 
unites a country like India, history and community among other bonds; America, 
meanwhile, is held together by the dreamworlds that have become its sole religion, but 
these dreamworlds are hollow, obscuring the competition, the lack of community, the 
lack of empathy, the despair.
The New Dance—Fashion
One of the most visible dreamworlds business created is fashion—fashion as a 
function of designers rather than stores, fashion as an escape (Leach 91). It is also 
one of the greatest prompts to "alienated consumption." Paul Mazur, writing in 1927,
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notes that not only are clothes vulnerable to the whims of fashion, which he terms 
"style", but "everything from automobiles to washing machines reeks of the instability 
of style" (qtd. in Leach 312-13). Fashion is most often conceived as an incarnate 
entity to whom all are vulnerable; however, fashion is as open to calculation as the 
design of a window display, and those who lead the way quite clearly want that their 
products should be consumed, if not by the purchaser then by time. "The way out of 
overproduction,' wrote one fashion expert [in 1909], 'must lie in finding out what the 
woman at the counter is going to want, make it; then promptly drop it and go on to 
something else to which fickle fashion is turning her attention " (Leach 94) Fickle 
fashion" coerced in another direction, insuring future purchases. Dorothy Shaver, a 
well-known merchandiser in the twenties and thirties, leads the way in a 1937 radio 
address:
Last spring we were casual, given to poses and worries, restless, 
unhappy—and our clothes accurately reflected our state of mind. This 
spring we are more natural, more poised, more correct, more serene, 
happier. [....] We are more romantic about our personal relationships— 
more interested in our family life. (qtd. in Leach 3 16)
The mood Shaver attempts to plead into existence is, doubtlessly, reflected in some
way in the clothes she wishes to sell. Leach reports a retailer in 1908 acknowledging
that fashion "imparts to merchandise a value over and above its intrinsic worth,"
loading "with special desirability goods which otherwise excite only languid interest"
(91). Fashion, and the accompanying copy, must inspire interest, hence purchases; but
in order to maintain that interest, and to keep customers returning, the object of
inspiration—along with the adjectives and the slogans describing the product—must
frequently change.
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The new fashions unveiled each year "celebrated novelty rather than 
recurrence," writes Buck-Morss (98), which is largely true. Seasons recur as does the 
need to follow the new fashions unveiled for each season. Such repetition, however, 
comes to seem natural rather than forced: everything changes and must continue to 
change. In Aragon's Person de Perns, "la marchande" is open to ridicule because her 
clothes are out of date and the shape the suit provides is no longer considered 
attractive: "La jupe est large, et plus courte qu'on ne les fait aujourd'hui, au goût de 
1917 environ, coupée en forme, faisant la taille ronde [the skirt is large and shorter 
than those made today, to the taste of about 1917, cut in form, making the torso 
round]" (107). Fashion, as unsympathetic as any paid executioner, dictates that 
"nothing can be worn which is out of date" (Leach 92), as that would be akin to a sign 
of failure, that one was unable to keep up, that one was not industrious.
A nineteenth-century figure who might seem to stand as a sort of advertisement 
for fashion and yet who attempts to undermine fashion and bourgeois culture in 
general, by pushing fashion to its limits, is the dandy.^ The dandy, as described by 
Jerrold Siegel in Bohemian Paris, seems to have been largely a British and French 
phenomenon. For two years, in the early eighteen-forties, Charles Baudelaire adopted 
a dandyesque dress, and at various points in his life he espoused dandyesque views 
(especially in notes for his mémoires, Mon Coeur mis à nu). A typical 
misapprehension, writes Pamela Genova, is that the dandy was a one-dimensional 
figure, fashion's clothes horse as it were (80). Some dandies saw their actions as a
 ^Earlier figures have been claimed as dandies, but both Genova and Seigel focus 
on the dandy as a nineteenth-century figure, with precursors and descendants. For 
more on the dandy, see chapter four.
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"stand against the most powerful currents of [their] time" (Seigel 106)—among these 
currents, the consumer culture of mid-nineteenth-century Paris. Genova depicts one 
dandy as dressed in "an irritatingly elegant, inscrutable disguise of paisley and lace to 
upset and negate the tranquil banality of bourgeois culture" (78). Such elegance in the 
appearance of a dandy, going well beyond the limits of good taste, signifies a rebellion 
against fashion, by accentuating its superficiality, since it was often blindly and 
complacently followed by the bourgeoisie and its imitators.
Christiansen characterizes shopping to keep up with fashions as "an 
intoxicating pastime" rather than a necessity (113),* a great change from the experience 
of shopping in dry goods stores or, to a lesser extent, the passages. For Miller, that 
people imitate the ads and are blown hither and yon by the winds of fashion 
demonstrates that the advertisers have won: "It's a victory for the editors and 
publishers, for the cheap illustrators and the inventive advertising gentry. No more 
sales resistance. It's a pushover" {Cosmological 341-42). Fashion, through 
advertising, transforms people, so that they now eagerly do as instructed. Their 
defenses are largely broken and new habits—shopping for new clothes every season, 
discarding outdated technologies for the latest improvement, however minor or major— 
are adopted.
Fashion becomes "the modem 'measure of time,"' accelerating consumption, but 
Benjamin considers fashion, much as Fredric Jameson envisions collective action and
* "Intoxicating" brings with it the notion of addiction, which has become common 
currency in America, with terms like "shopoholic" and the related expression, "Shop til 
you drop." Such behavior was encouraged by department stores, for it meant 
continuing purchases, while the down-side of such behavior, repossession of purchases 
or bankruptcy, was tacitly disapproved of as disgraceful.
153
Henry Miller the American South, as replete with utopian possibilities, an optimism 
Miller does not share; "Fashion is the eternal recurrence of the new," Benjamin 
writes. "Are there nevertheless motifs of redemption precisely in fashion?" ("Central 
Park," 46). Fashion, for Benjamin, seems to presage a future markedly different from 
the present world, for if styles of clothes constantly change then perhaps people, too, 
might change. The cult of the new resulted in constant flux and just might expand 
beyond commodities to lead to decisive positive change. Marx, according to Berman, 
views the accomplishments of the bourgeois class in a similar light. "They had 
proved," he maintains, "that it is possible, through organized and concerted action, to 
really change the world" (Berman 94). Hence, in a number of the accomplishments of 
the consumption economy, opportunities presented themselves, forces for change 
emerged, when cut off from the limited goal the economy forced upon them. 
Unfortunately, fashion, as Benjamin notes, is also the eternal return of the same, so the 
flux that inspires his optimism may be, at least in part, illusory.
Fashion led to at least two developments in American and French culture, 
developments more fully visible in Miller's time than Baudelaire's, due to the 
expansion of consumer capitalism. One of the benefits of fashion, according to many 
people in the early twentieth century, was that it made Americans alike through 
standardization—and that signified safety. "If only Americans would desire the same 
goods and dream the same dreams, we would have nothing to fear from anarchists," 
Leach summarizes (243). With continuing immigration it is likely that fashion and 
regulated desire were understood as tools of integration. The essentially competitive 
nature of commodity capitalism seems here to be discounted, or perhaps goes 
unrecognized, in favor of its unifying dimension. It is possible to interpret
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Baudelaire's poem "Les Sept Vieillards" as a Aguration of the crowds the flâneur 
observes; due to fashion and die rise of mass production, the people in the crowds 
become less and less distinguishable as t h ^  begin to dress alike. The "sept vieillards" 
could then stand as a symbol for "the mass production of culture in the form of 
consumable objects" (Trachtenberg 150), which serves to mould people into groups 
unified by surface characters (their age, sex, class or build), into a distinct population 
with similar desires and goals. These various groups become defined and hence 
reduced to the products they consume and the outward appearances they affect.
A second development, and one that has had great repercussions in American 
and French culture, as well as Western culture in general, a development intimately 
tied with fashion, is the rise of the cult of the new. A movement, spawned by the 
rising consumer culture of late nineteenth century America, called itself the Mind 
Cure,® and like the Utopian theorists in France, it responded optimistically to the new 
culture of consumption, confident that capitalism would solve all problems. These 
people, in the figure of one of the leading exponents of Mind Cure, Samuel Patten, 
"translated an already clear American tendency (of seeing everything 'new' as 
inarguably good and everything old' as insufferable) into a theoretical law of 
civilization" (Leach 238). Just as old buildings were constantly demolished and 
replaced, "novelty" preferred to "recurrence," so too old clothes must be replaced.
Fashion entails continual change, perpetually looking for the "next big thing"-- 
in display windows, newspaper advertisements, films. There were others, however.
® Mind Cure might be considered a counterpart to the New Age movement, only 
without the overt religious mysticism. The most apparent characteristic of the group is 
the importance it placed on positive thinking as a means to improvement.
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who perceived that what they called "consumptionisni was encouraging Americans to 
shed respect for wisdom' and 'die continuity of life' and to exalt the 'new and 
improved' and 'the young"* (268). Fashion and die cult of the new enables people to 
escape history, even (or especially) the most recent history (Buck-Morss 98). Miller, 
however, asserted his independence of this cult of the new, the new-and-improved, the 
standardized;
Living in the midst of a world wdiere there was a plethora of the new I 
attached myself to the old. In every object there was a minute particle 
which particularly claimed my attention. I had a microscopic eye for 
the blemish, for the grain of ugliness which to me constituted the sole 
beauty of die object. Whatever set the object apart, or made it 
unserviceable, or gave it a date, attracted and endeared it to me. 
(Capricorn 55)
Miller rejects that which is new and detached—from time, from workmanship—in favor 
of the unique, the personal, the grounded in time. Part of the continuing relevance of 
Miller's sensibility lies precisely in the persistence of this cult of the new.
Consumption as Optimism
The optimism that seemed to accompany fashion, as exemplifred by the cult of 
the new, developed into an optimism that seems peculiarly American, part of its 
"youthfulness," underlying its "rags-to-riches" stories, supported by its inventors 
(Thomas Edison, Henry Ford) and its heroes (Charles Lindbergh, boxer Jack Johnson), 
exemplifred in its music (Scott Joplin, Glenn Miller)—and cinema, as we will see. The 
Mind Cure group believed "that real 'happiness' could be had largely through money 
incomes and consumption," through earning enough to take part in the capitalist 
economy, and "not through satisfying labor or a stake in the community," since 
workers produced nothing of their own, contributing only toward an end product, and
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often had little contact with dieir neighbors (Leach 244). Consumption can be 
envisaged, then, as an opiate, "assurance . . .  o f immunity from poverty, insecurity, the 
increasingly degraded status of the manual worker" (Trachtenberg 135). Importantly, 
the Mind Cure folk believed that labor—the actual fact of working eight or ten or 
twelve hours a day—would be forgotten, perhaps the way a child forgets a spanking, 
through distractions; the joys of purchasing more commodities. This new culture 
seemed to "[promise] a lifetime of security, well-being, and happiness" (Leach 111).
But Baum, whose works were thoroughly informed by Mind Cure beliefs,
illustrates the shortcomings of the movement, demonstrating that it is essentially a
surface-oriented movement, unwilling, even afraid, to open itself to experience.
"Baum," writes Leach,
broke the connection between wonderment and heartache. People could 
have what historically (and humanly) they had never had: joy without 
sorrow, abundance without poverty, happiness without pain. Like the 
other mind curers, Baum rejected that side of life—the suffering side, the 
growing-up side—that made the other side worthy of respect and 
affirmation. (252)
Classics such as Dante's Divine Comedy and Milton's Paradise Lost would be gutted, 
would lose the power of their description of the human experience, if such a one-sided 
view of life had informed their construction. Henry Miller observes the same shallow 
optimism that Leach does and responds to it in much the same way: "The American 
ideal is youth—handsome, empty youth. [....] Americans are not young and fresh in 
spirit, but senile; their humor is hysterical, a reaction bom of panic, of a refusal to 
look life in the face" (Wisdom 51-2). Americans, Miller argues, are immature, 
unaware of their past and fearful of (not just for) the future, unwilling to "look life in 
the face," to make sense of it and take responsibility for trying to ameliorate it.
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Miller acknowledges that the optimism of Americans tends to be admired, but 
he perceives a certain "cheapness" or vulgarity in that optimism, especially that 
inspired by commodity consumption: "More and more [America] seems to me like the 
madame of a whorehouse elbowing her way to the bargain counter" (Emil 57). The 
whorehouse madame, figured for the spirit of American youthfulness, presents a sharp 
contrast with the self-perception of Americans, for she is old and fat rather than young 
and sleek, like the new cars Americans identified themselves with and proudly drove; 
with her powder and rouge she is obvious and repulsive, decidedly not chic or 
glamorous; she is brutal and undignified rather than cool and seductive. Worse still, 
like greedy and acquisitive Americans, she is cheap with what is not hers—the bodies 
of other women, the labor of anonymous workers. Furthermore, figuring a bordello— 
the site of the commodity made flesh—for capitalism, serves to underline the fact that 
all people, under consumer capitalism, become commodities, just as the prostitute is, 
selling their labor, whether in a factory, an office, an art studio, or a classroom. In 
"Le Mauvais Vitrier," Baudelaire had already demonstrated the hollow promises 
spawned by commodity capitalism, aware even in the eighteen-sixties that goods alone 
could not bring happiness, a lesson that has yet to truly sink in to western 
consciousness.
The Peculiar Character of Advertising
Fashion, whether embodied in a particular designer or simply an aura 
surrounding commodities, must somehow make its presence known, while at the same 
time maintaining a "veil [on] the commodity character of things" (Benjamin, "Central," 
42), so it does not appear too vulgar. Leach, referring once again to Veblen, explores
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the peculiar character of the advertising that developed in order for merchants to both
create an awareness of their product and a desire for it—as well as to preserve the
"veil." Merchants, Veblen insisted,
promised "personal prestige and status," a high level of "personal well­
being," "keeping touch with the times"—all "irrespective of any inherent 
merit in the goods." They operated in the realm of "intangible" reality 
and of the "magical arts" (Leach 232-33).
A new service industry arose around department stores and consumer culture, an
industry of advertisers who aimed to harness dreams, such that advertising and fashion
became inextricably bound within the dreamworld of commodity capitalism. With
fashion as a nexus between the commodity and the dreamworld, producers were
ensured of continuing purchases, if only advertising could perpetuate the commodity's
position.
In one of his Mezzotints, "If You're Dying, Choose a Mausoleum," Miller
responds satirically to an undertaker's advertisement in the New York Times, as he
does so selectively quoting from the accompanying text (Jackson 13). Miller begins
by suggesting mausoleums will be of only short-term interest, by referring to other
products he perceives as fads (but which have since proven their longevity): "First we
had the rubber tire epidemic, then the chewing gum splurge," Miller writes, "and now
the undertaker is having his orgy of publicity" {Mezzotints 24). Miller points out the
mixture of hype and rationality in the ad:
He is hailed as "the director of a humanitarian movement." Like the 
cafe proprietor before New Year's, he urges a lagging public to "act to­
day, do not delay." You make your reservations for a cool, marble 
crypt just like you do a room in a hotel. He says; "You must admit that 
death is the final victor." (24)
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"Ugly fellow," Miller determines, "this humanitarian director" (24). Following the 
advertisement. Miller contrasts the various forms of burial, and the concomitant 
horrors, to "MAUSOLEUM ENTOMBMENT"; "when you place the loved form in 
the mausoleum you know it will be in the dry" (24). "It is," Miller assures his reader, 
"as sanitary as cremation and as sentimental as the church-yard, this method of burial. 
Other methods belong to by-gone ages" (24). Miller's satire is evident throughout, but 
this Mezzotint incorporates many of the features characteristic of successful 
advertisements—assuming an appropriate mood (here somber, in the face of death), 
emphasizing the modernity of the product (it does not belong to "by-gone ages") as 
well as its humanity, and demonstrating the improvements of this new product over 
the old one(s). His satire also makes manifest the absurdity and obscurantism at work 
in advertisements, for preservation of the body of the deceased in no way prolongs life 
or improves it, though the advertisement is meant to make one feel that somehow it 
does.
Such advertisements were certainly not unique to America, but found 
throughout western civilization. Advertisements were everywhere in Baudelaire's 
Paris. A u Bon Marché, as a progenitor of much that we associate with department 
stores, was the first store to place a full page advertisement in a newspaper 
(Christiansen 113). But advertisements also appeared out-of-doors, pasted or painted 
on the walls of buildings, the sides of cabs, on benches in parks as well as bus and 
train stations. As already noted, Haussmann's changes bewildered many Parisians, but 
concurrent with these physical changes to the city were changes resulting from 
industrialization as well as the rise of consumer culture.
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Terdiman indicates that just as Haussmann was in the process of 
defamiliarizing the city of Paris, with a rash of destruction and construction, so "the 
complication of urban reality was increasing"—a noticeable feature of which was the 
swelling "circulation and distribution of goods and messages" (180). As manufacturers 
produced greater numbers of goods, competition for unloading these goods on the 
public assumed ever greater importance. The duty of citizens of the city became to 
consume: "Consumption emerged as the hidden purpose of cities," Trachtenberg 
declares (139). This "consumption," in turn, serves "as a perpetuation of the corporate 
form of private ownership of production" (139). Through purchasing goods one 
supports, or maintains, the status quo.
Art, as already noted, was called into service through advertising. A whole 
new set of artists, called "commercial artists," arose around advertising.'® Where 
Benjamin first conceived of "printing [as] having found a refuge in the book," he sees 
in the advertisement that printing "is pitilessly dragged out onto the street by 
advertisements ( . . . that) force the printed word entirely into the dictatorial 
perpendicular" (qtd. in Buck-Morss 268). This image of printing "dragged" into the 
street is reminiscent of the old Puritan punishment of putting moral and criminal 
offenders in stocks or pillories to expose them to public revile. Just as the exhibition 
of those transgressors called for a public reaction affirming the (moral) order, 
advertisements require similar responses—in the world of consumer capitalism that 
signifies a visit to a store, a purchase.
Miller never tired of pointing out that commercial artists were the only ones in 
America who could make a living as an artist. Serving big business, in Miller's view 
they had bartered their souls.
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Advertisements, themselves, were often the object of revile. Hamon reports
that Parisians across the political spectrum decried the ubiquitous advertising found in
Second Empire Paris. Reactionary Louis Veuillot protested:
Among the many passions of democracy, none is more prodigious and 
more widespread than the need for conspicuous display; and the 
baseness it inspires is its greatest success: pretentious signposts, 
advertisements, grotesque and impudent charlatanism, theater—all of this 
is of a piece; a nation of democrats is a nation of ham actors {histrions). 
(Hamon 127)
Veuillot raises his complaint implicitly against the levelling effects of democracy and 
explicitly against what the all-pervasive advertising seems to signify, a land of plenty, 
a reassurance that life is better. He also complains, however, that the commodity has 
taken on flesh, in the form of people selling their image in support of their product: 
idiotic grinning faces juxtaposed with a variety of products. The superficiality of such 
advertising, the vulgar "hawking " of products, inspired repulsion in some quarters.
Yet commercial artists knew that in order to attract customers they needed 
"striking pictures,"" for just as we have seen with fashion, these pictures "gave "life" and 
"meaning" to otherwise meaningless or lifeless objects" (Leach 54). Trachtenberg 
writes that advertising’s decisive power lies in its ability "to disguise the character of 
consumption, to make it seem an act different from a merely functional, life-enhancing 
use of an object" (135). Owning and using a particular spoon, designed for a 
particular function, becomes a statement, one that every upstanding couple wants to 
make. Advertisements are designed "to make habitual the identification of products 
with something else, with ideas, feelings, status" (135)—that spoon, for example, 
provides evidence of membership in a particular class, proof that if nothing else, one's
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kitchen is truly modem, which argues for the success of that particular family within 
consumer capitalism.
A point worth reinforcement is that those behind this new consumer culture 
were quite conscious of the manipulative nature of their actions, and it is in 
advertising, perhaps, that their awareness is most evident. Advertising expert Emily 
Fogg Mead, in 1901, characterizes the successful advertisement: "Everyone reads it 
involuntarily. It is a subtle, persistent, unavoidable presence that creeps into the 
reader’s inner consciousness" (qtd. in Leach 48). This "subtle, persistent, unavoidable 
presence," however, proffers more than information on a product's existence; it makes 
a claim (occasionally supported by an argument) that this particular product is the best 
of its kind on the market, if not the only kind.
Not only can readers and pedestrians see advertisements everywhere they look,
but these advertisements demand engagement on the part of the viewer. They are
irresistible as well as, for some, overbearing. Miller regards advertisements as little
more than pure hype, as we say today:
Everything is better, cheaper, tastier, saner, healthier, lovelier than ever— 
if you believe in the advertisements. Everything has become more 
stupendous, more colossal, more this, more that. And yet everything is 
the same. It's marvelous. We've gotten beyond the superlative—were in 
the higher mathematics now. {Cosmological 340).
Miller announces here that the vaunted novelty of so many products is mere
willfulness rather than factual. Few products are sold humbly, except those—like
restaurants advertising "home cooking "—proud of their humility. For the most part.
Miller is saying, advertisers climb over one another to declare their product the latest
and the greatest. Advertisers try to differentiate their products from their competitors;
they attempt to inflate slight variations, to make a product appear "marvelous,"
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miraculous, so that these minuscule differences seem of utmost importance; "And yet 
everything is the same," even if there is more of it.
Baudelaire describes a similar experience, though one not overtly related to 
advertising, in his prose poem, "Le Gateau," from Spleen de Paris. In a foreign (and, 
clearly, backward) country, a black man watches the narrator cut a piece of bread and 
mutters, "gateau" cake. When the narrator offers the man a slice, other natives 
suddenly appear and fight for that one piece of "cake." The narrator, seeing the piece 
of bread reduced to dust, experiences sadness that there are people for whom bread, 
rather than a staple, is a treat—cake. Among various themes in the poem (one can cite 
the unequal distribution of goods), the power of naming is of most interest here, 
related to advertising, for bread, renamed "cake," increases in value and becomes 
something worth battling over, even to the point of destroying the actual portion of 
bread.
Just as "private use" of goods tends to obscure the laborers who produce them, 
so the hype in advertisements also conceals the laborer. During his years at Western 
Union telegraph company. Miller wimessed the degradation of messengers who were 
worked to death in order "that American people may enjoy the fastest form of 
communication known to man, so that they may sell their wares more quickly, so that 
the moment you drop in the street your next of kin may be apprised immediately" 
[Capricorn 72). Consumers are aware only of the service or commodity, and do not 
see the worker who produced it—even if they are workers themselves, for work 
becomes a trade-off and is further discounted: I work why shouldn't they? What 
becomes most important, for advertisers and consumers alike, is the connection 
between a product and a dream world, escape.
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Lighting and Spectacle
The theme of "Paris as 'spectacle,'" characterized by the depiction of the city
"as an endless adventure and feast for the eyes," appears repeatedly in French literature
of the nineteenth century and "is basic to the more optimistic side" of French literature
depicting the city (Prendergast 183)—appearing as well in the work of such a critic of
modernity as Émile Zola. In Zola's X u Bonheur des Dames, the name of a department
store as well as the title of the book, the grand magasin is depicted as a paradise for
the senses. Before even entering the store, Denise, a young woman from the provinces
new to Paris, is smitten;
II y avait là, au plein air de la rue, sur le trottoir même, un éboulement 
de marchandises à bon marché, la tentation de la porte, les occasions 
qui arrêtaient les clients au passage.
[There, in the open air of the street, on the sidewalk, was an avalanche
of inexpensive goods, the temptation of the door, the sale items that
stopped shoppers in the entranceway.] (Zola 13)
For this young woman, such a sight is overpowering: the cascade of goods causes her
to forget the reason she is even standing there in front o f the store, a rendez-vous with
her uncle who will offer her a job. "The consumer," writes Debord, "becomes a
consumer of illusions. Merchandise is that illusion effectively real, and the spectacle
its general manifestation" (44). The need to market and to advertise, to emerge from
the clouds of competition, inspires a spectacle, in the Debordian sense certainly, but
also in a more literal sense.
An important element of the spectacle, and "one of the most precious 
commodities," as well as one that began to appear wherever commodities were sold, 
was lighting (Prendergast 183), gas lighting at first, but by the turn of the twentieth 
century, electric lighting. This lighting was at first limited to diffuse interior lighting
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and the equally important street lighting, with the result that the "increased safety in 
the city made the crowds feel at home in the open streets even at night" and so "the 
shops in the main streets did not close before ten o'clock at night" (Benjamin, C5, 50). 
The glass-enclosed passages benefited from lighting, not merely because lighting 
allowed the night crowds to peruse the windows of stores, but because they emitted a 
bright, attractive glow, that lit up the night sky, and drew further crowds of shoppers.
Once lighting became practical, it was used to illuminate both the interior and 
exterior of many commercial establishments, department stores as well as cafés and 
other businesses, as well as to focus attention on display goods. Just as actors are lit- 
up on stage to center attention, or kept partially in the shadows at moments to 
stimulate the audience's interest, so goods too could benefit from stage lighting to 
draw the attention of passersby. While some might appreciate the lighting as a safety 
feature as well as an aesthetically pleasing technology, Baudelaire viewed the lighting 
spectacle as yet another "hollowed-out dream." Paris as a lighted spectacle, as theater, 
constitutes the surface (tourist) experience of "Paris." In "Les Yeux des pauvres," the 
lights of a new café attract not only the rich, as well as those of the middle income, 
but also the poor who cannot enter and drink or dine but only gaze at the edifice, 
dazzled and hungry, enjoying the spectacle at one remove, receiving none of the 
material benefits of the spectacle, at best only a figurative warmth.
Buck-Morss writes that Benjamin understood Baudelaire's poetry as an attempt 
to rip "apart the harmonizing pretensions of the mythic phantasmagoria that was just 
then congealing around the commodities" (Buck-Morss 182). In "Central Park," 
Benjamin asserts: "Tearing things out of the context of their usual interrelations— 
which is quite normal where commodities are being exhibited—is a procedure very
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characteristic of Baudelaire” (41). A product and the condition of its manufacture are 
resolutely separated, as we have seen, and offered in a new context, that of the 
commodity dreamworld. Baudelaire, reversing that trend in his poetiy, reintroduces 
the poor worker to the streets of Paris glowing with the lights of the café.
The lighting is meant to attract only paying customers, as if these people 
comprise the only worthy inhabitants of the city. But while the cafés may appear 
incandescent and promise sensual fulfillment, they do not satisfy the (materialist) 
desires of all. Reintegrating the poor into "spectacular" Paris, Baudelaire exposes the 
"hollowness" of these new mass dreams. He delineates the distance between the 
bourgeois couple, seated in the "dazzling" café looking out, and the poor man with his 
two sons, all of them dressed in rags and standing in the dusty road, looking in. The 
poor are overwhelmed by the splendor of the city: "How beautiful it all is! All the 
gold of the poor world must have found its way onto those walls, " the narrator reads 
in the eyes of the father (Baudelaire, Paris Spleen, 52-3). But the poor can only look 
on as outsiders, the eldest son recognizing that the café is "for people who are not like 
us" (53). Through their eyes, Baudelaire makes the city a brightly-lit phantasmagoria 
rather than a fantasy-come-tnie or a fantasy-made-matter. The narrator of the poem 
empathizes with the poor but comes from another world, one more accurately 
represented by his companion who wishes to drive these people out of her sight.
These poor, like the hungry children of Arthur Rimbaud's poem "Les Effarés" who 
stand silent in the snow watching a baker make bread (103), y earn so strongly that 
they can almost taste what they desire. The older boy realizes, in just this failure, 
their distance from the spectacle, like the hungry children in Rimbaud's poem who turn 
from the frosty window and shiver in the cold.
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Baudelaire, in a préfiguration of Rimbaud, reinserts the poor into a scenario 
that has either forgotten them or deliberately excluded them from consideration. The 
narrator in Baudelaire's poem reports that the woman who accompanied him to the 
café wishes the garçon would force the three ragged people to move on—she would 
exclude them too—so that they would no longer compel her to acknowledge their 
presence and their suffering, hence the inequality of city life, and to thus reduce her 
enjoyment. In this way, Baudelaire tears "things out of the context of their usual 
interrelation": The urban poor present a contrast to the bright lights of commodity 
capitalism, a whole class who do not benefit from the "plenty" and of whom, for that 
reason, the bourgeois are fearful. The glow on the streets should provide only 
comfort, evidence (like the skyscrapers in New York City) that "things are under 
control," but it cannot do so because all is evidently not well. The urban poor refuse 
to remain hidden.
The spectacle produced by lighting hits new highs, or lows as some 
complained, with the sculpted light advertisements in Times Square, many of which in 
the nineteen-twenties, due to a technological innovation, were "in perpetual motion" 
(Leach 339). Leach describes Times Square as "the country's most spectacular 
expression of the commercial aesthetic, a pictorial environment packed with giant 
images, money, and people on a massive scale" (339). More, bigger, brighter—people, 
advertisements, buildings—all signify success or excess, depending on whether one 
buys into the new culture or rejects it. Another lighted avenue, Broadway, for Miller, 
"looks exciting, even magical at times, but there is no fire, no heat—it is a brilliantly 
asbestos display, the paradise of advertising agents" (Clichy 7). As with Baum and his 
surface-oriented works, so too the lighting spectacle of advertisers is only color. The
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lighting, electrical and thus by its very nature "hot," is tamed by the display designers, 
no longer providing "heat"; to someone not part o f  the consumption culture, it lacks a 
figurative warmth as well. It becomes simply another advertisement.
Even as Times Square and Broadway and other regions were inundated with 
colorful flashing lighted advertisements, the French and the German governments put 
restrictions on "the spread of such 'spectacular* advertising" (Leach 343)." In Paris, 
any "product advertised had to be sold on the premises" (343), in effect drawing a 
customer into the store. Leach quotes an anonymous Parisian of 1928, who asserted, 
approving the new French law, "Paris is proud to be known as the City of Light, but 
she wants it to be intellectual rather than electric" (qtd. in Leach 343). Despite the 
haughtiness of this Parisian, it is possible to agree with the argument to some extent: 
the intellectual "light" would at least constitute a more personal production than the 
business-produced and -controlled light. Just as Miller perceived the department store 
as a symbol of emptiness, so too others understood "Times Square and Broadway as 
symptoms of spiritual failure " (Leach 346), as zones overwhelmed with lighted 
advertisements such that, as Lewis Mumford argued, they are "mere distractions that 
take our eyes off the environment, instead of instruments which would help us to 
mould i t . . .  a little nearer to human hopes and desires" (qtd. in Leach 346"). In the 
discussion of flânerie, in the last chapter, I described how both Baudelaire and Miller 
imprinted their moods on the passing architecture, but in regions dominated by the 
lighting spectacle, the walls become slippery, opaque and flâneurs can no longer
" Billboards, which clutter American highways, are noticably absent from their 
European counterparts.
"  In Steams, Harold, ed. Civilization in the United States, 8-9.
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"mould" their city since they oAen cannot get beneath the colored glow to the edifice 
beneath it.
Physically, the department store is itself a spectacle. One of the few buildings
in America whose design consciously employed elaborate and ornamental architecture,
the glitzy department store represented an attempt to impart an aura of elegance and
necessity to goods through a shower of "sparkling lights," especially in display
windows where goods were organized into "artful arrangements" (Trachtenberg 131) so
that, along with the lighting strategically splashed on the outside of the building, the
spectacle culminated in a showcase attracting shoppers. The largest department stores
were an "emporium of consumption," writes Trachtenberg, that contained "not goods
alone but a world o f goods, constructed and shaped by the store into objects of desire"
(130). The promise of the exterior, then, is in theory fulfilled by the interior. For
Miller, though, the lighting spectacle comprised nothing more than hype, just like any
other advertisement:
The sky's choked with illuminated merchandise, every single article of 
which is guaranteed to be pleasant, healthful, durable, tasty, noiseless, 
rainproof, imperishable, the ne plus ultra without which life would be 
unbearable were it not for the fact that life is already unbearable 
because there is no life. {Black Spring 123)
The lighting spectacle that greets shoppers as they walk on the sidewalk is only an
added exclamation point to the puffery that surrounds, that constitutes advertising and
has almost come to constitute life, at least for those who buy in (literally as well as
figuratively) to the life of commodity capitalism.
"There are two things in life," Miller writes in The A ir-Conditioned Nightmare, 
"which it seems to me all men want and very few ever get (because both of them 
belong to the domain of the spiritual) and they are health and freedom" (29). People
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do not want to be tied down to a job. Miller asserts, exhausted and demoralized by 
hours of meaningless labor. Similar to the disappointment experienced by Baudelaire’s 
narrator in "Le Mauvais Vitrier," Miller recognizes the dashed hopes raised by 
consumer capitalism: "La vie en beau!”
For Buck-Morss, as for Benjamin, the passages, which came into being 
contemporaneous with the shift toward the modem consumer economy, represent "[a]ll 
of the errors of bourgeois consciousness . . . (commodity fetishism, reification, the 
world as inwardness") as well as (in fashion, prostitution, gambling) all its utopian 
dreams" (39). The passages tended to channel the public's attention on commodities 
and the personal satisfaction that followed purchases, but they also offered the 
possibility that people could change their lives in a more profound way than can be 
accomplished with the purchase of some commodity. Department store owners learned 
from the way the passages operated, while at the same time they also developed new 
forms of marketing, and incorporated and extended the art of shop window design and 
strategic lighting—on goods and as advertisements.
The passages were, furthermore, a precursor of the skyscraper, that fortress of 
the corporation, in that they were "the first international style of modem architecture" 
(39). "By the end of the nineteenth century," writes Buck-Morss, passages "had 
become the hallmark of a modem metropolis (as well as of westem imperial 
domination)," appearing not only in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, Moscow, 
but even in Africa and South America (39-40). The Paris passages, then, represent the 
first step towards a mass, in the sense of world-wide, culture, a progression that 
continues today with the spread of American chains McDonalds and Pizza Hut and 
products such as Nike running shoes and Coke, a progression that promises to make us
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equal as well as alike no matter what country or background we happen to come from, 
something Miller fought against
The Media Spectacle
Along with the mass production of "baubles," as Miller calls them, signifying 
how unimportant many products are, and the showcases that house these "baubles," 
comes the mass production of media, viewed as "the democratization of culture, 
distributed as miraculously as Christ's multiplying food, [so] they too become fetishes" 
(Buck-Morss 120). Fetishes, certainly, these products of the mass media, but of 
doubtful utility.
With greater access to books and the arrival of cinema, with more sources of 
information—newspapers, the radio, the telephone, (and perhaps television, which was 
only a novelty in the early 1940s)—was more information available? According to 
Miller, writing in 1941, before America joined the Second World War, the answer is 
no. "What do we actually see and hear today?" he asks rhetorically. "What the 
censors permit us to see and hear, nothing more" {Nightmare 44). Parisians 
experienced a similar state of affairs under the Second Empire where the government 
exercised significant press censorship until Napoleon HI relaxed censorship laws in 
1868. Besides the literal censorship (of certain poems in Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du 
mal and the entirety of Miller's Tropic o f  Cancer and Tropic o f  Capricorn, for 
instance), there is information that never makes it out of the board rooms of 
governments and corporations, as well as a denial of some information that does. But 
there is also a form of censorship inherent in commodity capitalism—the censorship of
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what will not bring in maximum profits, Wiat is unpopular or unpalatable, what 
provokes strong reactions that might result in a loss of revenue.
Rather than risk financial loss, the mass media seek to provide one thing for 
all, "so that none may esc^e" (Horkheimer and Adorno 123) and all may be pacified, 
if not satisfied. In the middle nineteen-thirties, journalist James Rorty made a journey 
around America, similar to Miller's 1940-41 trip that resulted in The Air-Conditioned 
Nightmare, and sensed that '"mass production of a mass culture' was stronger than 
ever. Indeed, there were no other unifying bonds in America'" (Leach 382). The 
commodity spectacle and the entertainment industry, as well as the information and the 
images available to Americans through the various media, which like other 
commodities benefits from mass production, unites Americans, helping to mould them 
into Americans. These various media portray Americans to themselves, describing 
their likes and dislikes, their daily routines, their needs and goals.
In nineteenth century France, physiognomies, books devoted to the "types" one 
might see in the streets of Paris (the ./7âne«r the subject of one book, the ragpicker the 
subject of another), excited much popular interest by depicting Parisians to themselves, 
depicting the varieties of people that might possibly be seen daily. Honoré de Balzac, 
writes Patricia Ferguson, incorporated these figures into his books (83), which he 
gathered under the title Le Comédie humaine. Adapting the subject matter of this 
literature, these people from various walks of life, to the genre of the physiognomie 
effectively turned the subject matter into something that could be "consumed passively, 
pleasurably, and directly in its dream form" without "'refunctioning' the communication 
apparatus into a tool that will make it possible to wake up from the dream" (Buck- 
Morss 144). The beings described in the physiognomies become non-threatening for
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the most part-different, perhaps, but not quite other, setting them outside a context 
that might provoke a response.
Benjamin attributes to these physiognomies "a thoroughly limited vision" due 
to an almost willed ignorance of many of these people's real lives {CB 38), a 
shortcoming familiar to Engels who decried the incomprehension of die bourgeoisie in 
the face of the English worker's misery A similar appropriation through genrefication 
is at work with other literary productions (romance, realism, detective story, science 
Gction) as well as with cinema (where one can watch, among other things, action 
adventure Elms, romances and historical romances, courtroom dramas, as well as 
simple comedies and tragedies) where action is quite often so contrived that it 
discourages questioning that might provoke the notion that the day-to-day world might 
be otherwise.
While what follows m ^  at first appear tangential, we will return to the idea of 
art forms that encourage passivity in the viewers in a moment. I will explore essays 
written by Baudelaire and Miller dedicated to art forms outside literature to examine 
and interpret their own work—and their world. Baudelaire's essays on the visual arts, 
his Salons, examined paintings by a variety of artists and offered arguments about 
painting, such as the need to focus on the modem world, that informed Baudelaire's 
own production. Miller, similarly, found cinema to be of great interest and, indeed, 
inspiration, especially avant-garde cinema, which turned from simple realism to 
challenging fundamental perceptions of reality.
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Baudelaire, in his Salon de 1859, argues that the simple presentation of reality 
is not truly artistic. In his discussion of photography,'^ he faults the disreputable art 
form for nakedly reproducing reality, claiming that such reproduction fails to inspire 
dreaming or surprise because there is no human soul in evidence—only occasionally 
the form {Ecrits 288-89). Photographic reproduction carries to the extreme what is for 
Baudelaire one of the more troubling currents in modem painting, that of exact 
reproduction of nature; "II n'y a pas de plus grande jouissance ni de plus beau 
triomphe qu'une copie excellente de la nature [There is no greater joy and no more 
beautiful triumph than an excellent copy of nature]" (292). Baudelaire attacks such a 
narrow notion. "Et cette doctrine," he continues, "ennemie de l'art, prétendait être 
appliquée non seulement à la peinture, mais à tous les arts [And that doctrine, the 
enemy of art, affects to be applied not only to painting but to all arts]" (292).
Many viewers of paintings, Baudelaire believes, want merely the immediate 
and superficial shock of the new, the beautiful, rather than the shock that educates, and 
operate under a misconception: "Farce que le Beau est toujours étonnant, il serait 
absurde de supposer que ce qui est étonnant est toujours beau" [Because the Beautiful 
is always amazing, it would be absurd to suppose that the amazing is always beautiful] 
(288). Baudelaire suggests that some realistic painters respond to the inability of a 
sector of the public to "sentir le bonheur de la rêverie ou de l'admiration (signe de 
petites âmes)[sense the joy of dreaming or of admiration (a sign of small souls]", so 
they employ "des moyens étrangers à l'art [inartistic means]" (288). These artists
Baudelaire's judgment of the new technology is not very perceptive, offering 
what seems a reactionary response to a new medium rather than a well-developed and 
informed opinion, but it does present a useful foil for his theories on painting.
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provide superficial, short-term satisfaction, what we might today call "sensationalism," 
without truly engaging their imagination or that of their audience.
Arguing that imagination is "the queen of the senses," Baudelaire writes, "elle
crée un monde nouveau, elle produit la sensation du neuf [it creates a new world, it
produces the sensation of the new]" (293). But Baudelaire does not esteem the
imagination simply for the sake of the new. Imagination, beyond the banal conception
of creation, forms part of the intellect, "contient l'esprit critique [contains the critical
spirit]" (295). As an example, he provides the following:
D'un savant sans imagination? Qu'il a appris tout ce qui, ayant été 
enseigné, pouvait être appris, mais qui'il ne trouvera pas les lois non 
encore devinées.
[An intellectual without imagination? He has learned all that, having 
been taught, could be learned, but he will never discover laws still 
unknown.] (293)
For Baudelaire, imagination provides the means for generating "correspondences" 
between events, beliefs, or concepts that were previously regarded as unconnected, and 
he does not believe that photography, since it merely reproduces reality, can inspire 
the imagination. In Baudelaire's estimation, most photographers are failed painters 
unwilling to devote sufficient time to developing their talents and their imaginations in 
that art (289-90). The true artist would seem to be one who actively transforms 
content, marking it indelibly, thereby making an argument about reality, about the 
world.
Though painting and cinema are different art forms, they have both become 
commodities and have had, at different times, a wide audience. Certainly as 
commodities, before the age of mechanical reproduction, paintings were not nearly as 
accessible as movies; even so, the general public still had access to paintings in
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exhibitions. More importantly, however, both art forms share a complex relation to 
reality—should they reflect, comment upon, ignore, or improve upon reality?—even 
troubling the concept of reality itself by the very visual nature of the media—is reality 
only what we notice, what we personally see, hear, or sense, or is it something 
somehow much broader? Both painting and film can freeze a moment and call into 
question human perception, human constructions of reality.
Cinema, as a cultural production that came of age just when Miller was making 
his first attempts at writing, in the early nineteen-twenties, just might epitomize the 
commodity. Like the passages and the department store, the cinema emerged as 
another venue where dreams were offered for sale; like them, too, cinema became an 
educator, often provoking new fashions as well as instructing viewers on "new goods" 
(Leach 112)}* The movie theaters themselves were considered dream houses, even 
more literally than department stores. Siegfried Kracauer calls them "picture palaces" 
and "optical fairylands" (323). Referring specifically to Berlin theaters, but making an 
argument with wider applicability, he claims "the architectural setting tends to 
emphasize the dignity that used to inhabit the institutions of high culture" (327).
As opposed to the static nature of the painting in the exhibition hall, the 
fluidity of motion pictures envelops the viewer who is continuously tempted by the 
unfolding of events, asking "what will happen next?" Just as with the founding of 
America and, later, with commodity capitalism, the cinema is a sphere where Miller 
yet again perceives unfulfilled potential. He cites Luis Buhuel, director of Un Chien 
andalou and L'Age d'or, as "the man who really made me discover m yself {Emil 94),
'■* The Truman Show (1998), starring Jim Carrey, emphasizes the advertising 
element of movies.
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the man who "made me realize what I wanted to say, and how to say it—that is, with 
courage (101). "Like any other art," Miller writes, "cinema has in it all the 
possibilities for creating antagonisms, for stirring up revolt" {Cosmological 49). But 
the "dignity" of the new "picture palaces" works against such "possibilities": to show 
a truly subversive film in such a locale would be, like performing a striptease in 
church, inappropriate. Bunuel's films were shown, often to hostile audiences, but 
usually in small venues like Cinema 13 in Montmartre, dedicated to art, rather than the 
large cinemas, before being censored.
There are, for Miller, alas, few filmmakers with Bunuel's courage. The cinema 
becomes another sphere of American life, and of Westem life in general, that Miller 
comes to decry. "For the first time in the history of art," writes Miller in "The Golden 
Age." an essay on Bunuel, "the mob has dictated what the artist should do. For the 
first time in the history of man an art is bom which caters exclusively to the masses" 
{Cosmological 49). Miller recognizes, of course, that it is not the "mob" but the 
businessmen with their fingers on the public pulse and an eye on the cash receipts who
ensure that the new art is completely responsive to the public, or to what they prepare
the public to want and to expect.
Similar to Baudelaire's lament about crowds who look to be surprised at
exhibitions of paintings. Miller deplores the public fixation on
plot, action, character, analysis, etc—all this false emphasis which 
characterizes the literature and drama of our day—[and which] simply 
reveals the lack of these elements in our life. We want plot because our
lives are purposeless, action because we have only an insect activity,
character development because in tuming in upon the mind we have 
discovered that we do not exist. [....] In short, we demand of art a 
violence and drama because the tension of life has broken down; we do 
not find ourselves opposed to one another in any primal sense, certainly 
not as individuals. {Cosmological 67)
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Films must make up for the short-comings of life—the fact that so much time is spent
in work, the fact that there are not always hsqipy endings or even endings at all
sometimes— rather than dramatize them, comment upon them. Furthermore, Miller
argues that viewers need "primal" action because their contact with one another as
competitors for products tends to negate their existence as individuals. The films
themselves, too, lose that individual appearance, each coated with the same pleasing
features as another in order to continue attracting a wide audience. "Giving the people
what they want" emerges as a democratic idea, but as an example of the "levelling" so
much decried by Nietzsche, Spengler, and others. Baudelaire notices a similar
phenomenon in painting;
Cette race, en effet, artistes et public, a si peu foi dans peinture, qu'elle 
cherche sans cesse à la déguiser et l'envelopper comme une médecine 
désagréable dans des capsules de sucre.
[That multitude, in effect, artists and the public, have so little faith in 
painting that they ceaselessly search to disguise it and envelop it, like a 
disagreeable medicine, in capsules of sugar]. {Ecrits 286)
Baudelaire is half-right here, when he perceives a lack of "faith in painting."
However, the flip side is a lack of faith in a public willing or able to understand the
work of the artist, willing or able to engage with a piece and come to terms with it.
Artists succumb to the desire for popularity, and produce works that please rather than
speak, works that are affirmative rather than alternative or oppositional, in Raymond
Williams' use of those last two terms.
This same lack of faith appears doubled, trebled, or quadrupled in the cinema. 
Horkheimer and Adorno, in Dialectic o f  Enlightenment, assert the strong resemblance 
between movies, writing that the difference between a production by "Warner Brothers 
and Metro Goldwyn Mayer," or any large-scale Hollywood film factory, "is basically
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illusory” (123). "What connoisseurs discuss as good and bad points serve only to 
perpetuate the semblance of competition and range of choice" (123). Few directors 
really attempt to produce a film that is dramatically different from another Hollywood 
production. Miller argues that such a reluctance to push against expectations restricts 
the art form, much as for Baudelaire the use of inartistic shocks cheapens a painting; 
"In every art the ultimate is achieved only when the artist passes beyond the bounds of 
the art he employs" {Cosmological 54). Bunuel is one of the few people who makes 
such an attempt:
The world must be turned upside down, ransacked, confounded in order 
that the miracle may be proclaimed. In "L'Age d'or" we stand again at 
that miraculous frontier which opens up before us a dazzling new world 
which no one has explored. (54)
The cinema that Miller supports, however, goes well beyond the dictum of the New
Critics, "Make it new." Films must also go out on a limb, challenge the audience to
examine their own lives just as the artist must while engaged in the act of creation.
These productions cannot be "capsules of sugar." Max Horkheimer, in "Art and Mass
Culture," writes that the "inhospitable works of art, by remaining loyal to the
individual as against the infamy of existence" work against the harmonious front that
Hollywood and other media would propose, combatting "the happy countenance"
(Horkheimer, Critical Theory, 278), for both Horkheimer and Miller, echoing Spengler,
view "harmony as a delusion of decay" (279).
Hollywood directors, such as Orson Welles, occasionally strive "against the 
tricks of the trade," but they do so infrequently and with such restraint that their 
"departures from the norm are regarded as calculated mutations," gestures that evince 
an awareness and even respect for the rules, "which serve all the more strongly to
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confirm the validity o f the system" (Horkheimer and Adorno 129). When few people 
are willing to truly and consistently challenge the limits of a medium, a certain 
sameness, a certain surface quality becomes characteristic of the medium. Films 
become easy to read, meaning the action, the dialogue, and the viewer responses can 
become quite predictable.
Moreover, movies often progress at such a high speed, cutting from one scene 
to the next, that "there is no room left between them for even the slightest 
contemplation" (Kracauer 326). The audience only has time to mark "what happens 
next" and to react. "No independent thinking must be expected from the audience; 
the product prescribes every reaction: not by its natural structure (which collapses 
under reflection), but by its signals" (Horkheimer and Adorno 137). The plot, 
Horkheimer and Adorno argue, is craven and specious, only a vehicle for signals 
which will inspire audience reaction, signals which include the laughtrack, the 
appearance on the horizon of the Indian or the Man in Black or the Man in White, or 
the ubiquitous pie of slapstick films.
Films operating outside the narrow periphery often become the object of public 
ridicule and police prosecution, as was Un Chien andalou. Miller writes, "[I]t is the 
great virtue of Bunuel that he refuses to be enmeshed in the glittering web of logic 
and idealism which seeks to mask from us the real nature of man" {Cosmological 58). 
The logic Miller writes of is that which toes the straight and narrow, offering no 
surprises and leading in no tempting antisocial or irrational directions that might serve 
to confront people with themselves and their lives. "Any logical connection calling for 
mental effort is painstakingly avoided" (Horkheimer and Adorno 137), because, in the 
view of those who oversee the Culture Industry, the worker goes to the theater to
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relax, to forget, rather than to muse upon Ae injustices of life. Like "realist" painting, 
cinema encourages passivity in Ae viewer.
But films do have an educational as well as an experiential purpose. "The
tragic film," for Horkheimer and Adorno, "becomes an institution for moral
improvement" (152). The fatal flaw in a character serves as a warning for viewers.
The deaA o f a character "confirms the powers of Ae ruling institutions" (Kracauer
302). In a preface to a book critical of Hollywood, a preface later rejected by Ae
publishers,*^ Miller quotes some of Ae restrictions Ae Hays Office imposed on
filmmakers. Many of Aese rules are vague and have, not surprisingly, noAing
ostensibly to do wiA illegal activities; raAer Aey are educational—insuring Aat no
"wrong" lessons are learned. For instance,
I . No picture shall be produced which will lower Ae moral standards 
of Aose who see it. Hence Ae sympaAy of Ae audience should never 
be Arown to Ae side of crime, wrong-doing, evil or sin. [....]
3. Law, natural or human, shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympaAy be 
created for its violation [....]
The sanctity of Ae institution of marriage and the home shall be 
upheld. Pictures shall not infer Aat low forms of sex relationship are 
Ae accepted or common Aing. [....]
The treatment of low, disgusting, unpleasant, Aough not necessarily 
evil, subjects should be subject always to Ae dictate of good taste and a 
regard for Ae sensibilities of Ae audience. [....]
Ministers of religion in Aeir character as ministers of religion should 
not be used as comic characters or as villains {Sunday 45-6).
Miller describes Aese and oAer codes as "whitewash and revelation proceed[ing] in a
contrapuntal fugue" (46). The "whitewash" is over life as we know it, for "films
refute what life would make one believe" (Kracauer 300), while Ae "revelation"
involves demonstrating the lessons that, Arough Ae Hays Office, Ae government
The rejection of Ae preface may have been a result of its lack of focus toward 
Ae end raAer Aan its fulminations against Hollywood.
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wants viewers to leam. As is evident from the strictures suggested and imposed by 
the Hays Office, filmmakers are encouraged to present an uncomplicated world, one 
Wiere good is rewarded and evil punished, a world diat contrasts widi die experience 
of most or all viewers, but helps to ensure future docility on the part of die viewers.
Hollywood actively works to transform actors and plots into "dope,” as well 
Miller recites a "familiar" complaint of French actors when diey go to Hollywood, 
"They always want to make us over" {Wisdom 49). Horkheimer and Adorno, too, 
note a preference for a certain type in Hollywood, "for Mickey Rooney" over "the 
tragic Garbo" (134). Actors who appear to be like everyone else, rather than 
themselves, who do not stand out as "other," seem to be the preferred commodity of 
Hollywood. Movie viewers are here subdy (or not so subdy) instructed that 
conformity in appearance as well as behavior is preferred. "It is the American vice," 
Miller says, echoing Nietzsche, "the democratic disease which expresses its tyranny by 
reducing everything unique to the level of the herd" {Wisdom 49). Just as scripts must 
not seem to challenge the accepted wisdom of societal norms, for fear of inspiring 
audiences to question, actors must not stand out and thus engage the viewers, for such 
an engagement might serve only to make them aware of the mediocrity of the material 
or of their lives.
Movies, however, also function as surrogates for the viewers. "The death [in a 
film] that confirms the power of the ruling institutions," writes Kracauer, "prevents a 
death in the course o f a struggle against these institutions" (302). Those contemplating 
revolt can witness fellow rebels on the screen receiving just recompense for their 
antisocial behavior, possibly death or punishment leading to a renunciation of defiant 
ways. The culture industry serves to "incorporate" viewers, to show them the error of
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antisocial ways as well as the likely outcome, thus "taming revolutionary and barbaric 
instincts" (Horkheimer and Adomo 152).
When real misfortunes are displayed on the screen, misfortunes that caimot be 
denied, or that in this instance are not denied, society dresses them up "in romantic 
garb so as to perpetuate them, and lavishes pity on them because here it doesn’t cost a 
cent" (Kracauer 295). As an example. Miller might have chosen the starving 
American artist wdio has refused to sell out to commercial interests, suffering and 
perhaps dying for art because art, if it is not in the service of big business and not 
accepted by the art establishment, has virtually no value in American or Westem 
society. Exposing, for a moment, suffering of some kind serves as a sort of release 
valve for the viewers, reducing the need to call for actual change.
Though once there had been a number of avant-garde movie makers, by the 
early nineteen-thirties. Miller writes, "there remains only the mass production of 
Hollywood" {Cosmological 47) or what Horkheimer and Adomo term "the stone of the 
stereotype" (148), still-bom films so underdeveloped they can only be differentiated 
one from another with difficulty. There are only certain themes that the Hays Office 
and, perhaps, even the public wish to see depicted on the screen. Workers, possibly, 
do not wish to be reminded of their misery. The govemment certainly does not want 
them reminded, and we are often socialized to distinguish entertainment from 
education. "Pleasure always means not to think about anything, to forget suffering 
even where it is shown. Basically it is helplessness" (Horkheimer and Adomo 144). 
Horkheimer and Adomo assert, however, that what these viewers are escaping is not 
(or not only) the day to day drudgery they experience in their lives, "but from the last
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remaining thought of resistance" (144). To laugh at a comedy or cry at a tragedy is to 
be complicit with societal forces.
Movies, moreover, in their great number but limited thematic range, "reveal 
how society wants to see itself (Kracauer 294). Kracauer notes that recurrent themes 
in films argue for a particular perception of society, one that society itself wishes to 
put forth, and that it "is much too powerful for it to tolerate any movies except those 
with which it is comfortable" (Kracauer 292). Belief in the virtues of quantity, in the 
land of plenty, is important for those who do not have much at all but can only dream 
of acquiring more. They invest themselves spiritually in this economy, and to realize 
it is all worthless, that it does not and cannot satisfy, is to open a great hole in the 
center of existence.
Just as Baum wishes to simplify human experience, divorce the happy side of 
life from the bitter, in movies "the nonsensical at the bottom disappears as utterly as 
the sense in works of art at the top" (Horkheimer and Adomo 143). Thus, as a 
commodity, movies serve, like other media, as a "dope which is worse by far than 
opium or hashish" (Miller, Nightmare, 34)—for at least with hashish and opium you 
recognize it as dope and the intoxication lasts for a discrete interval. Movies break 
down resistance, put bandages over wounds, assuaging the symptoms though not the 
sources of distress.
The narcotic side of movies, finally, serves yet another vital function within the 
capitalist economy, that of a "prolongation of work" (Horkheimer and Adomo 137). 
Not only are the viewers subtly educated about the values of their society, so that all 
become alike, but they are to be further offered "an escape from the mechanized work 
process" in order to "recruit strength . . .  to be able to cope with it again" (137).
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Miller writes of the necessity of the cinema, given the life o f the average worker; "I 
cannot imagine the robots of this age being without a cinema, some kind o f  cinema. 
Our starved instincts have been clamoring for centuries for more and more substitutes. 
And as a substitute for living, the cinema is ideal" {Cosmological 50). Working in 
factories of mass production has transformed people into robots; the lives they see 
unfold on the screen offer surrogates for the lives they do not and cannot lead.
Without the spectacle, their lives might be unbearable because unescapable, but 
because of the dream palaces, because of the commodity dreamworlds contrived and 
ever-changing fashions displayed in department stores, display windows, 
advertisements, because these particulars, among others, become our "course on 
modernity," people become more passive and more alike.
Lands o f D isgust
In the years leading up to the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war, in which the
French were ingloriously routed, England's Queen Victoria received a letter from her
daughter Vicky, who had married a Prussian prince, in which Vicky criticized Paris,
and France in general, for its spectacle culture;
It would be well if they would pause and think that immoderate frivolity 
and luxury depraves and ruins and ultimately leads to national 
misfortune. Our poverty, our dull towns, our plodding, hardworking 
serious life has made us strong and determined, is wholesome for us. 
{qtd. in Christiansen 162)
It is an open question how "hardworking " Princess Vicky was; certainly she was no
factory hand or farm laborer, nor did she work in an office. Still, her criticism echoed
that of citizens of other countries as well as that of many French who believed the
French capital had reached the pinnacle of decadence (as it were), seeking enjoyment
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in sensual indulgence and luxury goods. French culture since the opening of the 
passages, but certainly under the Second Empire of Napoleon m , like American 
culture between 1880-1930, experienced profound disruptions; some people 
encountered an expansion of possibilities in the developing capitalist economy, while 
most found themselves drawn ever more persistently into the drudgery of factory work. 
The "frivolity" that many complained of in Parisian culture is certainly conceived of as 
escapist in nature—cabarets and bars and brothels as much as the department stores.
Just as Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and many others looked to Paris for literary
success. Miller recognizes that in 1941 people around the world still looked to
America as the new world, a land where dreams come true, but that recognition
troubles him profoundly:
they see cinemas which look like palaces; they see department stores 
with manikins dressed like princesses. They see the glitter and the 
paint, the baubles, the gadgets, the luxuries; they don’t see the bitterness 
in the heart, the skepticism, the emptiness . . . vsdiich is eating up the 
American worker. [....] They want a way out; they want the lethal 
comforts, luxuries. {Nightmare 33)
The commodities that comprise the dream world retain only their brittle, saccharine
surface—they are "hollowed-out." Rather than truly improving life, they refocus
attention on acquisition, repressing a general public awareness that life could be
otherwise, that life should be other than what it is. These comforts that the American
worker and American family venerate are "lethal," finally, because of the sacrifice
required in order to acquire them—long hours of often hard, repetitious work. What
these workers have acquired, however, after all that work is what anyone with money
can have. The most noticeable feature, then, of mass production is its "leveling
element," a "leveling" that does not seeks to make everyone equal, but lowers
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standards of expectation, wdiich become fixated on commodities rather than things of a 
more intangible nature, like happiness or job satisfaction.
Miller writes, in Tropic o f  Capricorn, "If I am against the condition of the 
world it is not because I am a moralist—it is because I want to laugh more" (305). He 
despises "the American way of looking at things" which he characterizes as 
"utilitarian" {Nightmare 157) or even "futilitarian" (42). The commodity-consumption 
culture has, for Miller, transformed people into beings who seek improvement only 
through increased purchasing power. Americans, he believes, echoing Louis Veuillot's 
complaint invoked earlier, are "spiritual gorillas, . . food and drink maniacs, success 
mongers, gadget innovators, publicity hounds" (157). They are spiritual sleepwalkers 
obsessed with functioning in their new economy; "All is goods, weights, facts, 
measurements, prices—ant/ bargains, of course" {Remember ZIA). It is a decadence and 
an indulgence comparable to that which Princess Vicky, and many others, ascribed to 
the Parisians.
While what is "unique" in Benjamin's Passagen-Arbeit is that it "takes mass 
culture seriously," both "as the source of the phantasmagoria of false consciousness" as 
well "as the source of the collective energy to overcome it" (Buck-Morss 253), 
Horkheimer and Adomo are not so sanguine. "In an unjust state of life," they write, 
"the impotence and pliability of the masses grows with the quantitative increase in 
commodities allowed them" (xv). The money workers earn turns out to be, in popular 
culture terms, hush-money.
Where Baudelaire was aware that commodities alone, in great abundance, were 
not going to make life better. Miller realizes that people themselves are commodities, 
and not in the obvious way that a prostitute is, but in the way anyone is who sells
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labor for money. Moreover, as an employment manager for the Cosmodemonic
Telegraph Company (Westem Union), he saw firsthand the exploitation of workers:
The whole system was so rotten, so inhuman, so lousy, so hopelessly 
corrupt and complicated that it would have taken a genius to put any 
sense or order into it, to say nothing of human kindness or 
consideration. I was up against the whole system of American labor, 
which is rotten at both ends. {Capricorn 19-20)
But what then is his position?—Miller is neither boss nor telegraph deliverer. "I was
the fifth wheel on the wagon and neither side had any use for me, except to exploit
me" (20). In fact, he claims, everyone is being exploited (20).
Benjamin asserts, somewhat optimistically, that once a person understands that 
"as labor power," he or she "is a commodity," other commodities lose their appeal {CB 
58), and thus we might have one root of Miller's rebellion. Miller refused to accept 
his "commodity" status, refused to maintain his status as peon and thus rejected the 
importance of commodities and work. In doing so, he finds himself on the periphery 
of American, and westem, culture.
189
Chapter Three /  Out of Step: Miller, Rimbaud, Baudelaire and Disobedience
My real enemy is organized society. I  want everybody to be like 
myself~\n  spirit at least I am not an enemy of man\ I am an enemy of 
stupidity, bigotry, patriotism, injustice, callousness. I don't need to kill 
anybody to establish my way. I can assert myself even under the 
conqueror's heel. (Miller, Hamlet 163)
Henry Miller vehemently expresses his dissatisfaction with modem life in his 
critique of the city, as well as with one of the more conspicuous features of the 
modem city, the commodity spectacle. While, in Miller's view, the number and 
variety of goods serves to anaesthetize people, consumer capitalism also makes its 
mark on the city in other ways—the skyscraper is perhaps, along with outdoor 
advertisements, the most visible stamp.
Miller's attack on the city and the modem world is not limited to these 
emblems of modemity. Other, perhaps less tangible, targets of his rebellion appear 
with regularity throughout his works. Among the most important of these targets, I 
include American (indeed Westem) notions of the role of money, work, and war in 
society. Miller's beliefs can be characterized as anti-bourgeois or anti-middle class, 
but he tends to simply react against society (or "civilization" as he most often terms it) 
in general, especially in America, as consciousness becomes less class-based or 
regional and more mass-based, resulting in part from the proliferation of mass media 
made possible by technological advances such as the telegraph, telephone, radio, and 
(later) television.
These media have, according to Richard Sennett in The Fall o f  Public Man, 
tended to create a public, but one more interested in determining who is really and 
truly a member than in taking any collective action. Miller prefers to that the freedom 
of the individual—his conception relying on what Raymond Williams has
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probiematized as "a bourgeois version of society" (M&L, 86-7), that of the individual 
who either stands up against society itself or ^ o  strikes out in his or her own 
direction, oblivious to or unaffected by society—a freedom such as Miller experiences 
in microcosm riding his bicycle, exploring the city and the countryside, a two-wheeled 
flâneur. In Plexus, he describes the camaraderie he experienced with other riders in 
the cool early morning hours of spring and summer when, pacing the six-day racers, 
he enjoyed a camaraderie made less and less possible in an era marked by inordinate 
consumption and competition, where people are more likely to look upon each other 
simply as competitors rather than companions on the journey that is life.
From Baudelaire to Rimbaud
Up to this point, I have in large part explored Miller's critique of modernity 
using the works of French poet Charles Baudelaire (especially Walter Benjamin's 
reading of Baudelaire's works) as a complement to Miller's critique. There is one 
important way in which Miller and Baudelaire differ, a discrepancy which links Miller 
with yet another nineteenth-century French poet. Miller believed that through his 
work he could change the world, specifically the Western world: If his readers 
followed his example, incorporated some of his attitudes, they might "throw off the 
chains which bind them" (Miller, "Fragment," 82). Without accepting the world, 
Baudelaire did not really believe that he could change it, writes Enid Starkie, or that 
there was another vision with any validity beyond the one available when fully awake 
(117). His rejection of hashish and opium as alternative sources of true vision
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illustrates this latter point.' Arthur Rimbaud, alternatively, "would not accept the 
conditions of human life, but intended to alter them him self (117). In a letter to 
Georges Izambard, one of the Voyant [Seer] letters, Rimbaud writes, "II s'agit d'arriver 
à l'inconnu par le dérèglement de tous les sens" p t is a question of arriving at the 
unknown by a disordering of all the senses] (Rimbaud 313). Like Miller he believed 
there existed another world behind that available daily, though in a rather more 
metaphysical sense than Miller, and he seemed certain he could reach this other world.
Miller sought to encourage his readers to look beyond the facts, to see the 
forces that linked and animated the world they took for granted, the daily world he so 
roundly criticized. Rimbaud wished to advance even farther, to become a seer, to 
move beyond the rational world, and to fundamentally change it. In the second of the 
Voyant letters, to Paul Demeny, dated March 15, 1871, he declares that poets are 
neither fully awake nor "in the plenitude o f the great dream" and have yet to create 
anything worthwhile; but from now on, Rimbaud asserts, poetry "sera en avant" [will 
be in advance] (Rimbaud 314-18)—and he, Rimbaud, will lead the way.
In his study of Rimbaud-as-hooligan or holy terror, Benjamin Fondane argues 
that what Rimbaud wanted was "an immediate, catastrophic occurrence that would 
change the conditions of this world" (92-3). Rimbaud's desire for revolutionary 
change parallels Miller's desire for "more and greater catastrophes" to transform 
modem civilization, to wash away the dead wood and pump new life into what 
remains. Among other specific concerns that will be addressed in this chapter and the 
next. Miller has in common with Rimbaud the desire to change the world, and seeks to
‘ See Baudelaire's Les Paradis artificiels.
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effect such change through rejecting the old, outdated literary forms, thereby initiating 
new perceptions of the world. As with Miller and Baudelaire, there are important 
differences between Miller and Rimbaud, but these differences once again serve to 
highlight each writer's stance.
Fondane argues that while Baudelaire was "the first true and conscious 
adversary of the bourgeois . . . that literature and general consciousness had known," 
he also "died and lived a Catholic" (79). Rimbaud, meanwhile, uncompromisingly 
willful as both Fondane and Starkie describe him, chalked '"Merde à Dieu!' ['Shit on 
God!'] on the walls of the church of Charleville" (Fondane 79), rejecting God.
Leaving aside the question of the maturity of Rimbaud's behavior^ (in itself a 
bourgeois concern perhaps) as well as the question of the death-bed conversion to 
Christianity (whether it happened or not, how a death-bed conversion might change 
our interpretations of Rimbaud and his work or if it should), his rebellion has a 
violence, at times, that Baudelaire's lacks. Rimbaud's is a generalized attack on 
bourgeois society that finds few parallels in Baudelaire, but whose spirit we can detect 
in Miller's declared attitude toward God; "I had no more need of God than He had of 
me, and if there were one, I often said to myself, I would meet Him calmly and spit in 
His face" {Ccqjricom 9). Such rejections of God need not be read solely on a literal 
level. They might only signify a rejection of the typical Christian God: "the one," as 
Starkie describes it, "supported by the bourgeoisie, the God of Capitalism, the God
■ Rimbaud once showed his contempt for current literary forms at a poetry reading 
where, as the poet came to the end of each line, he audibly punctuated it with 
"Merdre!" [Shit!]. Such disruptive behavior prefigures Dada, and demonstrates a 
desire to combat bourgeois notions of propriety.
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who demanded eternal sacrifice" (238), a God wdio differs but little from the 
capricious Homeric gods.
Rimbaud's poetry, though at times concerned with the experience of the city 
and of bourgeois life, differs greatly from Baudelaire's and is more difficult to cite as 
cultural criticism. The weakest chapter of Marc Blanchard's study. In Search o f  the 
City: Engels, Baudelcdre, Rimbaud, is that dedicated to Rimbaud, chiefly because 
Rimbaud's poetry resists interpretation and many of his poems (especially those 
collected in Illuminations to which Blanchard almost invariably refers) consist of a 
series of images, often unexplored, rather than one image that is dramatized—as in 
Baudelaire's "A une passante," for instance, where the poet probes sentiments evoked 
by a passing face in a crowd. Rimbaud does not, as Engels does with Manchester or 
Baudelaire with Paris, construct a vision of one city, in Illuminations, so much as 
telescope a variety of cities, from different eras, from around the world, into one city, 
in "Villes (11)"^  and "Villes (I)," offering alternative versions of the past, present and 
future, moving away from what he saw as the prisonhouse of Realism. Miller and 
Baudelaire more realistically depict the modem world in their criticism of it, though as 
we have seen they frequently employ fantastic imagery as well. Like them, though, 
Rimbaud deplores the city, sensing that the "suprahuman sprawl of the modem city 
destroys the perspective, and the importance, o f the human" (Aheam 297).
It is generally agreed that Rimbaud abandoned poetry at twenty-one. Despite 
his youth, Rimbaud presents a serious demeanor interspersed with frequent exceptions.
 ^ Where for instance he draws together the Allegheny mountains of North 
America, Libya, English sprites and Greek divinity, along with a street in Baghdad 
(259-60).
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sometimes ironic if contemptuous, sometimes, such as in this fragment from
Illuminations^ almost childlike:
Tai tendu des cordes de clocher à clocher; des guirlandes de fenêtre à
fenêtre; des chaînes d'or d'étoile à étoile, et je danse.
P hung cords from clock-tower to clock-tower, garlands from window 
to window, gold chains from star to star, and I dance.] (255)
Rimbaud, here, offers a picture of freedom and joy, an apparently naive even Edenic
vision of life. It seems clear that if Rimbaud rejects much in life, he still finds
something to celebrate.
Miller, too, often appears quite serious and yet his sarcasm, exaggeration, and 
humor suggest alternative release valves for pent-up bitterness. Outside of several of 
the prose poems in Spleen de Paris, Baudelaire's gravity is distinct from the more
varying contributions of Miller and Rimbaud who, feeling less betrayed by the world,
can dance. All three, however, share a pronounced rejection of bourgeois standards.
Rejecting Bourgeois Ways
In their literary productions. Miller, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud disregarded so- 
called standards of good taste. All three offended notions of propriety—Miller with his 
descriptions of sex and his "anti-Americanism," Baudelaire with his blasphemy and 
depictions of lesbians, and Rimbaud with his use of scatology and slang. While 
Baudelaire's subject matter may not have always been conventional, his poetic form 
(the sonnet predominates) remains within conventional bounds,^ despite the novel
'* Prose poems, as a form, are not original with Baudelaire. Sainte-Beuve and a 
number of other French poets of the early nineteenth century had already experimented 
with prose poems. Prose poems were certainly less accepted, but they were also less 
audacious by the time Baudelaire began experimenting with them.
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characterizations (a street that screams), and the fantastic, occasionally arcane imagery 
he employed. Miller and Rimbaud, on the other hand, share a predilection for street 
language, as opposed to the more prevalent, and proper, literary language, wdiich even 
Baudelaire had begun to abandon. Miller's topic is the street and he labors to 
faithfully depict it and the crowds that inhabit it by employing street language. Starkie 
notes that before writing the poems that comprise Illuminations, Rimbaud's poetic 
innovation consisted in his "daring use of vocabulary" (211). One of the innovative 
features of Kristin Ross's study of Rimbaud is her use of Alfred Delvau's 1883 
Dictionnaire de la langue verte, which records working class slang, in order to provide 
alternative, perh^s more authentic, readings of many of Rimbaud's poems.
None of these three writers comes from the same station in society.
Baudelaire, son of an aristocrat and the adoptive son of a distinguished military 
officer, came from the highest rung and Rimbaud, whose mother was a petit-bourgeois 
landowner directly descended from peasant stock, the lowest—which provides one, 
though unsatisfactory, explanation of the difference in their poetic language. Each, 
according to their biographers, was raised with bourgeois notions of proper behavior 
and attitudes and goals, and all three rebelled, recognizing the stifling constraints they 
would have to endure should they accept bourgeois ways.
In "À la Musique," Rimbaud expresses his contempt for the bourgeois who 
congregate in the center of the town, in the "Square où tout est correct" [square where 
all is correct/appropriate] (95), where landowners with pince-nez glasses point out to 
each other the mistakes of the band. In all their finery, "Les gros bureaux bouffis 
traînent leurs grosses dames / Auprès desquelles vont, officieux cornacs" [the fat 
wheezing bureaucrats escort their fat wives / next to whom they walk, officious
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elephant-guides] (95). In this poem, the bourgeoisie seems not only ridiculous and 
repulsive, but also complacent, calmly filling their pipes and adding, superciliously, 
"vous savez, c'est de la contrebande" [you know, ifs contraband] (96). Still, Aere are 
young girls in the square, and as he has clothed himself carelessly, like a student, the 
girls find the young poet attractive. The poem's conclusion unites decided antipathy 
toward the bourgeoisie in the square with attraction for the young girls who may in 
fact be daughters of the bourgeois class, such that his "désirs brutaux s'accrochent à 
leurs lèvres" [brutal desires snatch at their lips] (96), as if through a fierce kiss he 
wishes to punish and to inflame the girls and the bourgeoisie.
Such a specific rejection of a class finds no place in Miller's work, except for 
those on the very highest rungs of society, those wdio simply exploit the labor of 
others. By the nineteen-thirties. Miller has come to believe that the bourgeoisie are no 
less exploited than those in the classes below them. Miller, on the whole, rejects 
practices and behaviors, manifestations of values inimical to a full enjoyment of life, 
no matter which class espouses them, especially since, due to incorporation, all classes 
more or less proclaim many of the same values.
According to biogr^her Robert Ferguson, Miller's mother "was anxious to 
promote in her small son the virtues of industry, thrift, and respectability" (6). But 
like many other artists, such as the Romantics in England and many French artists of 
the nineteenth century. Miller rejects these typically bourgeois values. The term 
"bourgeois" is certainly, as Gordon Wright notes, an "amorphous " word that is 
descriptive not of one narrow class but, instead, a range of classes (168). Allan Janik 
and Stephen Toulmin provide an overall description of the values upheld as bourgeois: 
"reason, order and progress, perseverance, self-reliance and disciplined conformity to
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the standards of good taste and action" (42). To this list should likely be added 
"patriotism," though Janik and Toulmin might have sought to include patriotism under 
the last rubric, "conformity to standards of good taste and action." Duty to one's 
community and country demand the respect of the bourgeois as well. So-called 
normal families, in America and in the West, tend to value these traits and seek to 
pass them on to their children, so that these children become members in good 
standing of society. In rejecting bourgeois ways, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and Miller fall 
out of favor with their society, expressed in the cases of Miller and Baudelaire with a 
ban on certain of their works, in the case of Rimbaud with a shunning from literary 
Paris. Implicitly, when not explicitly, they offer alternatives to the dominant society.
One of the first connections Miller makes between himself and French poet
Arthur Rimbaud, in his study of the poet entitled The Time o f  the Assassins, occurs
through the figure of the "cold, critical, proud, unforgiving, and puritanical" mother
(12). Early on. Miller learned that the bourgeois conception of generosity, exemplified
in charity, often had limits that made little sense. He records that when he saw his
mother (a figure described by Miller and his biographers alike as a harsh and unfeeling
woman) giving something away, he ran off to his bedroom eager to find something to
contribute. Often he returned with
a bright new toy, a pair of boots, a drum, because I was too surfeited 
with possessions. "Oh no, Henry not thatV I can hear her say. "That's 
too new!" "But I don't want it any more," I would insist. "Don't talk 
that way," she would answer, "or God will punish you." {Plexus 60)
Comments Dearborn: "To Henry, material possessions began to seem suspect—useless
trappings—and the accumulation of them would remind him of his mother and the rigid
meaningless values she endorsed" (26). Early on, the acquisitive strain which, with
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the rise of consumer capitalism and the department store, was becoming so much a 
part of the American and Western way of life, a signifier o f progress and success, 
caused Miller to question the values informing his culture.
Starkie relates that Rimbaud called his mother "La Bouche d’Ombre" [Mouth of 
Darkness], "after the ponderous metaphysical poem by Victor Hugo, on account of the 
weighty and religious nature of her frequent utterances" (84). James Lawler suggests 
that Rimbaud's poem "Le Bateau ivre" [The Drunken Boat] exists in part as a 
"rejection of a cold mother," so the journey can be understood, at one level, as one of 
escape (9). Neither Miller nor Rimbaud ever reconciled with his mother, a sign 
perhaps of the strength of their respective rebellions against the restrictions and 
judgements of the mother figure, for both mothers embodied, or attempted to, the 
bourgeois values they sought to impart to their sons.
Miller also characterizes his family much as Rimbaud does, and this
characterization reflects an attempt to expose the true nature of the family beneath its
bourgeois pretensions. "My people were entirely Nordic," Miller declares early in
Tropic o f Capricorn, "which is to say idiots."
Every wrong idea which has ever been expounded was theirs. Among 
them was the doctrine of cleanliness to say nothing of righteousness. 
They were painfully clean. But inwardly they stank. Never once had 
they opened the door which leads to the soul; never once did they 
dream of taking a blind leap into the dark. [....] In my bitterness I often 
search for reasons to condemn them, the better to condemn myself. For 
I am like them too . . . .  As I look back on my life it seems to me that 
I never did anything of my own volition but always through the 
pressure of others. (11)
Beyond their faults. Miller seems to acknowledge the social forces operating to form
individuals, aware that acts often express a response to stimuli rather than some
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ultimate notion of choice and individualism. His rebellion, furthermore, represents a 
reaction against his family rather than a simple declaration of identity.
Similar to Miller's denunciation of his family and himself, in "Mauvais Sang"
from Un Season en Enfer, Rimbaud writes.
J'ai de mes ancêtres gaulois l'œil bleu blanc, la cervelle étroite, et la 
maladresse dans la lutte. Je trouve mon habillement aussi barbare que 
le leur. Mais je ne beurre pas ma chevelure.
Les Galois étaient les écorcheures de bêtes, les brûleurs d'herbes le 
plus ineptes de leur temps.
[From my Gallic ancestors, I have slate-blue eyes, the straight forehead, 
and the ineptitude in battle. I consider my dress as barbaric as theirs. 
But I do not butter my hair.
The Gauls were skinners of animals, burners of herbs—the most inept 
of their time.] (196)
Without simply rejecting the family, both Miller and Rimbaud regard their forebears as 
exemplars of failure and describe them in strong terms; Miller's ancestors are "idiots" 
while Rimbaud's are "the most inept of their time." Neither writer excludes himself 
from this judgement.
Both in fact implicate themselves in the family failure, while at the same time 
distinguishing themselves, making a triumph of their failure to conform to the genetic 
infirmity. Miller claims that he "inspired distrust," and he "fomented discord . . . 
because I always exposed the stupidity and futility of everything" {Capricorn 16). 
Rimbaud, breaking with his peasant past, proclaims that unlike his Gallic ancestors,
"Je ne me vois jamais dans les conseils de Christ; ni dans les conseils des Seigneurs,— 
représentants du Christ" [I never see myself in the teachings of Christ; nor in the 
teachings of the priests—representatives of Christ] (197)—perhaps only the begirming of 
the differences enunciated, implicitly, throughout Une Season en Enfer. In this
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instance, Rimbaud places himself outside bourgeois religion and outside the duties 
such a religion requires o f its followers.
Those who tend to appear most respectable also suffer at the hands of Miller
and Rimbaud. Following his contact with general managers and vice presidents at
Western Union as well as those who come to him seeking a job. Miller argues with
himself about the need to modify his views of humanity: ”[Y]ou need to get rid of
your false notions about humanity. You have to realize, Henry me boy, that you're
dealing with cutthroats, with cannibals, only they're dressed up, shaved, perfumed, but
that's all they are—cutthroats, cannibals" {Capricorn 102). Despite outward
appearances of bourgeois respectability. Miller recognizes that at heart people remain
the monsters they have always been, that civilization has not fundamentally altered or
improved their character. In like fashion, Rimbaud recognizes in those supposedly
most admired that they receive respect only by virtue of their title; deep down they are
no different from Miller's cutthroats and cannibals:
Marchand, tu es nègre; magistrat, tu es nègre; général, tu es nègre; 
empereur, vieille démangeaison, tu es nègre.
[Merchant, you are a nigger; magistrate, you are a nigger; general, you 
are a nigger; emperor, old rash, you are a nigger.] (200)
The epithet "nigger," in 1872 as today, signifies ignobility and servility, and Rimbaud
thus asserts that the most respectable are on par with, if  not worse than, the uncouth,
even Napoleon m , "the emperor" who conceived of himself (or at least attempted to
present himself) as a respectable bourgeois. In France, from 1830 forward, the
bourgeois class begins to take over the government (Wright 169), so Rimbaud's
denunciation of the class takes shape as a rebellion against the pre- and post-Paris
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Commune governments. Bourgeois pretention, for Miller and Rimbaud, serves only to 
obscure the contemptible human spirit which underlies it.
Miller maintains, and this is true of Rimbaud as well, that "the demon of revolt 
had taken possession of me at an early age" {Capricorn 16). Revolt against typical 
bourgeois concerns will center these two writers in such a way that Miller rejects the 
need to work and accumulate all the so-called necessities o f life, and Rimbaud affirms 
the Paris Commune of 1871, which Kristin Ross describes as "a revolt against deep 
forms of social regimentation"—against the "hierarchical divisions" that characterized 
life under Napoleon IQ and the Second Empire (5).
Fondane writes that Rimbaud rejects the choice of good versus evil, conceiving 
it as "the absolute proof that we are not free, that there is not the least freedom in the 
category of the real" (112). This good/evil binary Rimbaud attributes to Christianity to 
which he also attributes the rise of Monsieur Prudhomme (Rimbaud 219)—a figure for 
the bourgeois who seeks only to know that which will maintain him right where he is, 
who seeks only to remain respectable. À propos of M. Prudhomme, Miller writes,
"Let a man but dress differently from his fellow creatures and he becomes an object of 
scorn and ridicule. The only law which is really lived up to whole-heartedly and with 
a vengeance is the law of conformity" {Time 29). Neither Miller nor Rimbaud 
conceives the western individual as free, and both sense the need to move beyond the 
categories of good and evil. Miller claims that in the Middle Ages, "Men and women 
[were] storming heaven with their sexual apparatus. Was it immoral? Who cares?
The constant presence of death gave men and women an insatiable hunger for life" 
{World 60). Questions of good and evil, of morality and sinfulness, pale in 
comparison to the importance of individual freedom, to the enjoyment of life, and
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most often function solely as restraints, though not invariably in ways that will make 
life safer or better.
Just as Miller’s primary concern is the individual rather than the collective, 
Rimbaud's attempt to become a voyant signifies an attempt to maintain "individuality" 
which, according to Ross, he sees as under attack by the consumer capitalist culture 
(102), already entrenched in France by 1870 and exemplified by bourgeois conformity 
in purchasing. Whereas capitalism appeals to individuals as individuals in order to 
persuade them to purchase products, simultaneously, because it also relies on high 
sales figures, it attacks individuality—enticing whole classes of individuals to purchase 
the same products, often in the name of individuality (102).
According to Ross, the capitalist attack on individuality, disguised as "ordered 
disorganization," works counter to Rimbaud's "raisonné dérèglement de tous les sens" 
[reasoned disordering of all senses], because it serves in essence only to mystify the 
relations at work in the capitalist economy vis à vis the worker-commodity-consumer- 
producer relationship, rather than to clear the slate as Rimbaud attempts to do. She 
argues, moreover, that Rimbaud's new vision opposes "what capitalist development is 
at that moment defining (in the sense of setting the limits) as human, as ordinary 
perception" (102), therefore opposing as well what Walter Benjamin has called the 
"attenuation of experience." The connection between a thing and its use, for instance, 
must be transparent, in order to encourage the purchasing of products; experience itself 
must be quantifiable as well as capitalizable. Rimbaud's illuminations serve to 
distance the individual from that economy, to set the individual outside the bourgeois 
world.
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The attempt to reorganize one's vision of the world, to enunciate new values
and new behaviors, naturally causes frictions. Both Rimbaud and Miller behaved in
ways that surprised and, occasionally, offended those around them. Rimbaud, in his
time in Paris with French poet Paul Verlaine, through his bold pronouncements
(criticisms of Parnassian poetry and poets, for instance) and uncouth actions (refusals
to bathe, destruction of other people's property), behaviors untainted at that point by
consideration for others, made enemies of virtually all those he encountered. In the
"Mauvais Sang" [Bad/Evil Blood] section of Un Season en enfer, Rimbaud's harsh
narrator dramatizes the bitterness of his attacks;
À qui me louer? Quelle bête faut-il adorer? Quelle sainte image 
attaque-t-on? Quels coeurs briserai-je? Quel mensonge dois-je tenir?— 
Dans quel sang marcher?
[Who should I attach myself to? What foolishness should I adore? 
\ ^ a t  idol should I attack? What hearts will I break? What lie must I 
hold?—In what blood walk?] (199)
Rimbaud exhibits little respect and, in fact, a certain seriousness, in his intention to
scandalize those around him. While his youthfulness may help explain his behavior,
the poetry of I’art pour I'art inspired his contempt in the same way that "Literature," as
we have seen, raised Miller's ire. The Parnassians, like those devoted to "Literature"
in Miller's day, were behind the times, complacent, and/or self-satisfied like Rimbaud's
Charleville bourgeoisie.
Miller's rebellion against bourgeois values appears in the expressed attitude of 
the narrators of Miller's books, who are not unmoved by considerations for others but 
often present themselves as such. Miller's narrators can be conceived on one level as 
hard-boiled, a term often applied to Ernest Hemingway's narrators, among others, who 
affect a certain toughness and evince a thorough unsentimentality, as if  sentimentality
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were simply a weakness. Miller himself rejects the label as restrictive. "I don't like 
that hard-boiled attitude," he writes in a letter, "—it's inhuman again. [American artists] 
don't want to be emotionally susceptible to anything, and that's cockeyed" {qtd in 
Dearborn 179).
Miller's narrators often violate bourgeois sensibilities, especially when 
describing a sexual encounter; in other situations they might be just as offensive while 
remaining, as Miller says, "susceptible." For example, when narrator Dion Moloch 
reports the death of his friend Hari Das, a friend asks,
"What are you going to do?"
"Me? Nothing "
"You don't seem to care very much," Blanche observed.
"Care? What do you mean? He's dead now."
"Well, aren't you going to look after his body?"
"[ certainly am not. With death my interest in Hari Das ceases."
{Moloch 131-32)
Upon learning of the death of his friend, Moloch affects complete indifference—no 
tears, no acceptance of the duty imposed upon him by the deceased. In short, Moloch 
shows absolutely no willingness to "do the right thing "
The telegram he has received states there are no known relatives and that 
Moloch has been entrusted with the task of seeing the body properly buried. Moloch's 
wife Blanche, and friends Prigozi and Stanley, react to his renunciation of this duty 
with astonishment. Prigozi accuses him of acting "rather cold-blooded" (132). Instead 
of observing the social niceties that friendship would seem to demand of him, Moloch 
refuses to acknowledge any further duty to Hari Das. Criticized by those surrounding 
him for his attitude, he finally retorts:
"Who looked after him when he was alive? Who fed him and put a roof
over his head? None of you weeping willows! You hadn't much use
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for him, then . . . .  You, Prigozi. . . you talked a lot about letting them 
shift for themselves, these Hindu bastards. My sympathetic little wife 
here treated him like a scavenger . . . she was aAraid that the neighbors 
would catch sight of him blowing his nose in the gutter. He was a boor 
. . .  he laughed too noisily. And he didn't bathe often enough to suit 
her royal highness." He looked at them scornfully . . . .  "Suddenly he's 
converted to a cadaver. Immediately tears, lamentations, eulogies.
Can't do too much for him . . fo r  the corpse." (132, ellipses and italics 
in original)
For Moloch, treating people with respect and helping them as much as possible while 
they are alive demonstrates much more meaningful concern than performing the proper 
rituals when they die. Moloch disparages society's refusal to aid the living: "society 
shows more ingenuity when it comes to getting rid of stiffs," he says bitterly (133). 
When a corpse is treated with more tenderness and thoughtfulness than was shown the 
living being, societal values once again appear profoundly skewed.
Beginning with his first lesson, then, at the hands of his mother, on the 
conflicted nature of modem values (Christianity and giving in opposition to Capitalism 
and accumulating). Miller begins to rebel. Soon he realizes what Max Horkheimer has 
expressed so compellingly: "Truth can make no pacts with 'prevailing customs ' It 
finds no guiding thread in them. In the era of witch hunts, opposition to the public 
spirit would have been moral" {Critical Theory 284). Miller rebels against the 
consumer culture that grew up with him and flourished all aroimd him, seeing in its 
depths forces profoundly inhuman. Rimbaud and Baudelaire reject that culture as 
well, in varying degrees, due to their different personalities, historical situations, and 
social circumstances.
Money and the Borrowing Instinct
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Tenderness and consideration are two sentiments Miller finds noticeably absent 
in his relationship with his mother as well as in other interpersonal relationships. In 
bourgeois culture, these sentiments, though expected facets of the mother-child 
relationship as well as of most relationships between people, often disappear due to the 
myriad of new forces—work-related problems often resulting in greater marital strains, 
frustrated desires in the marketplace, greater split between the public and private life- 
making themselves felt in the industrial e ra  Growing up in a strict, middle-class 
German household (where German was often spoken). Miller rebelled not only against 
the actual heartlessness of the bourgeoisie but, more specifically, against their 
repressive and puritanical values, especially as embodied in attitudes toward sex 
(monogamy as well as the "hush-hush" attitude) and work. Miller also experienced a 
troubled relationship with money, not simply because he seems rarely to have had 
enough, but because of the difficulty in obtaining it outside the normal channels of 
intensive daily labor.
In American history, when elementary school students read Benjamin Franklin’s 
plans for self-improvement, they come across such succinct morsels of wisdom as, "A 
penny saved is a penny earned." Franklin's exhortation from the mid-eighteenth 
century, at odds with the consumer culture of late nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century America in which Miller grew up, and where credit begins to play such an 
important role (Leach 124-27), emphasizes the importance money already played in a 
society where bartering still accounted for a substantial percentage of transactions. 
Money, thus, exists early on as an important facet of American culture, one that Miller 
denounces and attempts to revalue.
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Miller and Rimbaud share a similar experience of money but also dramatically 
part company. Miller's second wife June (Mona, in his fiction) had a talent for raising 
money, while Rimbaud attached himself to Verlaine who, though not wealthy, at the 
time needed no job in order to live. Both Miller and Rimbaud experienced difficulties 
in Paris due to lack of money; but whereas Miller lived mostly in large cities and as 
an adult had to fend for himself, the young Rimbaud, bom in the country, lived much 
of his life, until leaving for Africa at age twenty-one, supported by either his mother 
or Verlaine and so was less dependent upon his own income than was Miller. Both 
writers occasionally benefited from the generosity of patrons as well; Anaïs Nin 
underwrote Miller for nearly a decade, and, much less substantially, both Verlaine and 
Théodore de Banville offered Rimbaud money. Still, nothing in Miller's history 
compares with Rimbaud's experiences in Africa, where he struggled to accumulate a 
fortune. Starkie writes of Rimbaud, "no sum of money was too insignificant to earn or 
to accept, no sum too small to save" (387). It was, she asserts, the "Ardennais peasant 
strain" making itself manifest (387).
As opposed to bartering, where equivalent is traded for equivalent, "[m]oney is 
a socially accepted general equivalent" which assumes "the role of general equivalent, 
and excludes all other commodities from that role" (Bottomore 337). As a socially- 
accepted equivalent, it serves as medium for a variety of social relationships, 
especially buyer-seller, debtor-creditor and employer-employee (339). "The role of the 
state in managing money must thus be seen as a managing of these social relations as 
well" (340). Rebellion against money, or an attempt to devalue or re-value it, thus 
constitutes an act of revolt against the state.
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Just as counterfeiting constitutes one such rebellion against the state, the easy 
acquisition of money envisaged by Miller constitutes another, for through borrowing 
one attempts to extricate oneself from the state-managed flow of money. Importantly, 
for Miller borrowing also constitutes an attempt to liberate himself from the necessity 
for work. Robert Ferguson, in fact, describes Miller's seven years with June in the 
nineteen-twenties as "ceaseless, baffled searching for a way of making money without 
getting trapped by a job" (122).
Miller's most considered pronouncement on money is his 1938 essay, "Money 
and How it Gets that Way," written in response to a query from Ezra Pound, "asking 
me if I had ever thought about money, what makes it and how it gets that way" {Stand 
Still 119). Miller responded with an essay that contains a mishmash of satire, history 
and nonsense, in addition to pithy statements on money, evaluating the role it has 
come to play in society. "In fact," he writes, "when we search for a counterpart to the 
role of gold in human life, we can adduce nothing equal to it in obsessive persistence 
unless it be man's continuous and uninterrupted preoccupation with the navel (128). 
Focussing on money steers people away from living. Miller asserts, compelling them 
to obsess on something that in itself bears very little value and which does not ensure 
happiness. One might view money, in that way, as a commodity (one that provides 
access to others), for money promises happiness, if we can only have enough of it, but 
on its own it does not really deliver. Money, it turns out, is as hollowed-out as other 
commodities.
Money does, however, inspire the formulation of truisms such as those 
Benjamin Franklin contributes, and Miller tries his hand at one: "To have money in 
the pocket is one of the small but inestimable pleasures of life. To have money in the
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bank is not quite the same thing, but to take money out of the bank is indisputably a 
great joy" (141). Clearly Miller does not take money seriously, except perhaps when 
in dire need of it; he refuses to believe it merits as much reflection and energy as it 
tends to receive. To the proposition "Thinking in money generates money," 
proclaimed by an unnamed "late German philosopher,"* Miller opposes, "Thinking in 
money generates nothing but confusion" (142). Money acts primarily as a distraction. 
An escape from the necessity of earning it or using it just might lead toward "the life 
more abundant."
On a more reflective note. Miller identifies the dominant attitude toward money 
in Amenca and the West—money (like sex)® as something sacred—when he writes, 
'"Neither a borrower nor a lender be,' said the good Shakespeare" {Sexus 61-2). But 
anyone familiar with the Tropics and other works by Miller knows that he quite often 
and unapologetically finds himself in the position of needing to borrow money, 
especially during his initial period in Paris, narrated in Tropic o f Cancer. Less often 
Miller finds himself in a position to lend money. In Tropic o f Ccpricom, for instance, 
he claims that while working for the Cosmodemonic Telegraph Company, charged 
with hiring and firing messengers, he sometimes borrowed money to give it away to 
the broken-down people who came to him seeking a job. "If I was asked for a dime I 
gave a half dollar, if  I was asked for a dollar I gave five" (27), he writes, suggesting 
he always gave five-fold what was requested. Such generosity does not tally with his
s The unnamed "late German philosopher" is Spengler, see Spengler p. 408.
® I could draw an elaborate comparison between Miller's attitudes toward money 
and sex, but I believe it would simply conclude with the notion that both should be 
alternately devalued, so that they are not so significant, and revalued so that their 
potential for bringing communal pleasure becomes the focus.
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professed habitual lack of funds, but it reveals an awareness, possibly based on his 
own experience with borrowing, that wdiat was asked of him was only the bare 
minimum, a sum thought by the petitioner to be less likely to inspire rejection, but an 
amount that would merely prolong the misery rather than extricate the person from a 
specific predicament.
Rimbaud's later obsession with making money is well-documented in Starkie's 
biography—as is his charity. She quotes one of his former employers, Pierre Bardey, 
who wrote after Rimbaud's death that his charity was "probably one of the few things 
that he did without disgust and without a sneer of contempt" (388). With Miller, we 
see the easy-come, easy-go attitude toward money, while with Rimbaud there is 
"lavish charity" (388) despite the fact that "no peasant ever used his body more hardly, 
nor lived in a more miserly or penurious manner" (387). Miller's apparent light­
heartedness toward money contrasts sharply with Rimbaud's combination of avarice 
and thoughtfulness.’
In Sexus, Miller provides his most complete theoretical, and practical, 
statement on borrowing, indeed a veritable primer on the subject (60-1). He concludes 
with the notion that the best "lender is the realist who knows that tomorrow the 
situation may be reversed and the borrower become the lender" (61), a theory 
supported by Friedrich Engels' contention that it is the poor, rather than the bourgeois, 
who give alms to the poor, "who know from experience how it feels to be hungry, and
’ Rimbaud's purported involvement in the slave trade certainly complicates this 
discussion of his attitude toward money. Starkie's biography of Rimbaud asserts that 
while gun running and the slave trade usually went hand-in-hand, Rimbaud dedicated 
himself to gim running, while his partners handled the other, more distasteful trade 
(381).
211
are liable to find themselves in the same situation at any moment" (120). Miller 
claims, furthermore, that he "never insisted on being repayed" {Sexus 61), for the 
haunting shame of knowing you owe somebody takes some of the joy out of 
borrowing as well as die joy of seeing the person in the streets. Insisting on 
repayment simply changes the nature of the act of lending, making it less charitable 
and unselfish.
But Miller tries to downplay the whole issue of "borrowing," finally, arguing
that everybody, at one point or another, finds themselves in the position of potential
lender and potential borrower. Because it is a universal experience, he writes,
everybody should give to the utmost;
For men on earth, borrowing and lending is not only essential but 
should be increased to outlandish proportions. The fellow who is really 
practical is the fool who looks neither to the left nor the right, who 
gives without question and asks unblushingly. (62)
Certainly Miller seeks to provoke his readers here, but the exaggeration—"the fool who
looks neither to the left nor the right"—serves to underscore the restraint with which
the bourgeois class conducts itself, when giving alms, for the fool at least gives.
Furthermore, though this incitement to bestow money on those in need can be
understood as self-serving, as wish-fulfillment, given Miller's begging letters in the
nineteen-forties while he composed Sexus, it can also be interpreted as envisioning
change: Money emerges desacralized and as plentiful as fresh air. People might then
begin to constitute a community connected by Christian bonds of giving and receiving.
At least, such may be his intention. Even so, the money-world has such a grip 
on the average citizen that living on money borrowed or accumulated through begging
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or busking’ fails to eliminate the need to use money to acquire necessities. Thus the 
escape from the consumer/producer relationship, within the capitalist mode of 
production, is never quite effected and is at best only partially achieved with respect to 
such money-mediated relationships as worker/supervisor, for instance, where friends or 
passersby merely serve as unofficial replacements for the factory owner or the office 
manager. Miller, regardless, prophesies a future where money will only exist if there 
are people "still foolish enough to believe in money" {Remember A\A). Since money 
has only socially-constructed value, it rests with people to decide whether money 
remains a functioning element of society or not.
Miller's narration of his difficulties with money, in both Tropics and The Rosy 
Crucifixion, illustrates his rejection of some of the most basic—hence, enthroned— 
values of Western culture. "Man is dominated by the making of money," writes Max 
Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, "by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of his life" (53). Miller's dismissal of money as something to be 
earned plays an important supportive role in his renunciation of the commodity 
spectacle and, equally, the work ethic, for the focus upon accumulating money 
encourages people to work, whether they receive any satisfaction from their work or 
not. It prompts them, in effect, to stifle themselves, to devalue themselves, to be, in 
Nietzschean terms, life-denying. The end of Rimbaud's poetic production, for instance, 
appears to coincide with the necessity to earn a living, though which inspired which, if 
such a connection can even be drawn, remains unclear.
Performing on the street for money.
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A Most Depressing Thought
In the West, work has generally become accepted as a duty, the customary 
responsibility of good Christians, and responsible citizens, to daily deliver themselves 
over to productive labor: labor that results in some commodity or part thereof or labor 
that can be sold as a service (waiting tables or street-cleaning, for instance). The 
Puritan work ethic—founded upon the notions that "God helps those who help 
themselves" (Weber 115), that "to work is to serve God" (De Grazia 45), and that 
there is great merit in submitting to both religious and secular authority (Weber 178)— 
promises material and spiritual rewards (especially the second) for those who 
virtuously devote themselves to their "calling," as Weber describes the new conception 
of daily labor in the nineteenth century. Despite its religious sanction, and the 
necessity of functioning within a money-economy, acceptance of wage labor, more 
specifically alienated wage labor, has been challenged in American literature, if only 
implicitly, at least since Mark Twain’s The Adventures o f Huckleberry Finn and, in 
French literature, implicitly again, since Henry Murger's Scènes de la Vie de Bohème.
During the transition to consumer capitalism, however, the owners of factories, 
mills, and mines often complained that work habits were not sufficiently developed, 
that workers were rather undependable and resistant to the new system taking shape 
(Thompson 392-93). As Weber describes it, "A man does not 'by nature" wish to earn 
more and more money, but to live simply as he is accustomed to live and to earn as 
much as is necessary for that purpose" (60). A worker, before and even during the 
transition to the new economy, preferred to earn enough money to survive for a period 
and to then quit working, a mind-set at odds with the capitalist system.
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In Europe, before the rise of the great, industrial cities, vdiich followed large- 
scale migration from the country to the city (see Chapter One), ”[t]he deference of the 
countryside," according to E. P. Thompson, "was rooted in bitter experience of the 
power of the squire rather than in any inward conviction" (386). The work ethic, 
however, impressing people arriving in the city with the importance of self-discipline, 
impelled them, in time, to become their own overseers, to provide that "inward 
conviction" (393). In their repeated support of the work ethic, especially strong in 
America and England, church leaders of many sects performed a great task for 
struggling industrialists, preaching "the idea that faithful labor, even at low wages, on 
the part of those whom life offers no other opportunities, is higly pleasing to God" 
(Weber 178), though the teaching has never quite fully caught on in the West. In 
France, for instance, rejection of work has been a constant, so that even today graffiti 
such as the following renouncing work can be seen: "Work is to life, as gasoline is to 
the ocean." The implication being that alienated wage labor is harmful, deadly, 
unnatural. Jack Kerouac's hoboes, too, in On the Road, live on the margins of society 
and outside the routine of daily work, travelling the midwest by "hopping" freight 
trains or hitch-hiking. They are free, but most people are not.
In high capitalism, it is generally a given that people must labor in order to 
survive, that (as Max Horkheimer describes it) they must yield to "natural" forces, i.e. 
the economic forces that sustain society but are assumed to be quite beyond its 
(society's) control {Critical 86). Workers, accordingly, acquiesce to the work ethic, 
heed the bosses in their places of employment, and in so doing maintain their 
respectability (as well as their anonymity), as good workers, within the larger society. 
Horkheimer observes that both workers and owners claim to submit to blind economic
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necessity, with the workers further "acknowledging the power and authority of the 
employer"; however, while this economic necessity represents "for the worker a 
pitiless fate," it constitutes for the owner "die condition for his control": "economic 
necessity," therefore, functions to the owner’s benefit (86).
Writers such as Upton Sinclair have depicted the life of the worker in the
factory (or the slaughterhouse in the case of The Jungle), but Miller's position as
hiring manager brings him, as we have seen, into contact with both sides of the labor
equation. All except for those at the very top are exploited. Miller no less than the
messengers no less than the vice-presidents, though some are at least better-paid.
Miller depicts even his appointment, as hiring manager, as a blatant act of exploitation.
Refused for employment as a messenger for the Cosmodemonic Telegraph Corporation
(Western Union), his purse empty, his pride wounded, a wife and baby at home. Miller
decides not to take "no" for an answer. At the corporation's head office, he speaks
with a vice president who, to Miller's surprise, listens eagerly:
I realized that by some accident I had really been instrumental in doing 
him a service. [....] Soon the assistant general manager was called in 
and asked to listen to my story. By this time I knew what the story 
was. I understood that Hymie—"that little kike," as the general manager 
called him—had no business pretending that he was the employment 
manager. [....] It was also clear that Hymie was a Jew and that Jews 
were not in good odor with the general manager . . . .  {Capricorn 18)
From a somewhat vulgarly exploitative scene, like the one related above, to that of a
worker hired to perform some task every fifteen seconds for between eight and sixteen
hours a day, is not so far as it might at first glance seem. Workers submit to "blind
economic" forces as well as to other forces operative within a society—racism,
misogyny, anti-semitism—as reflected in their predominantly white male bosses and,
just as often, their paychecks. Women and children have often been sought as
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replacements for men in certain industries, especially the clothing industry, because 
they could be paid less/ Miller recognizes the exploitative side of wage labor, that 
the product or service is exalted at the expense of the worker, w^o is only pushed to 
ever greater productivity, and condemns such an imbalance.
Oswald Spengler observes that "in the eighteenth century [work] loses its 
derogatory implication in all languages" but only because "work becomes the great 
word of ethical thinking" (411). This change in attitude, described by Weber as well, 
concomitant with the rise of capitalism and with factory labor, helps inaugurate the 
decline of work as predominantly skilled labor, as craft, into work as semi-skilled and 
unskilled labor, as well as unadulterated drudgery. As Karl Marx describes it in 
Capital, "it is not the worker who uses the means of production, but the means of 
production which use the worker" (383). Thus begins alienated wage labor.
Workers no longer actively create products, and, while many celebrate the 
notion of work, a wide range of trades once performed by artisans (who formed a class 
above workers and peasants)—cobblers, tailors, blacksmiths, vitriers, and many others 
forgotten today—die-out almost entirely, the former practitioners usually sinking into 
the working class. With industrialization, workers begin to tend machines that dictate 
their motions. They become, as it were, tethered to these machines which determine 
the pace of the work and prescribe if and when breaks occur, since the machines must 
be constantly attended. During the transition to the new economy, many "rebelled 
against the notion of week after week of disciplined labor" (Thompson 392), when 
earlier they had enjoyed the freedom of earning enough to get by and then turning to
® See Engels, p. 165, for an early example.
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other pursuits, such as working on a farm during harvest (393). T h ^  enjoyed variety 
and resented being forced, by "economic necessity," to tend a machine, month after 
month, year after year.
Spengler concludes that in this age o f  decline it is only because of machines, 
finally, that humans become "precious" (411)—factory machines as well as telephones 
and typewriters. Just as the relationship between product and worker is unequal, so is 
that between human and machine. "The machine works and forces man to cooperate," 
writes Spengler (411), a sentiment Henry Miller might have had in mind when he 
wrote, "Machines are expensive; human lives are cheap" {Remember 3Z), especially 
when often what is required of the worker is a few repetitive motions while the 
machine performs the more sophisticated tasks. Miller deduces that in our era "[ojnly 
the machine has burgeoned" (89). Like the machine, people are important only for the 
roles they play; in and of themselves they possess little value, especially when they 
lack highly sought after skills. Where machines have evolved technologically to 
become better producers of commodities, people have not—or certainly not as quickly. 
As unskilled laborers, they are easily replaceable.
Occasionally Miller appears to share, unwittingly, the same attitude toward 
unskilled or semi-skilled workers—their easy replaceability—that he laments. His 
biographers present his employment history as checkered at best. He experimented 
with a variety of positions, though with the exception of the job in his father's tailor 
shop (where he worked collecting unpaid bills) and later as hiring manager for 
Western Union, none lasted very long. The list his biographers present contains less 
colorful jobs than those Miller himself claimed in the conclusion to the collection of 
stories and essays entitled The Cosmological Eye\
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dish-washer, bus boy, newsie, messenger boy, grave-digger, bill sticker, 
book salesman, bell hop, bartender, liquor salesman, typist, adding 
machine operator, librarian, statistician, charity worker, mechanic, 
insurance collector, garbage collector, usher, secretary to an evangelist, 
dock hand, street car conductor, gymnasium instructor, milk driver, 
ticket chopper, etc. (367-68).
Nearly half of these jobs could be classified as white collar jobs, but some that do not
fit within that category are so far from qualifying (garbage collector for instance), that
they seem to insinuate a certain amount of shame involved with admitting to office
jobs on the part of one who claimed to be a child of the streets. Beyond an attempt at
self-mythology, this list also demonstrates (1) the wide variety of skills he imputed to
himself and suggests (2) that he conceives of skill as something to be learned with
little difficulty and shrugged off at will. Additionally, this list can be grasped as an
indication of the struggle a person must endure in order to survive in a thriving,
driving but ultimately hostile environment—the willingness to tackle a variety of jobs,
to expose oneself to a variety of interpersonal situations (librarian and newsie, for
instance) as well as either more or less respectable but physically demanding jobs
(grave digger, dockhand).
In short, a person must be willing to swallow his or her pride, undertake 
despised work, shrug off personal desires and submit. This "surrender" of sorts is 
diametrically opposed to what Miller means when he writes that in Paris he "gave up 
the ghost"—in Paris he "touched bottom. Like it or not I was forced to create a new 
life for myself {Cosmological 2). It is this new life that was responsible for enabling 
Miller to shake off the shackles of respectability and "Literature" and allowed him to 
speak in the voice which is recognizably Miller. On the other hand, there are those, 
perhaps less fortunate, less consumed by dreams, who when they touch the muddy
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bottom and fear they are about to be sucked under find it in themselves to take on a 
job that others would rather not tackle—janitor, door to door salesman—jobs in which 
the person feels in some way exposed and, possibly, demeaned. These positions, 
examples of alienated wage labor, for Miller, the consumer economy alone cannot 
recompense. The singular joy in purchasing some product cannot, for very long, 
eradicate the memory of humiliation.
While work loses its "derogatory implications" for the theorizers of work and 
of society, for those in the nineteenth century with the leisure to pursue such notions 
in the abstract, those actually engaged in work, the laborers who sweated in factories 
and mines twelve to sixteen hours a day, usually six days a week, were certainly less 
sanguine. The life of French factory workers during the first three-quarters of the 
nineteenth century was manifestly "subhuman" (Wright 171). Workers toiled an 
average of fifteen hours a day, and yet even with the entire family working often could 
not, because of low salaries, exorbitant rents, and the high price of foodstuffs, support 
themselves: "a supplement from private charity was common" (172). The government 
of Paris, moreover, found itself forced to pay the state tax of more than half its 
inhabitants because they lacked the means to pay it themselves (Marchand 28). And 
the life of workers in Paris differed but little from their confrères in other countries:
"If Karl Marx had written Das Kcpital in the Bibliothèque Nationale rather than in the 
British Museum," asserts Wright "he might have buttressed his argument with French 
examples just as appalling as those which he drew from official British surveys" (172). 
Not only were they poorly paid, but work was often dangerous. In America, where 
the situation was no better, even as late as 1904, "27,000 workers were killed on the 
job, in manufacturing, transport, and agriculture" (Zinn 319), a statistic which
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demonstrates that many laborers still worked in dangerous conditions, even if more 
and more laws were being written to protect them.
Ross notes that in France, along with the rise of work as an ethical imperative, 
as well as work consisting of a fixed set of motions prescribed for a set number of 
hours, the rebellion against this new ethic‘° was rendered a crime—vagabondage. The 
dandy's rejection of work (Genova 76) underscores the class element of this law, for 
dandies, while flaunting their uselessness, were not punished for they generally came 
from the upper classes and had means. Charles Baudelaire, who never held a job per 
se and often hid from creditors, never faced the charge of vagabondage. The law 
against vagabondage, moreover, exists as "a pure creation of penal law, a word of 
repression," writes Ross, because "technically, vagabonds have not violated any laws 
(except laws against vagabondage)" (57). Throughout the nineteenth century there was 
a surge in arrests for vagabondage, such that "[b]etween the years 1830 and 1896 
convictions for vagrancy (vagabondage) increased sevenfold in France" (56). Most of 
those convicted, she reports, "corresponded to the ritualization of the entry into the 
work force at the end of school" (56). In other words, many working-class youths, 
aware that once beyond school age they faced only years of unending labor in a 
factory with very little hope of ever achieving financial security, rebelled. Many of 
these vagabonds would, no doubt, have joined Arthur Rimbaud in declaring, "Jamais 
nous ne travaillerons" [Never will we work] (176). They left home to escape a life 
they knew would be filled with misery—certainly not, in Henry Miller's terms, "the life 
more abundant."
"Striking" was already illegal.
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In the depression years o f the middle nineteen-thirties, when the work situation
for those who had it was generally (though certainly not always) much improved over
that existing a hundred years earlier, due to gains usually effected by labor unions"
Miller describes the struggle o f American workers:
Men are struggling for the right to work! It sounds almost incredible 
but that is precisely what it amounts to, the great goal of civilized man. 
What an heroic struggle! Well, for my part, I will say that whatever 
else I may want, I know I don’t want to work. {Cosmological 157)
Miller's concern lies not so much with the fact of working, for if nothing else people
must feed themselves, so much as with the energy with which they go about
attempting to insert themselves into a system that aims only to exploit them while
giving them as little as possible in return.
Sebastian De Grazia argues American business executives often work the 
longest hours of anyone (131), but that their jobs are social, involving contact with 
others in intellectual as well as informal settings where work can be jointly 
accomplished (135). The executive "enjoys his work," writes De Grazia, which is 
varied and well-compensated financially (135). The same, however, cannot be said of 
the factory worker whose work requires greater and greater concentration, with each 
technological advance, which "lessens the chance for social relations on the job" (60), 
a development which helps to explain why "mass-production workers . . . have a 
higher rate of absenteeism and quitting the job than other workers . . ." (83). Factory 
jobs isolate workers from each other and force them to perform actions which fail to 
provide any enduring satisfaction.
" Such gains included the eight hour day and the five day work week.
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One further connection between Miller and the American South, which relates 
back to French rebellion against alienated wage labor, is that in the South one finds, 
according to W. J. Cash, "the assumption that the first end of life is living itself," 
though mill workers and tenant farmers in the south worked as hard as anyone else 
(384). On the whole. Miller concedes that people have bought into the work ethic and 
have yet to begin questioning the necessity for work—for wage labor—as currently 
conceived. Were they to do so, the proletarian class might possibly become the 
revolutionary class Marx prophesied.
Rimbaud, as we have seen, rejects work, but also those who devote themselves 
to work: "Maîtres et ouvriers, tous paysans, ignobles" [Masters and workers—ail 
peasants, all ignoble] (196). Rejecting both sides of the system, Rimbaud suggests 
that both are connected and degraded by the need to produc-profits and merchandise. 
It may be that Rimbaud's more realistic appreciation of what it takes to leam a skill 
and to be a skilled worker, to be a cobbler for instance, is revealed in his poetry.
While Miller claims to have held a variety of jobs, many of which his biographers do 
not support, Rimbaud writes, "Quel siècle à mains!—Je n'aurai jamais ma main" [What 
a century for hands!—I will never have a hand] (196). Workers perform their trades by 
hand so, in Rimbaud, the hand comes to represent the skilled or semi-skilled hand that 
performs the work. That Rimbaud will never have a hand, thus, suggests he will 
never have the skills necessary to successfully perform a trade.
His assertion, that he will never have a hand, may also be a comment on his 
own literary production, that his project as a seer has not measured up to his own 
conceptions.
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Miller, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud, as part of their renunciation o f the bourgeois 
values they were raised to honor, reject the importance of work, more specifically of 
work that is not theirs, alienated wage labor. Such a rejection, in favor of literary 
work, raises the issue of the type of work esteemed in western society—generally that 
activity which produces low wages for the worker and substantial profit for the owner, 
resulting from exertion on the part of the worker, especially the worker in the factory 
or sweatshop.'^
For Spengler, work associated with machines, impersonal and repetitive work, 
unskilled or at best semi-skilled, represents yet another sign of the decline of a culture, 
petrifying into a dead, fossilized civilization^* (412). Each technological development, 
moreover, reduces the worker's task, while requiring greater concentration. 
Development, too, of the division of labor, especially as embodied by Frederick 
Taylor's "scientific management" even further dehumanized the laborers, ensuring that 
they were "interchangeable" like screws manufactured to precisely the same length and 
width (Zinn 317).
Nietzsche and Marx problematize "work" under capitalism in a similar fashion, 
viewing it as, in part, an attack on individuals as individuals. In The Dawn 
(Morgenrothe), Friedrich Nietzsche, whose philosophy influenced Spengler (Spengler 
38n), views the "glorification of'work' and the tireless talk of the 'blessings of work "
Because of the class he came from, Baudelaire never faced the prospect of wage 
labor until faced with the fact that several years of "dandyism" had seriously depleted 
his inheritance. Even then he rejected it, declaring he would only devote himself to 
literary work.
Here, I use the italicized terms as Spengler does. For Spengler, stasis equals 
death (a very capitalist notion that serves, perhaps, to date Spengler's work). A 
civilization, then, is a culture that has stopped growing, has died.
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as mere mystification that conceals fear for "the danger of dangers; the individual" 
{Portable 82). Work that serves to mask the person operating the machine, as opposed 
to trades or metiers in which a person can make a mark within a community and gain 
some sense of accomplishment (hence self), alienates the worker from his or her 
product, and serves one purpose: "it keeps everybody in harness and powerfully 
obstructs the development of reason, of covetousness, of the desire for independence" 
(82)—in essence, of that which marks a person as an individual. The force workers 
daily expend on their assigned tasks is energy directed away from "reflection, 
brooding, dreaming, worry, love and hatred"; in its place it "sets a small goal before 
one's eyes and permits easy and regular satisfactions" (82). Wage labor, then, 
performs the role of "police" (82), keeping workers in line, ensuring they do not begin 
to yearn for something, beyond what the system provides for them, and exercise their 
will attempting to attain that "something."
Marx appears to view the alienation o f labor somewhat differently, perhaps a 
little more broadly. Workers are alienated from the product(s) to whose construction 
they merely contribute one element or one motion; from those people around (either 
co-workers or the capitalists who employ them); and even, in an argument that reflects 
Nietzsche's above, from themselves since their work demands just enough 
concentration to require their attention, forcing them to repress distracting thoughts; 
the final product, then, bears no insignia of their participation (Bottomore 9-12)—hence 
the magical appearance of products on shelves. If workers, through internalizing the 
Puritan work ethic, can police themselves, can repress desires or accept delayed 
satisfaction, so much the better for the system and its beneficiaries, who will reap ever 
greater rewards. As a (self-) defeated class, workers are much more manageable.
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Miller, upon his return from France in 1940 w4:ere he has spent ten years 
devoted to work—writing'^—and where he has finally established a reputation, arrives in 
America the same way he left: "that is, penniless" (Sundc^ 63). With little hope of 
earning any money from books unpublished and unpublishable in America, he must 
find some other source of income. "Perhaps I would have to take a job," he observes, 
"—a most depressing thought" {Nightmare 12). It is a "depressing thought" not only 
because of the exhausting routine wage labor requires, but because it would take him 
away from the work he believes to be truly his—writing—but for which he can earn 
very little money without sacrificing those features that make him distinctive.
The value attached to wage labor, and work in general, is often based not on 
what is produced but on the potential income. Miller's mother exemplifies such 
thinking when she asks, '"Can't you write something like Gone With the Wind and 
make a little money?"' {Sundc^ 64), as if he should write to order. Miller repeatedly 
argues that commercial artists earning great sums of money on commission receive 
praise and the trappings of material success, while the real artists such as Vincent Van 
Gogh, making no money yet producing works of art communicating their particular 
vision, receive during their lifetimes only condemnation {Plexus 61-2). The 
commercial artist (illustrator, graphic artist, copy writer, or someone who caters to the 
general public) is working, while the other is at best only dreaming, a judgement 
Miller explains by declaring that Americans are "against art—real art" {Emil 156), 
perhaps because it does not seem useful, possibly because art often makes its audience
Miller was employed at times, in Dijon as an English teacher, in Paris at the 
international office of the Chicago Tribune as a proof-reader, but neither job led to 
long term employment or seriously disrupted his writing.
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uncomfortable, or maybe because it demonstrates that some people, at any rate, are 
doing what they want to do rather than "leading lives of quiet desperation" as Thoreau 
once described it (in which case the American attitude toward art would signify "bad 
conscience"). But, Miller asserts, "I will write what I want, how I want. Fuck them!" 
(156): it is this attitude that differentiates Miller from the commercial artist and the 
wage laborer.
Rimbaud dismisses the glorification of work:
La vie fleurit par travail, vieille vérité: Moi, ma vie n'est pas assez 
pesante, elle s'envole et flotte loin au-dessus de l'action, ce cher point 
du monde.
[Life flourishes in work, an old/passé truth: Me, my life is not heavy 
enough, it takes flight and soars far above all action, that cherished 
rationale of the world.] (202)
I am not serious enough to work, Rimbaud seems to say; I'm too loose, too flighty, too
poetic. He feels himself free of societal expectations or requirements, unable and
unwilling, at this point, to bend himself to the acquisition of a trade or the repetitive
motor skills required in a factory, and the resulting limitation of possibilities.
Ross, who sees reflected in Rimbaud the ideas about work current during the 
brief lifespan of the Paris Commune, notes that Rimbaud's "horreur de tous les 
métiers" [horror of all trades] signifies a rejection of more than the notion of wage 
labor, "that the narrator refuses the very structure of work, the social division of labor 
itself that in the nineteenth century is beginning to be pushed to the limits of 
overspecialization" ( 5 0 ) . Rimbaud, in his poem "Les Effarés," seems to present a
Marx describes the decline that follows intensive specialization: "The tailor, the 
locksmith, and the other artificers, being now exclusively occupied in carriage-making, 
each gradually loses, through want of practice, the ability to carry on, to its full extent, 
his old handicraft" (Ccqjital 205).
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less certain picture o f work. In one version he depicts a bread-maker apparently 
enjoying his work, producing loaves vdiose smell ravishes the souls of hungry children 
looking in through a window from the cold outside. While he works, the baker 
"Chante un vieil air" [sings an old song] (Rimbaud 104). In an alternative version, 
however, the baker "grogne un vieil air" [groans/grunts an old song] (104n), signifying 
a less harmonious relation to his work: gone seems to be any pleasure or contentment, 
the singing merely a way of passing dreary hours. Perhaps where bread-making, and 
other crafts, had not yet been transformed into factory-type production, the baker still 
took some satisfaction in making—in creating—loaves of bread. With rising 
populations in cities and technological development, however, bread making would 
soon be one more form of drudgery involving little skill and more tending of machines 
that would mix the ingredients, knead the dough, and then divide it into loaves.
Just as in Miller's attempts to renoimce money, his refusal of wage labor 
manifests itself, as well, as a rejection of outside authority over his existence, an 
authority that, whether economic, legal, or self-imposed (in the form of the Puritan 
ethic), attempts to constrain individuals. The ideology of the isolated, self-contained 
individual with freedom to choose, but who must still acknowledge economic necessity 
(Horkheimer, Critical, 76), is exposed as sham in the face of workers' true 
"powerlessness amid an anarchic inhuman reality which is rent by contradictions" (79). 
Rather than attempt to make sense of this world and find a way out of the impasse, 
the misery that is often the worker's lot, the good worker or citizen must without 
question accept the situation as he or she finds it. Whereas once circumstances could 
be attributed to "God's decree," now "all real situations are brute facts which do not 
embody any meaning but are simply to be accepted" (78): there is no narrative here
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becomes the new law. But Horkheimer warns that rather than accepting or even 
adapting, as many workers might prefer to believe, "they submit to the authority 
relationship" (89, emphasis added).
To refuse wage labor, however, is not to embrace inaction. The flâneur, as we 
have seen, appears to be lazy but is in fact an observer, a sort of proto-detective.
Henry Murger, in Scènes de la Vie de Bohème, presents Bohemian artists of middle 
nineteenth-century Paris who reject the notion o f life scheduled around wage labor, 
and who practice instead their various arts, finding in that lifestyle, despite frequent 
bouts with hunger and homelessness, the life more abundant; Greenwich Village 
Bohemians of the nineteen-twenties’’ and the nineteen-fifties (the "Beats") will, 
similarly, try to exist outside the workaday world.
Both Miller and Baudelaire seek the means to devote themselves to the labor of 
art, often through payment for their artistic labor. Rimbaud, however, raises the stakes 
farther, rejecting even the need to constantly present evidence of artist production.
Ross writes that for Rimbaud "[IJaziness . . . constitutes a kind of third term outside 
the programmed dyad of labor and leisure" (61). For the artist, dreaming, letting 
thoughts and ideas shoot in and out of consciousness, signifies a kind of replenishment 
of the sources of creation. The Surrealists, in the first manifesto, describe human 
beings as essentially dreamers (Breton 13), when they are given the chance to dream. 
The either-or logic that defines an employed person as a worker and the unemployed 
person as lazy constitutes nothing other than a false binary, revealing more about what
”  Miller expresses, in The Rosy Crucifixion, his contempt for these figures, 
though without clear explanation.
229
a particular society values than what a person or group of persons is actually 
accomplishing.
Rimbaud's assertion in Un Season en enfer, "La main à plume vaut la main à 
charrue" [the pen-hand is as worthy as the plow-hand](196), aggressively proclaims the 
comparable value of artistic production with that more respected production within the 
market economy. "Laziness," concludes Ross, "hides an activity not subordinated to 
certain necessities, an activity that is not the everyday action of subsistence or 
industry" (54), which is not to say that such activity has no value, only that it is not 
valued—mvLch as gold was of inestimable value to the Spaniards but only of 
ornamental value to the Aztecs.
Miller, reversing the work ethic, characterizes the typical submission to the 
necessity of wage labor as laziness, protesting against "people who make work a fetich 
because they have no other way to occupy their minds" {Cosmological 344). What 
Horkheimer designates submission to "economic necessity" Miller might describe as a 
refusal by most people to take part in defining the boundaries of their lives, a refusal 
to determine for themselves their particular work, even, finally, a fear of themselves—a 
fear of living up to their own hopes and expectations rather than down (to the work 
ethic). Miller criticizes, especially, the smallness of life Americans tolerate—and the 
work ethic symbolizes much that is small-minded in Americans. For those who find 
satisfaction in the parade of commodities, "who live vicariously through newspapers 
and the movies" (344), writes Miller, it does not really matter who they submit to as 
long as they submit.
Thompson, following Weber, perceives the church encouraging just such blind 
submission, arguing that injunctions arising from British Wesleyan conferences after
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the French Revolution echoed earlier mandates from Martin Luther. He quotes several 
of these Lutheran injunctions, of which the following: "God would prefer to suffer the 
government to exist, no matter how evil, rather than allow the rabble to riot, no matter 
how justified they are in doing so" (Thompson 399). Unconditional submission, as 
advocated by many branches of the church, apparently offers people a sense that they 
are behaving properly, even virtuously, for otherwise they stand to gain little from a 
sorry state of affairs. Whether they surrender to the church or to Hollywood, they 
surrender. In Miller's view, however, such submission should be characterized as a 
defeatist rather than a realistic response or sign of strength. It may even be described 
as nihilistic since such submission involves the denial of any action that might 
improve the lives of the workers, unless (or, perhaps, even if) it is deemed useful 
within the capitalist economy.
In the following passage. Miller describes submission to "the company" as well
as to the "anarchic inhuman reality" in consumer capitalism, as exemplified by
business in New York City:
Your life is mapped out for you by the company, and it seems very 
regular, very well regulated. Actually you feel chaotic. You feel that 
you are running with the herd and the herd is on the stampede. Nobody 
knows where he is going, but he keeps close to his neighbor—he feels 
safer that way, more at ease. (A Her Retour 47)
This description corresponds to Miller's experience as hiring manager with Western
Union, described in Capricorn, where tremendous job turnover kept the personnel
office in a constant flurry of activity. The image of the alienated worker is more true,
in large part, o f the factory worker who receives less financially than white collar
counterparts, but as the economy begins to produce more and more products as well as
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profits, employees—blue collar or white collar—begin to feel helpless, disconnected, 
and alienated in the face of a system they cannot hope to understand, let alone master.
Many writers and philosophers criticized this new state of affairs, especially in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Marx, Engels, and Nietzsche, as we have seen, and others, Auguste Blanqui 
and many proponents of Socialism, critique industrial work and industrial life. In 
France, Zola and Émile Verhaeren, author of a book of poems entitled Les Villes 
tentaculaires [Tentacled Cities],'* both describe the life of the poor factory worker; in 
America, Henry Adams, alongside a generation of writers influenced by Zola, most 
especially Frank Norris (Bradbury 16), and to a lesser extent Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, 
Upton Sinclair, and, much later, John Steinbeck, deplore industrialized society, 
perceiving the demoralizing effects of wage labor. Miller's contribution differs in that 
he breaks the bounds of the realistic novel in denouncing a system that is perhaps 
more fantastic than his prose.
Every day, at breakneck pace. Miller relates in Capricorn, he performs the same 
task, much like the worker on the assembly line, asking the same questions and 
receiving the same responses, hiring and firing messengers ad infinitum. "Why get up 
and repeat yesterday's song and dance?" he asks. "As fast as 1 hired them they 
dropped out" {Capricorn 70). What upsets Miller most "is that it's totally unnecessary 
. . . .  1 plug on, through one victim after another, the telephone ringing like mad [with 
requests for messengers from branch managers or orders from above]" (72). He 
characterizes the job as "[a] hideous farce against a backdrop of sweat and misery"
'* A difficult title to translate, but one that attempts to articulate a sense of the 
inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of cities.
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(19), a pertinent description of factory work. "And that’s how it went," he 
summarizes, "day after day, and there was no reason for it, except that the whole 
country was cockeyed and vdiat I relate was going on everywhere, either on a smaller 
scale or a larger scale, but the same thing everywhere, because it was all chaos and 
meaningless" (75). The system, though it has spread throughout America and much of 
the West, certainly has not done so because it is, o f its own accord, sensible, humane, 
and rational, but, rather, because it fetches profits, because it has managed to assert its 
control over large numbers of workers.
This system does offer rewards, however, among them the ability to afford the
latest technological achievements—the automobile, for instance. Miller perceives the
parking lots filled with automobiles—one of the fanciest of the new commodities on
the market—not as a sign of success, though it is the recompense the advertisers would
have workers accept; instead, these parcels of land filled with gleaming, colored steel
signify submission and surrender;
The saddest sight of all is the automobiles parked outside the mills and 
factories. The automobile stands out in my mind as the very symbol of 
falsity and illusion. [....] [Those who think the American worker lucky] 
never ask what one must do to have this great boon. They have no idea 
that when the American worker steps out o f his shiny tin chariot he 
delivers himself over body and soul to the most stultifying labor a man 
can perform" (Nightmare 33).
For a writer who encourages his readers to seek out "the life more abundant,"
meaningless labor takes a seat next to the commodity spectacle as yet another site of
ambiguity, one unperceived by most workers. "Earning a living," Miller asserts, "has
nothing to do with living" (Remember 40), though Americans and those in the West in
general are raised believing that through work comes advantage, comes satisfaction,
comes life, as Rimbaud also noted and rejected.
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Miller does not merely criticize the system. He offers solutions, suggesting a 
move away from dependence on machines as one o f the first steps to making of work 
something that people can be proud to perform; "There has to be reborn a desire to do 
things with the hands, to work from within out, to make the home itself a work of art, 
from the building which encloses it to the items which constitute it" {Remember A ll). 
Assembly line work as well as assembly line products demean, for Miller. Both 
submerge people in an undifferentiated mass culture. He writes, "whatever they do 
themselves with their own hands is infinitely better than what is made for them by 
factory hands" (412), for factory hands are either unskilled hands or hands with one 
specific skill. But making something themselves will also provide people a sense of 
accomplishment, something they rarely receive from wage labor.
Miller acknowledges that people will likely think his ideas utopian, a charge 
levelled at many who hope to improve the condition of the world, and does not dodge 
the implication of failure often associated with the term utopian: "Every Utopian 
community has proved to be a failure. What of it? Does that mean that the idea of 
self-government, of creative government, is false? It may require thousands of 
experiments before the light dawns" {Remember A\A). Failure to launch a viable 
alternative offers no recommendation for the status quo, he implies.
In one of the more famous passages in Un Scâsin en Enfer, Rimbaud, similarly,
envisions a new world with work that will be meaningful to people:
Quand irons-nous, par-delà les grèves et les monts, saluer la naissance 
du travail nouveau, la sagesse nouvelle, la fuite des tyrans et des 
démons, la fin de la superstition, adorer—les premiers!—Noël sur la terre!
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[When will we, on the other side of the shores’’ and mountains, salute 
the birth of new work and new wisdom, the flight of tyrants and 
demons, the end of superstition, to adore—the first ones!—Christmas on 
earth!] (222).
Though one can read here a sort of Edenic yearning, Ross notes that this vision of 
"Christmas on earth" is "nonnostalgic," hence forward-looking, and understands 
Rimbaud's assertion "I will be a worker" to mean that he will work "only at the 
moment when work, as we know it, has come to an end" (71).'° In that moment, 
literary production will have value equal to that of other forms of labor. While such a 
position might appear self-serving for both writers, literary production can be 
understood to represent non-alienated labor where the worker gains some sense of 
achievement.
Whether either Rimbaud or Miller looks forward to a new type of work, or 
backward to work when it was more or less skilled labor, both reject work as currently 
conceived. Miller, especially, views the worker as poorly rewarded. Neither the 
automobile nor the myriad of other commodities available can compensate the worker 
for the submission and self-negation that work requires. Similar to the world 
intimated by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto, Miller believes that 
people must find their own work and give themselves over to it heart and soul. Work 
then would become its own end, its own satisfaction, and there would be no need for
” "Grève" can also mean to strike, as in "to go on strike." In this context it seems 
an unlikely translation, though Rimbaud might certainly have appreciated the double- 
meaning.
Eden as forward-looking makes sense within Rimbaud’s sense of time as 
circular.
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the bribery constituted by the glut of commodities on the market. Such a society 
would constitute a definite, progression beyond the current one.
Miller, therefore, rejects commodities, money, and wage labor as presently 
conceived within the currently available forms o f existence. He suggests that people, 
rather than allowing themselves to be served (with machine products), must re-develop 
skills they have surrendered to a factory-machine system that degrades skills; they 
must re-Ieam the satisfaction of making something themselves. That such a change, 
among others, seems unlikely induces Miller to reject civilization as it is, to perceive 
the decline of civilization a good sign.
Consequently, as war in Europe, and then American involvement in the 
European war, begins to look inevitable. Miller's examination of civilization produces 
fewer and fewer reasons to fight. People have come to focus on the wrong things and 
fear the future for the wrong reasons. "Our world is a world of things” writes Miller, 
in 1940 or 1941.
It is made up of comforts and luxuries, or else the desire for them.
What we dread most in facing the impending debacle, is that we shall 
be obliged to give up our gew-gaws, our gadgets, all the little comforts 
which have made us so uncomfortable. {Nightmare 17)
Miller, as we have seen, rejects commodities in general and as compensation for work.
He perceives the worry most Americans exhibit over the impending expansion of the
European war, into what we now know as the Second World War, as an expression of
a most small-minded apprehension: the fear that all the useless objects they have thus
far been taught to desire and require, and which they have dutifully struggled to
accumulate, will be taken from them. The American way of life has, thus, become
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reduced to laboring in order to accumulate a variety o f commodities; as such, it is 
certainly nothing worth sacrificing human lives for. It is, just maybe, better wiped-out.
Damning Praise: George Oiwell's Conception of Passive Acceptance in the works of 
Heniy Miller
At this perhaps unlikely point I wish to challenge what has become an accepted 
truism in Miller criticism. In his 1940 essay, "Inside the Whale," George Orwell 
identifies Henry Miller's works as advocating the position o f passive acceptance. 
Though the essay is nearly sixty years old, its stature appears undiminished.'* Orwell's 
thesis, however, is founded upon a narrow and prejudicial reading of Miller's earliest 
published works. At the risk of playing Ahab chasing after the White Whale, I believe 
this pernicious notion of passive acceptance in Miller must be firmly repudiated. 
Orwell's target, moreover, should be recognized to have been, rather than Miller, who 
serves mainly as Orwell's punching bag, the political writers of the nineteen-thirties-- 
who are critiqued in the second part of the three-part essay." Even so, Orwell's 
critique of Miller must be explored and refuted.
Thus far into this study of Miller, we have explored among other subjects 
Miller's arguments against the modem city, as epitomized by New York City and to a
*' A newly-translated and abridged version of Orwell's essay was published in the 
October 1991 special edition of Europe: Revue Littéraire Mensuelle, dedicated in part 
to Miller's 100th birthday. Charles Holdefer's 1993 essay, "The 'Other' Whale: The 
Ideology of Passive Acceptance in the Work of Henry Miller," offers an explication 
and update of Orwell's essay, supporting Orwell's contention, while remarking the risks 
of a politically-engaged text as evidenced in the fatwa  against Salman Rushdie.
"  Edward Mitchell's 1971 collection of essays on Miller contains an abridged 
(more accurately, gutted) version of Orwell's essay, which excises part 2 along with 
the first three paragraphs of the essay.
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lesser degree Paris, his criticisms of consumer capitalism and work, as well as his 
rejection of writer James Joyce for being too focussed on the past and not effectively 
in the present. Orwell's charge of passive acceptance should seem at odds with the 
critique Miller levels at the modem world, for critique would appear to contradict any 
simple notion of "acceptance." In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze asserts 
that critique is "the active expression of an active mode of existence" (3). Hence even 
on the surface. Miller’s position would appear to be anything but passive or accepting.
But Orwell, without in the least probing Miller's critiques of America, France 
and the West, dismisses them derisively as "the usual angle of the literary man who 
hates industrialism" ( 17) and, therefore, simply ignores what might otherwise discredit 
his thesis. Raymond Williams, however, argues that even if writers reiterate "a known 
judgement" of the evils of industrialization—and Miller here joins company with Zola, 
D.H. Lawrence, Upton Sinclair, and many others—such repetition is necessary. "This 
kind of observation," Williams contends, "has to be made again and again, in every 
generation . . . .  The reminder that the thing is still here has repeatedly to be issued" 
{Culture 202). Williams even defends so-called "professional protest," Orwell's 
implicit characterization of Miller's rebellion. Whatever the source of the protest, 
Williams declares, "the larger issue is the opposition on general human groimds to the 
kind of civilization that [is] being inaugurated" (36). Orwell's task, at the very least, 
should have been to demonstrate that Miller's alleged passive acceptance hinders or 
even defuses his protest, that it is a suicidal dialectic he puts forth. But Orwell 
chooses a different tack: he simply rejects Miller's criticism as "the usual angle" and, 
hence, inauthentic.
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The most insidious facet of Orwell's humorless criticism, however, is that it is 
couched in praise, a harsh and thoroughly damning praise, to be sure, that has yet to 
be truly recognized as such. Orwell opens his essay praising Miller as a writer using 
English "as a spoken language, but spoken without fear, i.e. without fear of rhetoric or 
of the unusual or poetical word" (14). Declaring Miller's affinity with Walt Whitman, 
a figure Orwell's praises, Orwell then wonders "if Whitman himself were alive at the 
moment he would write anything in the least degree resembling Leaves o f Grass" (16). 
Both Miller and Whitman, according to Orwell, are saying "I accept," but, he notes, 
"there is a radical difference between acceptance now and acceptance then" (16).^ As 
we will see in a moment, Orwell defines unequivocally what it means "to accept" in 
the late nineteen-thirties, deducing from there that Miller as a modern-day Whitman is 
"a sort of Whitman among the corpses" (50), a vivid if macabre vision of Miller as a 
careless man unmoved by the suffering and devastation all around him. Though 
Miller can be faulted, regarding his often thoughtless treatment of women, for 
instance, he frequently displays empathy with people, in his works—in relation to 
"money" and "work," as we saw earlier in this chapter, and in his critique of modem 
civilization in general which he believes provides only illusory joy.
Orwell concludes that the success of Miller’s works is symptomatic—"a 
demonstration of the impossibility of any major literature until the world has shaken 
itself into its new shape" (50). Clearly Orwell does not view Miller's work as "major
^ Orwell's reading of American history is remarkably naive. He writes, for 
instance, "The democracy, equality, and comradeship that [Whitman] is always talking 
about are not remote ideals but something that existed in front of his eyes. [....] 
Everyone had inside him, like a kind of core, the knowledge that he could earn a 
decent living, and earn it without bootlicking" (16).
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literature"^" but only the best that we can expect in a time of declining standards. 
Orwell writes: "One has only to think of Ulysses, O f Human Bondage, most of 
Lawrence's early work . . . and virtually the whole of Eliot's poems up to about 1930, 
to wonder what is now being written that will wear so well" (29). Orwell has, in turn, 
rejected the work of committed writers of the nineteen-thirties, members of the 
"Auden-Spender group" among others, and he has done so without directly addressing 
them, except in the second part, the implication being they do not merit his full 
attention. Their literature, for Orwell, is compromised by party politics. He writes: 
they must "toe the line, or shut up" (39), from which follows his approval of Miller's 
fearlessness.
Writers, in Orwell's view, either abandon their particular world view 
completely, surrendering to the party or to some religious affiliation; or, they abandon 
the world, except as it forces itself upon them, and surrender to their own egos.
Miller, consequently, escapes party politics, in his refusal to align himself with one 
side or the other, but at the price of making himself historically irrelevant. In his 
works, Orwell claims, "one gets . . . back to a viewpoint not only individualistic but 
completely passive" (40). Miller's fearless yet egocentric contribution, weighed against 
those who devoted their time to "propaganda campaigns and squalid controversies"
(40), is merely the best of a bad lot: though a "footler" or an "idiot" (10), he is better 
than they are.
*" In the opening pages of Cancer Miller rejects capital-L Literature rather than 
literature in general, literature as an art form. He rejects, as we have seen, what he 
views as lifeless craftsmanship (which he believes characterizes most literary 
production) in favor of passion and a realism that goes beyond Realism in describing 
lives as they are lived. Orwell's assertion should not be understood as reflecting 
Miller's critique but instead as a critique o/Miller.
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After the initial "appreciation," Orwell almost immediately launches his
offensive, condemning Miller in rather simplistic terms:
To say "I accept" in an age like our own is to say that you accept 
concentration camps, rubber truncheons. Hitler, Stalin, bombs, 
aeroplanes, tinned food, machine guns, putsches, slogans, Bedaux belts, 
gas masks, submarines, spies, provocateurs, press censorship, secret 
prisons, aspirins, Hollywood films, and political murders. Not only 
those things, of course, but those things among others. And on the 
whole this is Henry Miller's attitude. (13)
Orwell reads the provocative prose we expect of Miller and takes him at his word; but
Miller is caught in Orwell's double bind: if Miller criticizes the world, he merely
plays the role of the derisive Ivory-tower-ensconced literary man; if he accepts the
world, he accepts, above all, everything wrong with it.
Yet what is truly dismaying about Orwell's list—and we have already seen that 
some of the items on this list ("tinned food," "slogans," "press censorship," "aspirins," 
"Hollywood films") are subjected to Miller's critique, either directly or incidentally—is 
not simply that it is horrific as well as, with reference to Miller, demonstrably wrong 
(and Orwell tries to wriggle out of his accusation by adding "on the whole"). What is 
more dismaying is that several generations of critics, with access to works not 
available to Orwell,^ have made no attempt to clarify Miller's perspective(s) or to 
challenge Orwell's argument in any way. Though Mitchell, in an introduction to his 
1971 collection of critical essays, asserts (without citing any examples) that the 
immediate reaction to Orwell's essay was not entirely favorable (2), he does not 
indicate which aspect or aspects of Orwell's essay raised a protest (that word is
^  In 1939, Orwell had access to only a fraction of the material used in my study. 
For instance, Orwell admittedly had not read Tropic o f  Ceq>ricom, Miller's fourth, and 
for many, best work. Miller's anti-war tract "Murder the Murderer," which will be 
examined later in this chapter, was not written until 1941.
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probably too strong), and not one of the essays in his collection defends Miller against 
Orwell's attack. Lawrence Durrell and William Gordon have taken issue with Orwell, 
defending Miller, but only in the equivalent of side-long glances. Durrell does not 
dispute Orwell's criticism, but insists it should be "more balanced," adding that perhaps 
Miller's beliefs about "the betterment of the world " differ from Orwell's (97).
Gordon's fleeting bout with Orwell's essay is even more inadequate. In the two 
sentences he devotes to the issue, Gordon writes that "while [Orwell] extolled Miller's 
revolutionary fervor, [he] could not understand Miller and ultimately condemned him 
for his lack of social conscience" (39); in a foomote, Gordon adds, "If Orwell had 
understood Miller he probably wouldn't have approved him" (39n). What Gordon 
means by "Miller's revolutionary fervor" is at best vague, though it might refer to 
Miller's prose; what he believes Orwell failed to understand is not identified; and he 
does not even debate whether or not Miller can be said to lack a "social conscience." 
Few critics, in brief, have found much in Orwell's damning praise to take issue with, 
in writing, except for writers like Salman Rushdie who take issue with the "praise" 
rather than the "damning."
Orwell's commentary, however, demonstrates—as I hope to show—that his 
reading of the Miller works available to him was far from thorough. Moreover, he did 
not know these works in a way available to interested modem critics—who have access 
to scores of books and other publications by Miller, a number of biographies and
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critical studies of Miller and the nineteen-thirties^—nor did he have a distanced view 
of his historical period^ which might more effectively contextualize Miller.
Orwell dismisses Miller’s criticisms as insincere, but without explanation
regards the alleged acceptance, of everything and anything, as genuine. Orwell
chooses not to quote any passages from Miller's works to support his argument,
claiming exaggeratedly that he cannot do so because "unprintable words occur almost
everywhere" (14), so I have selected a passage at random. Miller's description in
Tropic o f Cancer of a walk home after work with two fellow exiles seems on first
glance a perfect example to support Orwell's theory:
we get to talking about the conditions of things with that enthusiasm 
which only those who bear no active part in life can muster. What 
seems strange to me sometimes . . .  is that all this enthusiasm is 
engendered just to kill time, just to annihilate the three-quarters of an 
hour which it requires to walk from the office to Montparnasse. We 
might have the most brilliant, the most feasible ideas for the 
amelioration of this or that, but there is no vehicle to hitch them to.
And what is more strange is that the absence of any relationship 
between ideas and living causes us no anguish, no discomfort. We have 
become so adjusted that, if tomorrow we were ordered to walk on our 
hands, we would do so without the slightest protest. Provided, of 
course, that the paper came out as usual. And that we touched our pay 
regularly. Otherwise nothing matters. [....] We have become coolies, 
white-collar coolies, silenced by a handful of rice each day. (153)
Orwell may well have read the above passage as "passive acceptance," but such a
reading could hardly be called compelling or exhaustive. Miller and this friends
discuss "current affairs," but Miller attributes their interest, in seeming contradiction,
to a lack of involvement. Farther down, he asserts that their ideas for improving
One could point out, for instance, that Miller wrote the greater part of Cancer in 
1931-32, before Hitler's rise. The novel waited over a year for publication, in 1934, 
by which time, as Orwell notes, "Hitler's concentration camps were already bulging." 
Had Miller somehow included the concentration camps, then, it would have been an 
act of prophecy.
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conditions may be "feasible," but they have no way to make their voices heard, "no 
vehicle to hitch" their ideas to. Their "lack" of involvement results from their status 
as exiles who cannot vote or participate in the political system, but it may at the same 
time signify greater freedom; a larger, more encompassing perspective than those 
whose interests are vitally connected with one side or another and whose room for 
maneuvering, consequently, is much more limited. The "enthusiasm," then, of these 
three men might indicate a certain fearlessness: they will tread on nobody's toes, or 
everybody's toes, as they impartially solve the problems of the world. In the ensuing 
sentences. Miller's scorn for people who accept "the absence of any relationship 
between ideas and living" becomes clear. Rather than supporting such a division and 
the resulting passivity. Miller suggests that such people are little better than well- 
trained dogs who obey their master's orders, no matter how humiliating the task. He 
insinuates, further, that such passivity, where it exists, is bought, a form of bribery, 
just like the factory worker's acquiescence is purchased with access to an automobile.
It is just this "bribery" that Miller, as we have seen, has struggled against. Perhaps he 
has succumbed to temptation, occasionally, but he has not submitted. Hardly a ringing 
endorsement of passivity.
Orwell writes, "Exactly the aspects of life that fill Céline [in Voyage au bout 
de la nuit / Journey to the End o f  the Night] with horror^’ are the ones that appeal to 
[Miller]. So far from protesting, he is accepting” (15-16). This happy acceptance that 
Orwell perceives in Miller—and Orwell, perhaps cynically, applauds Miller "as a man
Orwell contends Céline "protests against the horror and meaninglessness of 
modem life—actually, indeed, of life" (15).
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who is happy" (IS)^—may not be the unsophisticated spirit of that mood Orwell seems 
to assume. It may not even, as we saw above, be "acceptance" at all. As I read it. 
Miller’s apparent "acceptance" and, indeed, embracing of all the ugliness of his life 
and life in general runs along the same lines as Nietzschean affirmation. Both 
Nietzsche and Miller "choose life," to employ a phrase that has become a cliché today 
in America. Instead of bewailing and bemoaning his existence, like Job after God's 
betrayal. Miller chooses to make a strength of what others would suffer as a weakness; 
This is what we have, this is what we like (a Hungarian proverb).
Perhaps, too. Miller’s optimism is mistaken for "acceptance." Though no one 
besides Michael Fraenkel’® has seriously considered it, and Fraenkel does so without 
naming him, Spengler’s vision of a world in decline, in the death-throes, as I discussed 
in the introduction to this study, significantly informs Miller's thought. Spengler, 
recall, characterizes human civilization as a biological entity that endures all the 
phases experienced by a living being, from birth to death. Out of many possible 
examples, I present here two excerpts from Tropic o f  Cancer that spotlight Spengler's 
influence:
The atmosphere is saturated with disaster, frustration, futility. Scratch 
and scratch—until there's no skin left. However, the effect upon me is 
exhilarating. Instead of being discouraged, or depressed, I enjoy it. I 
am crying for more and more disasters, for bigger and bigger calamities, 
for grander failures. I want the whole world to be out of whack. I 
want everyone to scratch himself to death. (12)
The world is rotting away piecemeal. But it needs the coup de grâce, it 
needs to be blown to smithereens. (26)
■* Miller's "happiness" contrasts with that of the more dour committed writers.
Miller's friend and collaborator (on The Hamlet Letters) from the Paris days— 
and the "Boris " of Cancer.
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Doubtless, these statements are provoking. Both seem to support Orwell's accusation 
of passive acceptance in Miller. Certainly Miller depicts the undoing of the world, the 
diseased scratching and "rotting away” of Western Culture, without advocating any 
action to stop or slow it. In fact, he encourages the downward slide. These passages 
need not be read solely on a literal level, as Orwell apparently reads them. They can 
be read figuratively, as voicing a sensibility, evoking the disintegration surrounding 
him—the depression years of the early nineteen-thirties, a time when the world 
economy was in tatters—in which to situate and temper the action of the story.
However, if we are to read the above passages more literally, we must 
recognize Spengler's influence. Inspired by Spengler, Miller believes that once the 
current cycle of progress-and-decline has ground to a halt, a new life, a new 
civilization, will commence. Miller, therefore, views decline optimistically. Rather 
than "taking pleasure at the spectacle of [people] scratching themselves to death" (66), 
as Holdefer supposes in his essay supporting and extending Orwell's position. Miller 
perceives decline everywhere but look toward the future hopefully, without, however, 
discounting the here and now. Embrace what can and need be saved. Miller says in 
effect, but let the rest go. Spengler argues that Western Culture is experiencing an 
inevitable and inescapable decline. While acknowledging that the hopes of some will 
be dashed, because they are bom into an exhausted Culture, Spengler counsels 
acceptance, but acceptance in a Nietzschean sense as opposed to that critiqued by 
Orwell: "And if the hopes thus doomed should be those most dear, well, a man who 
is worth anything will not be dismayed" (31). For Spengler, inevitability vitiates the 
disappointment, so we had better face up to this world and take on all its limited 
possibilities.
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Accordingly, when Orwell notes that Miller’s vision of the world is that of a 
"world-process outside his control," but that he "in any case hardly wishes to control 
it" (40), Orwell has either not recognized or has underestimated Spengler’s influence.
If the decline is biological, that is to say natural as opposed to social, what will 
wishing do? Moreover, how would Miller, as a writer, attempt to stop the "world- 
process," without invoking the typical concerns "of the literary man who hates 
industrialism" that Orwell has already dismissed? Likely, once again, Orwell’s 
objection revolves exclusively around the rise of Hitler and the evident necessity of 
combatting him; for Miller, however. Hitler represents a symptom of the world malaise 
rather than the disease itself.^"
Orwell writes, further, that Miller "believes in the impending ruin of Western 
Civilization much more firmly than the majority of revolutionary’ [read: Communist] 
writers; only he does not feel called upon to do anything about it" (42)—an assertion 
valid only within Orwell’s terms. Orwell imposes on Miller his (Orwell’s) particular 
variety of activist ideology, to which Miller does not adhere. Miller takes action in 
the only way open to him, action which Orwell describes as "fiddling with his face 
toward the flames" (42), but which can be more properly and concretely described as 
critique. Though Orwell has already belittled Miller's criticisms of Western culture. 
Miller’s prose shows him to be a descendant of the muckrakers of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, committed just as they were to exposing injustice and to changing 
society.
Miller's appraisal of Hitler and the Second World War will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter.
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Beyond acknowledging the decline, however, in his work Miller asserts his 
optimism, "crying for more and more disasters, for bigger and bigger calamities, for 
grander failures," the way a drag queen flaunts his femininity—joyously and 
aggressively. Miller believes, as does Spengler, that an end is coming, and he urges it 
along, certain that a better world will rise from the smoky ruins of this one. Miller, 
remember, conceives of destruction as vital and productive. Far from being a nihilist, 
then. Miller should be regarded as an optimist, though in no silly or superficial sense. 
Instead, his optimism persists as willfulness, as a profound faith that the future can be 
marvelous—Christmas on Earth!—if only people resolve that it be so and shed those 
aspects of modem culture (alienated wage labor, consumer capitalism, and more) that 
demean them, and resolve to improve their environments, whether they be cities or 
villages, factories or offices.
Orwell indulges in personal attacks on Miller twice. Near the beginning of the 
essay he claims, "It is perhaps significant that [Miller] looks exactly like everyone's 
idea of an American businessman" (15, Orwell's italics), though what significance that 
has for Orwell, what bearing Miller's appearance has on his writing, is nowhere 
described. At the close of his essay, Orwell predicts that Miller is the equivalent of a 
one-hit wonder (49). His essay, then, bears some of the hallmarks of a grudge match.
But Orwell's critique of Miller the man and the writer is evident throughout.
He commences his essay declaring, "Of course a novelist is not obliged to write 
directly about contemporary history, but a novelist who simply disregards the major 
public events of the moment is generally either a footler or a plain idiot" (10). 
Approaching his conclusion, Orwell returns to Miller's alleged indifference, asking if 
Miller's is "a defensible attitude?" (43). Orwell responds that it is because "the
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disintegration of our society and the increasing helplessness of all decent people" is so 
rife (47). Still, he has already asserted, "To accept civilization as it is practically 
means accepting decay. It has ceased to be a strenuous attitude and become a passive 
attitude—even 'decadent' if that word means anything" (18). At best, then, Orwell 
views Miller's "acceptance" as justified if irresponsible, artistic if unfortunate—in short, 
"decadent," a sign of widespread moral decay in Western society.
At the beginning of the third section of the essay, Orwell presents his most 
damning piece of evidence against Miller. Here Orwell narrates his 1936 meeting 
with Miller wherein Miller attempts to dissuade Orwell from going to Spain to fight in 
the civil war. Orwell's account of the meeting coincides nicely with his reading of 
Miller's works. Miller, expressing "no interest in the Spanish war whatever" told 
Orwell
that to go to Spain at that moment was the act of an idiot. He could 
understand anyone going there from purely selfish motives, out of 
curiosity for instance, but to mix oneself up in such things fm m  a sense 
o f obligation was sheer stupidity. In any case my ideas about 
combating Fascism, defending democracy, etc., etc., were all baloney. 
Our civilization was destined to be swept away . . . .  (40-41)
Miller rejects Fascism but. even more, he is against civilization, a position he will
make clear in his 1941 argument against fighting. Miller's protest, against civilization
as it is, does not translate into an action-oriented philosophy along the same lines as
Orwell prescribes: going to war in a soldier's uniform. Miller explains that he can
understand base motives, because at least they are practical—their goals attainable—but
he rejects Orwell's idealism, which is shiny and new yet hollo wed-out like any other
commodity. Miller does not believe the Spanish civil war, even if the "correct" or
"good" side wins, will make society better for the Spanish, or improve the situation for
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the rest of the world. Destroying Fascism, which for Miller represents only a 
symptom of a larger issue, will provide no solution to the crisis. Miller’s position may 
in this instance be faulted as over-intellectualized, along the same lines as Horkheimer 
and Adorno's argument that "it is better not to be too clever" (209), suggesting that 
intellectuals overlook (or discount) important and obvious matters in searching for 
complexity. Still, Miller's position cannot be reduced to passivity or acceptance.
Orwell's either/or proposition is finally untenable, because it commits the 
individual to one side or the other without allowing for other options--//’you're not fo r  
me you're agin' me, as John Foster Dulles once declared, allowing for no middle or 
middling position. Orwell even rejects religious- or mystical-based pacificism, 
reductively to be sure, arguing "whichever way you like to look at i t . . .  the moral . .
. being 'Sit on your bum " (43). Rather than sitting on his "bum". Miller is "facing the 
flames" of Rome while it bums. Witnessing and describing what is happening 
signifies more than "Sitting on your bum." Sometimes, to be a wimess may be the 
only available option; a useless sacrifice may simply serve to bury the record.
Orwell's position, focussed on fighting, is understandable, perhaps, given the 
immediate danger of Hitler, the proximity of Spain, and the unmistakable anguish of 
the Spanish civil war, as well as the frustration inspired by one who appears to 
understand the world predicament, but denies the "obvious" conclusion, that of risking 
life and limb in battle. Still, Orwell has clearly loaded the dice against M iller- 
rejecting Miller's criticisms of the modem world and defining, within very limited 
parameters, what "commitment" requires of a person.
Toward the end of his essay, Orwell admits he has not read Tropic o f 
Capricorn, "because the police and Customs authorities have thus far managed to
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prevent me from getting hold of it" (49). He then unwisely engages in prophetic 
criticism, asserting, "it would surprise me if [Capricorn] came anywhere near Tropic o f  
Cancer or the opening chapters of Black Spring" (49). For some, Capricorn has 
become Miller's best work, while many others would at least place it among the best 
of his works. What is disappointing about Orwell's inability to lay his hands on a 
copy of Capricorn, however, is that in it Miller exposes the dehumanizing side of 
labor, and not just that of factory workers but also of their bosses. Had Orwell read 
Capricorn, he might have chosen to revise his understanding of Miller, might have 
accepted Miller's anti-modem stance as authentic, though Miller makes statements in 
Capricorn that still seem to support Orwell's contention that Miller is a passive 
accepter. Miller declares, for instance, "fundamentally I have no desire to work and 
no desire to become a useful member of society" {Ccpricom 102). Such statements, 
however, clearly retain their rebellious content in this later work, just as Rimbaud's 
assertion of laziness, "the antibourgeois value par excellence" (Ross 53), demonstrates 
sheer rebellion. As we saw in the conclusion to Chapter Two, Miller already grasps 
that he is just a pawn, that he is being exploited by the Cosmodemonic Telegraph 
Company, and that if to be "exploited" is what it means to be "useful" in this society, 
then he wants no part of it. This refusal to participate must be differentiated from 
passivity and from acceptance.
Orwell's reductive understanding of Miller as "a completely negative, 
unconstructive, amoral writer, . . a passive acceptor of evil" (50) is simply untenable, 
and it is disappointing that for close to sixty years the notion of passive acceptance 
that Orwell linked with Miller has gone unchallenged. Ultimately, Orwell perceives 
rightly that Miller is "non-cooperative" (47), though unfortunately linking even that
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with simple passivity. Civil disobedience, employed by Martin Luther BCing and his 
followers, exemplifies non-cooperation, and while such acts at times involve quite 
literally "sitting on your bum," to understand them only in those terms would be short­
sighted indeed. Perhaps now that we know so much more about Hitler and the 
Holocaust Miller’s position, non-cooperation, seems impossible, civil disobedience 
ineffective. While I would not wish to put Miller on an equal footing with Dr. King 
and his followers. Miller’s unwillingness to do anything to stop the decay of the 
Western world, to join in the fight to save civilization as it is, signifies a step in the 
direction of civil disobedience.
To reject the mass in favor of the individual, as Miller does, however 
problematically, is to be a traitor to the state and to be uncooperative with the larger 
society. Miller rejects and opposes much in bourgeois culture, and he rejects in favor 
of the individual and fo r  the future. His opposition stands in direct counterpoint to the 
passive acceptance wrongly imputed to him. He rejects "the world as it is” and 
refuses, as we will see, to support the battle to save it.
•Td Prefer Not To"
Miller’s rejection of the modem world, his disgust with cities and the 
commodity spectacle, his refusal to acknowledge the sanctity of money or work, 
converge at last in his unwillingness to support the Allies in the Second World War, 
an act of defiance rather than of passivity. He believes the war will only be fought to 
maintain the status quo. Alternatively, Arthur Rimbaud, with whom Miller felt 
himself spiritually aligned, because of his rejection of modernity, and his rejection of
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the bourgeoisie, expresses a keen desire to involve himself in fighting—for the Paris 
Commune.
Miller's most explicit anti-war statement, and the basis for much that will be 
discussed in this section and the next. Murder the Murderer, was first published as a 
chapbook in 1944 (Shifreen and Jackson 154). An expanded version was later 
included in Remember to Remember. Begun in early 1941, well before the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, it takes the form of a letter to his "boon companion" Alfred 
Perlés, who has enlisted in the British Army, though he is Viennese by birth and under 
no obligation to fight. Perlés has taken issue with Miller’s anti-war position, 
articulated in a previous letter, and accuses him of "detachment" {Remember 128)—an 
accusation that echoes Orwell's attack—inspiring an explanatory response from Miller. 
Miller’s rejection of modernity reaches perhaps its highest pitch in this refusal to 
support the war on any front. While it might seem reasonable to expect him to wish 
to defend at least the France that had provided him the freedom to write and grow, not 
even this portion of Europe, ultimately, appears worth saving. Miller's broad 
denunciation o f modernity leads him to take a position that cannot, as he believes, be 
classified as "pacifist" but is resolutely anti-war.
As an expatriate. Miller has already, in 1932, proclaimed his freedom and 
renounced all responsibilities; "I have no country, no frontiers, no taxes to pay, no 
army to fight for" {Emil 94). Eight years later, in 1940, he declares, "Europe is my 
homeland—not America" {Sundc^ 196), a statement I understand not as an affirmation
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of "Europeanness"^* but, instead, as a renunciation of America; for while Miller only 
inconsistently champions Europe he unfailingly condemns America. More to the 
point. Miller considers himself to be "living ahead of the European and the American. 
What they are fighting for I relinquished a long time ago" he asserts ("Farewell" n.p.), 
indicating above all nationalism and all that he rejects in declaring himself an 
expatriate (ties to land, custom, history, people, along with his own past in America, 
and more), but particularly the strain of acquisitiveness, so characteristic of the West.
He reiterates his status as an expatriate in an April 30, 1939 letter, written in 
France when war seemed only weeks away: "I have no interest in politics or culture. 
[....] I swear allegiance to no government" ("Farewell" n.p.). For Miller, the artist 
rises above the squabbles of governments which only use or squash the individual.
"The artist does not dedicate himself to the preservation of his country," Miller will 
argue later, "but to the preservation of what is human" {Remember 335). He rejects 
the synchronic in favor of the diachronic, refusing to protect what is characteristic of 
the life people experience in the here-and-now in favor of that which is truly human 
and has always been part o f the human makeup—for Miller that means only the 
creative side of humans and does not include the destructive side, more specifically the 
uncreative destructive side.
Miller's position may seem pacifistic, but given his intuitive (or perhaps 
idiosyncratic) approach to life rather than a consistently rational or logical approach, 
he is far from constant in his refusal to kill—though pacifism requires, above all.
Miller writes near the end of his stay in France, "I could have starved to death 
here, for all the French care. No Frenchman ever offered me help when I needed it" 
("Farewell" n.p ). While he may feel more at home in Europe, he is never accepted 
there as a Frenchman or a European.
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inflexibility on just this issue. In 1938, shortly after the Munich Crisis, Miller claims, 
"I am not ashamed to murder a man, if it is necessary. But I am ashamed to go to 
war, to murder in cold blood and for a cause which is not mine"—the preservation of 
this consumer capitalist society {Han let 164). Such a statement surely differentiates 
Miller from the run-of-the-mill Quaker who regards the Biblical injunction "Thou shalt 
not kill" literally (at least with regard to humans). In April 1939, however. Miller 
writes "I don't believe that peace is achieved by fighting for it" ("Farewell" n.p.)—just 
as slapping a child will not teach it to renounce violence, quite the opposite—a 
statement that sounds pacifistic, for it appears, though not categorically, to perceive no 
value in fighting. Then, in 1941, Miller states: "To me [the French] attitude [toward 
the war] always seemed to reveal the highest form of courage: it was eminently 
pacifistic. They would fight out of a sense of duty and without hatred" {Nightmae 
71). In this last statement. Miller is certainly wrong, for pacifism by definition rejects 
military and other similar life-threatening means of solving problems: There is 
nothing "pacifistic" about fighting or about championing those who fight. Miller's 
point seems to be that they fight because they are forced to, not from any desire to 
fight, not from any bloodlust. To fight without hatred,^' which further underscores the 
French reticence to go to war, may be a virtue, but it no longer indicates pacificism.
While asserting his general opposition to war. Miller takes another step away 
from pacifism by challenging those who so willingly line up to fight and who so 
earnestly proclaim the need to go to war. If a war is necessary, then he calls for 
absolute war:
Miller's claim is a dubious one at best, given the history of French-German 
rivalry.
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No prisoners, no Red Cross nurses, no Salvation Army, no Y M C A  
Complete devotion, sacrifice and consecration to the task—nothing more, 
nothing less. No retreating, no surrender. [....] Don't bury the dead, let 
them rot and sow pestilence. Risk everything, because there is only one 
goal; if that goal is not reached then nothing is worth saving. 
{Remember 157-58)
Likely, Miller remembers the First World War (he was twenty-three when it broke out 
in Europe), a war unlike all others—the first war, writes Eric Hobsbawm, that 
"involved all major powers" (23). It was a war which, despite the barbarity, still 
asserted gentlemanly overtones, thus explaining the fact that many young upperclass 
Englishmen, "destined as gentlemen to be officers, who set an example, marched into 
battle at the head of their men and were consequently mown down first" (26). Miller 
wishes to scrape away the gentlemanly veneer, to douse the patriotic glow, and expose 
the grisly reality of war, as if to say, if we are going to fight then let's do it out in the 
open, without shame and without remorse, with no holds barred, but above all without 
self-deception.”
During his decade in France, Miller certainly had occasion to wimess the 
human dimension of the French experience of the First World War—from the signs on 
the Paris Metro reserving seats for the war-wounded, to the "'gueules cassés' ('smashed 
faces') which became so vivid a part of the after-image of the war" (Hobsbawm 26)— 
and detected no romance in war. "War now means just as it did in the past, 'blood, 
sweat and tears'—oodles of it" {Remember 198), Miller declares. It is perhaps more
And that, in general, is what happened. The war was "fought to a finish, 
without serious thought of compromise on either side"; the "losses are literally 
incalculable" not only because of the particularly brutal nature of the war, but because 
noncombatants (especially city dwellers) finally became targets for both sides 
(Hobsbawm 43). The war, however, as Miller predicted, did not bring peace; it 
merely shifted the fronts—Berlin, Korea, Viemam—and gathered new combatants.
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correct to label Miller, if we must, an opponent of war rather than a pacifist, finally, 
because he also expresses amazement that men willingly "sacrifice their lives, their 
homes, their families by going to war," but not one man would "sacrifice his life by 
not going to war!" {Hanlet 159). He seems to suggest, here, violent revolt- 
assassinating the leaders (Hitler as well as Neville Chamberlain and Léon Blum, 
among others) who have thus far navigated a path toward provocation, or to taking 
vocal public stands against the preparations for war which might be seen as treason— 
but he does so only obliquely.
What Miller is trying to determine, it seems to me, is when one fights, when 
lives can be legitimately sacrificed. In the years leading up to the Second World War, 
when it became more and more apparent that war was imminent, especially during the 
Munich Crisis of 1938, Miller begins to make statements about war, working his way 
toward a clear, oppositional stance to the events unfolding before him with seeming 
inevitability.
In defending the willingness of the French to fight, it may be that he expresses 
the belief that when one country is physically threatened by another then fighting 
becomes a reluctant duty, at any rate acceptable, which may help to explain why 
Miller tried to convince Orwell not to fight in Spain. Orwell, rather than defending 
himself or his country, was mixing himself in another country's affairs. A defensive 
war, selfish as it might be, can at least attain its limited goals in a way that fighting 
for ideals, in an age of spectacles and of decline, cannot.
Miller's position on war, then, seems to balance between, on the one hand, a 
belief that fighting will not bring about the desired end (peace, ostensibly); and, on the 
other hand, the sense that fighting becomes appropriate only when one is defending
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oneself (as in the case of the French invaded by Hitler's armies). Defending a 
principle, or in Orwell's case fîghting for a principle, demonstrates to Miller the utmost 
naïveté. Miller asserts, "[R]evolutions . . . always involve a return to the status quo” 
{Cosmological 160), and a look at the American and French Revolutions provides 
evidence enough of the truth of his statement. Revolutions are exceedingly vulnerable 
to betrayal and almost inevitably become merely the new tyranny. Alternatively, if 
Miller is against civilization, as fundamentally impinging on the freedom of the 
individual, then he rejects principles that unite a civilization, and will refuse to fight 
for them.
Rimbaud's experience with war might be seen to illustrate at least one side of 
Miller's position on war as I have thus far theorized it. The Franco-Prussian War 
broke out in September 1870, and soon after began the siege of Paris by German 
troops under Bismarck. Rimbaud, at the age of 16, immediately sought to enlist in the 
army to defend his country. He was continually turned down, however, because "he 
looked far younger" than he was (Starkie 70), though he did spend three weeks in 
Douai drilling with the National Guard, frustrated at marching with broomsticks and 
yearning for action (62). During the fall and winter of 1870-71, Rimbaud like many 
French citizens began "developing a hatred of all government, of all authority" (72), in 
response to the corruption of the government of Adolphe Thiers, the government that 
had replaced the Second Empire of Napoleon II and was badly mismanaging the war 
and the country (71).
In January of 1871 as the war wound to a painful halt for the French and the 
five-month siege of Paris came to an end, the National Guard in Paris began to make 
gestures toward supplanting the government which had at last capitulated (treasonably,
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in the view of many) to the Prussians. In late February 1871, Rimbaud made another 
trip to Paris, not to look for welcoming arms in literary society, as he had done before, 
but "to help in his country's fight for liberty" (75), this time freedom from bourgeois 
Frenchmen. It is unclear whether Rimbaud participated directly in the Paris 
Commune,”  which followed quickly on the heels of the French surrender to Prussia, 
but certainly he sympathized with it, for he memorialized it in several poems ("Les 
Mains de Jeanne-Marie," "L'Orgie parisienne où Paris se repeuple," "Chant de Guerre 
Parisien," "Qu'est-ce pour nous, mon coeur"); in others he espouses ideas in circulation 
in Paris during the Commune—his rejection of alienated wage labor, as well as his 
frequent support of fraternity (Gascar 69)—such that for Ross he becomes the poet of 
the Paris Commune.
Perhaps it was the direct attack on France and then the political causes 
espoused by the Communards that aroused Rimbaud's fervor; perhaps it was merely 
his youth; a year later he might have rejected participation in a battle or in the 
Commune. Though both Miller and Rimbaud reject bourgeois values, this rejection 
settles them on opposing courses—one refusing to fight to defend these values, the 
other anxious to participate in fighting, believing that in the Paris Commune these 
values would be repudiated and new ones would take their place (—"Christmas on 
Earth!"). Rimbaud trusts the Paris Commune can effect change—genuine and 
fundamental change—while Miller foresees no positive outcome to the war in Europe.
”  Since the commune was under siege during its entire, brief existence, entering or 
leaving Paris was terribly perilous at best.
259
W hat are W e Fighting Foi?
While the Paris Commune and the Second World War might not seem on first 
glance a propitious juxtaposition, that Rimbaud wished to support the one with his life 
vdiile Miller refused support to the other invites just such a correlation, especially 
given Miller's sense that he and Rimbaud shared a similar background and similar 
ideals. Though the Commune can be described, briefly, as a war between Paris and 
the provinces, with Prussia looking on menacingly, and the Second World War became 
a conflict involving many nations and several continents, both indicate conflicts over 
ideologies, waged all the more brutally for that (Marchand 120; Hobsbawm 43). 
Hobsbawm, moreover, contends that the Second World War "can be best understood, 
not through the contest of states, but as an international ideological civil war*' fought 
over two conflicting visions of the future, one that venerates and looks forward to 
continued progress, the other regarding Enlightenment thinking (especially as given 
shape by the liberal democracies and their purported logical extension—revolutionary 
Russia) as a mistake, as decadent (144, emphasis added).
Though Miller was bom some twenty years after the end of the Paris 
Commune, and within his work on Rimbaud (The Time o f the Assassins) there is only 
a brief allusion to Rimbaud's interest in it, the Paris Commune might just have been 
worthy of his (Miller's) support, if not actual participation, in a way that the Second 
World War was not. Pierre Gascar notes a certain "generosity" on the part of the 
members of the commune (76) and an attempt to create a community, which he sees 
reflected in Rimbaud's poetry (71), two themes Miller takes up repeatedly. 
"Community," especially, is important for Miller because it "carries with it the idea of 
inclusiveness. It carries with it the assumption that there can be no viable civilized
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effort until the organism embodying the ideal becomes worldwide" {Remember 147).
In the early nineteen-forties. Miller found little to support.
The war underway in Europe in 1941, a time when Germany had conquered 
most of western Europe and England stood alone against Hitler (Hobsbawm 39), does 
not inspire Miller; "In the present conflict," he asserts, "there are no issues worth 
fighting about—yet" {Remember 147). With this "yet," Miller suggests that if the war 
situation becomes critical, the endangered governments (or those isolated by German 
conquest) may offer their citizens certain concessions that might finally amount to real 
and substantial change.
In hindsight. Miller's position places him in a clear minority. Even a left-wing 
critic such as Hobsbawm, who might be expected to write history against the grain and 
undermine current orthodoxies, reports that the causes of the war can be reduced to 
"two words": "Adolph Hitler" (36). Hobsbawm further explains that the war also 
resulted from "aggression by the three malcontent powers [Germany, Italy, Japan]"
(37), as well as the Treaty of Versailles, which he characterizes as a "penal peace"
(33) that "could not possibly be the basis of a stable peace" (34) and which served to 
spur the rise of Hitler. Though Hitler's accession to power can be in part blamed on 
the victorious nations in the First World War (England, France, and America), Hitler 
ultimately initiates the Second World War, for Hobsbawm.
Such a reading of the Second World War, however, simplifies it and amounts 
to, at least in part, what Herbert Marcuse might characterize as "affirmative" history— 
history that affirms the status quo. According to Howard Zinn, though the war has 
usually been presented as unanimously supported, a substantial proportion o f  the
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American population thought it wrong and the goals of the war unclear. "Out of 10
million drafted for the armed forces during World War II," Zinn reports,
only 43,000 refused to fight But this was three times the proportion of 
C.G.'s (conscientious objectors) in World War I Of these 43,000, about 
6,000 went to prison, which was, proportionately, four times the number 
of C.O.’s who went to prison during World War I Of every six men in 
federal prison, one was there as a C O (408)
Among artists, poet Robert Lowell was one of the few who refused to fight in the
Second World War and served time in prison instead. The war was less popular than
usually believed, though it was still widely supported. Non-support for the war, on the
other hand, was greater than in the previous World War and more sternly punished.
Miller was certainly mistaken to discount Hitler, to see him simply as a token 
of the decline of the West, and his suggestion that war might have been averted had 
the Allies simply laid their weapons down and invited Hitler in, thus defusing his 
imperialist desires [Remember 150), now sounds ludicrous if not positively willed 
ignorance. Miller, however, did not recognize Hitler as a unique and powerful danger. 
"Hitler and Mussolini are simply instruments of fate," Miller writes; "I can detect no 
more evil in them than in Churchill or Roosevelt, or any other of the democratic 
leaders" (148). Such a statement reveals more about Miller's attitude toward Churchill 
and Roosevelt, and the countries they represent, than about his feelings toward Hitler. 
Both democratic leaders represent, for instance, imperialist nations, and not just in 
intention but in reality. America's actions in Latin America alone—where time and 
again it sent troops to quell revolutionary movements or to overturn governments not 
sufficiently favorable to American business interests, or in the case of Panama to 
simply take land (for the canal)—demonstrate its concerns were not with the freedom 
of people but with increasing the wealth of America, more specifically that of the
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industrialists (Zinn 399). Both Churchill and Roosevelt act in their own best interests. 
Their ideals, as they proclaim them, quite often offer a counterpoint to their actions 
and the histories of the countries they represent
Miller, furthermore, was not the only one unsure of Hitler's ultimate intentions. 
Before the war, England and France, with American support, ignored Soviet calls for 
unity against Germany and sought several times to appease Hitler. The United States 
did not even enter the war, though France was defeated, most of western Europe was 
under German control, and Britain was under attack, until forced to by Hitler's 
declaration of war after the Jzq)anese attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S., as it has done 
in the past and continues to do, targets left wing governments for its animosity (the 
Soviety Union in the nineteen-thirties) rather than repressive right wing governments 
(which quite often receive its support since they are friendlier to business interests than 
their left-wing counterparts), a preference with disastrous consequences—in China, Iran, 
and Afghanistan, for instance.
Miller's critique of the Second World War contains many valid points, because 
as an outsider (though he was certainly not a very distanced outsider) he was not 
blinded by patriotism and would not accept that the cause of the war and its goals 
could be simply pinned on the figure of Hitler. Instead, he sought to determine why 
each side was fighting, what it hoped to protect and to gain, and what were the likely 
outcomes of the war. For Miller, Hitler is certainly a "monster" {Remember 169), but 
if Hitler is the sole cause of the war then the war should not last long, of its own 
accord. If it becomes an extended affair, however, then there must be more on the 
line, more to the struggle than a simple good-guy versus bad-guy shoot'em-up, and the
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issues must sooner or later come to the fore. In short, it is clear what America and the 
Allies are fighting agcanst; what is less clear is what thqr are fighting/br.
Some o f the basic assumptions, current in 1941, are simply untenable for 
Miller. For instance, it is questionable, at best, whether those fighting against the Axis 
Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) really constitute a force fighting fo r  "freedom and 
liberty" {Remember 130). At the moment he is writing, in 1941, Miller believes the 
people in the West are demonstratively not free, and in Murder the Murderer he 
presents several examples of "unfreedom." Referring to conscription, to which he is 
not subject (he turns fifty at the end of 1941), he writes that people "who live under 
democratic rule today have as little freedom of choice, in this matter of acting or not 
acting, as those living under the Communist or Fascist yoke," hence the freedom they 
thought they enjoyed before the war was illusory (130). In fact, he continues, citing 
Perlés' choice to participate in the war, "You had to be a man without a country in 
order to have that privilege [willingly enlisting]" (134). One of the more basic 
freedoms would seem to revolve around whether or not a person wishes to imperil his 
or her life, and/or deciding when such risk becomes necessary. No one in the West, in 
1941, possesses that right, due to obligatory military service. Miller next admonishes 
his friend by raising the issue of England's particular and blatant hypocrisy: "The 
country for which you volunteer to fight, in the name of freedom, denies the rights of 
freedom to a subject nation [India] of over 300,000,000 souls" (134). Referring, 
finally, to his own predicament as a banned writer, he notes that those who disagree 
with his position on the war claim he could not write {publish) his books under the 
Nazis. "But then neither am I allowed to write such books in England or America" 
(140). Moreover, in the U.S., in 1940, the Smith Act was passed "which took
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Espionage Act prohibitions against talk or writing that would lead to refusal o f duty in 
the armed forces and applied them to peacetime"—an act that clearly violated Free 
Speech rights, but that did lead to the imprisonment of alleged offenders (Zinn 411).
Miller concludes that though this war is being fought ostensibly for freedom, as 
most if not all wars are, "the English-speaking countries have never appeared to me as 
a haven of liberty, where freedom of speech rings" {Remember 140).^ * The only 
person Miller believes to be free today is "he who has money or who owns the 
machines we work with" (152)—the business magnates, the imperialists. The freedom 
of those who benefit most from the system is the real object being protected. Those 
exploited by the owners of the means of production in order to accumulate their 
millions, the workers, are now exploited as soldiers in order to protect those millions.
During the nineteen-thirties, and putting aside America's numerous imperialistic 
adventures (in Cuba, Haiti, Latin America, the Philippines, and more) as well as its 
treatment at home of African-Americans and o f women, the U.S. still did not take a 
principled stand for freedom for others. Even as early as 1934, Roosevelt and the 
State Department decided against public criticism of Nazi anti-Semitic acts (Zinn 400). 
Throughout the decade, moreover, the Allies (including the U.S.) did more than refuse 
support to countries faced with (jerman and Italian aggression, in Ethiopia, Spain, and 
Czechoslovakia, for instance. In the case of the Italian war on Ethiopia, "American 
businesses [sent] oil to Italy in huge quantities, which was essential to Italy's carrying 
on the war" (400). America supported Italian aggression in 1935, but in 1936 blocked 
aid to Spain against German-supported aggression, so that a democratically-elected
The anti-Communist hysteria of the late nineteen-forties and the nineteen-fifties 
was to further corroborate Miller's position.
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leftist government fell. America, it would seem, supports democracy of one limited 
variety—a conservative, capitalistic democracy offering rather circumscribed freedoms.
Rather than freedom. Miller reckons that the actual objective is merely "to 
defend the status quo" {Hamlet 163), which constitutes a state of unfreedom and 
conformity. In Capricorn Miller wrote, "The moment you have a 'different' thought 
you cease to be an American" (56). "Group think," as Orwell would later call it, was 
already in place in America. "The difference between being out of step with a dictator 
and being out of step with the democratic majority," Miller asserts, "is practically 
negligible. The important thing is to be in step" {Remember 130). Suppression of 
labor movements and of socialist rallies, for example, have occurred throughout 
American history, and the McCarthy Hearings, o f the early nineteen-fifîtes, constitute 
only the most infamous attack on those who were "out of step,"^* on those who were 
not "good Americans."
In contrast to the state of unfreedom that, in Miller's view, the Allies fight to 
maintain, the Paris Commune that Rimbaud endeavors to support appears to have truly 
been an attempt to improve day to day life for the average Parisian, the average 
French citizen. While Marchand claims "it would be dishonest to attempt to extract a 
coherent political position" from the Paris Commune (113-14), Marx, writing during 
and immediately after the Commune, argues that the variety of "interpretations to 
which the Commune has been subjected . . . show that it was a thoroughly expansive 
political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically
Zinn's A People's History o f the United States details numerous worker's 
meetings, labor rallies. Socialist rallies, and Women's rallies broken up by police, 
militia, and the National Guard, usually violently, usually without the least provocation 
(besides that inspired by their existence).
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repressive" (75), most certainly from the perspective of the laboring classes in France 
between 1830 and 1870 (Wright 172-73). The Commune leaders sought to replace the 
authoritarian Second Empire of Nî^oleon HI as well as the "Capitulard" government 
of Adolph Thiers,”  centered in Versailles during the time of the Paris Commune, with 
a government that offered more freedom and denied the economic determinism that 
kept the laboring classes mired in poverty.
Like Marx, who saw the Commune as "essentially a working-class government" 
(75), Marchand characterizes the battle between the Communards and the Versaillais 
as above all "a class war; the greatest part of the prisoners interrogated by the 
parliamentary commission were workers or artisans" (112). Rimbaud's memorial for 
the pétroleuses, women who put some regions of bourgeois Paris to flame with 
petroleum bombs when French troops from Versailles attacked the Commune in the 
last week of May, makes clear their working class origin through describing their 
hands, "des mains fortes, / Mains sombres que l'été tanna, / Mains pâles comme des 
mains mortes" [strong hands, somber hands tanned by the summer, / pale hands like 
those of the dead] ( "Les Mains de Jeanne-Marie," 132). That Rimbaud chooses to 
celebrate the hands of these women demonstrates his awareness that they are the hands 
of workers; the hands of these women, tanned if they work outdoors or like ivory if in 
factories, are strong—which differentiates them from their often delicate bourgeois 
counterparts. His description of their hands as "la place / Qu’en baisa tout Révolté 
fier!" [the place / where one kisses all proud revolt] (134) further acknowledges the
Thiers had figured in Napoleon Hi's government.
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women's participation in the Commune as no less inspired than the men’s, whereas the 
bourgeois wife was expected to be passive, doing as her husband-and-master said.
In addition to Rimbaud who was virtually unknown at the time, the Commune 
enjoyed the support of members of the avant-garde (Christiansen 317)—Jules Vallès 
(novelist), Eugène Vermesch (poet), and Gustave Courbet (painter), for example—all of 
whom actually participated in the Commune government. In contrast, Orwell 
describes the position of British left wing avant-garde writers of the nineteen-thirties as 
"narrowed down to 'anti-Fascism,' i.e. to a negative" (38). The Commune, rather than 
forcing artists into an essentially conservative or defensive position, offered them hope 
for dramatic change, for a fundamentally new world, that they could help bring into 
existence. Later French avant-garde groups like the Surrealists would be politically 
committed, but party politics (both Surrealist and Stalinist-Communist) would then 
play a restrictive rather than an expansive role. The New Left of the nineteen-sixties, 
with writers like Michael Harrington, Todd Gitlin, and Richard Sennett, as well as the 
Situationistes in France, led by Guy Debord, and those who took part in May 68, 
become the closest contemporary approximation to the attitude manifested by the 
Commune. During the Commune, for instance, the Federation of Artists o f Paris 
"proposed that Art should be run by Artists, free of commercial considerations . . . "  
(Christiansen 317), which suggests a freedom from party politics as well as from the 
market. The expansiveness, the generosity of the Commune is clear and will become 
more so in a moment.
The Commune, as noted above, signified a war between Paris, the site of the 
1789, 1830, and 1848 revolutions, and the more conservative provinces. In March 
1871, the provinces had overruled Paris and elected a majority of Monarchists into the
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Assembly (Wright 224), precipitating the Paris uprising o f March 18 which led to the 
establishment of the Commune. According to Marchand, "the Commune was before 
all an urban movement and typically Parisian" (102)—it did not spread widely nor last 
long in the few regions it did reach, in Lyon (a major manufacturing city) for example. 
The peace treaty concluded between the Prussians and the French government signaled 
for many Parisians, after a five month siege, "the return to power of the monarchy, the 
aristocrats and the priests. Against that return to a tyrannical past, Paris rallied 
together and organized another commime" (108).
While it may be unwise to provide too coherent a depiction of the Commune's 
goals, for Ross, the most important issues that attracted those who either declared an 
affinity with the Commune, like Rimbaud, or actively participated in it, were the 
"concrete problems of work, leisure, housing, sexuality, and family and neighborhood 
relations" (33). According to Rimbaud biographer Enid Starkie, this revolt against the 
world as currently delineated is reflected in Rimbaud's attempt to become a voyant, a 
seer, rejecting "accepted facts, . . . the very conditions of existence" (96), attempting to 
see beyond this artificially limited existence, to break the forms and take another step 
in human development. While Rimbaud looks for spiritual development, the 
Commune "offers moral and physical liberation to the people of Paris" (Gascar 64).
Whereas the Second World War appears to Miller to be a battle to simply 
maintain the status quo, the leaders of the Paris Commune took steps to decisively 
change society, to improve life for its most degraded members. Due to the brief 
lifespan of the Paris Commune, its ultimate tenor remains only conjecture, but its 
decrees (not always fully acted upon, again due to the brevity of the Commune's 
existence) provide some guidance. It freed political prisoners, destroyed the guillotine
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in abolishing capital punishment, and separated church and state (Marx 141)^'. For the 
laboring classes the Commune attempted to provide a better work environment: they 
suspended night work in bakeries (80); prohibited fines in the workplace, levied by an 
employer vsdio was at once accuser, judge, and beneficiary (80); and acknowledged the 
importance of women workers by decreeing equal pay for equal work (Christiansen 
314).
On a more broadly social front, they attempted to deal with the problems of 
alcoholism, particularly problematic among the working classes (338); to, in part, 
reconceive the family by abolishing "the discrimination between legitimate and 
illegitimate children" as well as loosening "the formalities governing marriage" (346); 
to set up programs to help the destitute (Marchand 114); to make education accessible 
to all by making it free and compulsory up to age twelve; and to "secularize 
education" in order to educate youths according to "experimental, positivist and 
scientific’ principles" (Christiansen 322-23). It is undeniable that when excitement ran 
high—at both the very beginning of the Commune, on March 18, and during the week 
of battle in May in which the Commune was overpowered by the army of the 
government in Versailles—over a hundred hostages (generally members of the army 
and the clergy) taken by the Commune were shot. During the Commune itself, 
however, crime actually was reported to have gone down (Marx 82; Christiansen 309- 
10). In contrast. Communards captured by the Versailles government during the time 
of the Paris Commune were routinely summarily executed (306). In the bloody
Since Marx is sometimes considered strongly partisan, hence (implicitly) 
unreliable, it should be noted that everything Marx attributes to the Paris Commune is 
confirmed by Christiansen.
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repression of the Commune, the Versailles troops suffered 1,100 deaths as opposed to 
nearly 35,000 for the Commune (Marchand 111 )—many executed in Père-Lachaise 
Cemetery, and numerous sites across the city, and then thrown in mass graves. In 
sum, the Paris Commune appears to have offered the people of Paris a very different 
way of life than that experienced before it rose, though perhaps due to its fleeting 
existence and thorough repression (in itself a comment on the example it set) it has 
been largely forgotten as well as trivialized by such historians as Gordon Wright.
It may be that, outside the immediate stakes to be gained by fighting (the 
removal of Hitler from power, for instance), in microcosm and within limits, the battle 
between the Paris Commune and the French government, centered at Versailles, more 
closely mirrors the Second World War than at first glance appears possible: a civil 
war in France against a civil war in the West. Certainly the Paris Commune more 
nearly approximates liberal democracy^® than did the Versailles government, composed 
chiefly of monarchists (Orleanists) and authoritarians (Bonapartistes). In the Second 
World War, lined on one side stood "the core countries of Western Liberalism—Britain 
France and the USA—the general hegemony of the revolutionary tradition" (Hobsbawm 
121), now grown conservative, facing a Germany, united by Bismarck after the 
Fran co-Prussian War, under the authoritarian rule of Hitler. In both cases heirs of the 
Enlightenment oppose authoritarian regimes hearkening to the past.
But the differences between them are also instructive. Whereas the Paris 
Commune frequently fell victim to propaganda, as Marx and Christiansen repeatedly
”  Members of the Commune were of such variety of political backgrounds that to 
characterize them as "Reds," as they were in the press of their time, or as Communists, 
in the twentieth century sense of that term, makes little sense.
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show,'”’ and had little time to prove itself, England and especially America had plenty 
of time to demonstrate the alleged superiority of their democratic systems of 
government, as examples of the virtue of the Enlightenment, but failed, most 
spectacularly in their "penal peace " And the Commune represented, at least in part, 
an overt attempt to improve the lives of the common people, while the Allies fight 
only to maintain the status quo or to return to the situation they enjoyed before Hitler 
rose to power and distracted attention—if not to simply extend their sphere of influence 
and open new markets.
Miller’s most prescient analysis then is that the war, between two opposed 
political forms, signals a failure on the part of the Allies, the liberal democracies.
With manifest sarcasm, he charges, "Over 200,000,000 people, hypnotised by their 
insane leaders, refused to see that the democratic way of life is the best. Somehow, 
possibly because of the bad example we gave them, they remained unconvinced" 
{Remember 181). America, England, and their allies, according to Miller, cannot lay 
claim to the moral high ground. Their ideals are flawed or else "sadly demonstrated" 
if others do not find them respectable. "If there be such undeniable truth behind our 
principles as to make us willing to sacrifice our lives for them, then why have they not 
been more convincing?" (144) he asks. The fault either lies with the ideals, that they 
are not worthy, or the people—that they have not personified the ideals to advantage. 
Miller opts for both.
One piece of propaganda leveled against the Commune was that foreigners or, 
alternatively, Marx's International Working Men’s Association, were behind it 
(Christiansen 320). The first is completely unfounded, and the backgrounds o f the 
Commune leaders, again, were too various to support the second.
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He notes that there are those who hnd "certain ideas which the Fascists have 
made use of were not entirely without value,” but that the Allies are fighting against 
only "the evil doctrines of Fascism" (135). "And what about our own evil doctrines—" 
Miller demands, "Wio are there who will admit the existence of wrong, or error, in our 
democratic way o f life" (135)? Miller could have cited as examples of "error" the 
continuing problems with racism in America, anti-Semitism, official repression of 
dissident groups (those who are "out of step") within America and the West, as well as 
the inequities of consumer capitalism.
Miller reads the demonizing of the Germans as an additional failure on the part 
of the Allies:
We could never admit to ourselves that we have decided to kill the 
Germans off because we are incapable of convincing them that our way 
is the better way—no, we must first believe that they are not only wrong 
but evil, a menace to the world. (144)
Though in hindsight, demonization of the Germans may seem justified,"*' Miller’s point
is not to argue the Germans were no threat but rather to emphasize the Allies'
unwillingness to discuss what benefits, besides the subjugation of an admitted evil,
would accrue to the survivors of the war. Hobsbawm describes the Nazi goal as
amounting to a "deliberate reversal of civilization" (150), arguing that even in the
Allied countries there were divisions between those who to one degree or another
supported Hitler in opposition to "the descendants of eighteenth century
Enlightenment" (144). In other words, the value of modernity, of liberalism
(Democratic Capitalism), even more, of progress, at last took to the field as issues to
"*' Daniel Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners portrays "The Final Solution" 
as the work of the average German rather than of a small but significant number of 
Nazi fanatics..
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be confronted, and yet the Allies repeatedly returned to simple demonization to explain 
the rush to war.
Miller recognizes a similarity between combatants on all sides, however:
As Democrats, Republicans, Fascists, Communists, we are all on one 
level. [....] We defend with our lives the petty principles which divide 
us. The common principle, which is the establishment o f the empire o f  
man on earth, we never lift a finger to defend. (Nightmare 21)
Like Rimbaud, he looks toward a "Christmas on Earth!" but understands that it will
not come about until all people learn to recognize what unites them and, more
specifically, what divides them—governments.
"Our democracy has been the worst democracy that has ever been tried out. It 
has never had anything to do with freedom, has never been anything more than a 
name" {Remember 169). Though his invective may appear somewhat overstated— 
American democracy may not be the "worst" ever "tried out" but only the most 
disappointing given the hope and hype surrounding it—his argument denounces a 
betrayal of the dream that inspired America: "we have reduced the conception of 
freedom and service to mankind to a poverty-stricken notion of power and riches"
(169). In America, Capitalism has replaced Democracy as the ideal. The Land of the 
Free, where all are welcome, has been transformed to a place epitomized by the belief 
that anybody can become a millionaire, can go from rags to riches and rule over a 
self-made empire, so that community is devalued in favor of the ideology of the self- 
willed, rugged individual struggling and sacrificing and gambling all—for riches, for 
simple pecuniary gain. The Land of the Free, consequently, is reduced to the Land of 
the Free Market.
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The Allies cannot, alas, claim the moral highground unless they resolve to 
improve the lot of their own populations as well as to curtail their imperialistic 
adventures, something Miller believes unlikely (though still possible—remember his all- 
important "yet"). The Second World War will not be worth fighting if it does not 
improve the life of the average American, the average Briton, the average Frenchman— 
not to mention the African and the Indian and Filipino.
But Miller predicts that the wrong people will benefit from the impending war. 
Citizens of a country "almost never" clamor for a war "in modem times. It is the 
minority which sponsors the war, and this minority always represents the vested 
interests" (133). Zinn corroborates Miller, reporting that the "chief beneficiary" of the 
war "was a wealthy elite" who gained greater access to European markets as well as 
new markets (408). The young and poor, who benefit least from a war, are forced to 
fight, while those who aid, abet, encourage the war, sit back, risk little yet stand to 
gain much (the inverse of the way the stock market usually operates), especially those 
in industries that outfit the military {Remember 153-54). The soldiers, meanwhile, as 
they march off "to rid the world of evil" will be "hailed as heroes," though after the 
war the survivors "will have to pawn their medals and stand in the bread line. Unless 
in the meantime the forces of evil on this side of the water have been vanquished too" 
(143).
Miller is especially exasperated by the fact that the two wealthiest nations in 
the world, England and America, turn to the poor, through taxation, to support the 
war."*' ”[H]ad these same poor demanded [money] of their government in peace time
Hobsbawm argues that England was not wealthy and, in maintaining its empire 
had finally overextended itself (153).
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for food and shelter," he argues, they would have received in response "bullets"
(153)/^ The government, in brief, acknowledges no obligation toward the people but 
requires their obedience. That inconsistent state of affairs must change. Miller asserts. 
If it will not change—and permanently—because of the war, then there is very little for 
most people to gain by fighting. The capitalists, the only free people, stand to make 
money, in the short term, in arming and outfitting the troops, while the troops—the less 
fortunate—stand only to lose their lives or else, at best, to return to life as they knew it 
before the war, providing they receive no permanent injuries.
Miller, thus, refuses to believe the Allies are praiseworthy and in fact indicts 
them on several counts in creating this war. Though he agrees the Germans "are 
poisoned with hatred," he counters that "we who oppose them are not precisely 
suffused with radiant love. Men do not become poisoned with hatred in a vacuum, 
nor when surrounded by loving, sympathetic neighbors" {Remember 163). Miller no 
doubt refers to, among other things, the Treaty o f Versailles, which practically ensured 
the next war. As bad winners, the Allies had guaranteed that Germany viewed itself 
as a rogue nation, and now the Allies were paying the price—more specifically, the 
descendants of those who had survived the First World War were paying the price.
Miller also notes that during the First World War, America fought not simply 
to "end all war" but also "to make the world safe for democracy.' Not real 
democracy," he adds, "but the American brand" (179). America in World War 1, like 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union later, fights in order to spread its ideology, as 
well as to open new markets to its products. It does not fight selflessly; its generosity
See Howard Zinn's description of the brutal treatment, at the hands of the U.S. 
government, of World War I veterans.
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bears the hallmarks o f self-interest, of imperialism. All sides then. Miller believes, 
fight for the wrong reasons in 1941: Germany is determined to expand and the Allies 
are just as determined to prevent that expansion, though at the same time they seek, 
themselves, to expand. War, Miller notes, involves more than anything else 
"economic rivalry" (160). Beneath the ideological warfare, the smokescreen of 
demonization proffered by both sides, lurks the selfsame pursuit of material benefit.
The real battle, for Miller, should be "for life, to have it more abundantly" 
{Cosmological 157). Hence, the way civilization is organized at the moment only 
insures future problems. "A real man has no need of governments," Miller claims, "of 
laws, of morals or ethical codes, to say nothing of battleships, police clubs, high- 
powered bombers and such things" (4). Miller rejects all those forces and institutions 
which serve to separate one person from another, one people from another, to keep 
one person or people down in favor of another. Civilization is the problem, for Miller. 
While many governments proclaim equality, even community, the Democratic and the 
Communist most emphatically, none delivers.
The war also reflects, for Miller, the continuing decline of western civilization, 
making the structural imperfections all the more apparent. "Civilization," he warns, "is 
in question" {Remember 132). No matter how much the Allies may deplore the 
German government. Miller asserts, "we carmot in all honesty pretend that ours is the 
only true way of civilization" (132). Miller does not suggest the Nazi government 
should be considered a viable alternative to that of the Allies, but rather that different 
countries (or regions or continents or hemispheres) with different histories may require 
their own particular forms of government: The idea that every country should be 
capitalistic demonstrates Western (or even American) chauvinism, in addition to
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economic opportunism, a one-size fits all ethic that may work for night shirts but is 
woefully inadequate for governing.
Ultimately, defense of the status quo will not sufRce. Miller reminds the 
reader that the brutalities of the Aztecs, who made daily human sacrifices to their 
gods, seem particularly horrific, yet "we see nothing ignoble in the periodic sacrifice 
of millions of lives in the name of country, God, Democracy or Civilization. What 
monstrous things can these be," he asks, "in whose name these horrible sacrifices are 
demanded" (148)? Those in the "civilized" West are little different from the Aztec 
"savages," for both require sacrifices to gods, ideals. All these centuries of reputed 
progress, then, appear to have been for naught.
Perhaps Miller unrealistically expects a country to examine itself before making
war on another country. Perhaps such an expectation is unfair, though the West had
nearly seven years, between Hitler's rise to power and the outbreak of war, to reflect
upon itself. On the other hand, the word "realistic" has often been used to justify the
status quo and not seeking solutions to problems, whether a threatening antagonist sits
on the borders or not. Max Horkheimer writes clearly and passionately, thus meriting
extended quotation, of the reluctance to inaugurate change, change of a fundamental
sort in society, most often deemed unrealistic because it goes to the very roots of that
society, because it presupposes a remaking of the world such as Miller advocates;
The relatively stable system of long-practiced, effortless behavior which 
people of a particular period and class manifest, the maimer in which 
they accept their situation with the help o f conscious and unconscious 
psychic practices, the infinitely differentiated and continuously revised 
structure of preferences, acts of faith, evaluations, and fantasies by 
which people in a particular social stratum come to terms with their 
material circumstances and with the limitation imposed on their real 
satisfactions, the set of internal contrivances which despite its 
complexity is for the most part the daughter of necessity—all this is
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preserved in many instances only because to leave the old way of life 
and to adopt a new one, especially if the latter demands increased 
rational activity, requires strength and courage; in brief it requires an 
immense psychic effort. This is also one reason why changes of world­
wide historical importance cannot be expected to occur if people must 
first change themselves. {Critical 67)
When real change occurs, people are discomfited. "Displacement," Ross asserts, in a
slightly different context, "after all, hurts" (14). People worry that they will lose the
little they have, that more—or simply different—actions may be demanded of them,
hence they will have to learn a whole new structure of behaviors, and so they gravitate
toward comfort zones. If  they lead lives of discomfort now, they would rather retain
these discomforts, familiar and bearable finally, rather than risk acquiring new ones all
in an attempt to improve their lives.
Such reticence to risk anything, beyond lives, on the part of the Allies and their 
populations settles Miller's position on the war. As we have seen him do in other 
circumstances, in rejecting war as it is sanctioned by societies. Miller once again turns 
to "the individual." He refuses to accept the manifest unfreedom of individuals 
(though without revealing that this unfreedom is onuiipresent); he refuses to accept 
that people who have both literally and figuratively bought-in to the systems he 
rebukes are not free and that this unfreedom is no isolated phenomenon. The 
"individual," moreover, just might surprise Miller, as the workers surprised Socialist 
leaders in 1914 by halting any strikes and enlisting to fight in the war, by rejecting the 
freedom Miller wishes to burden him or her with. But Miller, rightly, expresses 
especial distaste for "forcing a man against his will and his conscience to sacrifice his 
life for a cause he does not believe in" {Remember 154), though people have arguably 
already done so in the marketplace.
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Miller’s rejection of war hinges on war as just another exemplar of the
instrumental use of people—as workers, as consumers, and finally as soldiers, but he
grounds his rejection of the war on his notion of the sanctity of the individual, a fairly
vague notion, though he is willing to risk all for this individual:
"To me the screams of one agonizing individual rings louder and more 
imperious than all the exhortations of the righteous. I would rather be 
called a coward and a traitor than neglect the plea of that helpless 
individual" (162).
In opposition to all those who would provoke a crowd, who would inflame a nation 
and urge it to war. Miller sides with the minority, the voiceless individual amidst the 
clamoring crowd.
It is this crowd, as well as the short-sighted politicians who cannot manage or 
even choose not to eliminate war or the likelihood of its recurrence, that finally 
inspires Miller to wonder if  there really is any hope for humanity. Immediately 
following the Munich Crisis of 1938, when war was only narrowly averted. Miller 
asks, "has man always played into the hands of Fate or is there really an opportunity 
to surpass himself each time a great problem arises" {Hamlet 159)? In other words, in 
this so-called age of progress what really and finally constitutes "progress," and is it 
possible for humans to advance in a fundamental way?
Miller does not foresee a world of indolence, but he does envision a world 
where people contribute according to their abilities and where they focus on living and 
live in peace without governments (a war, it should be remembered, is between 
governments rather than people, for Miller), without civilization. The distance 
between such a picture of the future and "progress" as conceived in Enlightenment
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thinking demonstrates the distance between Miller and mainstream modernity, but 
unites him, once again, with the worlds of Charles Baudelaire and Arthur Rimbaud.
281
Chapter Four / Life Never Looked So Bleak: Heniy IVGller on Progress
The average man . . .  is more frightened of alien ideas than of cold steel 
or flame throwers. ("Murder the Murderer," Remember to Remember 
206)
Every improvement in machinery throws workers out of employment, 
and the greater the advance, the more numerous the unemployed; each 
great improvement produces, therefore, upon a number of workers the 
effect of a commercial crisis, creates want, wretchedness, and crime. 
(Engels 159)
Henry Miller argues against fighting what has since become known as the 
Second World War, and his argument rests in large part on the relation between that 
war and the notion of progress. Throughout this discussion of Miller's attack on 
modernity, his critique has been implicity, when not explicitly, an attack on the notion 
of progress. Have we improved our cities? Has commodity culture fundamentally 
enhanced our lives? Has technological development provided us more free time in 
which to enjoy life?
"Progress," as we shall see in a moment, has not been universally heralded and
has, in fact, been subject to numerous critiques. Miller is concerned, furthermore, not
with technological progress alone, but with what he considers a more important and a
more basic site of progress, human development, which entails among other things a
better day-to-day life for the mass of people. Miller's concern, finally, is that
conceptions of progress might be overly enthusiastic and not properly elaborated.
"Whether it be true or not," he writes,
civilization has come to stand for something in the nature of a 
continuous advance, something ineradicable in the human scheme of 
things underlying the ephemeral birth and death of cultures. Is this 
advance maintained by war? If not, why should one take up arms, even 
though the aggressor be obviously in the wrong? {Remember 132-33)
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As we observed in the last chapter. Miller decries the rush to weapons without a 
rational discussion of the object to be gained by fighting. Though he seems to read 
the possible Nazi conquest of the West as yet another step toward the final downfall of 
Western culture, predicted by Spengler, he fails to address the prospect that 
surrendering to forces "obviously in the wrong" might lead to a dangerous regression 
that could actually slow the decline and that such a state of affairs might linger rather 
than quickly pass. However, since Miller does not—as many do in the West—perceive 
progress as necessarily automatic, he questions both the reasons for going to war and 
modem understandings of the concept o f progress, linking the two.
Technological development seems an assured outcome of war. Just as the 
American space program hastened the development of computers, so war generally 
accelerates the development of new technologies, inspiring engineers to design new 
and better machines of destruction and providing immediate opportunities for field- 
testing this machinery. But while technological advances seem quite certain, how do 
such developments square with human progress, with the progress of civilization?
Miller suggests that if civilization is helplessly sinking into barbarism, whether the 
Germans win or not, the war is futile. Within Miller’s critique of modernity, as with 
Baudelaire, Rimbaud and others writing in the second half of the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth centuries, lurks what is at least an ambivalence toward the 
concept of progress; progress as real, as unquestionably good—as implicitly and 
essentially beneficial to humanity—especially when linked with what amounts to its 
blood-relative, technology. If, as seems likely, cities have become less humane, our 
daily needs are more and more constructed by advertising, work has steadily become 
more dehumanizing, war has not been eliminated, and riches continue to offer the
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ultimate sign of success yet remain in the possession o f only a privileged few, the 
question whether the West has progressed at all, or progressed in a desirable direction, 
becomes one of serious importance for Miller.
Miller and Rimbaud, both, directly question whether the world is more human 
as a result of scientific progress. In Une Saison en Enfer, Rimbaud writes, "La 
science, la nouvelle noblesse! Le progrès. Le monde marche! Pourquoi ne tournerait- 
il pas? / C'est la vision des nombres" [Science, the new nobility! Progress. The world 
advances! Why shouldn't it turn? / It's the vision of numbers](198). Rimbaud 
proclaims the victory of science, of advances in human affairs directly linked to the 
new science, but then questions why time cannot be considered cyclical.' Abruptly 
altering his tone, he adds that the victory of "progress" reduces the world: "It's the 
vision of numbers '— numbers in this instance are static, compartmentalizing, over­
rationalized and myopic, reducing people to flesh and blood machines, denying the 
side of nature and the human psyche that resists regimentation. The "vision of 
numbers," in the industrial age, stands also for the linear conception of progress which 
reduces the notion of "progress" to something of a parade, from point A to B.
Commenting on these lines of Rimbaud's, Miller writes, "The poetry of life is 
expressed only in terms of the mathematical, the physical, the chemical. [....] The 
world has indeed become number" {Time 34)—hence, inhuman. Charles Dickens' 1854 
novel Hard Times had earlier challenged progress, attacking the shortcomings of a 
world produced by scientific progress, along the same lines as Miller and Rimbaud 
will later: Students describe a horse by listing its species and its genus, its various
' Spengler and many others before him—Vico, for example—posit cyclical 
progression rather than linear progress.
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teeth, bones, eating habits, and yet somehow manage to lose horseness in their 
definition. Neither Miller nor Rimbaud, nor Dickens for that matter, stands against 
explanation or exploration as such. Rather, they deplore the tendency, in the name of 
progress, to harness nature and reduce it to a formula, to that which is quantifiable 
(with the rest set aside as of no real importance), to that which fulfills human material 
needs. The basic mystery of nature, as well as the Dionysian side of human nature, 
unless it can be measured and codified, loses its appeal, is denied, if it cannot be 
yoked to utilitarian ends. Raymond Williams describes one of Dickens' themes in 
Hard Times in terms that very nearly describe Miller's critique of what is missing in 
science: "The instinctive, unintellectual, unorganized life is the ground, here, of 
genuine feeling, and of all good relationships" {Culture 95). Modem science, as 
reflected in industry and the educational system, often serves to deaden human 
interaction—interaction among people, interaction between people and the natural 
world.
This vision of numbers does not stimulate hope for the future but rather the 
opposite. "And what is the chief emotion which our great discoveries inspire?" Miller 
asks. "Dread! We have knowledge without wisdom, comfort without security, belief 
without faith" {Time 34). We have facts, but we have not gained in wisdom, for all 
these facts do not amount to anything like a complete picture of the world, which must 
admit forces that go beyond human comprehension. While commodities make our 
lives easie rat times, they cannot ensure our future. And belief systems focused on 
capitalism and material benefits—people believe in the value of commodities, they 
believe in the importance of fashion—fail to produce faith in the future. Richard 
Sheppard describes the ambivalence some felt toward "progress," asserting that the
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"very generation which had grown up amid the triumphant achievements of 
increasingly confident nineteenth century science, technology and economics, now felt 
that these systems were becoming dysfunctional and potentially totalitarian" (9). For 
many in the early twentieth century, progress appeared to be moving toward the 
circumscribing of individual rights, a questionable development, at best, in the 
progress of history, or the history of progress.
In one of his notebooks for the Passagen A rbeit,' which implicitly and 
explicitly confronts the idea of progress, Walter Benjamin suggests that once the 
bourgeois class gained power in the early to middle nineteenth century, progress as an 
ideal "may increasingly have forfeited those critical functions that originally 
characterized it" ("N" 68). It was, thus, transformed from a sort of measuring stick, 
with which people evaluated their living conditions, into an article of faith, like the 
Christian belief in the Resurrection, and much less open to questioning. Benjamin 
adds that later in the century, after Darwin's theories had won many converts, "the 
notion that progress was automatic" further robbed it of any critical faculty and 
assured its transformation into a conviction, while at the same time broadening the 
scope of its perceived influence "to the entire realm of human activity" (68). Progress, 
then, is what happens and is no more open to doubt than the sunrise. Before 
embarking on an exploration of the critique of "progress" put forth by Miller, 
Baudelaire, and Rimbaud, I want to briefly explore the concept as we have received it.
* The English translation of the German title (literally: Passages Work), the 
Arcades Project, has, I think, inappropriate overtones. Today we generally think of 
video and pinball arcades, rather than shopping arcades.
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A Short Histoiy of Progress
Progress—this belief, this ideology, this bourgeois value par excellence^—comes 
to us with a history, though it is perhaps a briefer one than we might expect, given its 
cardinal role in our century and the one preceding. J. B Bury, in The Idea o f  
Progress, argues that the concept of progress as we know it has only existed since the 
sixteenth century. Before that, from the ancient Greeks up to the medieval Christians, 
all western cultures posited a "golden era" in the past, viewed the present as 
constituting a decline, and only anticipated further degeneration. That the mythical 
golden era of the past is unattainable, while the present and future are marked by 
continued deterioration, precludes a notion of "progress," of advances in human culture 
(broadly speaking).
It is in the sixteenth century, with Bacon, that progress begins to assume its 
modem characteristics. "Francis Bacon," according to Bury, "sounded the modem 
note; for him the end of knowledge is utility" (51). The study of nature soon 
commences to revolve around the attempt "to establish the reign of man over nature" 
(52), to master nature such that it becomes the raw material for human projects. The 
ability of humans to reason transformed nature from an "end" in itself, from something 
out there, to a "means," something bestowed upon humans, to do with as they please. 
Once the grip of an absolute "golden ageism" is loosened and knowledge is believed 
to be a force capable of improving the lives of humankind, once it is possible to chart 
developments in science and the arts, progress becomes at last imaginable.
 ^ Though the bourgeois class is certainly not the only one to subscribe to it, that 
class is one of the main beneRciaries, hence proponents, of progress.
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The notion of progress, however, has taken humanity on some unexpected 
detours. In France, during the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century, 
the intelligentsia began to question "the value of the achievements of science and the 
improvements of the arts o f life, if life itself could not be ameliorated " (127), 
suggesting that progress then exhibited the philosophical and critical dimension that 
Benjamin wanted for it  Reason demanded that people take more control over their 
lives and that they work to improve them, which helped lead France in the direction of 
revolution. Widely considered an aberration by aristocracies of other nations of 
Europe, the French Revolution revealed the need, for other countries (or empires) as 
well as France, to more directly focus the energies unleashed in the name o f progress.
Progress, since the advent of industrialization, has become synonymous with 
technological advance and with a sense of "plenty"—plenty of food, commodities, and 
(at some point in the future) time—and with a belief that progress will continue into 
the future indefinitely.^ However, according to Bury, there is no generally accepted 
scale upon which to measure progress (what constitutes progress—evolution of 
technology or human morals or political systems? is civilization moving in the right 
direction and how can we be sure?) and no insurance that any present progress will 
continue indefinitely (3-4), or will continue to be considered progress.
Bury concludes that "[bjelief in [progress] is an act of faith" (4). It is, he
asserts,
a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the 
future. It is based on an interpretation of history which regards men as
“* One form of this belief is the expectation of infinite economic growth and 
greater profits year after year.
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slowly advancing . . .  in a definite and desirable direction, and infers 
that this progress will continue indefinitely. (5, emphasis added)
This new faith, based upon interpretations of the past and inferences about the future,
constitutes no minor development in the history of humanity but, instead, marks a
radical break with the past.
The idea of progress. Bury claims, "would have struck [the Greeks] as 
audacious, the theory of men unduly elated and perilously at ease in the presence of 
unknown and uncalculable powers" (18). Such a prescient vision of the modem 
concept of progress is powerfully revelatory when considered in light of the recent 
development of nuclear energy, whose vast powers for destruction have been 
confirmed and have only with difficulty been harnessed for more positive ends, but 
whose safety as a power source remains questionable at best due to the volatility of 
the technology that generates the energy as well as the wastes it produces, which 
remain toxic for millennia. "Pourquoi un monde moderne," asks Rimbaud, seemingly 
anticipating such developments, "si de pareils poisons s'inventent!" [Why a modem 
world, if such poisons are invented!] (220). certainly people have feared and continue 
to fear the side effects of electricity and the toxic elements of nuclear power, but by 
and large people trust that such power sources has been or will soon be tamed. In the 
face of the unknown, humans do indeed appear to evince blind, even foolish, 
complacency, something foreign to the Greek whose world was filled with inexplicable 
happenings.^
 ^ The modem world, too, is full of inexplicable phenomena. They simply are not 
recognized as such. Few people understand the functioning of modem technology and 
could, if deposited on a desert island with all the necessary equipment, construct a 
toaster, let alone a car or a computer.
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Spengler, whose The Decline o f  the West can be read as a contribution to the 
debate on progress, argues that the concept of "progress," among other conceptions 
people have about themselves, "is an exclusively Western hypothesis, living and valid 
for a season" (165). It has evolved, as a concept, over the course o f  a few centuries, 
but as a means of understanding the world it will eventually lose its powers of 
description. With each country, the concept has a particular histoiy—focussing on 
economics or science or philosophy—but it culminates in the Enlightenment, in the 
belief in human rationality, the conviction that reason alone can and will solve the 
problems of humanity. As such, progress manifested itself in "rapid changes . . . 
which provided the background of historical optimism" later associated with progress 
(Iggers 46). Progress, and that optimism which often accompanies it, helps define the 
modem era but is also, as Spengler noted, particular to it as well. Benjamin, in 
Notebook "N," argues that in rejecting progress one must also reject decline; 
"Overcoming the concept of 'progress' and the concept of period o f decline' are two 
sides of one and the same thing" (48). Spengler's theories of decline, then, are as 
much a product of the modem era as is "progress."
Progress, which implies constant change, has also produced conflicts. Marshall 
Berman notes that one of the recurring fears of "the modem ruling class" remains 
something people "have always yeamed for: prolonged solid stability" (95). In a 
capitalist world, though, "stability can only mean entropy, slow death" (95). The 
capitalist economy survives on change, requires it for its continued existence.
Although people want, and perhaps expect progress, they begin to desire, alongside it, 
permanence. The optimism associated with progress exists side by side with fear of
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the unknown. It is this world o f anticipation and dread that Baudelaire describes vdien 
he writes of the modem world as a simultaneously eternal and ephemeral world.
Ultimately, the question arises; Is change, within a world that remains largely 
the same, finally to be considered "progress"? W. J. Cash describes "progress" in the 
American South as follows: "And so it went along the line in these years. On all 
sides there was change, but everywhere it was taking place within the lines laid down 
in the past" (233). Progress, in other words, requires no great ruptures, merely 
development along "the lines laid down in the past." Earlier, as we just saw, progress 
involved revolution, an abrupt change of direction, in France, and Benjamin seems to 
imply such an element when he writes that an apologetic history of the existing order 
"misses those jags and crags that offer a handhold to someone who wishes to move 
beyond them" ("N" 65), the "jags and crags" being "revolutionary moments in the 
course of history" (64) which seem to offer dramatic change. Such change better 
describes Henry Miller's implicit call, in "Murder the Murderer," as we saw in the last 
chapter, for a rupture with the past, a decisive change of direction.
Bury specifies three characteristics associated with the idea of progress, "the 
growth of modem science, . . the growth of rationalism, and . . . the struggle for 
political and religious liberty" (348). Historian Georg G. Iggers offers a somewhat 
different notion of what characterizes progress: "the incessant growth of scientific 
knowledge and technological control, the transformation of society from an order of 
privilege to an order of meritocracy, and the extension of these modem forms of 
civilization" (58). Iggers' first component essentially combines Bury's first two and 
straightforwardly acknowledges the idea of "control" within the concept of "progress." 
Iggers and Bury similarly incorporate the idea of liberty into progress, though they use
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different terms which suggest a somewhat different conception of liberty. Where they 
most clearly differ is in Igger’s additional notion of the "extension" o f progress to 
other lands, what might be more correctly termed imperialism, economic as well as 
cultural imperialism, further politicizing the notion of progress, perhaps returning to it 
a critical element Benjamin saw lacking. Neither Bury nor Iggers, however, 
incorporates the idea of "rupture" into the concept of progress, and it is there, perhaps, 
that Miller's notion of progress differs most definitively.
It’s Getting So Much Better All the Time
The "extension" of progress might be understood as an important vindication of 
progress and its concomitants, inasmuch as it appears to support the popular perception 
that progress has improved the whole of the lives of the people (and not just the 
material conditions). This extension, however, provokes distress in Miller, as we saw 
in Chapter Two. In Miller’s view, the advertisements for progress are fundamentally 
misleading to those in the capitalist countries but more especially to inhabitants of 
other countries in different stages of (capitalist or pre-capitalist) development. The 
latter perceive the so-called benefits o f progress, the shelves in American stores filled 
with new products, but overlook the drawbacks: "they don't see the bitterness in the 
heart, the skepticism, the emptiness . . . which is eating up the American worker," 
Miller declares {Nightmare 33), describing worker alienation. They do not see, in 
other words, the inhuman system the workers must submit to in order to reap the 
benefits of "progress."
Rimbaud, writing à propos of imperialism, depicts progress as a brutal force 
demanding immediate and unconditional surrender in the newly-subjected populations:
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"Les blancs débarquent. Le canon! Il faut se soumettre au baptême, s'habiller, 
travailler" [The whites debark. Cannonl/Canon! We must submit to baptism, dress, 
work] (201). Alluding to the Spanish meeting with the Aztecs in Tenochtitlan or the 
later colonizers of North America encountering the natives living along the east coast 
or the European conquest of large parts of Africa, Rimbaud perceives progress as a 
technological and spiritual force removing people from their first innocence and, 
through compulsion, modernizing them—as if Westerners have played the role of the 
snake and thrust the apple from the "tree of knowledge of good and evil" into the 
mouths of these "savages." Here, "modernizing" in the technological sense, or to 
employ the current term, development,^ has grave consequences, including deadening, 
mindless labor as well as warfare, and in the spiritual sense, social restrictions and 
new taboos, new shames, that would seem to belie the positive notion of progress, 
whether linked to the improvement of human comfort or to the settling of a "new" 
continent and an improvement of human potentialities. Translating the French word 
"canon" to mean a collection of texts, such as the Bible, Rimbaud's vision of religion 
as a regressive and oppressive force emerges, for the smug bourgeois has only a 
limited notion of "progress," that which benefits the bourgeois class and that which 
reflects the bourgeois class as it would like to perceive itself.
One of the conceptual changes that occurred between the age of Enlightenment 
and the time when Henry Miller begins to write is that most philosophers no longer 
conceived humans as irmately good, as perfectible. The numerous and bloody wars 
fought throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and most especially the early twentieth
® Such a term serves to characterize the actions as good, beneficent, rather than to 
describe them.
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centuries, cast sharp doubts on any optimistic view of humanity. A new conception, 
more cynical, largely replaced the earlier one, taking into account "the destructive and 
aggressive aspects" of human beings (Iggers 58). And if humans were "destructive 
and aggressive" then the fruits of their labors, the fruits of progress, might also be.
In an era before imperialism switched into high gear, Charles Baudelaire, in
Mon Coeur mis à nu, notes for his autobiography, despairs of the news reported daily:
II est impossible de parcourir un gazette quelconque, de n'importe quel 
jour ou quel mois ou quelle année, sans y trouver à chaque ligne les 
signes de la perversité humaine la plus épouvantable, en même temps 
que les vanteries les plus suprenantes de probité, de bonté, de charité, et 
les affirmations le plus effrontés relatives au progrès et à la civilisation. 
[It is impossible to peruse any gazette, from no matter what day or what 
month or what year, without finding there on each line the signs of the 
most fearsome human perversity, at the same time as the most 
surprising boasts of integrity, of goodwill, of charity, and the most 
impudent affirmations relative to progress and civilization.] {Oeuvres 
424).
Baudelaire expresses amazement that newspapers, whose daily subject matter—crime 
and all marmer of human depravity—would seem to contradict the idea, boast of 
progress in the face of their own contents. The fact that they continue to make such 
claims for progress would seem to confirm the public's blind belief in it, perhaps even 
their need to believe in progress, given that they must sacrifice their present life, in 
working, for future enjoyment.
The result of such a blind faith is mental regression. Miller characterizes 
Americans, bragging of their success, of their delight in the fruits o f progress, as "a 
pack of children. Senile idiots. What we call life is a five-and-ten cent store 
romance. [....] That cheap optimism which turns the stomach of any ordinary 
European" (Cancer 307). Miller refers, here, to the rags-to-riches romances of Horatio 
Alger, or Hollywood success stories, where any worthy person can supposedly become
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rich, and where the movement from poverty to affluence is viewed, naively, as 
(inevitable) progress. Most Americans, in Miller's view, infected by the optimism that 
goes hand-in-hand with American conceptions of progress, have only a narrow vision 
of their world—childish, blind, romantic—failing to see, or else forgetful of, the 
destructiveness in what they do: "We're like a herd of wild horses with blinders over 
our eyes. On the rampage. [....] We're pulling the whole world down about our ears. 
We don’t know why. It's our destiny" (307-08). Progress, rather than something 
controlled by people, is "unleashed" {Wisdom 34). Like the contents of Pandora's 
Box, progress personifies a chaotic and independent force (like the economic system 
discussed in the last chapter), though it may be that progress should more correctly be 
compared to a river whose energy could be channelled and used productively to 
improve the lot of humanity rather than to simply line the coffers of the those who 
already benefit from progress.
Similar to the Pandora's Box vision of progress. Miller views progress as a 
calamity. In Black Spring, he enumerates what he calls, "The plague of modem
progress":
colonization, trade, free Bibles, war, disease, artificial limbs, factories, 
slaves, insanity, neuroses, psychoses, cancer, syphilis, tuberculosis, 
anemia, strikes, lockouts, starvation, nullity, vacuity, restlessness, 
striving, despair, ennui, suicide, bankruptcy, arterio-sclerosis, 
megalomania, schizophrenia, hernia, cocaine, prussic acid, stink bombs, 
tear gas, mad dogs, auto-suggestion, auto-intoxication, psychotherapy, 
hydrotherapy, electric messages, vacuum cleaners, pemmican, grape 
nuts, hemorrhoids, gangrene. No desert isles. No Paradise. Not even a 
relative happiness. Men running away from themselves so frantically 
that they look for salvation under the ice flows or in tropical swamps, 
or else they climb the Himalayas or asphyxiate themselves in the 
stratosphere . . . (45-6, ellipses in original)
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Such a listing contains a number of factors that cannot necessarily be ascribed to 
modernity or progress—disease, starvation, mad dogs—though their persistence becomes 
less understandable in an era wdiere progress should, in theory, have eliminated them. 
This list also includes obvious problematical outcomes of progress, some of which 
have already been explored—factories, war, vacuity, imperialism—as well as the general 
malaise of modernity, the uneasiness and dissatisfaction that some people feel.
Where the list above becomes most interesting, however, is in its reading, 
against the grain, of some apparently positive outcomes of progress—artificial limbs 
and psychotherapy for instance. It might be that Miller does not disparage the 
development of artificial limbs so much as the (continued) need for them: new and 
improved devices for blowing up people, developed by the military, motivate the 
medical industry to technological feats with artificial limbs. Recent inventions, such 
as the automobile, also induce a host of new injuries as well as a greater number of 
what once were relatively rare injuries.’ Psychotherapy too, rather than simply a 
modem cure, may signify recognition of the greater difficulty surviving in the modem 
world presents, as well as a way of labelling people and making the world easier to 
explain, on the surface.
Feats of courage and strength, included in the above listing, such as crossing 
the North Pole on sled or scaling certain mountain ranges, appear to be mere 
sensationalism to Miller, rather than assertions of an extension, or progression, of 
human capabilities. While Miller can be understood to be complaining about the non­
utilitarian ends of such feats, it is rather the unthinking, self-congratulatory tone of
’ For more on this subject, see the opening pages of the chapter entitled "Speed" 
in Stephen Kem's The Culture o f  Time and Space: 1880-1918.
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such news (as typified by newsreels shown before films in the nineteen-twenties and 
thirties and forties, for instance), which provokes his criticism. Just as Miller earlier 
designated mainstream cinema one of the opiates of the masses, news about human 
accomplishments can be understood as another such opiate, for such feats, affirmative 
in the Marcusian sense, project the illusion of progress and control of nature and lull 
the viewer or reader into contentment and a false sense of the mastery of nature, of 
improved living conditions hence an improved life.
Miller, Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Progress
Miller’s conception of Progress, in contrast to his position on killing, can be 
fairly easily determined; Progress has been a disaster. "The world is pooped-out, " 
Miller writes in Cancer, "there isn't a dry fart left" (249); its an empty belly too weary 
to groan. In Black Spring, he has called progress a "plague," as we have seen, a 
particularly virulent strain, based on the results as he enumerates them. If Western 
civilization is on the decline, as he, Spengler and others believe, then progress has 
halted, or is grinding to a halt, in which case "the march of progress was a dead 
march" (Time 156) because it did not lead to a significantly improved world; or at 
least it is less to be boasted of than heretofore, given the sacrifices demanded.
Paralleling his later sarcastic call for all-out war in "Murder the Murderer," in
Cancer Miller calls for all-out progress:
Forward). Forward without pity, without compassion, without love, 
without forgiveness. Ask no quarter and give none! More battleships, 
more poison gas, more high explosives! More gonococci! More 
streptococci! More bombing machines! More and more of it—until the 
whole fucking works is blown to smithereens, and the earth with it! 
(267)
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Miller’s description of progress links it with warfare, suggesting yet again that the 
greatest beneficiary of progress is the military, \^ o  have more weapons at their 
disposal, as well as the wealthy, who manage to outfit the military at a substantial 
profit to themselves. Progress leads to disaster (as well as a plague again); it is its 
own mirror image. "They read progress and evolution," writes Miller, "in the bloody 
wake of Moloch" {Remember 336).
The dehumanization of people in work and recreation and war, the brutality 
required to break them rather than the machines, is this "bloody wake," which usually 
appears as richly displayed commodities unconnected to the producers. Worse, people 
cannot make sense of the facts they see before them; two plus two is fiv e  (to quote the 
title of a collection of poems by e. e. cummings).* New and improved killing 
machines, or new and improved methods of manipulating people (electronic 
advertisements, for instance), or new and improved machines that require less of the 
operator who now only pushes a button every thirteen seconds for hours at a time, do 
not constitute progress, for Miller, but rather tragedy. People are not raised up by 
progress, but beaten down, reduced.
Baudelaire's rejection of the "new," which "makes no contribution at all to 
progress" ("Central Park," 53), as Benjamin notes, incorporates a similar suspicion and 
is expressed venomously as well. Benjamin contends that Baudelaire attacks the 
concept of progress "with his hate, as if it were heresy, false doctrine, rather than a 
simple error" (53). As suggested in his critique of newspapers above, Baudelaire 
conceives of progress as predominantly a human issue, as it relates to human
* cummings" title suggests, hopefully, a smashing of the domination of "numbers" 
and a blinding rationality.
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behaviors. The popular notion of progress, however, turns away from the mirror and 
looks for hope elsewhere. "La croyance au progrès est une doctrine de paresseux . . . .  
[....] Il ne peut y avoir de progrès (vrai, c'est-à-dire moral) que dans l'individu et par 
l'individu lui-même " [The belief in progress is a doctrine of the lazy—There can only 
be progress (true progress, that is to say moral) in the individual and by the individual] 
(Oeuvres 408). Products can only constitute progress to the degree that they improve 
the people themselves, or help people to improve themselves, and not merely their 
material conditions.
Baudelaire characterizes the individual as "ivre de son génie" [intoxicated with 
his/her genius] ("Le Voyage," FM, 158), hence incapable of determining what is truly 
of value. New products do not mark progress for Baudelaire; progress or its opposite— 
as suggested in Baudelaire's wrath against newspapers proclaiming "progress" 
alongside reports of murders, robberies, and other crimes—can be measured only in the 
behavior humans exhibit toward each other. As such, we might look at the prose 
poem about the glazier who sells colored glass and the treatment he receives at the 
hands of the narrator and see that consumer capitalism has engendered neither 
prosperity nor contentment, but rather frustration and bitterness, which is often 
unleashed upon the intermediaries of progress rather than the primary beneficiaries.
French artists in the second half of the nineteenth century rejected notions of 
"progress," in turning art in upon itself and denying that the market's role as ultimate 
judge, denying the work of art's necessary reference to the outer world, while at the 
same time striving for a realism that took them outside proper academic circles. 
Innovators of the movement, VA rt pour VA rt, included writers Gustave Flaubert and the 
Parnassians, and painters Gustave Courbet and Edouard Manet. Benjamin asserts that
299
what arises from I'A rt pour VA rt is "the conception of the total work of art, which 
attempts to isolate art against the developments of technology" (C5 172). Manet, 
discussing and defending his painting Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe [Picnic on the Grar^], 
refuses to link features of the painting to mythology or some "higher" intention, as 
academic painting would have. The stiffness of the figures in the painting prevent it, 
however, from being read as strictly a realistic painting. Instead, Manet encloses the 
painting within itself as an aesthetic whole, where the parts explain and justify each 
other. The painting, the novel, and the poem then follow their own laws which "are 
distinct from those of familiar reality, and [the artist's] first loyalty is to the canvas, 
not to the outside world" (Janson & Janson 379). Such a position rejects the 
marketplace because of its vulgarity, because it seeks only "copies of nature" as 
Baudelaire wrote rather than works that shock and challenge, and the corresponding 
drop in the quality of the works available there.
Legitimate scorn for the marketplace, however, which has reduced craftsmen to 
button-pushers and sacrificed quality for quantity, can only with difficulty be separated 
from elitism which simply detests the masses as beings without taste and education. 
Moreover, as artists find themselves on the defensive, attempting to satisfy an 
uncomprehending public, they often take harsher, more conservative, anti-democratic, 
anti-populist stands. Initially, however, it is possible that, along with academic art, 
many artists merely rejected the capitalist system, the marketplace, as the arbiter of 
value when it plainly devalued products through destroying craft, as an appropriate 
venue for art, and therefore suggests a rejection of "progress" rather than support for a 
strict and obtrusive elitism.
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Just as Miller calls for a critique of progress, a call that has yet to be heeded 
except by subcultures like the Beats of the fifties, the New Lefi and the Hippies of the 
'sixties, Baudelaire considers the concept of progress as a means of ignoring the 
present, since it "is predicated on a historical continuum"; current events, thus, have 
less weight and are merely "rooted in the past" (Blanchard 111). Rather than 
examining the present, and making demands on the here-and-now, many look forward 
to an improvement—/nrer Meanwhile, the majority of people live in misery, hence 
Benjamin's conception of progress, drawn from his study of nineteenth-century France, 
that it "is to be grounded in the idea of the catastrophe. That things 'just go on' is the 
catastrophe. [Progress]," he reminds us, "is not that which is approaching but that 
which is" ("Central Park" 50). The ideology of progress obliges, or at minimum 
encourages, people to ignore day-to-day life and to be distracted by planning for some 
vague future, since the life of the moment can be examined and judged. Progress, 
therefore, in the hands of the wealthy, replaces Christianity in the hands of the priests, 
as a slave morality, in Nietzsche's phrase, that keeps most people submissive and 
expectant. Belief in progress tends to subdue the rebellious elements in those who 
benefit least from the current system by promising future improvements—more 
products as a sort of heaven, a better environment to live in and more free time to 
enjoy it, developments which may or may not take place within the next several 
generations, since they have failed to occur in the last fifty years or more.
Like Miller, Rimbaud, as we have seen, clearly perceives the brutality inherent 
in progress. Imperialism, one of the underwriters of modem progress since it provides 
so much of the raw materials and impetus for "development" and change that fuels the 
system, embodies little or none of the paternalism popularly associated with it.
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Kristen Ross distinguishes Rimbaud’s anti-progress attitude from the typical anti­
progress attitude o f the nineteenth century, which she characterizes as "the clamor of 
bourgeois intellectuals who feared progress because th^r thought it meant equality" 
(28). At least one strain of the anti-progress protest is a protest against political 
liberalism, in the form of democracy and socialism. Rimbaud, as a champion of the 
Paris Commune and of the working class, rejects progress as he realizes that, contrary 
to then-current perceptions, "it has nothing to do with equality" (28) and everything to 
do with solidifying the current stratification of society which sustains continuing 
oppression. The notion of "progress" merely strengthens the position o f its main 
beneficiaries, the bourgeois class. Ross also opposes Rimbaud's prose, "a non­
expository, nondidactic prose," to a utilitarian prose in the service of "the great 
pedagogical movement of the century of progress" intended to effect "step by step 
enlightenment of the masses" (27)—in order to turn them into good workers. 
Understanding that education is incorporation, an instilling of the values of a certain 
culture, Rimbaud's prose can be understood as a sign that he supports "the side of 
emancipation raiher than pedagogy" (27-8).
Miller, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud perceive the brutality inherent in progress and 
realize, as well, that it functions as a distraction, as an incursion, that the modem 
world is fundamentally shaped by the concept of progress—only progress as popularly 
conceived differs substantially from progress as generally experienced. Human 
rationality, in the service of progress, especially technological progress, is 
dehumanizing, ignoring the individual and working against a more comprehensive 
vision of the world through simplification and confusion.
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Reason to the Nth Degree
As briefly discussed above, Charles Dickens' novel Hard Times depicts children 
forced to memorize and recapitulate facts. Dickens satirizes this type of schooling 
because he realizes that what is lost in the obsession with accumulating more and 
more facts is a broader understanding of the object under examination. The ability to 
list all the parts of a combustion engine does not ensure an understanding of how it 
functions nor the potential uses for such a machine. Miller expresses a similar distaste 
for such habits of mind: "This is a mania—exp/mnmg things. It goes with a certain 
type of mind which I abhor. And always leaves me with the feeling that nothing is 
explained, that we are simply eating into a hole" {Hamlet 114). Miller seems to be 
arguing that some things require a logical leap that moves beyond a simple gathering 
of facts; another possibility, however, is that Miller laments a focus on details when it 
is the larger, more encompassing perspective that needs clarification. Miller is 
suggesting, once again, that modem people obsess on the little things to the detriment 
of a more comprehensive vision of their world.
Max Horkheimer describes such a habit of mind, wherein "[ejverything and 
everybody is classified and labelled" {Eclipse 23), as an approach to making sense of 
the world which actually reduces it. While science requires methods of organization 
to impose on chaotic nature, these schemata have only limited utility and should not 
be mistaken for what they describe. Horkheimer warns against an uncritical use of 
them, especially in the field of philosophy, writing, "the logic of identity is a symptom 
of the quest for certainty, the all-too-human impulse to trim intellectual needs down to 
pocket size" (167). It is this "trimming" which Miller alludes to when he writes of 
explanation as "eating into a hole"—explanations carried out so far, in hope of reaching
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some final understanding, that the concepts lose all shape and connection with their 
origin and become, in effect, false.
Especially when applied to people, such tendencies can become dysfunctional. 
"The pigeon-hole into wdiich a man is shoved," writes Horkheimer, "circumscribes his 
fate" {Eclipse 23). Rather than allowing workers to develop a variety of skills, 
employers prefer to nurture and exploit one narrowly specialized skill, in each person. 
A worker, then, is labelled a machinist, or what-have-you, and fitted into some scheme 
under that single designation. As we saw in the previous chapter, such labelling 
induces a certain de-skilling of laborers, such that one particular skill develops while 
others atrophy. The effect of this upon the worker, as Marx has described it, is to 
inspire alienation, for the worker is no longer truly engaged in work. Moreover, he or 
she is now much easier to replace. The kind of reasoning Horkheimer denounces 
produces goods faster, with lower expenses, but at the price of the worker's loyalty, 
career development, humanity.
Such an appropriation of reason can be directly related to progress, to Francis 
Bacon's notion that "the end of knowledge is utility," for reason, along with most 
everything else, becomes subjugated to usefulness: It is instrumentalized, its value 
based solely upon the uses to which it can be put. Reason, finally, is "completely 
harnessed to the social process" and assessed with regard to its effectiveness in "its 
role in the domination of men and nature" (Horkheimer, Eclipse, 21). Truly, as 
Rimbaud wrote, "the vision of numbers."
What is missing in this focus on reason, naturally, is humanity, and, more to 
the point for Henry Miller, something that humans, like nature, are quite enable of 
but not always willing or able to express. Miller quotes French writer Henri de
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Montherlant and then harangues those Wio today we might call bureaucrats or
number-cnmchers:
"I'm not talking logic. I’m talking generosity." [....] You think to 
supply guns and ammunition to the winning side is generosity. You 
think sending Red Cross nurses to the front or the Salvation Army is 
generosity. [...]; you think if you give a man his old job back it's 
generosity. You don't even know what the fucking word means, you 
bastards! To be generous is to say Yes before the man even opens his 
mouth. You can even say Yes and No at the same time, provided you 
do more than is expected of you. (Ccpricom 294-95)
Miller revolts against reason when those exercising it can ignore what we call today
"the human element," the human cost or impact, and even suggests that reason has
only a limited role in human relations if it can be used to argue agcanst generosity. As
with lending. Miller's call for generosity can be read as self-serving, but such a narrow
reading collapses quickly, for Miller seeks to influence actions well beyond the mere
exchange of money. Progress and reason, for Miller, as well as Baudelaire and
Rimbaud, must be linked to humans, to human development and to relations among
humans.
In order to better understand Miller's critique of reason, it might be helpful to 
look at Horkheimer's analysis of reason in Eclipse o f Reason. Horkheimer divides 
reason into subjective and objective reason. Subjective reason can be understood, 
basically, as reason seen through the Baconian lens, reason as relative to what is 
useful, productive, remunerative. Objective reason, alternatively, is founded upon 
some universal or broadly cultural sense of right and wrong—usually on some religious 
sense of the world. Horkheimer claims that in the era of high capitalism subjective is 
now more dominant than objective. He does not, however, relegate objective reason 
to the dunghill of the past.
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Miller rejects subjective reason, for it results in generosity that is offered only 
because it is useful, convenient, productive. Generosity, in that case, is largely self- 
serving. In contrast, the poor giving alms to the poor, as Engels describes it, provides 
an example of people giving charity because they empathize with the supplicant and 
because this person is part of the community and the role of each member of a 
community is to help those in need.
What Miller advocates instead, for example in his attitude toward money, is a 
move away from subjective reason, perhaps even from reason in general, into a full- 
fledged, heart-felt generosity, like "the fool who . . . gives without question" (Sexus 
62), wherein people truly live the Christian ideal of giving. Subjective reason balks at 
such logic, and occasionally Miller relates encounters with Christians espousing a 
mixture of subjective and objective reason, refusing to lend money with the words that 
God will provide, never questioning whether God had sought to provide through them. 
Refusing to lend Miller money towards his rent, one such friend says, "God will 
shelter you with His blessed wings. He watches over the homeless just as much as He 
does over others" {Plexus 202-03). Such Christianity appears heartless.
Furthermore, reason dominated by the concept of utility has helped to destroy 
the beauty of America and cities in the West in general, as we saw in Chapter One. 
"Everything that was of beauty, significance or promise has been destroyed and buried 
in the avalanche of false progress," Miller writes during his tour o f America in 1940 
{Nightmare 36). Rather than renovate or restore, those who take responsibility for 
modernizing cities usually prefer to raze old buildings and replace them with new 
buildings, structures not designed to last but to be once again replaced. The result is 
that cities in America, except where they are abandoned to the poor, are often largely
306
composed of modem buildings designed widi immediate utilitarian concerns, rather 
than a sense that a building contributes to the skyline, to the history and beauty of a 
city, to the life of the citizens. In many European cities, buildings—especially those 
built before the First World War—have the year they were completed and the name of 
the architect engraved on them, suggesting both the historical place of the building as 
well as the architect's pride in the design. Such information has no place in a city 
with little or no architectural history and whose buildings further few aesthetic values.
Development, thus, where it has occurred has often not been a positive 
experience for cities or city-dwellers. As James Kunstler notes, progress has ruined 
the cities and towns: "Ever-busy, ever-building, ever-in-motion, ever-throwing-out the 
old for the new, we have hardly paused to think about what we are so busy building, 
and what we have thrown away" (10). Like Miller, Baudelaire, Rimbaud and 
Benjamin, among many others, Kunstler laments the apparently blind force of 
progress, the bull in the china shop, the vision of numbers, the idea that bigger is 
better simply because it is bigger, or more is better because it is more. Baudelaire, 
when confronted with a Paris transformed by Haussmann, which seemed to embody 
the "promise of change-as-progress" (Buck-Morss 178), pens "Le Cygne" [The Swan], 
a despairing poem that does not so much lament the lost past as the fact that the 
present is no better, for all the change: "Paris change! mais rien dans ma mélancolie / 
N’a bougé!" [Paris changes! but nothing in my melancholy / has altered!] ("Le Cygne," 
FM, 96). The sense of loss has not been ameliorated by marveling over the new. 
Everything, beauty included, is subordinated to utility, to money-making, rather than 
providing an attractive environment in which people can live peacefully. "Progress," 
broadly conceived, is yet again deferred.
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Miller, in his criticism of the lack of human generosity as well as in his 
criticism of cities, suggests the existence of a conflict between instrumental reason and 
aesthetic values. Horkheimer and Adorno seem to agree, only they view the struggle 
as largely over. "The earth, now rational, no longer feels the need of an aesthetic 
reflection" (251), they assert. They are not quite correct, however, for people do need 
"aesthetic reflection," for instance the relaxation afforded by the cinema, when they 
leave their machines for the day. Aesthetic reflection has value, is even encouraged, 
when it serves a useful end—nurturing and rejuvenating exhausted workers so they can 
toil day after day—but it should not inspire viewers to reflect upon their existence, 
should not suggest that life could be otherwise, for then its utilitarian aims would be 
thwarted by strikes or slowdowns. Hence, aesthetic reflection has been limited and 
subordinated to a functional end, hollowed out, in the Benjaminian sense.
Consequently, reason, advanced with little or no concern for humans, has served to 
curb human experience rather than to extend it.
Raging Against the Machine
Life is certainly not more filled with experience when most everything that 
occurs must consistently be related back to some utilitarian end. For Miller, "the life 
of the modem man is pale and empty. [....] He has become the victim of his own inner 
emptiness; his torments are the torments of sterility" {Time 126-27). The machine age 
inaugurates the age of humans as automatons, going through the daily gestures of life, 
work, and love, without any real interest, without energy, lulled into the half-sleep 
within which they function. Moreover, the department store, which Sennett describes 
as the "complement to the factory" {Public 143), helps further transform the public
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sphere into "an experience of publicness more intense and less sociable" (141). Rather 
than interacting with merchants, in bargaining over prices, products stirring up 
customers' desires are now marked with their prices, and the customer's options are 
either to purchase the product at that price or to move on to another store. The silence 
typifying the merchant-customer relationship spreads to envelop relationships between 
customers as well.
Writing of Rimbaud, Miller notes that for him, "the earth was not a dead place 
. . . but a live, throbbing mysterious planet, where men, if they but knew it may dwell 
as kings" (Time 156). It is not fate that has made the world the way it is, but people 
who look for progress, in the outside world only, rather than comparing their lives, as 
they are, with the notion of progress. Because of choices people have made, the 
planet has become "an eyesore" (156). Horkheimer notes the human cost of progress 
should probably have been visible as far back as the time of Bacon. "Domination of 
nature," he writes, "involves domination of man" (Eclipse 93). In order for people to 
subdue nature, to bend it to their uses, they "must subjugate nature" in themselves 
(93), must repress desires and needs, whatever is not amenable to the utilitarian aims 
of control and domination—hence, the sterility denounced by Miller. Sennett argues in 
The Fall o f Public Man that one site where such subjugation manifests itself is the 
public sphere where people regard one another but do not interact, for fear of giving 
themselves away, o f betraying emotions and inclinations that might be misinterpreted, 
or for fear of being different.
At the same time, as people struggle to dominate themselves and nature, they 
rarely stop to question the purpose of it all, beyond making money, either for 
themselves or others. "What have we [America] to offer the world," Miller asks,
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beside the super-abundant loot which we recklessly plunder from the 
eartib under the delusion that this insane activity represents progress and 
enlightenment? The land of opportunity has become the land of 
senseless sweat and plunder. {Nightmare 20)
Such activity, for Miller, dedicated to thankless toil for most and to amassing wealth
for a few, is not an end in itself, and whatever purposes it serves, whatever roles it
appears to play in the life of human beings, it is work and it is destruction. In the
name of progress, labor continues and is constantly refrned, but without essentially
changing its character, usually only making it more demanding. A select few gain
greater wealth and can purchase more and more products, or businesses, but the lives
of the many remain largely unchanged if not actually worsened.
Horkheimer argues, "the blind development of the technology strengthens social 
oppression" {Eclipse 134). The artisanal quality once associated with much labor is 
outmoded when labor is reduced to maintenance of machines or to simple, repetitive 
motions. Workers come to realize they are easily replaceable—and had better submit if 
they wish to keep their income. More broadly. Miller asserts, echoing Engels’ 
statement at the beginning of this chapter, "We never think beforehand of the 
consequences which a new invention entails" {Remember xxix); though he refers to the 
atom bomb, his assessment can be related to other developments. Moreover, Paul 
LaFargue, writing in 1880, argued that such blindness went all the way back to the 
Greeks of Cicero's time, where it was thought that the invention of a water-powered 
mill would free slaves and workers to enjoy leisure. Instead, he writes, it 
impoverished them (31). W. J. Cash provides a more recent illustration of the 
problem, observing in 1939 that the invention of a cotton picking machine "promises 
to eliminate most or all of the sharecroppers and a great many of the tenants within a
310
short period, since it overcomes the last and principal barrier to the mechanization of 
Southern cotton farming" (411). Picking cotton may be back-breaking labor, but for 
some it is the only work they have. The new machine displaces not only the 
sharecroppers, but also tenants unable to afford the purchase of such machines. 
Displaced sharecroppers and tenants are then forced into cities where there may be few 
jobs for unskilled laborers and those to be had will be poorly compensated, thus 
further alienating a group of workers already discontented. Cash adds that there will 
be other victims, for with more and more cotton on the market and the price 
plummeting, the new machine will only contribute to the glut and the downward spiral 
of cotton prices. An invention such as a cotton picking machine, thus, threatened the 
livelihood of even those who, theoretically, would benefit the most—the large 
landowners. As a harbinger of progress, the cotton picking machine bore with it, 
alongside the technological wizardry it represented, socially- and economically- 
destructive elements.
Another alienating effect of the newer machines employed in factories, as 
described by Benjamin, is that working them no longer constituted "experience"; since 
each movement was identical to the previous one, the worker cannot improve {CB 
133). It is, writes Benjamin, "work . . . devoid of substance (135). Machines, whether 
they be cars, sewing machines, or telephones, demand more and more of their 
operators, requiring faster and faster reactions, both physical and mental, while at the 
same time demanding less and less of them—as beings with a particular set of skills to 
be utilized. In Miller's view, "acceleration . . .  is the keynote to this new epoch" 
{Remember xxix), and in order to sustain the momentum people must more narrowly
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focus their attention, again regulating and adjusting themselves in their attempt to 
dominate themselves, to repress anything that might distract.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Spengler and Miller agree that people are
only valued in relation to the machines they operate. They must "serve them if [they]
are to survive," writes Horkheimer {Eclipse 97). Miller, likewise, views people as
conquered by "our great inventions" {Remember yodx). Machines determine what
procedures a worker performs as well as at what pace they must be executed. "We
pretend that we created them for our own use, but we are no longer the masters, we
are the victims" (xxix). William Morris, writing in the second half of the nineteenth
century, recognizes a similar feature of the machine age. He asserts,
if the necessary reasonable work be of a mechanical kind, I must be 
helped to do it by a machine, not to cheapen my labor, but so that as 
little time as possible may be spent upon it, and that I may be able to 
think of other things while I am tending the machine. (152)
Morris describes technology serving human beings, not the other way around, so that
the person "tending the machine" can be released from wretched servitude and allowed
at least greater mental freedom, so that worker community may be develop on the job.
But for owners and managers, machines and humans have different and unequal status.
While a worker is usually easily replaceable, due to the minute division of labor, a
machine represents an investment; if it goes off-line, if it is improperly operated or
shoddily maintained, the owner stands to lose money in profits, through lower
productivity as well as repair bills. New machines often lead to greater
unemployment, at least in the short run. Those who still have jobs must adapt to the
requirements of the machine—or relinquish the position.
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And even as more work is demanded of factory laborers, they do not inevitably 
receive pay increases, are often expected to be thankful they even have jobs. Such an 
outlook explains, in part. Miller and Horkheimer's shared notion that progress, 
technological developments hailed without any foresight into the results for humans, 
"threatens at every stage to transform progress into its opposite, complete barbarism" 
{Eclipse 134). Further, rather than incorporating the human element into planning, 
what Iggers calls "the cult of efficiency" threatens "the elimination of the personal 
factor" through strengthening "rational social and political control" and the 
"establishment of impersonal regulation by means of bureaucracy" (60). The 
individual ceases to have value as a human being, instead becomes interchangeable, a 
cheap commodity whose life outside the factory demands little or no consideration 
from the management who, responsible to those above, seldom treat workers as 
anything other than instruments of the factory.
Workers thus reduced are less likely to take any rebellious steps or to do 
anything that will cause the bosses and owners any problems, for the powers aligned 
against the individual seem so all-powerful that the individual merely chooses "to 
launch himself onto the path prescribed for him" (Horkheimer, Critique 4). Pierre 
Gascar notes that already in the nineteenth century such a system was in place, and 
aroused the dissatisfaction of French workers, whose "sense of isolation and 
oppression" was due "in large part from the new form of life industrialization imposed 
on them" (64)—and which kept them narrowly confined. Progress, then, must be 
conceived as victimhood, as Miller asserted; or, to put it more dialectically, with 
"progress" there come victors and victims, remarkable advances and staggering defeats.
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The surrender of both the outer and the inner life, by the worker, coincides 
with the decline of aesthetic enjoyment for its own sake. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, a person not working is l a ^ —or is perceived that way by the bosses as well as 
those in the communities who regard dawdling as an evil. "Relaxation," writes 
Horkheimer, "comes to be regarded as a kind of vice so far as it is not necessary to 
assure fimess for further activity" {Eclipse 152). The issue is that people should be 
gainfully employed, producing for the owners, not relaxing or dreaming, neither 
producing something quantifiable nor purchasing products such that they contribute to 
the economy. Kunstler observes that "if the worker was a new kind of slave, then the 
industrial method of production itself was the new master" (71), such that economic 
necessity, as we have already seen, takes its place as the new boss. That being the 
case, however, Kunstler contends that the daily reality of the workers, ”[t]he naked 
brutality of industry was the most difficult thing to reconcile with any theory of the 
utopian future" (71). "Progress" for the average laborer was not toward an 
amelioration of life but entailed an actual worsening of conditions. While there were 
some who benefited from technological advances, workers by and large did not. 
Technological advances either further enslaved them, deprived them of their jobs—or 
passed them by, inspiring resentment; perhaps they were lucky enough to own an 
automobile; if so they could not afford the new ones though they did notice them, 
which served only "to inflame [their] envy" (Cash 268). Fashion, that dream-world, 
becomes submerged in another dream-world, progress, and prompts desires that—quite 
often—can only be thwarted.
The life of the worker is, in large part, one of disappointment, even misery. 
Their surroundings, the tenements as well as the factories themselves, inspire only
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further distress. Even modem architecture, in the form of a factory designed by one of
the master architects of the age, Frank Lloyd Wright, does little to relieve the situation
for the worker. Miller, who visited a factory Wright designed, contends that while
such architecture might adhere strictly to modernist aesthetic principles, it fails to
correspond to human aesthetics and only abets the misery of the worker;
This place is flawless—deathlike. Man has no chance to create once 
inside this mausoleum. Just work endlessly. Man doesn't want to work 
efficiently. He wants to work inefficiently. This is perfect for 
automatons. Not for men and women. Here you work fully exposed— 
every movement can be detected. It's a theatrical performance and the 
wages are death. {Nightmare Notebook n.p.)
The antiseptic architecture, designed for an aesthetically anemic culture, merely
provides an apt backdrop to the inhuman activity that takes place inside it in front of
machines. At the same time, it provides owners and managers the means for greater
control of workers, thus aligning architecture with the side of oppression.
Rather than augmenting life, providing a counterpoint to the monotonous work
going on inside it, modem architecture generally reflects the inhumanity of life as it is
currently lived, finally reinforces what is already a day-to-day reality. "It is sad to
think," writes Miller,
that a country which has the greatest advantages has so little to show 
for it. It is sad to think that scarcely anyone likes the job he is doing, 
that scarcely anyone believes in the work he is doing, that almost no 
one . . . sees any hope in the future. It is even more sad to observe that 
no real effort is made to do anything about anything. {Remember xvrn)
For Miller, as for Charles Baudelaire and Arthur Rimbaud, it is the individual and life
which matters, but individuals rarely unite to take matters into their own hands and try
to change things. The assumption of bourgeois values by the working class, one form
of consumer capitalism's attack on individualism, helps to further destroy their sense of
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community, and without organization they often lose sight of those circumstances that 
unite them—and differentiate them from those for whom they work.
Miller's warning, within the context of "work," is worth repeating within the 
context o f "progress": "Earning a living has nothing to do with living" (40). The idea 
that either working is living or that having a job will allow a person to benefit from 
"progress," to purchase all the new commodities on the market, is misguided. The 
sense of community, as well as the family itself, can be seen to suffer from such a 
confused notion of what constitutes life; either work or the accumulation of "things," 
or both, becomes the focus of people's lives, but neither can be absolutely described as 
constituting the blessings of progress.
The acceleration that characterizes modernity, for Miller, reflects the influence 
of machines. This acceleration is part and parcel of the machine age. But these 
machines, occasionally serving people but more often served by them, force people to 
surrender to them (Horkheimer and Adorno 222). Progress, here, means capitulation, 
incorporation—m Miller's term, victimization.
Rescuing the Individual
Incorporation is antithetical to freedom, because it happens without people 
really being wholly aware of it, and because it tends to produce people with much the 
same outlook and too many of the same desires. While such molding might serve the 
capitalist system, ensuring smooth functioning of factories and otlier sites of 
production—department stores—it does not serve the individual. "Freedom," writes 
Miller, "is bound up with differentiation" {Time 49)—different goals in life, different 
hopes for the future, and different tastes in clothes, hairstyles, and movies. The only
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way for the individual to survive, in this world dominated by machines and mass 
culture, is to wage an all-out struggle to maintain "one’s unique identity in a world 
tending to make everyone and everything alike" (49). Much of this uniqueness, 
certainly, is already lost in people who form part of a society, but vestiges of 
uniqueness may remain and these vestiges, even more under attack in our time, are 
what Miller refers to.
Friedrich Nietzsche, writing in a late nineteenth-century Germany struggling 
behind the rest of the West to modernize itself, remarks, "Our time, however much it 
talks of economy, is a squanderer: it squanders what is most precious, the spirit" 
{Portable, The Dawn, 83). His complaint, remarkably similar to Miller's, laments 
reducing the skills of a worker to one repetitive motion, and thus using only a small 
measure of a worker s capabilities, and laments as well a focus on externals, on 
improving life through technology, producing commodities, expanding cities, or 
writing new laws, rather than exploring the ways people live and providing more 
opportunities for people to expand themselves in that way.
Baudelaire, in Mon Coeur mis à nu, recognizes what Nietzsche will later point 
out when he refers to ”[l]es abolisseurs d'âme {matérialistes)" [the abolishers of the 
spirit {materialists)} {Oeuvres 410), those who dedicated themselves to accumulating 
things for the sake of having things, those who feed off a culture rather than contribute 
to it. In this way, the critique returns to that of the bourgeois household, emulated by 
working class households, seeking only to conform, which, as Horkheimer asserts,
”[i]n our era of large economic combines and mass culture . . . [is] raised to the rank 
of an ideal per se" {Eclipse 139). Conformity, especially a blind conformity, results in 
a diminution of experience.
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"The wonder and the mystery of life—which is throttled in us as we become 
responsible members of society!" {Capricorn 144), Miller declaims. The world of the 
child seems so small and limited, he writes, but contains "boundless potentialities" 
(145). "I have gained nothing by the enlargement of my world," he adds; "on the 
contrary, I have lost" (145). It is a wider world that he journeys into, but a world 
shorn of mystery, delight, chance, and reduced to drudgery. Physically larger, it has 
become a house without rooms, furniture, paintings, with little or nothing to attract the 
eye, feed the imagination, providing only a minimum of what humans need to live.
In The Dawn, Nietzsche, as do Miller and Horkheimer, asserts that the trade-off 
workers believe they are making, in submitting to the machine, plainly constitutes 
surrender;
Phew! to believe that higher pay could abolish the essence of their 
misery—I mean their impersonal serfdom! Phew! to be talked into 
thinking that an increase in this impersonality, within the machinelike 
workings of a new society, could transform the shame of slavery into a 
virtue! Phew! to have a price for which one remains a person no longer 
but becomes a gear! (90)
Asserting that progress has moved in exactly the opposite direction from that
counseled by William Morris, above, this progress reflects progressive enslavement,
progressive dehumanization, rather than progress toward self-realization and greater
freedom.
But this dehumanized society is the world as Miller, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud, 
came to know it, a world growing into itself. It is this civilization now, that defines 
what human beings are, what they can become, what they should be and must be. So 
when Miller proclaims, "If I am inhuman it is because . . .  to be human seems like a 
poor, sorry, miserable affair" (Cancer 259), it is because human beings remain largely
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the prisoners of custom, of duty, of so-called necessity, rarely advancing and 
expanding themselves outside die paths laid-out for them, rarely taking risks except 
perhaps on Wall Street, and, instead, repressing themselves. Machines, though 
consistently refined, only rarely alleviate the stress and suffering of the human being. 
That people accept this state of affairs persuades Miller his only option is to become 
"inhuman," which means to attempt to live out the possibilities most humans in the 
West deny themselves, to be almost criminally negligent in evading the responsibilities 
one is supposed to assume.
Nevertheless, the greatest number of people simply continue along the paths 
mapped out for them, doing just as they are told. Like the good worker, they must be 
reasonable, though "to be reasonable," as Max Horkheimer warns, usually "means not 
to be obstinate," which would be to show a flicker of life; to be reasonable means to 
be in "conformity with reality as it is" {Eclipse 10). This reality, "as it is," defined by 
the state and/or those who benefit from wage labor, is the "economic necessity" that 
owners benefit from and which makes work a necessity. "When will we forget about 
the state," Miller asks, "and think of humanity, of ourselves . . .  ?" {Remember xxi). 
Such an attitude is unreasonable, selfish, perhaps even treasonous, and almost certainly 
"inhuman." In Miller's view, however, while the state demands much of people, their 
individuality which must be sacrificed in their submission to "economic necessity," the 
state offers little in return. "Everything proceeds from the living individual" 
{Remember xxi). Miller writes, asserting once more his long-standing concern for the 
individual. The state exists as "the specter of tyranny" (xxi), where only the strong, 
perhaps, survive—or, more specifically, benefit. But the survival of the strong is not 
enough; "There can be no common good unless the individual is recognized first and
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foremost—and until the last, the weakest, of men is included" (xxi). This last assertion 
echoes Eugene V. Debs’ claim, which Miller quotes in "Murder the Murderer," that 
only when there is no one in prison will he be free. Such an echo aligns Miller with 
those who champion "the little guy" or the "forgotten worker."
As a banned writer. Miller was well-aware of how little freedom he and others 
had, and of how illusory such freedom generally was. "What do we actually see and 
hear today?" he asks. "What the censors [i.e. those in power] permit us to see and 
hear, nothing more" {Nightmare 44). Despite improved printing technologies and new 
electronic media (film and radio), the appearance of a wider and freer dissemination of 
information remained deceptive.’ Such censorship, an example of which regarding 
movies we examined in Chapter Two, is never apolitical. Along with electricity has 
come a greater number of cultural artifacts—movies and books, magazines and 
newspapers, radio and television—and along with that more repression, more 
regulations about what can be promulgated and what cannot.
"The age of electricity is as far behind us as the Stone Age," Miller writes 
{Time 35), referring to archeological means of describing an epoch based on its level 
of technological development. The acceleration so characteristic of this age, made 
possible with electric and gasoline engines, has served to more quickly distance people 
of the modem era from those of the past, such that the lives of grandparents or great- 
grandparents are almost unimaginable. Life without a refrigerator?—Impossible. No 
cinema?—What did you do at night? Electric technology, so pervasive in Miller’s
’ This is to sidestep the question of the implications o f "information," which 
Walter Benjamin considers in "The Storyteller" and "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," 
both in Illuminations. Newspapers, for instance, present information as a series of 
unrelated items, provoking a sense of the futility of action on the part of the reader.
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world and ours, is insufficient to describe the modem era. It is the uses to which 
technology is put, finally, that become definitive—hunting, cooking, or city-building.
For Miller, tihe state utilizes modem technologies to maintain control. "This is 
the Age of Power, power pure and simple" (35), he writes in 1949—several years after 
the Americans had dropped an atom bomb and a hydrogen bomb on Japan, the Soviet 
Union had taken over much of Eastem Europe, the Chinese were fighting a civil war, 
the Koreans gearing up for one, and while the McCarthy era was in full stride in the 
land of the free, attacking free speech, the fifth amendment, and other basic rights. On 
a more local level, everything, from the reign of machines to the ubiquitous radio and 
newspaper, functions to maintain the status quo, if not to actually increase the power 
of those goveming. Miller's declaration of the primacy of the role of power 
anticipates a similar theme later taken up by French post-structuralist Michel Foucault, 
the philosopher "credited with welcoming the concept of power into the contemporary 
philosophical landscape" (Kelley 1), most importantly in his 1975 (in French) 
Discipline and Punish. In regarding censorship and mass media as ubiquitous. Miller 
senses what Foucault describes, the networks of power, the dynamism of these 
networks, their expansive reach.
To assert one's individuality in the face of such forces, to identify with certain 
values not popularly accepted and to live according to them, may seem to mark one a 
madman, write Horkheimer and Adorno. They hold that in an age of mass media, 
when incorporation threatens from all sides, to remain an individual requires 
"superhuman" strength (240). People \^ o  do not live according to society's rules, who 
envision the world differently, are labelled neurotic not only by those who stand to 
lose the most but by those who are themselves "incorporated, " for they too have been
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taught to consider such behavior abnormal. This strength, that Horkheimer and 
Adorno write of, is to keep the "neurotic" in that state in order "not to become healthy 
[i.e. sick] too" (240). Benjamin, anticipating them, had earlier written, "The hero is 
the true subject of modernism. In other words, it takes a heroic constitution to live 
modernism" {CB 74), and attributed such a sentiment to Baudelaire, Balzac and others. 
Benjamin describes suicide, after noting the recurrence o f themes of suicide in 
nineteenth century literature, as "an act which seals a heroic will that makes no 
concessions to a mentality inimical toward this will. This suicide is not a resignation 
but a heroic passion" (75). However difficult it may be to accept this last part, in an 
age that struggles to assure itself life is "worth it" by vilifying suicide, Benjamin's 
point is comprehensible: The struggle to live, a battle with little possibility of victory, 
is exhausting, and suicide provides an escape from abject defeat.
Consumer Capitalism and Human Evolution
For Miller, it is not only the individual, who is sick, but modem society as a 
whole, as it is, as it is supposed to be, according to popular modem self-conceptions, 
disseminated in advertising and movies and magazines and newspapers, where 
technology serves fashion to insure future purchases, where accumulation for the sake 
of accumulation is valorized. Modem consumer capitalism simply creates new needs, 
in order to sell products, and consumers quite often simply follow along.
Peter Gay, in his biography of Sigmund Freud, reports Freud's assertion, in his 
Introductory Lectures, that the world has undergone three revolutions: "Copemicus 
had displaced humanity from the center of the world; Darwin had compelled it to 
recognize its kinship with animals; he, Freud, had shown that reason is not master in
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its own house” (Gay 580). Another revolution Freud might have acknowledged, one 
described by Marx in The German Ideology, is the recognition that "the satisfaction of 
the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument o f satisfaction which has 
been acquired) leads to new needs" {G I49). As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
artificial creation of desire altered, in a fundamental way, the lives of humans.
Products they had never known and never sensed a lack of soon became necessities 
and led to further purchases, to further "alienated consumption." With the rise of 
department stores and modem advertising, the need for greater and greater 
consumption in order for the capitalist system to experience continual growth, the need 
to create desire fueled creativity, induced a greater preoccupation with "progress." The 
near past soon began to look like the Dark Ages.
As such, the modem world exists as a place "suited to the monomaniacs 
obsessed with the idea of progress—but," adds Miller, "a false progress, a progress 
which stinks" {Nightmare 24). The modem world is, above all, characterized by a 
surface "progress," an illusory progress, a delusion fostered by an abundance of 
commodities, a progress that leaves many of the poorest people still living by earlier 
standards. Moreover, quality begins to suffer as quantity becomes the focus of 
industry. "It is a world cluttered with useless objects," Miller asserts, "which men and 
women, in order to be exploited and degraded, are taught to regard as useful" 
{Nightmare 24), or, more precisely, as absolutely necessary. Thus, they willingly 
submit to the work regime. The capitalist world is typified by education-as- 
incorporation, though not school-education alone, but education through mass media, 
especially advertising, an education that thrives on, even as it reinforces, the notion
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that technological development is the keynote of the era and constitutes, in and of 
itself, an undeniable good.
But technological development did not (and still does not) inevitably lead to 
purchases. A novelty might not be affordable or immediately desirable, if it does not 
obviously relate to material needs. Nevertheless, Columbia economist Edward R. 
Seligman argues that technological developments will retain an evolutionary role, that 
they will change the way people live and conceive their day to day world. Confirming 
Marx’s declaration above, Seligman asserts, "Progress may be the process of 
converting superfluities into conveniences, and conveniences into necessities. The 
diversification of consumption lies at the root of human development" (qtd in Leach 
295). In short, human evolution is connected to "progress," involves overt 
manipulation, altenng people's lives through convincing them they need some new 
product {controlled diversification), and then helping them grow dependent upon that 
product (if not because it represents a technological breakthrough, then through 
advertising, for instance, which reinforces its social value), thus insuring future 
generations of purchasers as well. The refrigerator, for instance, now frees people so 
that they need shop only once or twice a week, rather than daily. A person who does 
not own a refrigerator (a television might be a more appropriate example for today) is 
not really living in the modem world and is, thus, a suspicious type. Why don't you 
buy a refrigerator? we want to ask. At the same time, shopping once thrust a person 
daily into a communal existence such that he or she came into frequent contact with 
neighbors and merchants. The refrigerator, however, allows people to withdraw from 
such communal relationships, subtly encourages it even; Now, you only have to shop 
once a week. Progress, in this instance, is measured not simply in increased
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convenience but also in the further atomization of communities and the increased 
isolation of individuals. And while the refngerator can be said to have freed women 
from the house, to some extent, in many cases it simply freed them to submit to 
someone or something else.
The profusion of products on the market, however, conceals the fact that in 
many cases there is only a negligible difference between one product and another, 
more specifically one brand and another, hence no genuine choice. But the shades of 
difference "between equally-priced popular articles," a difference often "corroborated 
by 'scientific tests,' is dinned into the consumer's mind . . .  as if it represented a 
revelation altering the entire course of the world rather than an illusory fraction that 
makes no real difference . . . "  {Eclipse 99).'° Though such a statement is less true for 
connoisseurs or aficionados of a certain product, it remains true in general and 
explains in part the oft-repeated refrain we hear when running to the store for someone 
else, "Get whatever's cheapest." Benjamin, moreover, charges that consumers who 
worked with craftsmen became knowledgeable about the product they were purchasing, 
often learning from the craftsman when negotiating its construction and price; as 
buyers in department stores, however, they are "not usually knowledgeable" {CB 104) 
beyond whatever limited experience they bring with them.
But these mass produced articles, altering the lives of purchasers, unite people 
in their desire for these products. "Mechanization," which bound workers hand and
'° The "Coke and Pepsi Taste Tests" of the 1980s can be viewed, for instance, as 
an argument not only that one soft drink was better than the other (the ostensible 
argument), but also that there was a difference. It would make little sense to do "taste 
tests" that compared gin and whisky, hence the implication in the "Coke and Pepsi 
Taste Tests" is that the soft drinks are similar in taste and composition.
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foot to machines, also "made possible the mass production of culture in the form of 
consumable objects" (Trachtenberg, Incorporation^ 150). Once an article is mass 
produced, its value as a cultural artifact is that everyone has it and is, thus, united by 
common ownership. On the other hand, as an artifact it can be trivialized, to the point 
where ownership of a particular item becomes requisite among a certain population 
and yet meaningless, like a Steinway piano in a house where no one can play.
In "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Benjamin writes 
of the "aura" of objects that are singular, that are original. Once the item is mass 
produced, the aura is separated from the object; the aura is no longer meaningful 
because the art work has been separated from its context {Iliumincaions 223). It lives, 
i f  it lives, on what might be called residual meaning: whatever meaning or 
understanding a viewer brings to something is the meaning it comes to possess. 
Benjamin also observes that mass-produced articles become "imitations" {CB 105), 
such that a piano in every house underscores the "mass" facet of its production. A 
mass produced item whose worth is solely fashionable and only for a season is thus 
essentially a meaningless accoutrement—the residual meaning vanishes with time and it 
comes to represent not the skill of one worker or a few workers but of machines. 
Another result of mass production is that fashion becomes much more important for 
retailers, for new seasons and new fashions must inspire new purchases (Leach 93). 
Clothes cannot be made to wear-out within a season, because purchasers generally still 
search for and recognize quality, on some level, even if they will gladly retire such 
articles once the winds of fashion have rendered them obsolete, whether they are good 
as new or not. Therefore, as Benjamin noted, describing the Parisian fashion world of 
Baudelaire's era, "Fashion prescribed the ritual by which the fetish Commodity wished
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to be worshipped" {CB 166), which alerts die purchaser to how something is worn, 
appropriate occasions for wearing it, and proper longevity of the article.
Like fashion, technological development o f household appliances as well as 
other household items (radios, phonographs) also serves to insure future sales. Minor 
improvements, hyped to appear dramatic and necessary, inspire people to discard 
perfectiy functioning machinery to replace it with the latest "improved" version. It is 
in this way, according to Horkheimer, that science becomes subservient to economic 
forces—big business and the government. Money invested in universities as well as 
private foundations involved in scientific research focusses less on inquisitiveness, on 
what interests a particular scientist, than on the possibility of lucrative results 
(Horkheimer, Eclipse, 72). Horkheimer argues funding often produces results, "for 
instance in the production of the best baby foods, super-explosions, and propaganda 
methods; but one could hardly claim that it contributes to the progress of real thought" 
(72). Once again we see knowledge linked to utilitarian ends, hence to improvements 
and small breakthroughs, rather than revolutionary change. As we have seen in other 
areas, city-planning for instance, a focus on profits invariably results in a limitation of 
aims. The scientist, like the worker, must dominate or repress desires, theories, 
aspirations in order to receive funding to achieve quite limited but quite achievable 
goals. Considerations outside those related to profits attract little attention, and so 
there is little real examination of a new product's, or a new system’s, often tangential 
connection to progress. Advertisements will assert such a connection, through 
extravagant claims perhaps, but these claims are likely transparent to a critical 
purchaser.
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There is such belief in progress, however, such a sense of the importance of 
each technological development, diat as another faith, it shares some of the same 
weaknesses that critics o f certain Christian groups/sects outline One can criticize the 
lack of tolerance for differing viewpoints, within certain Christian groups, as a sign of 
weak faith, to argue diat these groups attempt to exclude views that differ from theirs' 
out of fear rather than strength, and so they surround themselves with people vdio 
share the same beliefs and endeavor to convince unbelievers whose mere existence 
implicitly challenges their truths; similarly, those who believe in progress feel the need 
to proclaim the benefits o f progress, to constantly remind themselves and others of 
how progress has improved their lives. Henry Miller writes of being assaulted by the 
fruits of progress: "It's almost impossible to escape the radio, the telephone, the fat 
newspapers, the glass of ice water," he asserts {Cosmological 343). Each new 
technology and each technological reHnement must be hailed as a wonder, as a 
necessity, as something that it is almost inconceivable people once lived without. The 
belief that life is better with the new technologies signifies a faith in progress, and one 
who disagrees with the notion that life is better is a fool or a heretic
Miller is that heretic, for he claims that these improvements simply feed "the 
delusion that we are making things easier for ourselves. Easier and better. Or else 
bigger and better" {Remember xxix). This delusion has a tranquilizing affect. It 
discourages questioning or evaluating modem conditions: Who are the real 
beneficiaries of progress? what constitutes progress for most people? what are the 
immediate and what are the long-term consequences of each invention? Such 
questions go unanswered, usually unasked except by the few. Human communities 
become atomized and human beings live in isolation, from each other and from
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themselves. In this sense, we can see progress has replaced religion as the opiate of 
the masses, the masses here signifying more than the working classes, more than 
Marx’s lumpenproletariat, but all wiio are fully incorporated in Western culture.
The Ultimate Failure of Progress
Like the Baptists arguing against evolution in the Scopes trial, the devotees of 
progress argue from a position under direct and indirect attack, proclaiming life to be 
better in the face of strong and damning evidence that it is no better at all, that if 
anything it has worsened. For while America, "the most productive nation in the 
world," manages to produce consumer goods by the shipload and its cities experience 
constant growth, it is still. Miller laments, "unable to properly feed, clothe and shelter 
over a third of its population" {Nightmare 30). Like Miller, Horkheimer and Adorno 
allege that the unequal distribution of the benefits of progress is not accidental but 
systemic, for the "idea of 'fully exploiting" available technical resources and the 
facilities of aesthetic mass consumption is part of the economic system which refused 
to exploit resources to abolish hunger " (139). The priorities of the system, according 
to Horkheimer and Adorno, are narrowly focused on products which will inspire 
purchases from the middle class. Housing, clothing, and feeding the poor is generally 
not financially remunerative and is therefore disdained.
During his tour of America in the years 1940 and 1941, Miller observes 
"suffering and misery everywhere throughout this broad land" {Nightmare 27). He had 
seen poverty in Paris and had even experienced it (or something close to it) himself 
and written about it in Cancer, but to see such pervasive poverty in America, the 
hallmark of progress in the twentieth century, seemed unfathomable and even
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monstrous. Miller writes, "[T]here are kinds and degrees of suffering; the worst, in 
my opinion, is the sort one encounters in the very heart of progress” (27). It is the 
"worst" because it does not have to be and, by all rights, should not be. A system, 
however, geared towards making money, to providing returns to investors rather than 
improving the life of the average citizen, ignores those who do not or cannot 
contribute as much as others. People are valued less and less, in such a system, 
except as potential customers.
The failure of progress, for Miller, results from the goals that inspire it, and
what has inspired progress at least since Industrialism is just that desire to make more
money—not to make the world a better place in which to live. Machines are improved,
not to make work easier, though they may occasionally do that, but to speed up
production. Horkheimer exposes some of the problematical priorities of Western
society. It is, he argues,
a society that in the face of starvation in great areas of the world, 
allows a large part of its machinery to stand idle, that shelves many 
important inventions, and that devotes innumerable working hours to 
moronic advertising and to the production of instruments of destruction 
—a society where luxuries are inherent has made usefulness its gospel. 
(Horkheimer, Eclipse, 143)
Usefulness, in consumer capitalism, has become a codeword for lucmtive. What
constitutes progress is improved products that make the old versions appear obsolete
and thus in need of replacement, new slogans that attract the public's attention and
alert people to new necessities; what constitutes progress is making money, spending
money {investing it) to make money—to put more money in circulation so that more
comes back. Workers often demand higher salaries so they can purchase more of the
commodities they see in advertisements and store windows and which they themselves
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produce. M on^  spent in advertising, which is never one-hundred percent successful, 
is even at times only a shot in the dark, occasions little regret, though it might more 
wisely be spent in renovating poorer neighborhoods, buying new books for public 
schools, and/or underwriting soup kitchens and homeless shelters. Such, as we have 
seen, is Miller’s protest.
During the time Baudelaire was composing the prose poems that make up
Spleen de Paris, Baron von Haussmann was modernizing Paris by slicing boulevards
through old Paris, hoping to improve pedestrian and vehicular traffic circulation in the
city. The Parisians who wimessed these changes, even those who helped—pAys/coZ/y--
to make these changes, likely did not recognize the changes as "progress." Marshall
Berman describes some o f the side effects of these changes:
The new construction wrecked hundreds of buildings, displaced 
uncounted thousands of people, destroyed whole neighborhoods that had 
lived for centuries. But it opened up the whole of the city, for the first 
time in its history, to all its inhabitants. Now, at last, it was possible to 
move not only within neighborhoods, but through them. Now, after 
centuries o f life as a cluster of isolated cells, Paris was becoming a 
unified physical and human space. (151)
Berman suggests in a footnote that those "displaced" (an innocuous word which
softens the violence of "eviction") left without a fight because the housing was old,
unsanitary, and overcrowded (15In). Perhaps. But this "progress" also evicted the
poor from the city center and pushed them outside the city. Losing whatever sorry
housing they had, and thereby breaking up their communities, probably did not seem
an improvement to poor workers forced to resettle in tenements located elsewhere,
often on the perimters o f the city. Progress, doubtless, is only considered "progress"
once the memory of the pain of the victims is forgotten or dies out of popular
consciousness.
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OAen the goals of progress are professed to be concerned not only with 
providing better housing, but, as proclaimed through advertising, with providing 
workers more free time, as Sebastian de Grazia notes repeatedly in O f Time, Work, 
and Leisure. To that end, labor-saving devices are produced by the millions. That 
these products fail to save time or that working longer hours to secure them eats into 
the free time is often not registered. They may make additional demands on free time 
as well. De Grazia points out that the lawnmower, for instance, was once viewed as a 
labor saving device: "How often," he asks, "was the grass cut before the lawnmower 
(now motorized) was invented?" (330). The lawn in your average suburb must now be 
neatly trimmed; if it is not, neighbors complain, property values on houses abutting the 
guilty lawn fall. So, rather than saving time, the lawnmower now consumes free time, 
for few consider time spent in cutting the grass "free time." Many labor-saving 
devices, some of which we have mentioned, are fraught with sacrifices that often go 
unremarked or lead to developments unimagined. As we saw earlier, for Miller the 
automobile parked outside the factory is a truly depressing sight because it represents 
one of the most explicit symbols of the worker's surrender to the system. The worker 
must labor in order to afford the car as well as other supposed necessities—some, like 
a house, are vital (though an apartment or duplex might suffice but be socially 
questionable in much of America) while others are less so.
What Miller never seems to recognize, at least explicitly, is why the system 
works so well. It would seem that convenience and comfort, as both surface 
manifestations and systemic supports, may be the highest expression of progress in the 
modem era, after power. The worker is taught through advertising to value 
"convenience" and "comfort" and to avoid, as much as possible, inconvenience and
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discomfort; in laboring the worker earns the right to purchase commodities that 
symbolize progress, avoidance of discomfort and further labor. Commodities promise 
to make life easier, though whether they actually do so is at best doubtful. Rebellion, 
however, takes effort; rejecting popular notions of what constitutes the good life, 
working and enjoying free time (courtesy of the latest commodities), requires 
imagination and puts a person in a vulnerable position with regard to much of the rest 
of society. When Miller rejects the "fat newspaper" and the ice in his drink, he may 
seem merely a crank, but these items are symbols, for Miller as for most Americans, 
though for Miller they are symbols not of the good American life but of the 
superficiality of so much that goes by the name of progress.
Down on Progress: Chaos, the Dandy and the Bohemian
In the land of progress where instrumental reason is a god that reigns supreme. 
Miller envisions himself a divisive and destructive force, a stick of dynamite in the 
backside of civilization. In the very heart of progress, at the very core of the business 
world. Miller perceives "chaos" {Capricorn 68)—from which he takes hope. Rather 
than a state of being, in Nietzschean terms, the world is still in a state of becoming, in 
however limited a fashion, which means that change is still possible. In his position 
as hiring manager, he comes to embody this force, chaos, that he also perceives 
elsewhere in the business world.
The world Miller describes, especially that in Capricorn, is the mirror image of 
a hurricane where, in the "eye," there are no winds and the storm seems to have 
subsided, to have moved on. Similarly, the chaos that runs like a current beneath the 
well-regulated surface of the business-world is not readily apparent even to those who
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facilitate i t  Some, like William Morris, describe the business world in less benign 
terms. "War, or competition, which ever you please to call it," writes Morris, "means 
at the best pursuing your own advantage at the cost of someone else's loss, and in the 
process of it you must not be sparing of destruction even of your own possessions or 
you will certainly come the worse in the struggle" (136-37). What Miller calls chaos— 
his job as hiring manager for Cosmodemonic Telegraph Company which he describes 
as senseless hiring and firing at high velocity—and what Morris terms "war or 
competition" appears to most people to be business as usual. Miller and Morris's 
descriptions, chaos or war, suggest that the system has few rules beyond survival of 
the fittest or winner take all, such that profits from competition, benefits from 
progress, need not be shared, and the larger repercussions of such actions need not be 
examined. The social costs of progress, of capitalist competition, so much decried by 
Miller and the Institute for Social Research, in Frankfurt, actually go beyond the scope 
of legitimate business concerns, and thus the system really is less methodical than it 
appears.
Miller's response, as he describes it, was to enter "the very heart of chaos" and 
there "I danced or drank myself silly, or I made love, or I befriended someone, or I 
planned a new life, but it was all chaos, all stone, and all hopeless or bewildering" 
(68-9). Though he had no hope o f truly changing things, though he could see the utter 
destructiveness and inhumanity of what went on around him (the "stone" is perhaps 
emblematic of the inhumanity and the wreckage). Miller embraces the chaos that lay at 
"the very heart" of the system and even added to it. Chaos serves as an aid in the 
struggle against uniformity and labelling, against the sensibility, the regularity, 
however limited, that fueled the system.
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Miller describes himself in the midst of it all, "like a man in a lighthouse";
below me the wild waves, the rocks, the reefs, the debris of 
shipwrecked fleets. I could give the danger signal but I was powerless 
to avert catastrophe. I breathed danger and catastrophe. At times the 
sensation of it was so strong diat it belched like fire from my nostrils. I 
longed to be free of it all and yet I was irresistibly attracted. I was 
violent and phlegmatic at the same time. I was like the lighthouse 
itself—secure in the midst of the most turbulent sea. Beneath me was 
the solid rock, the same shelf of rock on Wiich the towering skyscrapers 
were reared. My foundations went deep into the earth and the armature 
of my body was made of steel riveted with hot bolts. Above all I was 
an eye, a huge searchlight which scoured far and wide, which revolved 
ceaselessly, pitilessly. [...] all my powers were used up in the effort to 
see, to take in the drama of the world. {Capricorn 75-6).
Like the Yin-Yan symbol, like the stillness in the eye of the hurricane, big business
and progress contain in themselves their opposite; both are ruthlessly destructive,
squandering energy and spirit, while appearing exceedingly resourceful because of all
the new products and developments. Miller imagines himself in the midst of the storm
and yet above the madness, the storm-tossed seas, able to wimess it all, and from there
he tries to whip it up even more, in his struggle to bring the whole structure crumbling
down. Then, from this chaos, this unchannelled energy, a new world can be forged.
Arthur Rimbaud, too, asserts that he will struggle violently against the system 
that wishes to enslave him. "Le travail paraît trop léger à mon orgueil: ma trahison 
au monde serait un supplice trop court. Au dernier moment, j ’attaquerais à droit, à 
gauche . . [Work seems too light for my spirit: my treason to the world would be a 
very short punishment. At the last moment, I would lash out to the right, to the left] 
(Rimbaud 221). Rimbaud rejects work but is not content to stop at what is essentially 
a negative point. Rather, he promises an attack against the very system that wishes to 
enslave him, a lighming strike (which echoes one possible translation o f the poem's
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title, "L'Éclair"), and that he will fight wildly, on all sides. What he will fight, as did 
Baudelaire and as will Miller, is "progress."
Such violent activity appears a poor introduction to a depiction of Miller or 
Rimbaud as dandies or bohemians. Dandies affected a certain "distance" and, 
moreover, preferred apparent worthlessness (as a producer) to usefulness. But like 
Baudelaire and Rimbaud, Miller's self portrait contains characteristics of both the 
bohemian and the dandy, though these two types are in some ways "opposite," as 
Jerrold Seigel argues (98). The dandy usually appears refined and elegant, while the 
bohemian is typically threadbare and poverty-stricken, or affects to be so. It is this 
need for, or embrace of, affectation that serves to link the two at the hip, as it were. 
Furthermore, the two types are united by a certain boastfulness, which may be 
considered one of the more distinguishing forms of affectation. For example, they 
parade their elegance or their poverty. Though bohemians, when employed, were 
often placed in somewhat menial positions (not as laborers but rather in positions that 
required at least a modicum of education) and were improvident artists or would-be 
artists; like the dandy, what they produced was something that would not be 
recognized as of value in the world of modem capitalism." In that way, both partake 
of the rebellion against modernity and industrialism, especially in the form of the 
marketplace.
" That bohemians, for instance, produced works of art, does not necessarily make 
of them producers, within the capitalist system, if their works are not generally 
perceived to have value. Vincent Van Gogh, for instance, lived a life of poverty, sold 
virtually nothing during his lifetime, and died a failure. Both Baudelaire and Rimbaud 
were only coming to be recognized artists at their respective deaths. Finally, a 
bohemian who makes money on art seldom remains a bohemian, as Henry Murger 
illustrates in the conclusion to his Scènes de la vie de Bohème.
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Miller in Cancer records, along with his sexual exploits and his meanderings 
through the day and through Paris, his difficulty in obtaining a good meal, day after 
day, proclaiming even his willingness to eat rotten food. "Bad o r good what 
difference? Food\ " {Cancer 79). Likewise, since his living situation is often 
precarious, he boasts o f his recurrent fear that someone will "take the chair from under 
my ass" (32). While it is a fear, it also underscores Miller’s relative freedom; he is 
unfettered by possessions or a regular job, hence this fear of being forced on the 
streets to scout another "situation" is presented with a swagger. He is not paying rent, 
he is sleeping on the floor, he is eating meals paid for and prepared by others, but he 
is not contributing anything more than his abilities as a conversationalist, for which he 
is recognized, valued—by his friends though not by society at large.
Rimbaud's boastfulness, which peppers his poetry, seems an equally
dandyesque or bohemian element. As we have already seen, he revolts against the
work ethic, and threatens to lash out to the left and right at the bourgeois class which
would force him to submit. In "Vies," a poem from Illuminations, he writes
Exilé ici. J'ai eu une scène où jouer les chefs-d'oeuvre dramatiques de 
toutes les littératures. Je vous indiquerais les richesses inouïes.
J’observe l'histoire des trésors que vous trouvâtes. Je vois la suite! Ma 
sagesse est aussi dédaignée que le chaos. Qu'est mon néant, auprès de 
la stupeur qui vous attend?
[Exiled here, I had a stage on which to perform the dramatic 
masterpieces of all the literatures. I pointed out to you unknown 
treasures. I regard the trivial story of treasures that you discovered. I 
see the end! My wisdom is as disdained as chaos. What is my 
nothingness in comparison to the stupor that awaits you?] (250-51)
Like Miller, the narrator in Rimbaud's poem realizes he has not eluded all the traps,
that he is substantially incorporated by contemporary society, but he also believes he
has not been completely taken in and celebrates his difference. His "wisdom," which
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"is as disdained as chaos," because it is out of step with the times, allows him to 
perceive wdiat others cannot, just as Miller-the-lighthouse examines the chaos, invisible 
to most others, raging all around him. Rimbaud concedes a certain failure to take 
flight, to break free of constraints, but relative to the failure of others he believes his 
has not been so complete.
Charles Baudelaire, the one among the three writers considered here who most
closely approximated a dandy (in the years 1843 to 1845), flaunts his dandy-ish
disinterest in politics in Mon Coeur mis à nu:
Je n’ai pas de convictions, comme l’entendent les gens de mon siècle, 
parce que je n’ai pas d’ambition.
Il n’y a pas en moi de base pour une conviction.
Il y a une certaine lâcheté ou plutôt une certaine mollesse chez les 
honnêtes gens.
Les brigands seuls sont convaincus,—de quoi?—qu’il leur fait réussir. 
Aussi, ils réussissent.
[I do not have convictions, as understood by people in my century, 
because I do not have ambition.
There is in me no base for a conviction.
There is a certain cowardice or, above all, a certain lethargy in honest 
people.
Thieves alone are convinced,—of what?—that it is made for them to 
succeed. And they do succeed.] {Oeuvres 407)
For Baudelaire, success in modem society is a sign of debasement. Success is based
upon simplification, upon an unwillingness to acknowledge complications, for example
an intentional disregard of moral questions. A person with ambition has direction,
attributes importance to certain things over others based upon the goal in view, and
can then act accordingly. Without ambition, there is no way to organize the data of
daily existence or, rather, less inclination to organize it purposefully.
The dandy, who affects the refinement—to an extreme—o f the aristocracy and 
often descends from the aristocracy, evokes the pretensions and the uselessness of the
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aristocracy. Pamela Genova, in her study of the dandy as a terrorist whose weapon of 
choice is style, points out that "dandies challenged the practicality of the 
commonplace" as well as "negating the quotidian, scorning the social icons of family, 
marriage, labor, profit and love" (76). The artificiality of the dandy's appearance 
implicitly asserts that much in society has only show-value and contains little or no 
intrinsic value. The dandy, thus, is someone whose cause is change, though dandies 
would almost certainly repudiate any notion of "causes," since they flaunt their 
uselessness within their society. The bohemian, meanwhile, generally arises from the 
bourgeois class and discards the outward appearance of respectability so important to 
that class, but adopts almost the same posture as the dandy, choosing to live without 
much that "normal" society requires—a job, a regular meal time. Both the dandy and
the bohemian constitute a general attack on modernity as well as the classes they arise
from. Both are extreme in self-presentation, in order to attract attention.
Baudelaire writes of the dandy:
tous participent du même caractère d'opposition et de révolte; tous sont
des représentants de ce qu'il y a de meilleur dans l'orgueil humain, de ce 
besoin, trop rare chez ceux d'aujourd'hui, de combattre et de détruire la 
triviliaté.
[ail participate in the same character of opposition and revolt; all are 
representatives of that which is the best in the human spirit, of the need, 
so rare among those of today, to combat and destroy triviality.] {Ecrits 
390)
By "triviality," Baudelaire intimates much the same thing Miller does when writing 
that earning a living is different from living, when Miller decries the ugliness of cities 
or the blind pursuit of the accumulation of commodities or the modem conception of 
progress. Action steeped in immediate results or convenience or even simple short­
term goals frequently results in triviality—in buildings, products, or actions containing
339
only vestiges of the human spirit and, hence, are not durable, are hollowed-out, and 
will not endure as representations o f human spirit.
And dandies, like Baudelaire,'* did combat the notion of progress. Genova 
recounts the legend of the dandy famous for taking his pet lobster for a walk "on a 
leash of powder blue ribbon" (82). This, she writes, is the "first step in his terrorist 
strategy: he captures the attention of his audience" (82). This "terrorism" represents, 
as do most if not all acts of terrorism, an attempt to put forth a message that differs 
quite radically from that of the dominant elements within the society under attack. 
Benjamin reported a similar tale, perhaps another version of the same tale, of a dandy 
taking a turtle for a walk, conceiving it a "strategy" as well, where what he calls 
flâneurs, but clearly means dandies as well, used to take turtles for a walk and "liked 
to have the turtles set the pace for them. If they had their way, progress would have 
been obliged to accommodate itself to this pace," Benjamin writes {Illuminations 197, 
6n). Once noticed, then, the dandies attempted to introduce another pace, a pace far 
more humane as well as refined, but the theorists of work triumphed, as Benjamin 
recognizes, and "Down with dawdling" became the refrain (197 6n). Dandyism, as a 
sort of demonstration of another way of life (and bohemianism as only a little less 
passive), rather than a literal attack, could not truly compete with the active 
incorporation functioning in the modem industrial state.
Miller makes a prototypically dandy esque statement in Capricorn when he 
writes, "fundamentally, I have no desire to work and no desire to become a useful
'* Baudelaire is a figure who bridges the gap between dandy and bohemian. He 
spent much of his inheritance, after finishing school, as a dandy in Paris. After almost 
financially ruining himself, he lived a life of near poverty, dedicated to his art.
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member of society" {Capricorn 102). Such a statement, however, occurs in the same
book where he had earlier asserted;
I was constantly urged not to be too lenient, not to be too sentimental, 
not to be too charitable. Be fîrm! Be hard! they cautioned me. Fuck 
that! I said to myself. I'll be generous, pliant, forgiving, tolerant, tender. 
[...] I heard every man to the end; if I couldn't give him a job I gave 
him money, and if I had no money I gave him cigarettes or I gave him 
courage. But I gave! (27)
Miller’s declaration, as an extreme statement, puts him in a category with the dandies
and bohemians who were given to extreme pronouncements as well, whether through
verbal means or by illustration. Such an assertion of uselessness, however, must be
read as quite different from a typical dandy-ish declaration of uselessness, which has
given Orwell and those who assert Miller's "passive acceptance of evil" so much
artillery. When Miller writes that he had no wish to be "useful," he means specifically
within that segment of society fixated on the utilitarian, but not within the society of
human beings where he wishes to be supportive, to contribute—if nothing else—
"courage."
True Progress
For Miller, life and work—Ars work—is an end in itself rather than a means to 
an end; it is an accumulation of experience rather than of wealth or commodities.
That we are alive here and now and that we must act within the here and now, without 
constantly looking to the distant future, appears to be one of the shaping forces within 
his works. Miller’s example of generosity, giving money or cigarettes away, suggests 
that the future was less of a worry for him than the present, that his actions were not 
generally future-oriented so much as a determination to resolve immediate problems, a
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strategy reminiscent of Brecht's slogan, "Eats now, morals after." For Miller, as for 
Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Benjamin, and others, the present must be the main focus. Just 
as Benjamin criticizes the modem notion of progress by forcing readers to address the 
world as it is, for progress is the now. Miller proposes "the life more abundant"—now.
In The Wisdom o f the Heart, Miller describes time not as linear but circular. 
"There is no progress: there is movement, displacement, which is circular, spiral, 
endless" (22). Certainly he is indebted to Spengler for this conception of time, but 
Miller and Spengler are not alone in subscribing to this circular understanding of time. 
De Grazia writes that for most of the world outside the west, "the wheel is a better 
symbol of time than the line" (319). Such a vision of time connotes a certain 
acceptance of the world as it stands and perhaps a more "natural" perception of the 
world, as well, because everything that happens is understood as seasonal (319) and 
little is considered "singular."
This circular perception of time helps explain, then. Miller’s concern with the 
present and near-future rather than solely with long-term goals. The distant future 
bears upon present actions but cannot be a repository for hope, cannot be an excuse 
for delays in a widespread enjoyment of the benefits of "progress." It is important, for 
Miller, that people realize time is circular so they "become imbued with the idea that 
the age of plentitude is inevitable" such that "all the current world views, petty, 
destructive, mutually exclusive, will vanish like dust" {Remember xix). If a world of 
plenty is not something that needs to be struggled for, but something inevitably 
coming in the future, so much that people strugge to achieve is unnecessary. People 
can work at their own pace, live their lives and contribute to the growth of society, 
without sacriftcing everything, especially the present. They should, instead, struggle
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against this system that portrays life as linear, presenting a mirage where the goal 
always remains equally distant from the present
Contrary to what might be expected, therefore. Miller does not entirely reject 
the concept of progress, as does Baudelaire and, to a lesser extent Rimbaud. Miller 
believes, as we have seen, that progress has been yoked to selfish pecuniary aims, 
hence it has been restricted. But as he suggests in the introduction to Remember to 
Remember, if the energies now expended in the dead-end pursuit of technological 
progress could be redirected, away from selfish pursuits and toward improving the lot 
of all, true change, true progress would at long last come about. Progress must simply 
be focussed less on financial gain and more on improving existence (xix-xx).
Such a change in perspective, however, is not as simple as Miller sometimes 
seems to suggest; rather, it is revolutionary, requiring a complete break with the last 
two to four hundred years. "New beings, yes! We have need of new beings still. We 
can do without the telephone," Miller argues, "without the automobile, without the 
high-class bombers—but we carmot do without new beings" {Ccpricom 293). A 
change in human perspective, to that which recognizes human beings first, seems 
perhaps an impossible demand under the present capitalistic system, but that is just 
what Miller calls for. All other forms of progress have only secondary importance, at 
best.
As an advocate for the underdog, for the individual on the margins. Miller does 
not wish to erase individuality but to free it. Max Horkheimer shares just such a 
concern for the individual. He asserts that progress will consist in transcending 
humanity's adaptability, the mimetic impulse, into a broader and more complex form 
of reasoning that lies somewhere between objective reason (based on "god-given"
343
reason) or subjective reason (Wiat is good, serviceable at this moment) {Eclipse IIS).
Such a reliance on the individual means that sooner or later individuals will have to
live up to their promise, something they have yet to do but that it is not impossible
they will do. Miller writes.
Only a new mentality, a new consciousness, only a vision capable of 
embracing all the conflicting tendencies, of seeing around, beyond and 
above them, will permit men to adapt themselves to the order and the 
ambiance of this new world. {Remember xix)
Miller, like Baudelaire and Marx, is linking progress to human beings rather than
technology or the simple remaking and expansion of cities. If progress is conceived of
as an energy source that requires direction then its use becomes, much more obviously,
a moral issue.
Herbert Marcuse writes that progress, as Miller appears to define it, would 
constitute a challenge to the system: "In a society that reproduces itself through 
economic competition, the mere demand for a happier social existence constitutes 
rebellion" (99). To suggest that the commodities produced for consumers at breakneck 
pace are not valuable in and of themselves, that they are not the ultimate source of 
satisfaction, is a direct attack upon the life-source of most corporations. To reduce 
hours worked, to reduce pay, could mean less money in circulation, fewer commodities 
purchased, and smaller profit margins. While many workers in the past have gladly 
chosen fewer hours and less pay, for corporations it is not an optimal situation and one 
that shows the workers markedly less consumption-oriented than those who profit from 
their purchases could wish.
Miller also suggests, in "Murder the Murderer," that a sure sign of progress 
would be marked by the end of nations, assuming the major rivalries would die out.
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Certainly there would be no cessation of petty rivalries, personal and/or regional, but 
there is the likelihood that there would be less potential for global events such as the 
Second World War, which is the subject of the essay. All that divides people, that is 
imposed on them from without (patriotism drummed up by politicians and then 
channeled by the military) should be done away with. The competitions that 
strengthen people, that sharpen their wits, must remain, but the imposed, contrived 
conflicts can be eliminated. And it is here where Miller recognizes the strength of the 
fears people have toward ideas that involve considerable change, whereas a new 
product, such as a flamethrower, is generally welcomed; they do not necessarily 
foresee a flamethrower's direct application on them.
For Miller’s vision of progress to really take place, it would likely require that 
energy currently spent tearing down old buildings and raising new ones, producing 
products for the military and for the general consumer, all the energy directed toward 
producing things be halted and redirected toward thoughtfully purposive actions that 
eschewed any idea of producing a profit of any kind—though profit there would have 
to be, but this time for everyone along the line. Progress would involve transforming 
cities, work, and nations into entities that offered individuals the chance to discover 
their own work, to enjoy themselves and other people (community), to focus on the 
here and now wisely (and not to use such a focus as an excuse to destroy the 
environment), so that human communities could form nurturing environments, public 
spaces.
Certainly there is a utopian element in Miller's works, as in Remember to 
Remember’s "Artist and Public," utopian in the negative sense where he constructs a 
vision of the future equal to Charles Fourier's most unlikely prognostications (which
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only form a part o f Fourier’s philosophy); but "utopian" does not deserve the negative 
cormotations so often associated with i t  Utopia offers direction, something to strive 
for, and without direction there can be no sensible change, only more chaotic action. 
Those who would do away with utopia, who would discredit i t  would eliminate all 
change that they were not responsible for themselves or that did not benefit them. 
These people, naturally, would be the producers and beneficiaries who stand to lose 
profits if society really were to change.
In Cejpricom, Miller describes—in three sentences—the world that would arise if
he were in control;
If I were running the boat things wouldn't be so orderly perhaps, but it 
would be gayer, by Jesus! You wouldn't shit in your pants over trifles. 
Maybe there wouldn't be macadamized roads and streamlined cars and 
loudspeakers and gadgets of a million billion varieties, maybe there 
wouldn't even be glass in the windows . . . maybe people would kill 
each other when their patience was exhausted and maybe nobody would 
stop them because there wouldn't be any jails or cops or judges, and 
there certainly wouldn't be any cabinet ministers or legislators because 
there wouldn't be any goddamned laws to obey or disobey, and maybe it 
would take months and years to trek from place to place, but you 
wouldn't need a visa or a passport or a caarte d'identité because you 
wouldn't be registered anywhere and you wouldn't bear a number and if 
you wanted to change your name every week you could do it because it 
wouldn't make any difference since you wouldn't own anything except 
what you could carry around with you and why would you want to own 
anything when everything would be free? {Ccpricom 281-82)
Such a paradise seems to almost approximate a Marxist worker’s paradise, only with
even less structure, for it is order, reason, structure, in a word, civilization, that for
Miller kills everything, that threatens generosity, that sustains misery, that defies
optimism, that strips people of their humanity and orders them to accept it, for they
must.
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One of Orwell's criticisms of Miller is that he was happy. It is a sentiment that 
Miller maintains throughout his works though some, like Capricorn, have a far more 
bitter edge to them than others. Still, Miller’s protests against progress and modem 
life demonstrate his affirmation of life. Life can be better, he wants people to know 
It does not have to be reduced to work and to accumulating merchandise. Likewise 
Rimbaud commands, "Esclaves, ne maudissons pas la vie" [Fellow slaves, let us not 
curse life] (222). Both see possibilities for another world, another way of life, for 
"Noël sur la terre!" [Christmas on earth!] (222). That Miller does not simply reject 
life as not worth living can be understood as one step toward the rebellion that 
Marcuse prophecies above. If life is not worth living, the choice is suicide or passive 
acceptance of all that transpires; if it is worth living, but merits improvement, then 
change is the only thing worth fighting for.
347
CoiKlasion / Reading Miller Now
[T]he most wonderful proof of my fitness, or unfitness, for the 
times is die fact that nodiing people were writing or talking 
about had any real interest for me. {Capricorn 54).
La liberté consiste à savoir vivre et parler en même temps que 
les événements se déroulent. Phillippe Sollers, "Le grand style 
est-il révolutionnaire? Chateaubriand, Lautréamont, remparts 
contre la bêtise" Le Monde Friday, 15, 1998 
[Liberty consists in knowing how to live and to speak at the 
same time as events unfold.]
For Henry Miller, a writer must confront the real issues of the day—not through 
the aegis of some party or clique but following the call of his or her own conscience. 
When Miller claims in the epigraph to this chapter "that nothing people were writing 
or talking about had any interest for me," his lack of interest can be attributed to his 
belief that the issues most people concerned themselves with were not real issues or 
certainly not the truly important ones, that they were concerned only with improving 
material comforts rather than with improving the system itself, that concerns revolved 
around short-term, even immediate, benefits rather than middle- or long-terms costs.
Miller's "fitness for the times," then, would refer back to his role as adversary, 
for his is one of the great "oppositional" voices of this century, and Tropic o f  Cancer, 
Tropic o f Capricorn, and The Air-Conditioned Nightmare rank at the top of the list of 
rebellious works produced this century; his "unfimess" rests in that he was perhaps 
ahead of his time, rejecting the current world as superficial and inhumane, rather than 
celebrating the advances it continually armounced. Miller attempted to expose the 
forces dominating in the West; to cut through the pretense, hype, illusion, deceit and 
self-deceit, which obscures the functioning of a capitalist system that in some cases 
better serves the average citizen than previous systems had, but whose failure to
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eliminate poverty and war, among other maladies o f human civilizations, certainly 
demonstrates it cannot be the last word in the progress or evolution of forms of 
government.
Rather than moving backward. Miller wanted to help lead America and the 
West forward, into a truly post-industrial age, where people take control of technology, 
where they are not set up by mass media and other tools of mass society to make 
certain seemingly pre-programmed selections, where life assumes a greater variety and 
people shake off the simple and deadening routine of work-home-television-bed life 
has come to consist of for so many.
Miller writes about the death of community, in reflecting upon a time when 
community once flourished, when life followed a different routine. He never wrote 
about returning to some earlier golden age, though in such pieces as "The Tailor 
Shop," from Black Spring, he describes something of what the world has lost, as it 
becomes more and more impersonal.' He seems to have known America and the West 
and the rest of the world would not regress into a pre-industrial age, but he believed 
people could change the way they currently viewed the world, for, historically, it was 
not that old and ingrained. Though, of course, it was that ingrained. Still, Miller's 
reading of Spengler offered him hope for a world beyond capitalism or at least in a 
different shape than it had come to assume by the nineteen-twenties and -thirties, if 
not considerably earlier.
' Impersonal, it should be noted, not in the way Sennett articulates in The Fall o f  
Public Man, for there people are impersonal and social; here, it is impersonal and 
asocial.
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That Miller is often better known in America, to people familiar with his 
works, as a pomographer demonstrates, among other possibilities, (I) that readers 
come to Miller's works with certain expectations and, like George Orwell, refuse to 
allow the text to amend them; (2) that people rely more on second-hand sources of 
information rather than their own reading of his works; or (3) that people are as 
obsessed with sex today as they were in the days when Miller was first writing and 
their reading of Miller functions as something of a Rorschach test. Readers 
confronting the works of Henry Miller today, if they look beyond the sexual themes in 
his works, will likely notice that most of his criticisms of his world, as described in 
this essay, are still relevant today, that often they have only become more persuasive, 
and thus Miller's "fimess or unfitness for the times" remains just as debatable as ever. 
The capitalist system that he decried as inhumane has only become more so, and 
technological developments such as the automobile, with their debilitating impact on 
cities and the environment, have only compounded the problem in the years since 
Miller began writing.
Miller's Criticisins T o d ^
Though most readers will have grasped the relevance of Miller's critiques to 
modem America and the West, a few of his primary targets bear further albeit brief 
investigation. New attacks on human communities and humans in general have been 
unleashed in the so-called Postmodern era. Concerns, here, revolve around 
globalization as well as the fall-out from new technologies, especially the computer 
which brings with it, naturally, much that is beneficial.
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Miller’s criticisms of cities, especially of New York City, still hold true. In 
The A ssassination o f  Paris, historian Louis Chevalier—who several times cites Miller 
as a writer who appreciated Paris—laments that the same attitude which has made such 
a mess of New York and other American cities has come to inform, to an even greater 
degree than before, the viewpoint of those who decide the future of Paris. "People are 
beginning to use [the term ’Developer’]," writes Chevalier, "without understanding very 
clearly, as their usage shows, what the word signifies, or better what it conceals” (30). 
What is concealed, certainly, behind the label is simply a businessman looking to 
make money in real estate by building whatever will be most lucrative at the moment. 
Nothing is sacred to such people, Chevalier repeatedly notes, and the new buildings 
going up all over Paris, as well as the highways now cutting through the Right Bank 
demonstrate that those making decisions about Paris' future lack the organic vision of 
Paris so many in the past have to greater or less degrees upheld. These "developers" 
hardly view Paris as a historic text to be embellished or improved. Instead, Paris has 
come to signify, more and more, nothing other than an especially lucrative investment.
Chevalier criticizes the arch of La Défense,* the area to the northwest of Paris 
dedicated to skyscrapers, which was "built to line up with the Arc de Triomphe, 
destroying forever 'the door opening on infinity' that Barrés [the designer of the Arc] 
had celebrated" (268). The I. M. Pei-designed dome, in the Louvre courtyard, at the 
other end of Barrés' "door," has also been aligned with the Arc and the arch, 
something more in the nature of a Disney-like gimmick, now that the three points form
* La Défense, it should be noted, is a compromise with business interests who 
hope to make France even more economically powerful. Rather than razing vast 
regions of Paris for skyscrapers, they were placed a short distance outside the city.
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a line, rather than the one that simply opened onto a vast, unbroken vista and which, 
thus, engaged the imagination. It must be recognized, however, that the alignment of 
the three points does acknowledge the physical if not the historical context.
Writing in the middle nineteen-seventies, Chevalier argues, "In barely fifteen 
years [Paris] will be gone except when we conjure up its image—always inadequate— 
from books (11), though in an addendum written for the English translation in the 
early nineteen-nineties, Chevalier acknowledges, "despite the intrusions of men and 
things, what still endures, here and there, of the Old City, unchanged and miraculously 
preserved, always has a  strange fascination for me" (271). Paris has not been 
completely wiped out by the "developers," but latter-day Baudelaires like Chevalier 
remember another Paris, one that died with the destruction in February 1969 of Les 
Hedies, the vegetable and meat market that for centuries had formed the heart of Paris. 
The desire to instill order on the city, one of the reasons given for the removal of Les 
Halles to the outskirts o f the city, has sounded a death knell, according to Chevalier, 
for disorder is an intrinsic element of human beings and their communities.^
Parisian "developers" active in the era I960 to 1968, he accuses, "do not 
understand that history is an essential part of the present city" (168), and their wish to 
transform the city from a place of pleasure to one of work (180), their ideas for re­
designing the city, tzike the United States as "the model and the vocabulary" (188), the 
very thing Miller warned against and which some still fear today, given the
 ^ For more on the idea of disorder in community, see also Richard Sennett's The 
Uses o f  Disorder and The Conscience o f the Eye.
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proliferation of American businesses, products, and images, not to mention ideology/ 
Some of Miller's greatest fears, regarding America and cities, have thus come to pass, 
or nearly so, in Paris.
Paris, for Chevalier, is continually under attack from "developers." The more 
the old buildings are destroyed, the more the surviving ones become decontextualized, 
hence curios, simulacra for the old city. Like American cities, Paris has also been 
ravaged by the automobile. While American cities have increasingly been designed 
around the automobile, hence the zoning restrictions which force people to live in one 
place, shop in another, and work in yet another, such designs, argues James Kunstler, 
have further atomized people and destroyed communities, decimating inner cities as 
well as the American countryside. Numerous Parisian planners, according to 
Chevalier, have planned highways in the center of Paris, cutting huge paths through 
old and ancient neighborhoods, though none of these have been implemented. Still, 
the threat seems to recur with a dangerous regularity, despite Paris’ public 
transportation system which provides extensive coverage over a wide area and despite 
the damage the older buildings themselves suffer from the exhaust of too many cars, 
trucks, and buses passing down narrow streets. These highways would, as they have
 ^ American images abroad are almost ubiquitous; Michael Jordan, for instance, is 
a hero in Germany; professional baseball, basketball, and football jerseys and caps are 
worn by Europeans; Walker Texas Ranger and many other American television series 
appear, dubbed, on German and French television. This list ignores businesses in 
Europe exported from America—McDonalds, Burger BCing, Pizza Hut—which tend to 
make a city like Prague less different from London or Frankfurt.
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in New York City, and many other cities, cut off pedestrian traffic, destroy local
businesses, and divide and/or isolate existing communities/
French writer Philippe Djian, wdio has many affinities with Miller, recently
reaffirmed some of the problems with America that Miller earlier noted. In a 1994
interview, he explains wdiy he moved from Boston, Massachusetts, one of the more
European of American cities, to Florence, Italy:
Voilà ce qui manque, aux États Unis. Ce n'est pas un pays où l'on 
s'assoit. Et puis à Florence, vous avez la douceur de la compagne qui 
s'insinue dans la ville, la compagne est comme apprivoisée. Les 
Américains ne savent pas faire ça. Leurs villes ont besoin de s'imposer 
à l'environnement, de manière brutale. En Italie, la ville hypnotise la 
compagne et s'ouvre à elle, adopte sa lumière, ses couleurs, son rythme. 
Beaucoup d'Américains sont installés à Florence. Et ceux que j'ai 
recontrés ne voulaient pas repartir.
[This is what is lacking in the United States. It is not a country where 
one sits down. And then at Florence, you have the gentleness of the 
countryside which infiltrates the city, the countryside is as if tamed. The 
Americans do not know how to do such things. Their cities must be 
imposed on the environment in a brutal fashion. In Italy, the city 
hypnotizes the countryside and opens to it, embracing its light, colors, 
rhythm. Many Americans live in Florence. And those that I have met 
do not want to leave. (Djian 173-74)
Djian, here, sounds very much like the Miller we encountered in Chapter One, the one
who complained that in New York City he could find no space that offered the citizen
peace, no place to sit and reflect, no place that did not simply encourage him to keep
walking. Americans, it appears, must leave their country in order to find community,
to find organic and hospitable cities.
The current situation for workers in America, far worse than that in Europe,
has only worsened in the years since Miller's death in 1980. While there has been a
 ^ See Chapter Five of Marshall Berman's A ll That is Solid Melts Into A ir  for a 
moving description of the destruction of sections of New York City in the nineteen- 
fifties and -sixties.
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movement toward the thirty-five hour week in Europe, most notably in the France of 
Lionel Jospin, the Socialist prime minister, the American system, rather than becoming 
more humane has only succeeded in becoming less so. Richard Sennett, speaking at a 
panel discussion at S t Paul's Church, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, on the one 
hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1848, warned the German 
audience that soon they might face some of the same choices Americans had 
unwittingly made in the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties. One result of these 
"decisions" was the shipping of American jobs south of the border, to Mexico, where 
workers receive considerably less pay than their American and European counterparts 
and usually no benefits.®
Another result, Sennett added, is that work in America has become more and 
more brutal, especially for the office worker. What Sennett called "flexible work," 
learning specific skills for a specific job before moving on to another job requiring an 
entirely different set of skills, has effectively destroyed the notion of a "career" in 
America for many people, essentially making the craftsman a button-pusher yet again. 
It has, Sennett elaborated, destroyed, in part, some o f the "narrativity" of our lives.
No longer does one job lead to the next, one set of skills build upon another; now, 
employees simply learn what they need to for this job, recognizing that, in all 
likelihood, it will not serve them in their next job.
® The history Sennett provided was more complex. Factory jobs in the unionized 
north were moved to the largely non-unionized south, where labor was cheaper, and, 
when such moves were legalized, from there to Mexico and to third-world countries 
where labor was even cheaper. If nothing is done to prevent such movements, 
German factories could relocate to the former Eastern Europe, or to southern Europe, 
where labor is cheaper and social benefits fewer, and from there to third world 
countries, throwing many Germans out of work in order to increase the profits of 
investors.
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People have become short-term employees, wiio may hold as many as ten to 
fifteen different jobs in their lifetime, Sennett estimated, and wdio therefore feel little 
or no loyalty to the company and no bond with fellow workers, so that community- 
like the workers themselves—is further effaced. The church, dancing clubs, reading 
clubs, bowling leagues, as a replacement for the community usually created in and 
around a work environment, are generally much less successful in establishing a sense 
of community, Sennett argued, because they account for a far smaller percentage of 
time than work normally does. The modem worker, as a result, has lost, in job 
security, job satisfaction, and health benefits, much more than he or she has gained in 
pay, and in the meantime become an itinerant worker who sets down shallow roots.
Writing in USA Today, Stephanie Armour describes work-related stress as a 
major problem diat costs American companies approximately $200 billion dollars 
yearly (7A), an expense surely passed on to consumers. Many, certainly, in an era of 
"downsizing" (a codeword for mass layoffs/firings) and reduction of social services, 
worry about losing their job, even if they perform their jobs well (8A). Armour's 
experts say, "There's no cure-all, but there is hope" (8A), to which Miller might 
respond, yet again, "Earning a living has nothing to do with living," warning these 
experts that the system itself is still the problem, since the bottom line is profits and 
workers remain only "means to an end."^ Workers without job security, workers who 
feel themselves over-worked, all awaiting the technological development that will 
leave them unemployed or simply performing a different job, will feel stress. These
’ In his lecture, Sennett described one of Microsoft's practices: They assign 
several groups the same task and give them an impossible deadline. The group that 
accomplishes the task first is rewarded, while the members of the other groups are 
fired.
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people, whether over-worked or under-worked, will have little leisure time because 
neither can forget work or their worries long enough to focus on something else.
Stress, thus, does not disappear but proliferates, as workers face the threat of 
obsolescence with only a foundering social system to fall back on.
Miller's anti-World War II stand, though it may put him in an even smaller 
minority today, demonstrates he had a better understanding of American history—and a 
better sense of the capitalist tendency to act upon vulgar self-interest in virtually any 
situation—than most Americans of his day or even, perhaps, of today. One of the 
outcomes of that war, as Miller predicted, was the further entrenchment of the 
capitalist powers and their expansion such that today we have a more "pure" 
capitalism than ever, a trans-national global economy, as evidenced not least by cities 
around the world that have begun to look alike, each with several McDonalds, Burger 
Kings, Pizza Huts, each with a Body Shop, Aldi, Benetton, and other international 
businesses. These apparently innocuous developments signal the monopolization of 
giant corporate interests as well as a reduction in the choices available, the education 
of modernity serving to focus taste on the products of fewer and fewer companies.
Miller's critique of the movie industry, especially Hollywood, holds true today, 
as well, for it still chums out predictable melodramas and action thrillers, even if, as in 
Fried Green Tomatoes or Waiting to Exhale they address them to narrower or 
specialized audiences. It is true that independent films have finally received greater 
praise and wider distribution than heretofore and Quentin Tarrantino's Pulp Fiction, 
Spike Lee's Malcolm X , and Jane Campion's The Piano seem a sort of high water mark 
for these films, but whether these films are any less "affirmative," in Marcuse's sense, 
of American or capitalist culture than a Hollywood film is arguable. Moreover,
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Hollywood, with its high-priced stars and its financial backing often lures away these 
independent filmmakers, who believe they can demand the same freedom they always 
enjoyed. How well they succeed remains to be seen.
It might be asked, finally, what relevance Miller can possibly have for readers 
in the "Postmodern era," an era that would severely tax certain of Miller's pet notions. 
The concept of the individual, as we have already seen, has been further 
problematized, making it an even more unstable concept than it was already in the era 
of Freud. Binaries—good and evil, true and false, authentic and inauthentic—have been 
similarly attacked as simplifications that require rethinking.
One binary of possibly paramount importance for Miller is that of surface 
versus depth. As mentioned throughout this essay. Miller bases many of his criticisms 
of America and Americans on just this notion of surface and depth, specifically the 
American refusal to look beyond the surface facts to the depths, the underpinnings, the 
significance. His criticism of commodities and cities, his refusal to support the Second 
World War and his renunciation of money, even his endorsement of a true charity that 
gives left and right, are all based on the notion that there are depths, that there is a 
surface that can distort and a depth that must be discovered and disclosed.
Miller's notion could not be replaced, I think, by what Fredric Jameson has 
called "multiple surfaces," and which he discovers in painting and architecture and 
intertextuality {Postmodernism 12). Miller's insistence on "the reality behind the 
facts," on a certain distance, seems to require the surface-depth relationship. Today 
we might conceive this relationship as far more intricate, much more closely related 
than Miller did, rather than simply denying it's existence. Still, Miller's non-linear
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prose, as well as its often provocative nature, generally attacks any notion of a simple 
surface-depth relationship.
A more satisfactory reading of the this binary, however, might involve 
interpreting the surface-depth relation somewhat differently. If we take a specific 
example, the Second World War, his use of surface versus depth assumes an added 
dimension. Miller perceives other issues behind those popularly thought to be the 
impetus for war and articulates other goals for the war. In this case, his reading of the 
war might be understood as an attempt to perform what Walter Benjamin has 
described as the task of the historical materialist: "to brush history against the grain" 
{Illuminations 257). Miller refuses to accept the pronouncements of political leaders at 
face value and searches, dialectically, for other causes for the war, for other goals.
The surface-depth binary could then be reconceived as a dialectical strategy.
Miller, despite throwbacks to the modernist era, retains a certain pertinence to 
the "Postmodern era." His opposition to the dominant culture may be harder to 
maintain now that "even overtly political interventions like those of The Clash are all 
somehow secretly disarmed and reabsorbed" (Jameson, Postmodernism 49) by a system 
that allows most anything and thus defuses rebellion from the start. A prose like 
Miller's, which invites or elicits responses from the reader, still functions 
oppositionally, even if its impact is somewhat impaired.
Coda
To those unfamiliar with Miller’s work, it probably bears reiterating that his 
works do not contain a simple and unremitting negativity. Instead, they are replete 
with images of his exuberance and enjoyment of life. His optimism, his humor, his
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exaggerations differentiate him from many Modernists wdio betrayed little hope for the 
future, little love for the present, and, as Miller accused, buried themselves in the dead 
dust of books. Change, in such a desperate climate, would just not be worth the 
effort, and Miller spurns such despair.
One might expect that such a figure worthy of academic consideration, but 
there has been little published, especially in the last ten years. On the centennial of 
Miller's birth (1991), two biographies were published. In the years since, works by 
Miller and on Miller have come out, but generally outside academic circles.* Ronald 
Gottesman published a collection of critical essays on Miller in 1992 but of the thirty- 
six contributions no more than seven were recent. In the intervening years, at best a 
handful of studies have been produced.
For some 30 years,® Miller exemplified the rejected artist—just as Van Gogh 
had in the last decades of the nineteenth century—though he did not always live up to 
his ideals.N evertheless, he represented the artist committed to his or her work, the 
bohemian artist who will not bend, who will never sell-out. Such an attitude is visible 
in Miller's veneration, throughout his life, of the little person, the ignored artist whose
* Roger Jackson has published works by Miller as well as pieces on Miller but 
these are rarely academic. James Decker's just published analysis of Miller's prose is 
an exception, being an abbreviated version of his dissertation on Miller.
® From first publication of Cancer in 1934, in Paris, until final publication, in 
America, in 1961.
Poet Kermeth Patchen, approached about contributing an article to a book of 
praise of Henry Miller, wrote to Miller that the people organizing the venture- 
published as The Happy Rock—v/ere sycophants, just the sort of people to be avoided. 
The biographies of Miller by Dearborn and Ferguson depict a man caught between his 
own ideals, his desire for recognition, and his struggle for survival, an ominous 
combination.
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work is niled with passion, vision, but who never reaches a wide audience, for one 
reason or another, generally from avoidance of what is currently fashionable. In a way 
paralleling his "oppressors," those concerned only with "the great men," Miller rarely 
concerned himself with the famous figures, but instead the ones not quite famous, 
nearly forgotten, even (or especially) those who have no chance at recognition. Albert 
Camus says somewhere that it is the job of the thinking people not to be on the side 
of the executioners. For Miller, most people of his era acted in the interests of the 
executioners, and the ones being executed were people like him, the little guys who 
yearned for an alternative way of life, people he felt called upon to defend, 
"convinced," as Benjamin asserts a historian must be, "that even the dead will not be 
safe from the enemy" if the other side succeeds in imposing its values, interpretations 
{Illuminations 255). Miller's works can be read, consequently, as a record of his 
struggle, as a sort of Everyman.
Miller attempts to provoke, on the part of his readers, a general rejection of 
currently accepted values, especially relating to a certain utilitarian notion widespread 
in Western culture that denies the value of pleasure as a value in itself. Max Weber 
writes, "the reason for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensual 
and emotional elements in culture and in religion [is] because they are of no use 
toward salvation and promote sentimental illusion and idolatrous sensations" (105). In 
his works. Miller's depictions of sex and sexuality expose people's fantasies as well as 
their fears, just as his calls for a radical change in society did. A society where 
pleasure is denied a central role, when it is not actually repressed, is a life-denying 
society for Miller. Miller challenges readers to seek out the life more abundant.
People dare not hope for a change which will remove them from servitude—to an
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economic system as well as to a puritanical sexual morality—for fear that they will lose 
the little Areedom they have and for fear of the freedom they might gain, for then, as 
Miller pointed out, they would be forced to discover for themselves wdiat it is they 
wish to do with their lives.
Those who would criticize Miller for not drawing a picture of the new world 
he wishes to see replace the one already in existence, for not outlining a solution to 
the current dilemma, would, if he were to do so, charge him with depicting, what in 
these jaded times has come to be associated with failure, a utopia. As we saw in the 
last chapter, he was not afraid of being utopian, for better and for worse. Miller, 
however, should be read both for his critiques and for his love of his world. He saw 
possibilities everywhere, but he believed that radical changes had to come about first. 
Though often disappointed in people, he rarely despaired of them, believing that if 
they had the courage at last they could effect the changes becoming more and more 
necessary in an inhuman capitalist-industrialist world.
He was out of step with his times, both ahead of them and behind them. He
knew something of what had been lost and something of what had to be gained back,
though he also recognized that the forms alone would never be enough. He
understood, as we saw earlier, that people had to begin to perceive the driving forces.
James Kunstler, in concluding The Geography o f Nowhere, writes;
The coming decades are still bound to be difficult. We will have to 
replace a destructive economy of mindless expansion with one that 
consciously respects earthly limits and human scale. To begin doing 
that, we'll have to reevaluate some sacred ideas about ourselves. We'll 
have to give up our fetish for extreme individualism and rediscover 
public life. In doing so, we will surely rediscover public manners and 
some notion of common good. We will have to tell some people, in 
some cases what they can and cannot do with their land. (275).
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We will have to leam, he adds, "to live locally" (275). We must, in short, move 
beyond this capitalist system that Miller so much decried, move beyond the era of free 
market, and realize that people have responsibilities to others, that a "free market" 
does not exist in a vacuum and without repercussions on others." Such a system will 
be accused of being "socialist" because it will be a system that acknowledges 
responsibilities not just to business interests but to public interests—and not simply a 
monolithic public such as "The American People," which does not exist, but one 
which acknowledges diversity of interests, talents, hopes.
"What is it that people fear?" Miller asks in The A ir-Conditioned Nightmare:
What they don't understand. The civilized man is not a whit different 
from the savage in this respect. The new always carries with it the 
sense of violation, of sacrilege. What is dead is sacred; what is new, 
that is, different, is evil, dangerous, or subversive. (172)
We have to change. Miller argues repeatedly, if we are to be happy, if we are to live
comfortably in this world, with other nations. As the American Century, as many
have called it, comes to an end, these issues that have weighed on us will have to be
dealt with, profoundly, if America and the West are to play a positive and powerful
role in making the twenty-first century a century for people. Miller, in his attempts to
free himself, was calling for just such a change.
" "Free Market" can also be seen as yet another misnomer at this stage of 
capitalism. The market is "free" if you have enough money to participate, to compete 
on a larger than local level. Locally-owned stores have largely disappeared from the 
American landscape and are in grave danger of doing so, where they have not already 
done so, in Europe.
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